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LE SULTAN

ET

LE PACHA D'ÉGYPTE.

PAR

M. DAVID URQUHART.

TRADUIT DE L'ANGLAIS.

> Rien ne changea dans le caractère et les vues de notre politique extérieure. Nous cherchions à avoir partout la paix et à faire des acquisitions sans guerre. Nous n'ajoutions pas foi à l'amitié de ceux dont les intérêts ne s'accordaient pas avec les nôtres, et nous ne perdions aucune occasion de leur nuire sans manquer ostensiblement aux traités.
>
> (KARAMZIN, *Hist. de Russie*, t. XI, p. 31.)

PARIS.

LIBRAIRIE DE P. DUFART,

RUE DES SAINTS-PÈRES, N° 1.

1839.

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PRÉFACE

DE LA TROISIÈME ÉDITION ANGLAISE.

En publiant de nouveau cet écrit sur les affaires de l'Égypte, de la date d'octobre 1834, je me crois autorisé à penser que la sanction du temps lui donne aujourd'hui une valeur nouvelle.

Après la convention de Kutahieh, les hommes d'État aux connaissances et aux jugements desquels étaient confiées les destinées du monde, croyaient qu'une paix durable avait été rétablie en Orient, une paix due à leur politique et accomplie par leurs efforts. J'ai osé alors protester contre cette conviction. J'ai déclaré que ce repos n'était pas une paix; que leur politique, comme leurs efforts, n'y avaient été pour rien, si ce n'est pour accomplir les vœux

de la Russie. Cinq années d'alarmes ont depuis confirmé ma protestation et démontré leurs erreurs. Aucun mérite n'est dû à ceux qui ont vu juste dans une question si claire et si simple; mais de l'autre côté, la réprobation de l'Europe doit peser sur les gouvernements de l'Occident qui se sont montrés si peu clairvoyants et si fort au-dessous de leur mission.

Enfin la guerre éclate entre le sultan et son vassal, et le gouvernement de la France vient, après en avoir reçu la nouvelle, demander à la Chambre dix millions pour armer une escadre. Le gouvernement français croit donc cette escadre nécessaire; mais cette nécessité n'aurait-elle pas dû être anticipée? Le gouvernement veut employer la force pour maintenir le *statu quo*, et attend que le *statu quo* ait cessé pour se donner cette force. Le gouvernement français veut maintenir le *statu quo;* il a donc

aujourd'hui les mêmes vues qu'en 1833. Il y a donc ressemblance parfaite entre la politique du jour et la politique du passé. Les paroles prononcées par le président du conseil sont exactement celles que la France et l'Angleterre firent entendre avant chacune des violences ou des perfidies dont l'empire ottoman fut l'objet de la part de ces puissances, et l'escadre votée par la Chambre pour le maintien de l'empire ottoman, ira, dirigée par la Russie, préparer par quelque nouveau Navarin, une nouvelle descente sur le Bosphore!

Mais la commission de la Chambre a fait justice de la politique passée du gouvernement français, comme d'un non-sens, dont on déguise à peine le ridicule par deux mots latins. M. le rapporteur de la commission de 1839 s'exprime en ces termes :

« A quoi tient la faiblesse actuelle, la « faiblesse plus grande qu'elle ne devrait

« être naturellement, de ces deux moitiés « de l'Orient, et le péril où leur situation « met l'Europe? aux deux actes qui, en « 1833, ont réglé cette situation, aux deux « actes qui la constituent encore aujour- « d'hui, l'arrangement de Kutahieh et le « traité d'Unkiar-Skelessi.

« Que fait, en effet, le premier de ces « actes, messieurs? il laisse les deux parties « mécontentes, l'une de ce qu'elle a cédé, « l'autre de ce qu'elle n'a pas obtenu; il « n'est qu'une trêve imposée par l'Eu- « rope, une suspension d'armes qui ne ter- « mine rien, et qui, tenant l'Égypte et la « Porte sous la menace perpétuelle d'une « nouvelle guerre, engendre pour chacune « tous les inconvénients d'une situation « précaire que le premier événement peut « bouleverser.

« L'arrangement du Kutahieh rend la « situation de l'Orient précaire, le traité

« d'Unkiar-Skelessi la rend périlleuse pour « l'Europe. Il stipule l'intervention russe « en cas de guerre, il fait de la Russie « l'auxiliaire naturelle, convenue de la « Porte. Que la guerre éclate donc entre « la Porte et l'Égypte, la Russie peut inter- « venir, ses escadres reparaître devant « Constantinople; au moment où je vous « parle, elles sont peut-être à l'entrée du « Bosphore, attendant le premier coup de « canon sur l'Euphrate. Voilà le péril de la « situation de l'Orient pour l'Europe. Il est « dans l'intervention russe; il est dans le « traité d'Unkiar-Skelessi, qui la prévoit et « la stipule.

« On a lieu de s'étonner que, depuis six « ans que cette situation dure, la France, « l'Autriche, l'Angleterre, n'aient rien fait « pour la changer. Cela seul indiquerait, au « besoin, la mollesse et l'incertitude des réso- « lutions et de la politique de ces puissances. »

Il continue :

« Ainsi un arrangement fragile que cha-
« cune des deux parties a intérêt à rompre,
« et qui peut être brisé sans qu'il soit man-
« qué à aucun engagement positif; et à la
« suite de cette rupture, l'intervention
« probable de la Russie, stipulée par un
« traité, une nouvelle occupation, par cette
« puissance, de Constantinople et des Dar-
« danelles, avec toutes les conséquences
« qu'elle peut entraîner et qu'il est impos-
« sible de calculer. Voilà, messieurs, ce
« qui constitue cette paix, ce *statu quo* de
« l'Orient, que la diplomatie européenne
« fait vivre depuis six ans. »

Il ajoute :

« Parce que la paix et le *statu quo* du
« monde peuvent en dépendre. »

Mais la paix du monde n'en dépend que parce que l'on veut bien qu'elle en dépende, et parce que l'on ne sait pas voir que cette

paix et ce *statu quo* favorisent exclusivement l'intérêt de la Russie. Pourquoi les affaires de la Turquie nous tiennent-elles en suspens? c'est qu'elles peuvent à tout instant fournir un prétexte à une occupation russe; c'est donc une question diplomatique européenne et non turque, qui doit se traiter entre Saint-Pétersbourg, Londres et Paris, et qui cesse de présenter des dangers pour la Turquie, du moment où elle est considérée sous ce point de vue.

On est d'accord que sur cette question la France a eu une politique sans but, sans idée et sans résultat; qu'elle a employé ses ressources et ses forces à faire ce qui est contraire à ses intérêts, à ses intentions, à son honneur, à ses déclarations; à viser à des fins impossibles, à croire à des choses qui n'existent pas. On est convenu que, semblable à un homme dans les ténèbres et conduit par une main ennemie, la poli-

tique de la France erre et ne marche pas, s'agite et n'avance pas, et n'est sûre de parvenir que là où elle ne voulait pas arriver.

Puis, au moment où ces vérités sont hautement proclamées, on procède gravement à la répétition du passé que l'on paraissait répudier. En effet, dans le rapport à la Chambre où sont signalés ces funestes égarements, ne voit-on pas reparaître précisément les pensées qui ont produit le traité de juillet 1826? Dans les paroles du président du conseil, ne retrouve-t-on pas tout au long la politique de 1833? A quoi donc sert l'expérience, si l'on n'apprend à distinguer les erreurs que pour les répéter avec plus d'aplomb et d'exactitude?

Dans la crise qui nous surprend après six ans d'attente, la France se trouve donc au point où elle était lorsqu'elle signa le traité qui amena la guerre de 1828, où elle était lorsqu'eut lieu l'occupation du Bos-

phore et le premier partage de l'empire ottoman à Kutahieh; et elle n'en continue pas moins à parler simultanément de conserver l'empire ottoman et de maintenir le *statu quo*, d'arrêter les empiétements de la Russie et de se concerter avec elle. Elle n'a donc pas compris que l'empire ottoman ne peut être maintenu s'il est divisé en deux parties hostiles, et que la Russie ne peut être arrêtée par la France, tant que la France apparaît en Orient comme l'alliée de ses injustices.

Le rapport de la commission également remarquable par l'habileté de l'analyse que par l'ineptie des conclusions, recommande, par une déplorable inconséquence, la politique dont il démontre l'erreur et dont il dénonce les dangers, et la Chambre l'accueille avec une approbation et une adhésion universelle. Cependant une semaine s'écoule, la discussion s'ouvre, et une ré-

probation non moins universelle vient frapper ce projet de *statu quo* qui, huit jours auparavant, était unanimement applaudi. L'éloquence poétique et les calculs commerciaux flétrissent également le rêve d'un empire arabe [1]; pas une voix ne se fait entendre qui ne dénonce la perfidie de la Russie, et sur la question, de toutes la plus grave, celle de la vitalité de l'empire ottoman, des paroles inaccoutumées retentissent. Cette vitalité est proclamée avec force aussi bien par un ministre [2] que par le chef du parti légitimiste et le chef du parti libéral, et déjà leurs voix ont

[1] Même M. de Carné, parlant de l'idée d'un empire arabe, avoue que ce n'était qu'un des palliatifs pour prévenir la domination anglaise en Égypte. (Voyez *la Revue des Deux-Mondes*, du 15 juillet.)

[2] La réplique de M. Villemain exprimait les franches convictions de l'homme, mais la parole (l'arrière-pensée) qui lui échappa vers la fin indique les convictions pénibles de son poste.

eu un écho en Angleterre; elles réveilleront au fond du sérail des sympathies depuis long-temps engourdies, et à l'heure qu'il est, elles jettent l'inquiétude dans le cabinet de Saint-Pétersbourg, qui voit la France prête à lui échapper.

Il y a quatre ans, un Français [1] désespérant de son pays, qu'il voyait asservi à la Russie, tourna ses yeux vers l'Angleterre et lui offrit l'avantage et la fortune de ses connaissances; à mon tour, voyant mon pays bien plus asservi encore à cette influence fatale, je tourne mes yeux vers la France. Une même pensée a présidé à

[1] M. Blacque, rédacteur du *Courrier de Smyrne*, ensuite rédacteur du *Moniteur ottoman*, l'un des hommes les plus remarquables de ce siècle. La Russie lui offrit, par l'entremise de l'amiral français, 50,000 roubles pour la suppression d'un seul article, sans pouvoir l'obtenir. Son imprimerie fut fermée par des soldats français. La Russie lui offrit telles conditions qu'il voudrait dicter pour entrer à son service, il refusa. Retournant en Europe, il mourut subitement à Malte.

l'espoir de mon ami comme au mien. La résolution de l'une de ces deux puissances doit amener celle de l'autre ; il suffit donc de la détermination de l'une ou de l'autre, pour prévenir le mal qui les menace toutes deux.

L'espoir de voir la France prendre une position digne d'elle, et salutaire pour l'humanité et l'Europe, je le puise dans l'intelligence de ses hommes d'État. Puisse le changement heureux qui vient de se manifester dans leurs dispositions prévenir à temps les désastres qui nous menacent. Puisse-t-il prévenir l'arrivée d'un nouveau secours russe dans le Bosphore, et forcer le gouvernement français à se séparer de la Russie, aussi bien que de la politique dictée par cette puissance. Puisse la sympathie de la France apporter à temps au sultan ce secours matériel qui, même à la dernière heure, résoudrait encore toutes

les difficultés! Les opinions émises dans la Chambre feront désormais peser sur le gouvernement une double responsabilité; il ne peut rester aveugle aux conséquences désastreuses pour lui-même, et peut-être fatales à la monarchie, du triomphe de la Russie.

Une collision entre la flotte turque et l'escadre française ou anglaise, tel est pour le moment le résultat que rêve la Russie, et qu'elle se promet de la continuation de l'état de lutte entre les deux parties de l'empire ottoman. L'intervention plus formelle de la diplomatie européenne entre le pacha et le sultan, en sera la suite nécessaire. Mais auparavant une nouvelle occasion de protéger Constantinople peut se présenter; alors on renouvellera le traité d'Unkiar-Skelessi avec quelques clauses de plus. On proposera l'hérédité à Méhémet-Ali, comme terme de la nouvelle convul-

en 1798, et qui devint alors le premier théâtre comme la principale cause de la grande lutte entre l'Angleterre et la France; l'Égypte, que la Russie lui offrit une seconde fois en 1807, comme le prix de l'occupation russe de Constantinople. Aux yeux donc de l'Angleterre, la France, pour participer au démembrement de l'empire ottoman, paraît s'associer à la politique de la Russie, qui vise ouvertement à ébranler les possessions asiatiques de l'Angleterre. Et cependant ces deux nations conservent l'une envers l'autre les allures d'alliées, et les peuples des deux côtés ne devinent pas l'avenir que leur préparent les actes coupables ou insensés de leurs gouvernements.

Tandis que le gouvernement français, sous une inspiration fatale, conduit la nation dans cette voie funeste, la nation même n'en reste pas moins dominée par une antipathie profonde pour la Russie, et

un instinct qui lui crie que les plus précieux intérêts de la France sont en contradiction directe avec les desseins de cet empire. La politique française marche donc aveuglément dans une direction à la fois contraire à ses intérêts et à ses sympathies. La faute, nous nous hâtons de le reconnaître, n'en est pas moins à l'Angleterre qu'à la France, à l'Angleterre qui de son côté méconnaît son devoir comme ses droits, en encourageant l'insulte. Mais le résultat n'en reste pas moins déplorable : la sympathie dont on s'était pris en Angleterre pour la France diminue tous les jours, et ce changement, qui est en lui-même une perte énorme pour les deux peuples, menace de ramener de longues guerres et de longs malheurs.

De son côté le Français ne soupçonnant pas les torts de son propre gouvernement, voit dans chaque acte de l'Angleterre un plan, un système arrêté. L'éloignement

pour la France qui reprend racine en Angleterre, il l'attribue à des desseins jaloux; frappé de voir le gouvernement anglais ne point entraver la Russie, il présume que quelque arrangement secret entre ces deux puissances dédommagera un jour l'Angleterre de l'abandon palpable de tous ses intérêts patents. Ce dédommagement, il ne le conçoit que dans un sens hostile aux autres grandes puissances; il soupçonne donc que l'Angleterre est au fond d'accord avec la Russie pour la chute de l'empire ottoman, dont elle se dédommagerait en s'emparant de l'Égypte. Ainsi l'Égypte est dans tout ceci le grand sujet d'alarme, au moins par les jalousies qu'elle réveille entre la France et l'Angleterre. La Russie a su tirer du vieillard d'Alexandrie et de son ambition des avantages égaux, peut-être, à ceux que lui a fournis la lutte de trente ans entre l'Angleterre et la France.

Ainsi ces deux nations se méfient et s'éloignent l'une de l'autre; chacune méconnaît et ses intérêts et les dispositions de sa voisine. Ainsi de jour en jour le trouble d'esprit, l'incertitude d'action augmentent, les vrais principes d'honneur, les sages instincts de nationalité s'effacent; le droit des gens disparaît, et à la fin ce sera à qui briguera mieux et payera plus cher la faveur de cette Russie, qui domine aujourd'hui et subjuguera à la fin l'Europe parce qu'elle sait prendre à son service quelques Européens habiles, et parce que profitant de l'insouciance des peuples, elle fait de leurs gouvernements mêmes les exécuteurs de ses propres desseins.

Si les faits qui se sont passés de nos jours et sous nos yeux ne suffisaient pas pour mettre en évidence ces vérités que nous ne cessons de proclamer, nous n'aurions qu'à renvoyer les incrédules au

témoignage, aux aveux de l'historien même de la Russie, qui, admis aux archives secrètes de l'empire, et travaillant sous les auspices de l'empereur Alexandre, ne croyait pas pouvoir passer sous silence le principe éternel de la diplomatie des Czars, qu'il rencontrait à chaque pas mis en pratique, et qu'il développe en ces termes : « Rien, » ce sont les paroles propres de M. Karamzin, « ne changea dans le carac-« tère et les vues de notre politique exté-« rieure. Nous cherchions à avoir partout « la paix, et à faire des acquisitions sans « guerre. Nous n'ajoutions pas foi à l'ami-« tié de ceux dont les intérêts ne s'accor-« daient pas avec les nôtres, et nous ne « perdions aucune occasion de leur nuire « sans manquer ostensiblement aux trai-« tés. »

(Karamzin, *Hist. de Russie,* t. XI, p. 31.)

Il y a de cela quelque temps, nous mé-

prisions la Russie, et nous traitions de visionnaire quiconque nous avertissait du danger; aujourd'hui, le visionnaire est celui qui soutient que la position n'est pas désespérée. Nous craignons les progrès de la Russie; mais, ne possédant pas d'hommes d'un savoir suffisant et d'un caractère assez décidé, nous n'avons aucuns moyens de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour les arrêter. La question se présente à nous ainsi : Ferons-nous la guerre à la Russie pour empêcher son triomphe, ou bien allons-nous devenir ses alliés pour neutraliser sa prédomination? Notre choix est évident, nous devenons ses alliés, dans l'idée d'adopter par là une décision qui lui sera hostile, tandis qu'en réalité nous tombons dans le piége qu'elle nous a tendu, et nous lui permettons, par notre coopération, de faire ce qu'elle n'aurait pu jamais mener à bout toute seule, et ce que nous nous pro-

posions justement d'empêcher. Les cabinets de l'Angleterre et de la France avaient toujours sur leurs lèvres l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'empire ottoman; chaque acte de violence ou de perfidie, chaque promesse trompeuse et chaque mesure de démembrement de leur part étaient toujours annoncés et introduits dans le monde sous la forme d'un désir sincère pour le maintien de la paix de l'Europe et de celle de la Turquie, comme indispensable pour la première. La Russie, de son côté, ne s'est jamais aussi servie d'autres paroles; en toute occasion, elle a exprimé, soutenu et répété jusqu'à satiété, combien il était désirable et religieusement nécessaire de maintenir entier et intact l'empire ottoman. Ainsi, pendant que les *actes* des deux cabinets témoignent d'un entier assentiment aux buts de la Russie, le *langage* de cette dernière présente la même harmo-

nie avec les intentions avouées de l'Europe.

La position actuelle de l'Angleterre vis-à-vis de la Russie a besoin d'être expliquée. Notre esprit insulaire, assez prompt à s'enflammer par une étincelle qui tombe dans son voisinage, est indifférent à ce qui se passe au loin; nos hommes d'État sont absorbés par des questions intérieures. Il est impossible de faire comprendre à un Anglais ces impressions de nationalité que ressent tout peuple qui a une frontière territoriale. Les chefs des partis, non seulement ne cherchent pas à profiter des questions extérieures pour obtenir des avantages parlementaires, mais s'opposent à toute discussion sur ces matières. Une exception eut lieu cependant; le gouvernement anglais, après avoir brûlé la flotte de la Porte, son alliée, avait achevé de mettre cet empire à la merci de son en-

nemi, en rompant toute relation avec lui. Un des chefs de l'opposition saisit cette occasion pour porter au gouvernement des coups rudes et sévères. Mais ces énergiques paroles, que blâmèrent-elles? la honte de trahir un allié? la démence de s'allier à son ennemi? Non, cet orateur reprocha au gouvernement de n'avoir pas à temps déclaré à la Porte qu'elle devait se soumettre aux volontés de la Russie, et de n'avoir pas proclamé que l'Angleterre ne pouvait, dans *aucun cas*, se mettre du côté de la Turquie. Les ministres qui sacrifièrent alors la Turquie étaient le duc de Wellington et sir R. Peel. L'homme d'État qui les attaquait parce qu'ils semblaient pencher vers l'Autriche, c'était lord Palmerston. Il devint ministre, et depuis ce jour la politique de l'Angleterre a invariablement été ce que la Russie aurait elle-même dicté, tandis que les pa-

roles du ministre des affaires étrangères furent ce qui pouvait le mieux la servir, car elles ne cessèrent d'indiquer des intentions opposées à ses actes.

Une illustration frappante de cette politique se trouve dans la conduite tenue au sujet du traité de commerce entre l'Angleterre et la Turquie. Ce traité, dont les bases avaient été posées de manière à faire cesser d'un coup l'influence russe en développant un immense commerce d'exportation du territoire ottoman, on le fit languir pendant trois années; réclamé par l'opinion publique et par quelques uns des collègues de lord Palmerston, le traité est enfin conclu, mais changé de telle sorte qu'il ne peut qu'embarrasser les relations qu'il devait simplifier, et hâter la catastrophe qu'il devait arrêter. Dans l'Asie centrale, sous prétexte que la Perse admet les conseils d'une puissance ennemie des in-

térêts anglais, l'Angleterre occupe des îles dans le golfe Persique, des positions en Arabie, sans tenir aucun compte du droit des gens. Mais alors, comment fera-t-elle désormais pour le faire respecter à l'égard des nations que la Russie attaque ou menace?

Le plus vif désir de la Russie est de faire oublier partout le respect du droit des gens et des principes d'honneur entre les grandes puissances. De même qu'elle s'est assujettie la Prusse et l'Autriche par la part qu'elle leur laissa prendre des dépouilles de la Pologne, de même elle cherche à s'assujettir la France et l'Angleterre en excitant leur désir de participer aux dépouilles de l'Orient. L'alliance si désirable de la France et de l'Angleterre ne peut se maintenir que sur le respect du droit des nations. Que l'un de ces deux gouvernements, et à plus forte raison tous

les deux, s'abandonnent à des actes d'injustice, et leur alliance n'est plus possible un seul instant, et dès lors le triomphe de la Russie est assuré.

Mais que ces deux puissances s'entendent, qu'elles adoptent la ligne invariable de la justice et du respect des droits de chacun, qu'elles réalisent le vœu de tous les esprits éclairés et généreux, qu'elles rétablissent l'unité de l'empire ottoman, et la Russie, qui prépare son vol pour la ville de Constantinople, la reine du monde, la Russie qui nous menace aujourd'hui d'une catastrophe qui n'a point sa pareille dans les annales du monde, qui marche à l'asservissement des peuples, non par la force, comme les anciens barbares, ses devanciers, mais par l'action des vices les plus hideux, cette Russie ne pourra faire un pas de plus. Vous la verrez alors, et sans long-temps attendre, retourner sur

elle-même le dard venimeux dont elle nous menace, et amener, par sa propre décomposition, la renaissance des peuples nombreux qu'elle a dégradés par sa domination.

POST-SCRIPTUM.

Londres, 20 juillet.

La mort du sultan Mahmoud est intervenue pendant le cours de la traduction et de l'impression de cet ouvrage; cependant le passage du sceptre ottoman, des mains de celui qui l'avait tenu pendant si long-temps, et avec tant d'énergie, entre les mains faibles et inexpérimentées d'un jeune monarque, n'a aucunement changé les relations du pacha d'Égypte vis-à-vis de son souverain, ni celles des puissances européennes vis-à-vis de l'empire turc.

La Turquie vient de subir une grave

perte, qui en est aussi une pour nous. Les traits du caractère du sultan défunt retracés dans notre ouvrage, sont exacts. Il réunissait, en effet, les dispositions les plus désirables pour l'Angleterre et l'Europe, si celles-ci eussent mérité sa confiance et compris leurs propres intérêts. Cependant, quoique par ces raisons, aussi bien que par des raisons personnelles, je regrette profondément la mort de ce monarque, je suis bien loin de croire que le changement ainsi survenu soit un mal irréparable ni un événement à redouter.

Dans un moment de si graves embarras et dangers, la mort du sultan, dans la personne duquel semblaient se concentrer tous les pouvoirs de l'État, toutes les espérances de l'Europe et tous les intérêts intérieurs de la Turquie, cette mort n'a produit ni bouleversement, ni alarmes; et un

jeune homme sans expérience a succédé tranquillement à l'empire, ce qui prouve que, malgré les raisonnements contraires de l'Europe, les anciennes traditions servant de base fondamentale à l'empire ottoman sont encore ce qu'elles ont été jusqu'ici. Poussé à bout, comme l'a dû être nécessairement le feu sultan par la conduite des puissances européennes, chargé de tous les désastres que l'aberration de l'Europe avait entassés sur la Turquie, impliqué dans un si grand nombre de malheureuses circonstances, les souvenirs de son règne avaient affaibli également et son autorité et les forces de l'État; mais aujourd'hui, sa disparition de la scène, tout en nous faisant subir une grave perte, nous offre seulement de nouveaux éléments pour la consolidation de la Turquie, et ouvre un champ libre au jeu des traditions de la race ottomane.

Le sultan Mahmoud est descendu dans la tombe au milieu des regrets de son peuple, malgré toute l'ombre qui s'était appesantie sur son règne. Son fils est monté sur le trône au milieu de paisibles témoignages d'espoir et de loyauté qu'un peuple sage et uni pouvait manifester, et au milieu de cette confiance modérée qu'un peuple prudent doit accorder comme encouragement à son jeune souverain au début de sa difficile et glissante carrière, et non telle qu'elle pouvait détruire dans son esprit le respect dû à la nation, respect qu'auraient mis en danger des acclamations démoralisatrices d'une popularité imméritée.

Le sultan Abdul-Medschid est monté sur le trône de son père, sans rien perdre de sa dignité, de ses droits, ni de ses prérogatives. Il a appelé autour de lui les hommes éminents par leur nationalité, leurs lumières et leur position sociale; et

l'observateur à distance a lieu d'être rassuré sur les éventualités d'un événement, considéré depuis long-temps par ceux dont la tâche et le devoir était de bien comprendre la situation politique des puissances, comme le terme de la dynastie ottomane et la dernière catastrophe de l'empire turc.

LE

SULTAN MAHMOUD

ET

MÉHÉMET-ALI-PACHA.

Depuis quatorze ans, c'est-à-dire depuis le commencement de la révolution grecque, les gouvernements d'Angleterre, de France et de Russie ont toujours paru diriger leurs relations et leur politique orientale d'après des vues et des intérêts parfaitement identiques. Partout et en toute occasion on les voit marcher sur la même ligne, concerter les mesures à prendre, échanger des assurances d'amitié et de bienveillance, rédiger des protocoles, signer des traités et employer tous les moyens à leur disposition, moraux, diplomatiques et militaires, pour l'accomplissement de leurs plans communs. Cependant, les intérêts de ces puissances, loin d'être les mêmes, sont directe-

ment opposés, le succès de leurs plans communs devient donc nécessairement nuisible à l'une ou à l'autre des parties contractantes. Cependant elles ne se sont alliées qu'avec une parfaite connaissance de cause de leur antagonisme, et il a été même le vrai motif de leur alliance. L'Angleterre et la France se sont jointes à la Russie pour arrêter sa prépondérance ; elle est entrée dans leur alliance pour les faire servir à ses projets. La base de la coalition n'était donc qu'une tricherie réciproque, son résultat le triomphe de la Russie, et comme chaque coup successif fut porté par les trois puissances réunies contre la Turquie, la Grèce, la Circassie, contre les droits de l'Angleterre et de la France, contre le but avoué de la coalition elle-même, les trois alliés se sont complimentés tour à tour et se sont fait complimenter par leurs peuples pour avoir conservé cette harmonie dans les intentions et cette unité dans les actes qui a été justement l'unique cause de leurs désastres, de leurs fautes, de leurs difficultés et de leurs dangers.

Le traité de protection imposé à la Porte par la Russie, a paru un moment avoir mis un terme

à cette monstrueuse union; l'Angleterre et la France firent des remontrances, des menaces, envoyèrent des flottes dans le Levant; la Russie répondit à leurs demandes, non seulement par la négative, mais d'une façon insolente. L'Europe et l'Orient paraissaient toucher au terme de l'émancipation.—Mais, hélas! on finit par subir les réponses insolentes, on retira les flottes, et les trois cours rentrèrent de nouveau dans leur unanimité accoutumée, c'est-à-dire dans un tel aveuglement et une servilité si parfaite de la part de l'Angleterre et de la France, que la Russie n'eut plus rien à désirer. L'alliance de l'Angleterre et de la France avec la Russie a donc ainsi amené le traité du 6 juillet, — la bataille de Navarin, — la guerre turco-russe, — le passage du Balkan, — le traité d'Andrinople, — un pas important dans la séparation de la Servie, de la Moldavie et de la Valachie de la Porte, — la cession des embouchures du Danube, — une position menaçante en Asie-Mineure, — la proscription de la Circassie, — la séparation totale de la Grèce, — la révolte de l'Égypte, — l'occupation des Dardanelles par les Russes, et tandis qu'ainsi le premier pas est

fait vers le démembrement de la Syrie et de l'Égypte, un traité d'alliance offensive (celui d'Unkiar-Skelessi) est conclu entre la Russie et la Turquie contre l'Angleterre et la France.

Tout cela ayant enfin soulevé les alarmes des deux alliés dociles, ils ont bien essayé de s'émanciper de leur liaison avec le troisième, mais, au bout du compte, ils ont fini par lui fournir seulement une occasion d'insulte et un moyen de les ramener à leur ancienne position coopératrice. Voilà quelle est la série des actes jusqu'ici accomplis par les trois alliés, alliés dans le but de soutenir l'empire ottoman et de conserver la paix en Orient, en renonçant solennellement à tout désir de conquête ou d'avantages exclusifs. Il est évident que l'Angleterre et la France ont dû, au commencement de ce rôle politique, se tromper dans leurs opinions comme dans leurs mesures, leur erreur se trouvant toujours profitable à la Russie; mais depuis qu'elles se sont réveillées de leur sommeil, qu'elles ont fait des remontrances, qu'elles ont résisté — pour retomber ensuite de nouveau dans leur obséquiosité, — le caractère même de leur coopération a changé,

et il ne leur est même plus possible de soutenir d'avoir été purement dupes, depuis qu'elles sont maintenant les simples instruments de la Russie.

A l'égard de cette partie du vaste sujet à laquelle nous consacrons les pages suivantes, il y a d'abord à remarquer que le schisme de l'empire ottoman, résultant de la révolte du pacha d'Égypte, forme une question infiniment plus importante que tous les événements qui l'ont précédé. La séparation de la Grèce, de la Valachie, de la Moldavie et de la Servie, la perte de plusieurs districts importants en Asie et en Europe, le traité d'Andrinople, l'indemnité de guerre imposée au sultan, la destruction de sa flotte, tout cela ne tendait qu'à diminuer sa puissance; mais sa puissance, ainsi réduite, n'était pas au moins mise davantage en péril que celle de tous les autres États de second ordre, dont l'intégrité se fonde sur le maintien de la paix générale et le respect mutuel des puissances européennes. Le schisme, au contraire, qui s'est déclaré dans le cœur de l'empire ottoman, depuis que l'Angleterre et la France ont refusé leur protection au sultan, ou plutôt depuis qu'elles ont créé ce schisme

et lui ont donné les moyens de devenir dangereux, a changé tout le caractère des relations du sultan avec la Russie et avec elles-mêmes. L'empereur Nicolas, en devenant le protecteur du sultan, se lie avec lui contre l'Angleterre et la France, puis il le force d'avoir recours à sa protection en amenant ces puissances à le menacer. Du moment que les choses se passent ainsi, nous voyons que la Russie a quadruplé ses forces en mettant le sultan dans la nécessité de ne s'appuyer que sur elle; nous la voyons tour à tour menacer l'Angleterre et la France, puis les ramener à ce même système de coopération qui a produit ces malheureux résultats.

Dans les événements précédents, l'unique source du mal ou du danger fut la malheureuse intervention de ces puissances; aujourd'hui, ce n'est que cette même intervention qui fait subsister le *statu quo*, prolonge le schisme fatal, crée toute la force de la Russie et toute la faiblesse des deux puissances, ses alliées. Cependant, comme il faut supposer que les ministres de ces deux peuples agissent au moins d'après leurs convictions consciencieuses et que la

source de leurs échecs ne se trouve donc que dans l'erreur, je vais m'occuper à exposer la fausseté des arguments qui servent de base à leur politique actuelle, savoir, à leur union avec la Russie pour prévenir la chute de l'empire ottoman, en y maintenant la paix intérieure. Les dangers intérieurs de la Turquie ont pris naissance d'abord dans les menaces, puis dans la protection étrangère. C'était à l'Angleterre et à la France à aller au-devant de ces menaces, et ce sont elles seules qui ont amené la protection étrangère. Mais le concert qui caractérise les actes des puissances alliées se montre-t-il également dans le secret du cabinet du Reiss-Effendi? La Russie s'y présente-t-elle aussi unie de but et de moyens avec ses alliés? Si non, alors mettons-nous seulement à sa place et examinons ce que nous autres, spectateurs inexpérimentés et à distance, nous dirions cependant en son nom. « La France, dirions-nous au sultan et à ses ministres, se prétend votre alliée, mais n'a-t-elle pas pris Alger, ne vous a-t-elle pas chassé autrefois de l'Égypte? Le démembrement de l'empire ottoman est donc son but, Méhémet-Ali n'est que son instrument. L'An-

gleterre ne vous a-t-elle pas refusé son appui contre un rebelle, à qui elle avait déjà proposé de se déclarer indépendant; d'ailleurs, n'est-elle pas l'alliée de la France, et comme telle, participatrice dans tous les projets de cette dernière? Est-ce que l'Angleterre pourrait s'aveugler tellement sur les intentions de sa plus proche voisine et souffrir un seul moment sa politique, si contraire aux déclarations communes des deux puissances, si elle n'agissait en cela qu'après mûre réflexion? » Le ministre de la Russie ajouterait : « Le possesseur d'Alger d'un côté et celui de Calcutta de l'autre ne cherchent qu'à partager ou à se disputer l'Égypte et l'Asie centrale, » et quoique d'ordinaire le sultan pût ne pas trop ajouter foi aux paroles de la Russie, cette fois-ci, cette dernière se présente avec des témoignages et des arguments trop évidents. Les actes des deux gouvernements et les opinions émises par la presse des deux pays [1], combinés ensemble par un interprète aussi habile que la Russie, ne pouvaient manquer d'inspirer au sultan la conviction que l'Angleterre et la France étaient ses ennemies,

[1] Il s'agit de l'année 1834.

et cette conviction seule a fait la force de la Russie et de Méhémet-Ali, le danger de la Turquie, de Constantinople et de l'Europe, c'était la conséquence inévitable de votre alliance avec la Russie, un résultat qu'on n'aurait pu atteindre par aucun autre moyen. Vous devez donc, par vos paroles et par vos intentions, démentir cette fausseté, et vous ne le pouvez que sous deux conditions, la première, en devenant conséquents avec vous-mêmes et en vous séparant de la Russie; la seconde, en prêtant votre appui au sultan et en l'empêchant désormais d'appeler à son secours contre un rebelle cette même puissance qui a rendu ce rebelle votre égal et qui n'a fait de vous et de lui que ses instruments.

Vous affectez de parler de l'indépendance de l'Égypte, et cependant le danger que vous redoutez, c'est la prise de Constantinople. Est-ce qu'un si complet changement a eu lieu dans l'équilibre politique pour que ce danger, qui a tant menacé l'Europe de la part du Nord, cette prise de Constantinople, envisagée depuis des siècles comme le plus grand des événements et des dangers, dût être amené par une force

née tout à coup et d'un côté où l'on ne s'y attendait guère? Si vous parlez de l'indépendance de l'Égypte, c'est qu'il ne peut être question d'un danger intérieur pour la Turquie de la part de l'Égypte, et si au contraire il y a danger, c'est une absurdité que l'indépendance égyptienne. Si vous ne craignez pas la révolte d'un vassal, mais l'invasion d'un ennemi, pourquoi hésitez-vous à protéger le pouvoir que vous déclarez vouloir défendre? Si vous redoutez la révolte d'un sujet contre le souverain légitime, cessez alors d'employer tous les moyens qui ne font qu'assurer le succès du rebelle. Mais que peut-on attendre de gens qui parlent autrement et pensent autrement, qui disent marcher dans une direction inverse à celle qu'ils suivent en effet, qui prétendent appuyer le sultan en faisant juste le contraire, qui affirment soutenir l'indépendance de la Turquie au moment où ils prêtent leur force à sa destruction, qui, enfin, ont contracté une alliance dans le but de tromper leur associé, et qui n'ont fait que changer sa position à leur propre désavantage. Vous avez doublement déplacé la question en écartant de la discussion la question exté-

rieure entre la Russie et la Turquie, et en traitant la question intérieure entre Méhémet-Ali et le sultan; vous êtes intervenus où vous n'aviez ni droit, ni connaissance de cause; en prétendant donc secourir le sultan, vous l'avez précipité seulement dans les bras du seul ennemi que vous eussiez à redouter, et en intervenant entre votre allié et son sujet pour préserver l'existence de l'un ou de tous les deux, vous les avez placés ainsi sur la même ligne par l'élévation de l'un, comme par l'abaissement de l'autre. Vous avez seulement égalisé les forces hostiles et tellement ajusté le poids des haines et les chances de péril, que de quelque côté que vous tourniez les yeux, n'importe où vous vous placiez dans ce cercle vicieux, votre esprit se trouvera également embarrassé et vos actes seront également funestes. Vous faites pis en empêchant le conflit que si vous le souffriez. Vous faites plus de mal en prolongeant l'existence de la dynastie ottomane, que si vous admettiez sa chute. Si Méhémet-Ali est capable de l'amener, vous n'avez aucun intérêt à le soutenir puisqu'il est la seule cause du péril. D'ailleurs, vous pouvez retarder, mais non pas empêcher la lutte

et vous ne la retarderez que jusqu'au moment où la Russie jugera convenable qu'elle éclate. Méhémet-Ali a outragé, depuis la convention de Kutaiah, et son souverain, et la France, et l'Angleterre : cependant il est soutenu par une erreur de ces puissances, qu'on ne peut expliquer que par leur conduite passée, et par l'une des deux hypothèses, ou que leurs ministres ont trahi les intérêts de leur pays et de leur honneur, ou qu'il y a eu chez eux ignorance entière des événements et erreur complète sur tous les faits.

Maintenant nous allons présenter quelques observations sur la révolte de Méhémet-Ali, et sur le caractère du sultan et de son vassal. Je m'efforcerai de faire envisager ce sujet sous un point de vue oriental, et en m'arrêtant principalement sur les circonstances qui peuvent être le plus faussement interprétées par les Européens, et sur les opinions qui sont de nature à être le plus méconnues par eux.

Les annales de l'empire ottoman depuis un grand nombre d'années sont remplies de révoltes de pachas qui, avec plus ou moins de moyens, pendant un temps plus ou moins long,

se sont soustraits à la domination de la Porte, ont formé des alliances avec l'étranger, ont envahi d'autres provinces, ont été considérés en dehors comme fondateurs de nouvelles dynasties, mais qui tous sans aucune exception ont fini par être vaincus. La cause de leur chute doit être attribuée à la coïncidence des intérêts de leurs peuples avec ceux de la Porte. Les pachas ne faisaient usage que des forces militaires qu'ils pouvaient acquérir au prix de trésors accumulés. L'oppression rendue nécessaire pour amasser ces trésors minait leur autorité à la suite des exactions exercées contre les masses. Plusieurs de ces rebelles avaient de grands talents, d'éminentes vertus, —mais un sort commun les atteignit tous et leur chute fut toujours considérée comme une délivrance, par les peuples qu'ils avaient gouvernés.

Les seules exceptions à cette règle nous sont offertes par la Grèce et par la Servie. Mais en Grèce, ce n'est pas un pacha, c'est un peuple qui se souleva. Les Grecs ont combattu pour leur indépendance, et l'ont conquise. Elle ne leur offre aujourd'hui, à la vérité, que peu d'avantages; elle peut être précaire, grâce aux

théories européennes, — mais elle a été maintenue en dépit de toutes les forces ottomanes, car toute une population était intéressée à l'issue de la lutte. De même en Servie, c'est la masse du peuple qui a été intéressée au combat, et qui est encore intéressée à la sage indépendance qui, tout en garantissant les Serviens contre les abus des administrateurs turcs, fait considérer leur pays comme une partie de l'empire ottoman, et le fait jouir de la simplicité de son administration, de ses impôts modérés, et d'une protection générale.

Quant à l'Égypte, nous y trouvons au contraire toutes les circonstances qui ont invariablement caractérisé une révolte de pacha : le peuple entièrement désintéressé à la lutte, et le pacha ne se maintenant uniquement que par le sabre. Les forces militaires de Méhémet-Ali sont bien plus considérables que celles d'aucun autre chef qui ait comme lui convoité l'indépendance; ses ressources sont plus grandes; il a des troupes disciplinées; il possède une marine; il a été dirigé et appuyé par une puissance étrangère; il a été heureux; et il a jusqu'à présent, par la supériorité de sa flotte, empêché

toute agression. Mais nonobstant toute supériorité, la base intérieure de son pouvoir est précisément la même que celle de tant de ses prédécesseurs. Il épuisera et s'aliénera ses provinces par les exigences de sa position.

Possédant l'Égypte, ce pays d'une fertilité presque inépuisable, il se trouva cependant dans la nécessité d'étendre sa domination, et lorsque la Syrie, Damas, et l'ancien royaume de Cilicie furent joints à ses domaines, lorsqu'il eut vaincu son souverain et envahi l'Asie-Mineure, il lui fut toujours impossible de licencier un seul soldat; de nouvelles levées, de nouvelles conscriptions furent faites; — il lui fallut frapper de nouveaux impôts, et malgré cela il est à présent aussi mal à son aise dans ses vastes possessions, qu'il l'a été auparavant en Égypte. D'autres pachas insurgés ont eu de plus grands succès que lui, ils ont touché à Constantinople, ils sont entrés par la Porte du Salut, ont précipité du trône, ou y ont fait monter des sultans. Si les victoires de Homs et de Koniah étaient de nouveaux incidents dans l'histoire de cet empire; *si la résistance à l'autorité voulait dire révolte en Turquie*, alors certainement,

mais seulement alors, Méhémet-Pacha pourrait être envisagé comme un prétendant à la couronne.

La position de Méhémet est donc identiquement la même que celle des autres chefs qui, pendant quelque temps, se sont maintenus contre la Porte et ont donné lieu de croire, suivant leurs forces et leurs rapports européens, à de grands résultats. La dynastie actuelle a occupé le trône pendant six cents ans, et non seulement aucune rébellion n'a réussi contre elle, mais aucun rebelle n'avait jamais levé le bras dans le but de la détruire. Et cependant elle n'a point eu d'armée permanente; elle n'a pas été appuyée par une haute et puissante aristocratie. Son gouvernement ne possédait ni les moyens pratiques d'autorité, ni le pouvoir habituel chez les autres gouvernements européens. Quoique cependant la dynastie ottomane ait montré à travers tant de générations la capacité de gouverner, et de gouverner sans lutte intestine un empire si vaste et des populations si diverses, l'opinion de l'Europe à son égard n'est pas moins restée toujours la même qu'autrefois. —

Nous ne comprenions jamais comment la Turquie existait, et nous soutenions que cela ne pouvait durer ainsi. — Nous avions vu quelquefois les neuf dixièmes de l'empire ottoman dans un état de révolte, et cependant tout cela n'a pas abouti à mettre un terme à son existence, et la cause en est que là où les liens du gouvernement sont le moins ostensibles, leur influence réelle et secrète n'en est que plus sûre. —Le gouvernement, en Turquie, conserve l'attitude d'un juge, et n'intervient jamais comme administrateur : ce ne sont donc point les principes d'après lesquels il agit, ni les lois qu'il porte qui font naître une résistance à son autorité; et les troubles qu'occasionnent les abus, les violences ou l'ambition des gouverneurs de province (car la révolte n'y provient jamais directement du peuple), troubles qui paraissent à l'Europe une attaque contre les prérogatives du sultan et un ébranlement des bases de l'empire, ces troubles ne produisent pas en réalité même son affaiblissement. Ces violences partielles ne font plutôt que diriger davantage les yeux et les affections des peuples vers le chef de l'État, en qui se

concentrent tous les éléments flottants de l'autorité gouvernementale, de la simplicité judiciaire et de la sanction religieuse. — Méhémet-Ali (car il ne s'agit pas ici des Arabes ni du peuple égyptien), Méhémet-Ali ne diffère donc sous aucun rapport des autres pachas révoltés, excepté que les progrès de la diplomatie européenne et russe sont parvenus à le rendre plus dangereux, en rabaissant le pouvoir du sultan, et qu'il est à même de profiter des erreurs qui ont dominé l'opinion à ce sujet en Europe.

Toute l'histoire de l'empire ottoman prouve qu'une position comme celle de Méhémet-Ali doit nécessairement provoquer une hostilité implacable contre la Porte.

Mais en supposant que cette hostilité ne soit pas une conséquence nécessaire de cette position, dans des circonstances ordinaires, ne doit-elle pas l'être aujourd'hui, qu'elle est si avantageuse pour la Russie, quand c'est la Russie qui protége le sultan, et peut si aisément travailler l'esprit de deux hommes dont toute son influence ne saurait modérer la haine réciproque? En même temps qu'il est de l'intérêt de la Russie d'entretenir le schisme entre

Méhémet-Ali et le sultan, il n'est pas dans ses vues d'amener entre eux une rupture avant qu'elle y soit préparée.

On admet que la réconciliation de Méhémet-Ali et du sultan est nécessaire à l'indépendance de cet empire. Est-ce en rendant Méhémet-Ali indépendant qu'on atteindrait ce but? La proposition est absurde de quelque côté qu'on l'envisage. Une fiction de mots pourrait-elle changer le fait? Une séparation apparente pourra-t-elle ôter à chacun des rivaux le pouvoir de se nuire réciproquement? Fera-t-elle cesser le désir et le besoin d'une mutuelle destruction? Ajoutera-t-elle à la considération du sultan aux yeux de sa nation? Affaiblira-t-elle les liens forts et anciens, les affections, les préjugés et les intérêts qui attachent les habitants de ces provinces à la Porte, et lui imposent le devoir de faire d'incessantes tentatives pour les recouvrer?

La faiblesse du sultan est également nécessaire à l'existence de Méhémet-Ali, qu'il soit nominalement indépendant ou nominalement sujet. De même, la destruction de Méhémet sera dans tous les cas le premier but des efforts

du sultan, — but auquel il sacrifiera et a déjà sacrifié ses plus chers intérêts, et jusqu'à l'indépendance extérieure de son empire.

Mais supposons l'impossible. Admettons que Méhémet-Ali soit entièrement détaché de la Porte et disposé à vivre en paix et en bonne amitié avec le sultan. Supposons que la Russie se tienne tranquille derrière le Dniéper, et n'exerce aucune espèce d'influence sur la Turquie : nous soutenons que même alors il sera de toute impossibilité de maintenir la paix entre les deux rivaux turcs.

Méhémet-Ali a non seulement formé un état militaire au-dessus des moyens de son pays, mais il a eu recours à des mesures fiscales de perception qui ont augmenté les effets désastreux de son système d'impôts. Pendant qu'il est obligé d'augmenter ses dépenses, la production du sol diminue. Il est donc obligé de faire exister son armée et sa flotte par elles-mêmes. Pour se maintenir chez soi, il est obligé de courir après de nouvelles conquêtes au dehors, et où peut-il diriger ses vues si ce n'est à Bagdad ou vers l'Asie-Mineure? Méhémet-Ali est forcé d'être conquérant. Il a sur pied une ar-

mée supérieure à celle du sultan. Il gouverne un pays désaffectionné où la plus faible invasion rallie tous les mécontents et où l'idée qu'on se forme de sa puissance forme sa seule sauvegarde. Il est donc obligé d'attaquer les domaines du sultan comme l'unique proie à sa portée. Il les attaquera, comme l'unique moyen d'éviter l'invasion de ses propres provinces.

D'autre part, le sentiment du droit et d'une injure à venger, porte le sultan à attaquer Méhémet-Ali, à fomenter contre lui les mécontentements et à en profiter, et cette nécessité morale n'est pas moins impérieuse pour le sultan que la nécessité matérielle l'est pour Méhémet. Mais en supposant que cette cause n'existe point, en supposant l'Égypte séparée de la Porte depuis un temps immémorial, en supposant le sultan animé des dispositions les plus amicales envers Méhémet-Ali, en supposant que la tentation produite par sa faiblesse en Égypte n'existe point : en supposant encore la nullité de toute influence russe, même alors l'hostilité forcée de Méhémet-Ali devra encore produire une hostilité contre lui. — Les deux rivaux ne peuvent point coexister depuis que

l'un d'eux est préparé à attaquer l'autre [1]. L'Angleterre et la France interviendront alors comme la Russie le jugera convenable à son avantage. Mais si elles le font avec l'idée de prévenir toute contestation entre les adversaires, nous n'hésitons pas à déclarer notre conviction qu'elles feraient mieux alors de tout abandonner à la Russie. Il est absurde de vouloir concilier des intérêts inconciliables; de vouloir renforcer un empire par une union de parties nécessairement hostiles. Méhémet-Ali et le sultan n'ont cessé de combattre que par épuisement, semblables à ces gladiateurs couchés sans mouvement dans l'arène, parce qu'ils n'ont pas la force de s'atteindre et de se détruire. Il y a entre eux cette différence que la vie chez l'un est toute en dehors, tandis que chez l'autre, tout meurtri et tout étourdi qu'il est, elle se trouve trop forte et trop profonde pour qu'elle puisse être atteinte par l'épée de son adversaire.

L'Angleterre et la France sont puissantes;

[1] Ceci fut écrit au moment où tous ceux dont la pénétration et le jugement décidaient de la politique de l'Europe croyaient avoir définitivement arrangé l'affaire égyptienne.

mais il n'y a pas de puissance sans intelligence. Elles peuvent, si elles le veulent, détruire facilement et le sultan et Méhémet-Ali, mais elles ne peuvent maintenir l'un d'eux que par la destruction de l'autre. Elles feraient mieux d'abattre le sultan et de mettre à sa place Méhémet-Ali que de livrer l'empire à la Russie, conséquence nécessaire de la politique impraticable qui veut concilier deux intérêts inconciliables, politique qui ne sert qu'à les mettre en hostilité avec tous les deux.

Heureusement, elles ont eu le temps de se convaincre de cette vérité par les faits et l'expérience. Quels pas ont-elles pu faire faire à Méhémet-Ali pour régler un article quelconque des stipulations de Koniah? Et cependant combien n'est-il pas facile à l'Angleterre de commander à Méhémet-Ali? Sa volonté est une loi pour lui, si elle connaît seulement la manière de l'exprimer. Ce n'est pas que sa puissance puisse faire changer les intérêts de Méhémet, mais elle peut influencer sa conduite. L'Angleterre peut donc prescrire à Méhémet de faire telle ou telle concession, mais elle ne saurait maîtriser à temps les événements à moins de les

faire naître, de se préparer à les mettre à profit et d'agir avec connaissance de cause et avec un système arrêté.

Et comment voudrait-on prévenir une collision? Par des menaces? et de quoi, — d'une vengeance *ex post facto?* Devrons-nous entretenir des flottes sur les côtes de la Syrie aussi long-temps qu'une mésintelligence indéfinie nous prescrira de veiller sur une indépendance destinée à s'établir plus tôt ou plus tard? Et que peuvent faire des flottes? Une armée sur le Taurus et une autre à Bagdad pourraient seules assurer l'inaction des adversaires, et ce n'est que lorsque ces deux armées auront été établies en Turquie qu'on pourrait parler d'empêcher les hostilités [1].

Si donc la France et l'Angleterre sont disposées à prendre une part utile dans les affaires de la Turquie, elles doivent opter positivement

[1] Maintenant que le sultan est plus fort sur mer et Ibrahim sur terre, on envoie une escadre pour protéger la Syrie contre son maître légitime, mais non pas une armée pour protéger l'Asie-Mineure contre un rebelle, et voilà ce qui s'appelle soutenir l'empire ottoman, voilà le mot et la fin de votre *statu quo*.

entre Méhémet-Ali et le sultan. Toutefois, avant d'entrer dans cette question, nous sommes forcés d'observer que cette nécessité de choisir entre Méhémet-Ali et le sultan n'est imposée qu'uniquement par la position et l'attitude de la Russie, car autrement nous pourrions tranquillement permettre au sultan et à Méhémet-Ali de vider leurs querelles entre eux, comme beaucoup d'autres l'ont fait avant eux; mais comme la question est posée, tout mouvement implique l'Europe entière. L'Angleterre, la France et plus solennellement encore la Russie, ont déclaré au sultan que toute démarche qu'il entreprendrait contre son vassal compromettrait sa couronne et la paix de l'Europe. Si la paix de l'Europe dépend d'une collision entre ces deux musulmans, il faut qu'il y ait des intérêts opposés en Europe pour les favoriser. Il faut que les chances de succès se balancent. — Nous, nous sommes certainement une de ces parties, engagée, compromise, intéressée, menacée, — et serait-il possible, puisque la lutte peut éclater par la seule rupture entre Méhémet-Ali et le sultan, puisqu'il faut qu'elle soit amenée par cet événement, que nous n'ayons

point encore choisi notre champion sur ce champ de bataille et qu'au lieu de concerter nos plans avec lui nous ne pensions qu'à effectuer une réconciliation entre les deux adversaires, ce qui ne fait réellement que prolonger le danger et augmenter les chances de la défaite. Mais si nous nous décidons à prévenir le mal pour le détruire dans son principe, si nous nous décidons à attaquer la Russie, si nous nous décidons à lui prescrire de ne plus s'immiscer dans les affaires de la Turquie, — alors certes, nous serons dispensés de choisir entre le sultan et le pacha, et du moment que l'Angleterre et la France auront senti leur importance et leur dignité comme nations, — quand même elles ne seraient pas arrivées à une conclusion satisfaisante au sujet de la Turquie, dès ce moment, tout péril aura cessé.

La question entre Méhémet-Ali et le sultan ne repose en Europe que sur des considérations *personnelles*. Nous croyons, au contraire, que les considérations les plus importantes et les plus décisives surgissent de la *position* elle-même et surtout des habitudes, des intérêts et des vœux des populations orientales, considé-

rations qu'un Européen est fort enclin à négliger d'abord, parce qu'il ne les entend pas, puis parce que son jugement ne saurait se former à cet égard que sur des notions européennes. Nous commencerons donc à comparer les caractères des deux rivaux, en tant qu'ils ont réfléchi sur leurs administrations respectives; leurs opinions, telles qu'elles ressortent de leurs actes, et puis nous considérerons quels sont les intérêts et les désirs des populations orientales, ainsi que les conséquences qui pourraient résulter de l'établissement de Méhémet-Ali à Constantinople. Ce n'est pas que nous croyions cet événement possible, mais nous entrevoyons, dans la supposition de cette possibilité et des avantages d'un événement pareil, une indécision prolongée de la part de l'Angleterre et de la France, ou même une action violente de leur part, qui pourrait non seulement abandonner la Turquie à la Russie, mais faciliter l'accomplissement des vues de la Russie par une conduite de ces deux puissances semblable à celle qu'elles ont tenue jusqu'à présent.

Méhémet-Ali et le sultan sont tous les deux des hommes remarquables; doués de grands

moyens naturels, ils sont tous les deux au-dessus des préjugés de leur temps et de leur pays; ils ont réussi également à extirper l'oligarchie militaire qui opprimait la Turquie et l'Égypte; mais ils ont aussi négligé et méprisé les admirables principes fondamentaux du gouvernement qu'ils ont été appelés à diriger.

Toutefois, le premier d'entre eux a de nombreux et d'immenses avantages sur l'autre. La destruction des mamelucks donna à Méhémet-Ali toute latitude pour agir comme il lui plairait. En Turquie, la destruction des janissaires, quelque importante qu'elle fût dans son principe, laissa et la cour et les habitudes de tout un peuple, et la puissante oligarchie administrative debout et sans contre-poids. Méhémet-Ali avait un peuple de fellahs à gouverner, gens habitués depuis des siècles à l'incessante oppression de quelques milliers d'aventuriers étrangers, gens qui ne prenaient point, et ne pouvaient prendre part aux changements que subissait leur condition, qui ne possédaient ni armes, ni chefs, ni volonté, ni propriété. Le bien-être de l'Égypte dépend d'un seul fleuve; ce fleuve est son grand chemin, son

seul chemin; il arrose ses champs, il abreuve ses troupeaux, étanche la soif de ses habitants, et ce fleuve peut être commandé par vingt chaloupes canonnières. Méhémet-Ali n'est point le gouverneur, il est le propriétaire de l'Égypte; ni les complications étrangères, ni les invasions du dehors et les révoltes à l'intérieur ne vinrent troubler ses mesures, épuiser ses ressources, ou déranger ses projets; s'il intervint quelque part, ce ne fut que de son propre gré; s'il envahit la Grèce, il le fit sur sa propre demande. Méhémet-Ali était né dans l'indigence; élevé dans l'adversité, il se forma au milieu de longs et fatigants travaux et dans les combats; il eut de bonne heure l'occasion de juger et les hommes et les systèmes; dès le commencement de sa carrière, témoin de la lutte de la France et de l'Angleterre, il put de bonne heure apprécier l'importance de la discipline et le poids d'une puissance européenne.

Mahmoud n'a eu aucun de ces avantages; possesseur fortuit du sceptre ottoman, nous ne pouvons pas nous attendre à trouver en lui tous les talents qui ont créé à Méhémet-Ali sa brillante fortune. Une des plus grandes difficultés

pour Mahmoud fut son caractère même de sultan; porté qu'il était à regarder son pouvoir comme tout-puissant et ses droits comme incontestables, chaque lutte, au lieu de provoquer son énergie, ne faisait qu'irriter son indignation. Peut-être cependant le principal point de contraste entre eux, est que Mahmoud, né dans la pourpre, a montré une simplicité et une modération entièrement étrangères à Méhémet.

Combien n'était-il pas facile de gouverner en Égypte? Aucun empêchement ne s'y présentait; nul besoin d'armée et de flotte, peu de sacrifices en comparaison de la grandeur des résultats, et par-dessus tout cela d'immenses ressources, qui fournissaient à Méhémet 125 millions de francs de revenu, c'est-à-dire vingt-cinq fois autant qu'il ait jamais payé de tribut à la Porte. L'homme qui, après vingt ans de la paisible possession d'un pays pareil, s'est trouvé incapable d'y demeurer, est-il donc destiné à reconstituer un empire comme la Turquie? L'homme qui, sujet, a montré une ambition aussi démesurée, peut-on lui confier le diadème impérial? Est-ce bien au pacha d'Égypte

à s'asseoir sur le trône de Constantinople dans des temps si difficiles, lui qui, pendant que toute son existence a été exposée aux coups des puissances maritimes, n'a pas craint de les défier, et a osé, ou du moins a cherché à troubler l'Europe entière, lui qui, depuis douze ans, a été l'instrument immédiat de toutes les dangereuses complications en Orient? Nous ne le pensons pas.

On nous dit que le sultan est partisan de la Russie. — S'il l'est, la faute en est à l'Angleterre; nous ne disons pas qu'il ne soit dans la nature des choses qu'il fût Russe, mais nous affirmons que les faits prouvent le contraire. A qui s'est-il adressé pour chercher des secours? N'était-ce point à l'Angleterre? Le protectorat et le secours de la Russie lui ont été imposés comme une conséquence inévitable de notre refus. Ne s'est-il pas empressé de saisir l'offre subite de l'ambassadeur de France d'insister sur la retraite de l'escadre russe? Le ministère français n'a-t-il pas démenti les paroles de son ambassadeur, méprisé la confiance de la Porte et repoussé la glorieuse mission qui s'offrait à son pays?

L'apparente liaison du sultan avec la Russie prouve jusqu'à quel point l'Angleterre et la France avaient déçu ses espérances, trahi ses intérêts et sacrifié les nôtres. Y avait-il là matière à insulte et à reproche?

Si nous nous décidions à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour restaurer l'empire ottoman, nous trouverions en Mahmoud un instrument docile et de bonne volonté. Rien ne le prouve mieux que son obséquiosité envers la Russie, obséquiosité qui est si contraire à sa dignité, à ses intérêts et à ses propres inclinations. Il vaudrait mieux sans doute qu'un grand génie pût seul et sans nos secours et nos soins secouer l'énergie assoupie de l'empire ottoman et nous épargner la peine de le défendre. Mais il faut considérer les choses comme elles sont. Maintenant, la Turquie ne peut être soutenue que par nos efforts, et cette décision une fois prise, la seule chose à craindre serait une disposition malveillante de son chef.

Le règne de Mahmoud a vu s'accomplir d'importantes améliorations : la pompe et l'étiquette, cette occupation exclusive de la cour et de la capitale a été abolie; les charges inutiles

du sérail ont été supprimées. Une économie notable a été introduite dans les différents départements de l'État; ce qui, à tout prendre, n'est point un médiocre résultat. Le pouvoir de vie et de mort a été enlevé aux pachas; les chrétiens se sont vus délivrés des charges et des prohibitions qui pesaient sur eux; le nombre des pachas a été diminué; le revenu de l'État, malgré le déficit causé par la perte des contributions de la Grèce, de l'Albanie, de la Valachie, de la Moldavie, de la Servie, pendant un certain nombre d'années; de l'Égypte, de la Syrie, de Candie et de Bagdad, dernièrement d'Akhalzick, de Kars et d'Erzerum, et par suite des préparatifs actuels contre Méhémet-Ali, de Sivas, de Malatia, de Marasch, de Chorum et du Diarbekir, c'est-à-dire, de la moitié de l'empire, le revenu public, dis-je, est encore en état de satisfaire aux besoins croissants d'une nouvelle organisation. Les accusés politiques et les rebelles ne sont pas seulement graciés, mais encore employés selon le degré de leur capacité politique. Les prisons de Constantinople sont vides; il n'y a plus de têtes au-dessus de la grande porte du sérail. Voilà des faits : ils exis-

tent, bien qu'on ne les connaisse point en Europe. L'empire a résisté à bien des orages, il a accompli sa réforme intérieure, l'autorité du gouvernement s'est raffermie, et l'indépendance du peuple a augmenté.

Si l'on reproche au sultan de manquer de l'intelligence qu'a montrée Méhémet-Ali, en ce qu'il n'a point organisé une force militaire proportionnée à l'étendue de son empire, nous répondrons que s'il en avait été doué, il est probable que nous n'aurions pas eu, à présent, à raconter les améliorations qui ont signalé son règne. S'il avait entretenu une armée formidable sur pied, il aurait essayé du même jeu que Méhémet-Ali, et s'il l'eût fait, ni son caractère de sultan, ni celui de calife ou d'ottoman, ne l'aurait sauvé. Sa sauvegarde, et la cause négative des améliorations qui ont eu lieu, se trouvent dans sa faiblesse militaire.

Depuis la destruction des janissaires, comme auparavant, il a eu toute l'Europe sur les bras, et il n'y a pas de gouvernement européen qui eût résisté au ban de cette excommunication politique. D'autre part, son administration extérieure se distingue de celle des règnes précé-

dents par l'économie, la modération, l'humanité, des progrès administratifs graduels, mais réels, et dont les résultats auraient déjà arraché des applaudissements à l'Europe si son empire avait été favorisé par une longue paix extérieure [1].

Nous ne disons pas, nous le répétons encore, que ce soit l'énergie de Mahmoud qui ait opéré ces changements. Chaque amélioration a été attribuée, en Europe, à l'individu. La personnification a, il est vrai, beaucoup plus d'effet dramatique en elle, et il y a peu de monde qui se doute de tout le bien qu'il y a dans les institutions de la Turquie, et le caractère de ses habitants. Ces heureux changements ont coïncidé sans doute avec les excellentes dispositions naturelles du sultan, mais seul, sans appui, il n'aurait jamais pu avoir la force de les mettre à exécution. Que nous faut-il de plus? Quand ce monarque réunit en sa personne, et ces qualités et ces utiles faiblesses, et le droit imprescriptible de la plus ancienne dynastie de l'Eu-

[1] On sait maintenant (voir le n° 7 du *Portfolio*) que la dernière guerre russe n'avait été provoquée que par les alarmes causées à la Russie par les progrès de la Turquie.

rope, quand il possède une autorité légale plus étendue que celle de tout autre souverain, nous devons nous réjouir d'avoir un pareil instrument entre nos mains si nous nous proposons de sauver la Turquie. Mais nous ne devons cependant pas oublier que ces mêmes qualités qui nous le rendent utile, nous imposent l'obligation de nous en servir, car si nous ne le faisons pas, la Russie, sans aucun doute, en tirera profit.

A nos yeux, et aux yeux de son peuple, le plus grand crime du sultan c'est de s'être jeté dans les bras de la Russie. N'est-ce point là le résultat que la Russie s'est proposé d'atteindre en imposant son traité de protection à la Porte? Devons-nous tomber dans l'embûche qu'elle a dressée sous nos pas, et rester jusqu'au dernier moment la dupe de notre antagoniste, et l'ennemi de notre alliée?

Mais peut-être les cabinets sont effrayés des victoires qu'Ibrahim a remportées sur le sultan.

L'armée de Méhémet-Ali est devenue un objet de prédilection pour l'Europe, parce qu'il a des officiers européens à son service, parce que chaque voyageur en obtient toutes les informations dont il veut tirer le plus grand parti,

parce qu'une grande nation s'est laissée entraîner à le prendre sous son patronage, et qu'un habile gouvernement le trouve utile à ses propres desseins; de là, nous le répétons, l'opinion favorable qu'on a de Méhémet-Ali, de son gouvernement, de ses vues et de son armée. Après avoir, pendant trente ans, possédé une des plus riches provinces du monde, après en avoir tiré 50 à 60,000,000 de livres sterling, quels sont donc les résultats obtenus par ce soi-disant civilisateur de l'Orient? Une armée de soixante mille Arabes disciplinés, mais d'une fidélité douteuse, et une trentaine de vaisseaux de tous rangs, de construction médiocre. Son armée, nous ne le nions pas, est, ou du moins a été supérieure à celle du sultan : c'est qu'en Égypte, le Pacha c'est l'État; c'est que toute son attention a uniquement été portée sur ses troupes; c'est qu'il a appris dès sa jeunesse, et comme témoin de la lutte entre la France et l'Angleterre, à apprécier toute l'importance de la discipline. La supériorité de son armée n'a consisté, toutefois, que dans les officiers supérieurs.

La marche d'Ibrahim à travers l'Anatolie, et sa conquête de la Syrie, exigent quelques mots

d'explication. Il y a, en Orient, une disposition générale à se soumettre à toute apparence de force et surtout à une armée disciplinée. Toutes les villes de la Syrie ouvraient leurs portes devant Ibrahim, et le recevaient comme un libérateur. Ici comme dans l'Anatolie, peu ou rien n'avait été fait pour améliorer l'état du peuple qui ne prévoyait donc aucun changement favorable pour lui, tandis que les gouverneurs, les deré-beys qui y restaient encore, et les petites oligarchies, appréciaient très bien la nature des nouvelles mesures du gouvernement, y apercevaient leur propre destruction inévitable, et de cette manière tous les partis s'unissaient à rechercher l'appui d'Ibrahim; le peuple impatient d'un soulagement à ses charges, les chefs contents d'un contre-poids dans l'autorité qui ne pouvait qu'affaiblir le pouvoir du sultan. Il est bon d'observer aussi que depuis douze ans l'empire ottoman avait été engagé dans des guerres continuelles, tant au dehors qu'à l'intérieur, et qu'il n'existe point de système financier en Turquie au moyen duquel les charges présentes pourraient être rejetées sur les générations futures. Cette

cause pourrait seule suffire à expliquer les succès d'Ibrahim, qui, comme tant d'autres pachas rebelles, a réussi à envahir les provinces de l'empire et à déployer en peu d'années les signes de la force et de la puissance; mais ce n'est point encore la seule cause de ses succès.

C'est la politique européenne qui régit aujourd'hui les destinées de la Turquie. Les espérances et les craintes de cette nation sont placées en dehors d'elle-même. D'une extrémité de l'empire à l'autre, on attend son salut de la France et de l'Angleterre; on craint le joug de la Russie. L'alliance connue du sultan et de la Russie, que l'Angleterre et la France l'avaient cependant forcé de contracter, exaspéra tout le peuple contre lui, et c'est de ce sentiment naturel que naquit la conviction qu'Ibrahim était appuyé par la France et l'Angleterre, puissances supposées rivales de la Russie, conviction que mille artifices vinrent confirmer, et qui en effet, grâce aux forces qu'elle donnait à Ibrahim, finit par arracher au sultan la convention de Kutaiah.

Les Égyptiens avaient la supériorité de leurs chefs et de leur administration, comme nous

l'avons déjà expliqué. Ensuite, ils étaient appuyés par les intrigues de la Russie et des autres puissances qui, en agissant sur l'indolence de la Porte, paralysaient toutes ses mesures de défense. A la fin, cependant, après la prise d'Acre, la perte de la Syrie et l'occupation des Thermopyles de Syrie et de Cilicie, la Porte songea à sortir de son engourdissement. Le grand-visir fut rappelé de la Bosnie; il amena avec lui une belle armée de 30,000 montagnards rouméliotes, outre 10,000 soldats de troupes régulières. Le sultan ouvrit ses trésors; d'immenses magasins de provisions furent formés et expédiés; la destruction d'Ibrahim paraissait inévitable. Telle était la conviction de Méhémet-Ali lui-même sur le danger de la position de son fils, qu'un jour, en recevant un courrier, juste avant la dernière bataille décisive, Méhémet s'arracha la barbe de désespoir, et s'écria : « J'ai sacrifié mon fils! » Reschid-Pacha fit un mauvais calcul, se précipita trop, engagea l'action après une marche longue et fatigante au milieu de l'hiver, et fut battu. Voilà les circonstances extérieures de cet événement d'après lequel l'Europe a formé son opi-

nion sur les forces relatives de la Turquie et de l'Égypte. Mais nous devons écarter le voile : il nous faut examiner les ressorts secrets et ne pas juger de la force de la machine d'après une expérience dans laquelle le principal rouage a agi en sens inverse avec tous les autres.

Personne n'ignore que le séraskier-pacha a été pendant quelque temps le premier personnage après le sultan. Il était le commandant du corps qui remplaça les janissaires ; il était le favori et le confident du sultan. Cette double charge le mettait à même de contrôler toutes les affaires, de nommer à tous les emplois. Il était le vieil ennemi de Méhémet-Ali ; l'on pouvait donc supposer qu'il emploierait tout son pouvoir et son influence pour amener la perte de son rival.

Mais pas du tout ; Housref-Pacha pensa, et pensa avec raison, que l'extension du pouvoir de Méhémet-Ali augmenterait sa propre influence sur le sultan, et que si Hussein-Pacha ou Reschid-Pacha, triomphait d'Ibrahim, l'heureux général reviendrait à la tête de son armée victorieuse, et que le poste de séraskier deviendrait la récompense de ses services. Et ce n'était pas

seulement Housref-Pacha qui le sentait, ses subordonnés, ses créatures, le prévoyaient également. Il en résulta qu'à la première occasion, Hussein-Pacha fut trahi. On lui expédia des provisions, mais de manière à ce qu'il ne pût en tirer parti [1]; on lui envoya des canons, mais sans munitions; on lui envoya des troupes commandées par des officiers qui savaient bien qu'ils seraient sacrifiés s'il réussissait, et le gouverneur d'un district qu'il traversait, saisi et jeté en prison pour avoir désobéi à ses ordres, osa le menacer au nom du séraskier, et fut *relâché*.

Reschid-Pacha avait au moins des troupes

[1] Le sultan prit 4,000 bourses sur son trésor privé, et enjoignit au séraskier de les expédier à Hussein-Pacha dans le but de dédommager les paysans chargés du transport et autres services appelés angaria ou corvées, et qui jusqu'alors avaient toujours été en Turquie obligatoires et non rétribués. Différents ordres avaient été donnés pour mettre fin à ce système, mais il avait fallu auparavant procurer des fonds à cet effet; la destination de cet argent fait donc le plus grand honneur au sultan. Eh bien, ces fonds ne quittèrent point Constantinople, et furent partagés entre les créatures du séraskier, dans son propre palais. Hussein-Pacha, battu et malheureux, n'osa pas après son retour révéler ce fait à son maître.

fidèles et dévouées ; avant de quitter Constantinople, il insista sur la nécessité d'être pourvu d'abondantes provisions ; il lui fut assuré que son armée en aurait pour une campagne de trois ans. Mais l'intendance dépendait du séraskier. Avant que l'armée eût fait une marche de huit jours, les provisions vinrent à manquer, et arrivée à Ak-Sher, son unique chance fut d'en trouver dans les quartiers d'Ibrahim.

Avant de quitter Constantinople, Reschid-Pacha exprima au sultan, dans les termes les plus énergiques, son intime conviction qu'en observant l'ennemi, en le harcelant, en lui coupant les vivres au moyen de ses Albanais, familiers à ce genre de guerre, Ibrahim ne pourrait tenir plus de six semaines ; que son armée serait obligée de se rendre ou de battre en retraite, qui bientôt se changerait en déroute ; que la haine des Turcs contre les Arabes renaîtrait en les voyant fuir, et qu'alors aucun d'entre eux ne dépasserait le Taurus. Mais le sultan, enhardi à l'aspect des Albanais, et poussé par le séraskier, ne voulut point entendre parler de délai. Le manque soudain de vivres éclaira bientôt Reschid-Pacha sur son

danger. Il faut ajouter que des ordres péremptoires et pressants lui parvenaient journellement de Constantinople. Arrivé à peu de marches d'Ibrahim, il exposa à son maître sa situation précaire, le danger qu'il y avait de pousser plus avant au milieu de l'hiver, dans une contrée presque déserte, sans provisions, sans tentes, sans vêtements et sans souliers. Un fonctionnaire élevé fut expédié au camp, avec l'ordre précis du sultan d'attaquer à jour fixe, à tout hasard, et dans n'importe quelles circonstances. Reschid-Pacha devint furieux au dernier point; une bataille décisive fut livrée avec tous ces désavantages, et, comme on le sait, perdue, mais sans déshonneur [1].

Voilà, certes, des motifs suffisants pour expliquer la défaite de la meilleure armée du monde; l'activité et la patience de l'armée de Reschid-Pacha se sont montrées ici au-dessus de tout éloge. Que n'aurait-on pu faire avec de tels

[1] Reschid-Pacha n'existe plus; on peut donc dire ici qu'il proposa à Ibrahim, la veille de la bataille, de joindre ses forces aux siennes, et de retourner à Constantinople pour déposer le séraskier, ce qui, comme de rajson, ne convenait pas à Méhémet-Ali et à la Russie.

moyens, si on les avait mieux employés? Puisqu'en une pareille occurrence, la victoire d'Ibrahim a été achetée au prix du tiers de son armée, que ne serait-il pas résulté, si l'on eût combattu à avantages égaux? Comme de raison, quelques semaines seulement d'attente, et l'issue n'était point douteuse. Le rôle de Reschid était celui de Fabius. Il le sentait aussi; mais que peut faire une bonne armée et un habile général, quand la corruption et l'ignorance siégent aux premières places de l'État, et qu'un habile ennemi vous y conseille et vous trahit?

Mais il est encore un autre fait à dévoiler, fait accablant pour l'apathie ou la confiance aveugle de la France et de l'Angleterre s'immolant sur l'autel de l'ambition de la Russie.

Le séraskier avait choisi les meilleurs régiments de l'armée pour en former un corps de réserve, qui se montait à vingt-cinq mille hommes. Il stationnait à Broussa, Izmit et autres places, de manière à couvrir la capitale. Reschid-Pacha démontra la nécessité de placer ce corps à sa disposition; il insista pour que du moins ce corps se rapprochât du champ de

bataille, afin de lui servir d'appui moral et de point de ralliement en cas d'échec ou de défaite. Il démontra que s'il était battu, son armée serait perdue n'ayant pas de réserve, et que si ce malheur arrivait, une réserve placée à Izmit ne serait d'aucun secours. Il représenta que Constantinople ne pouvait être sauvée que par la force de l'opinion, et qu'une défaite comme celle dont il s'agit ouvrirait à Ibrahim les portes de la capitale, tandis qu'Ibrahim, même victorieux, ne pouvant l'être sans de grandes pertes, serait définitivement défait, si la réserve composée des meilleures troupes remplaçait immédiatement le premier corps d'armée. Ses arguments étaient certes irrésistibles; le séraskier affectait d'hésiter, de consentir, de se rétracter, et aurait fini par céder, quand un nouvel acteur apparut sur la scène.

Mouravieff arriva sur ces entrefaites, porteur des bons offices de son souverain, et de pressantes offres de secours contre le rebelle; car l'empereur, outre les rapports d'amitié avec un allié, avait des devoirs à remplir, et ses devoirs sacrés consistaient à mettre fin à une

conflagration qui menaçait la maison du voisin.

Mouravieff s'intéressa vivement, comme de raison, à la disposition des forces du sultan. « Où est votre réserve? » demanda-t-il avec inquiétude au séraskier, comme si aucune de ses dispositions ne lui était connue. Il ne lui coûta pas beaucoup de peine pour convaincre le séraskier que sa réserve ne devait pas être confiée à Reschid-Pacha. « Reschid-Pacha est « un fou, » dit le général russe, « il sacrifiera « son armée, et que deviendrez-vous si vous « n'avez pas de réserve sous la main pour pro- « téger la capitale? Vous, séraskier, vous serez « le premier la victime, et du sultan, et de la « populace, et des Égyptiens. » Le séraskier exposa au sultan l'opinion de Mouravieff, et fort des lumières d'un officier distingué, il fixa l'irrésolution du sultan. Ainsi fut décidée la défaite de Coniah; trois causes y concoururent; d'abord le manque de provisions, de vêtements, de munitions et d'artillerie, puis la nécessité où se trouva Reschid d'agir contre son opinion et l'évidence des faits; et enfin l'inaction et l'éloignement d'un corps d'armée considérable

où se trouvaient inutilement les meilleures troupes de la Turquie [1].

Dans cette guerre, tous les avantages, et ils ne peuvent plus reparaître, étaient en faveur de Méhémet-Ali; tous les désavantages, et ceux-ci n'existent plus, étaient tournés contre le sultan. Dans toute la Turquie, Méhémet-Ali avait la réputation de grands talents et d'une grande puissance. Le peuple turc fatigué de contributions et de levées continuelles, n'apercevait point que la paix seule pouvait lui apporter un soulagement. Les exactions qu'il endurait lui faisaient désirer un changement et lui faisaient croire qu'il serait heureux sous la domination (non dans le sens de l'indépendance que l'Europe assigne à cette expression),

[1] Le meilleur général de l'armée turque, après le grand-visir, était Tshiappan-Oglou, Méhémet-Pacha, autrefois pacha de Silistrie. Il se montra en beaucoup de circonstances homme d'action et de courage. Il a non seulement perdu sa place, mais même son grade; il n'est actuellement que Méhémet-Bey. Nous croyons que tout commentaire serait superflu. Mais il est trop absurde d'espérer d'autres résultats que ceux que la Russie poursuit, tandis qu'on lui permet de travailler impunément. Que l'arbre soit coupé, si l'on veut, mais dites au moins que c'est la hache qui l'abat.

d'un homme dont la réputation était si grande, cette illusion est dissipée. Partout où le gouvernement de Méhémet s'est étendu, on le connaît pour monopoliste; partout où les Arabes ont campé, nous ne dirons pas l'animosité et la haine, mais le dégoût même est soulevé contre eux. Les contributions levées, la violence de la soldatesque dans l'Anatolie, leur présence et leur retraite ont détruit l'idée qu'on s'était faite d'Ibrahim comme libérateur, et les débauches et l'impudeur habituelle des Arabes ont révolté les Turcs, le peuple le plus sensible à la décence.

Mais les causes de la faiblesse du sultan dans l'Anatolie existent à bien plus fort degré par rapport à Méhémet-Ali en Égypte. Les populations de l'Anatolie ont souffert le passage d'Ibrahim, mais où se sont-elles rangées sous ses drapeaux? Elles ont souffert qu'il passât, parce qu'elles étaient mécontentes, parce qu'elles étaient portées à croire qu'il était appuyé par la France et l'Angleterre et qu'il marchait contre la Russie par suite d'une secrète intelligence avec le sultan. Cette croyance était généralement répandue dans l'Anatolie,

mais si quelques milliers d'hommes des troupes du sultan eussent débarqué dans le Delta, nul doute que dès lors le pouvoir de Méhémet-Ali aurait croulé; les troupes et le peuple en masse se seraient réunis autour de l'étendard du sultan, le pacha eût succombé sans coup férir, et il ne lui serait pas resté un parti, une tribu attachée par les liens du sang, pas un fort, pas une montagne pour prolonger la lutte ou retarder sa chute.

Méhémet-Ali a donc perdu l'appui de l'opinion; le sultan a gagné ce que Méhémet a perdu. Méhémet-Ali avait toute la Syrie pour lui, aujourd'hui elle est pour le sultan. Les désertions ne se font pas du camp vaincu au camp vainqueur, mais des Égyptiens aux Turcs [1]. Cependant les officiers en Égypte ont

[1] En parlant des déserteurs de l'Égypte, nous ne pouvons nous empêcher d'offrir un tribut passager à la mémoire d'Osman-Pacha. Il occupait la première place en Égypte, et devait tout à Méhémet, et cependant il sacrifia et sa position et ses affections personnelles, nullement dans l'espoir de plus grands honneurs, car il connaissait trop la corruption de l'administration de Constantinople, et savait trop bien que les yeux d'Argus et les bras de Briarée de la Russie veilleraient à ce que sa position ne le mît à même de bien

une paie double et triple de celle des officiers au service turc, ce qui est déjà une circonstance très grave.

Le sultan peut perdre de nouveau deux armées de troupes irrégulières et même toutes ses troupes régulières, et (pourvu que la Russie soit neutralisée), sa position ne sera pas pire qu'aujourd'hui; une seule défaite, un mouvement rétrograde serait fatal à Méhémet-Ali.

Mais le sultan a contre lui l'alliance officielle et solennelle avec la Russie. Cette alliance met en péril non seulement son caractère de sultan, mais encore celui de musulman;

faire. Mais Osman-Pacha était un homme guidé par de profondes vues, par des motifs d'un ordre supérieur. Sur son lit de mort, il disait à ceux qui l'entouraient : « Je ne vous « parlerai pas de mes motifs, car aucun de vous ne les com- « prendrait, mais il viendra un jour où les Turcs en sai- « siront la portée. » Osman-Pacha croyait que l'unité du pouvoir et la suprématie du sultan étaient les garanties indispensables de la constitution turque. Il croyait que la puissance de Méhémet-Ali (abstraction faite de ses fautes ou de son mérite) était incompatible avec l'existence de la Turquie, et que ses erreurs et son ambition aideraient puissamment à l'accomplissement des vues de la Russie. La vie de cet homme aurait rendu plus de services à l'État que peut-être dix victoires.

l'influence démoralisatrice de la Russie domine plus que jamais dans les conseils de la Turquie; les troupes voudront-elles se battre contre un homme proclamé par les agents russes, comme l'ennemi de la Russie, comme l'allié de la France et de l'Angleterre: combattront-elles pour un homme qui, bien que sultan, est le protégé de la Russie? Les chances sont donc bien diverses et l'influence et l'activité étrangères décideront nécessairement la lutte dans l'arène turque, où hélas! il y a complet aveuglement d'un côté, et rare clairvoyance de l'autre.

Les affaires de l'Europe ressemblent à un jeu d'échecs, où tous les mouvements possibles ont été effectués sans qu'il y ait eu échange ou retraite. L'échange doit à la fin se faire pour pouvoir prendre place dans un certain endroit; les pièces peuvent être insignifiantes, mais du résultat dépend la chance du jeu. Dans cette partie, dirigée en chef par la Russie d'un côté, et suivie, quoique pas assez appréciée par la France et l'Angleterre de l'autre, se joue d'une manière irrévocable tout ce qui peut exciter le plus la lutte entre de grandes nations.

Nous concluons donc que Méhémet-Ali, malgré ses talents indubitables et supérieurs, ses succès dans la culture du coton, la perception d'un grand revenu, la concentration de toute la fortune du pays entre ses mains, la formation d'une armée de fellahs et la création d'une flotte en Égypte, que Méhémet-Ali, malgré tout cela, est l'homme le moins apte à gouverner aujourd'hui l'empire ottoman. Cette conclusion, nous la tirons de la situation précaire à laquelle se trouve réduit à présent son propre pouvoir au milieu de contrées fertiles, d'une population humble et docile, et après les succès les plus brillants. Nous concluons ainsi à cause de ses fautes, de son ambition, de son opiniâtreté, de son insatiable avidité, mais surtout à cause de ses idées d'administration et de ses principes de fiscalité, qui n'auraient point été soufferts un seul mois en Turquie. Nous arrivons à cette conclusion précisément à raison de ses succès. Dira-t-on qu'il peut changer? mais ce sont justement ses succès en Égypte qui n'ont guère pu lui servir d'une bonne école de modération; l'homme qui a tant osé comme sujet, doit encore plus oser comme

souverain. En Turquie, le souverain n'a plus de contre-poids que la crainte de conséquences, dont les organes traditionnels ont disparu.

Nous concluons également que Mahmoud, malgré son avarice qui disparaît dès qu'on la compare à celle de Méhémet-Ali, malgré la faiblesse de ses vues, malgré son peu de succès à accomplir une grande réforme radicale, malgré sa disposition à se confier trop facilement en d'autres mains, et son manque de confiance en lui-même; malgré l'excès de son mépris pour les préjugés, son manque de respect pour les institutions de son pays, son extrême désir d'imiter l'Europe, malgré son obséquiosité obligée envers la Russie, que Mahmoud n'en est pas moins encore un instrument fort utile si on sait bien l'employer, et nous nous réjouissons de l'avoir en ce moment sur le trône de Constantinople.

Nous bornons ici la comparaison entre les qualités personnelles de Méhémet et de Mahmoud, à gouverner sans convulsion l'empire ottoman. Si tout observateur habile n'arrive pas à la même conclusion, après avoir comparé la nature des succès de Méhémet et celle des

revers de Mahmoud, nous avouons du coup que nous nous sommes entièrement abusés sur cette question.

Il est impossible de ne point signaler ici une des mille illusions qui obscurcissent cette question. On parle d'observateurs *impartiaux* relativement à Méhémet-Ali et à Mahmoud; cette expression indique une parfaite ignorance des institutions orientales et de la politique intérieure et extérieure de la Turquie, mais malheureusement cette grande science politique, il faut à la fois la découvrir et l'étudier. Les principes de cette grande société si différente de la nôtre, pourraient bien n'être appréciés que lorsque son existence politique sera finie; les desseins de la Russie ne seront peut-être connus que lorsqu'ils seront réalisés et ce sont là précisément les deux conditions indispensables de leur accomplissement. La politique de la Russie c'est la fable du Sphinx: l'énigme une fois devinée, son charme est rompu, son pouvoir et sa vie s'éteignent; mais jusques-là, garde à vous, Béotiens!

Dans tous les pays du monde, les impôts sont chose désagréable, les charges onéreuses

et la souffrance actuelle amène un mécontentement actuel. La Turquie subit le loi commune, mais ce qu'il y a de singulier dans sa position, c'est qu'après avoir produit les causes du mécontentement nous nous disposons à la punir de ses conséquences, bien qu'il n'y ait pas un État en Europe, qui, exposé à un pareil système de propagande, de perpétuelles menaces et d'excommunication politique, aurait pu opposer à ces causes dissolvantes, une patience, une simplicité et une unité d'opinion comme celles qu'a montrées la Turquie. Toute la chrétienté s'est liguée contre elle, au moment de sa transformation intérieure, la révolte a succédé à la révolte, une guerre a été suivie d'une autre guerre, et ici on la voit suivie de tout le cortége des maux qu'elle entraîne sans aucun des prestiges qu'elle offre en Europe, et sans qu'aucun de ces maux y éprouve quelque adoucissement à ses inexorables rigueurs.

Supposons que l'Autriche, qui, de même que la Turquie, est un assemblage de diverses races et de diverses croyances religieuses, supposons que l'Autriche, une des premières puissances de l'Europe, soit exposée à un tel sys-

tème de propagande; supposons qu'elle soit privée de toute son influence diplomatique à l'extérieur, et que seule, sans secours, opposée à un puissant ennemi qui dispose des événements, choisit les moments opportuns, trompe l'opinion ou embarrasse les conseils des autres États, et non seulement trouve ainsi le moyen de frapper dans l'ombre, mais se sert encore de la force des autres puissances pour parvenir à ses fins, et de plus, présente les succès obtenus de manière à se donner l'apparence de toute la force, son ennemi celle de toute la faiblesse? dans de pareilles conjonctures, combien de mois croyez-vous que pourrait tenir l'Autriche? Notre raisonnement ne servait qu'à prouver que la force matérielle et la cohésion intérieure de la Turquie est infiniment supérieure à l'idée que nous nous en faisons d'après les témoignages et les notions européennes. Les vicissitudes politiques de la Turquie pendant les vingt dernières années, auraient suffi à mettre en pièces une vingtaine de gouvernements centralisés de l'Europe. Nous sommes donc en droit de nous étonner du fait même de son existence, et non de l'existence de maux qui, bien que

grands dans leurs effets immédiats, ne sont pas encore parvenus au point de *produire une différence d'opinion politique*. Nous n'espérons pas que l'importance de cette observation soit appréciée comme elle le mérite, elle ne le sera pas avant que le sujet lui-même et les principes de l'administration en Orient aient été traités d'une toute autre manière que jusqu'à présent.

Le sultan, engagé dans une lutte continuelle pour sa propre existence, a été oppresseur, non comme Méhémet-Ali, par système et par caprice, mais par nécessité. Sa tyrannie manquant autant d'intelligence que de l'énergie et des combinaisons d'un despotisme raisonné, n'a pas atteint l'ascendant qu'elle devait imposer. De là toujours de nouvelles nécessités de nouvelles exactions, dont la cause et les effets, hors de toute proportion, ne faisaient qu'alimenter le foyer du mécontentement.

Mais cette oppression, ce mécontentement, comparés avec l'état de l'Égypte, ne méritent pas le nom de maux, tant ils disparaissent par la comparaison, car le Turc et même les races tributaires sont accoutumés à une indépendance et à une liberté d'action individuelle qui

sont non seulement tout-à-fait incompatibles avec la tyrannie systématique du pacha d'Égypte, mais qui ne pourraient même coexister avec ces institutions européennes qui sont censées conférer et assurer la plus large part de liberté politique.

Il nous est souvent arrivé d'avoir à expliquer à des Turcs pourquoi l'Angleterre et la France ne plaçaient pas Méhémet-Ali sur le trône de Constantinople. Que d'Européens ont été trompés par de pareilles questions! Eh bien! il ne nous est jamais arrivé de développer aux Turcs qui nous les faisaient les vues que nous venons d'émettre, sans qu'ils soient toujours arrivés à reconnaître et à sentir que, sans compter la question de la politique étrangère, les fautes du sultan n'étaient que des fautes d'omission, tandis que celles de Méhémet-Ali étaient des fautes de propre volonté; que les principaux malheurs de la Turquie provenaient de circonstances pour la plupart extérieures; que l'éloignement de la dynastie ottomane ne pouvait qu'augmenter et non alléger leurs maux, et qu'enfin si le sultan devenait absolument intraitable et si la France et l'Angleterre étaient

déterminées à s'en défaire, elles devraient même alors chercher à mettre à sa place un autre homme que Méhémet-Ali.

Mais, bien que nos opinions à ce sujet n'aient pu qu'être fortifiées par notre expérience personnelle, nous n'avons pas besoin de citer des faits isolés pour établir des vérités que des villes et des populations entières ont reconnues. La Syrie a manifesté son changement d'opinion, l'Anatolie a ouvert les yeux dès que les Arabes y ont paru; même dans la capitale où il y a tant de justes et d'injustes causes de mécontentement, le pacha n'a-t-il pas perdu presque entièrement ce nombreux parti dont il pouvait disposer il y a encore quelques mois?

Du reste, pendant tout ce temps, Méhémet-Ali a jugé nécessaire d'appeler à son aide tous les détours de la ruse. Il s'est surtout servi d'influences étrangères, telles qu'on n'en trouve guère dans l'histoire d'aucun peuple, et particulièrement chez les Turcs. Ses partisans et agents ont toujours mis en avant, comme principaux titres à la confiance publique, sa liaison avec la France, sa prétendue alliance avec l'Angleterre, deux pays qu'on ne sépare jamais en

Orient. La Russie, comme on peut le penser, se fût bien gardée de négliger un pareil levier; ses agents ont habilement répandu cette funeste croyance que ne contredisait aucun agent d'Angleterre, parce qu'il n'y en avait pas, et moins encore ceux de France, puisqu'ils ne le voulaient pas [1].

Si cette croyance sert la Russie en Turquie, de quelle importance n'est-elle pas pour elle en Europe? En indiquant à qui elle profite, n'avons-nous pas indiqué ici sa véritable source? Méhémet-Ali trouve de l'appui en Turquie,

[1] Dans une réunion de plusieurs personnages des plus distingués de Constantinople, le premier drogman de France, après s'être étendu sur les abus du gouvernement, les fautes du sultan, et sa liaison avec la Russie, ajouta : « Aussi la « France et l'Angleterre se sont-elles tournées vers Méhémet- « Ali comme l'unique ancre de salut pour l'empire. » De semblables paroles ont en quelque sorte des ailes; leur effet est incalculable. Ce n'était point là une suggestion russe; c'était bien la légation française qui énonçait ainsi son avis. Les Turcs ne pouvaient comprendre cela autrement. Il faut ajouter ici que bien que le drogman en question eût pu avoir des motifs personnels et indépendants de la politique française, l'amiral de Rigny, qui commandait la station du Levant, semblait avoir *également* à cœur de discréditer le sultan et de grandir Méhémet-Ali.

parce que les Turcs sont portés à croire qu'il est l'ami de l'Angleterre et de la France qui sont les ennemies naturelles de la Russie. En Angleterre, et surtout en France, la conviction de la nécessité qu'il y a d'appuyer le sultan, et en lui l'empire turc, est paralysée, parce qu'on y fait croire au public que les Turcs préfèrent Méhémet au sultan. Vraiment, ce drame mériterait d'être joué pour le plaisir de l'empereur Nicolas, si la Russie n'avait même pas d'intérêt dans la question. La politique russe, jugée sous le rapport des immenses résultats qu'elle a obtenus, paraît certes admirable, elle a cependant de rudes épreuves à subir avant de mériter ce glorieux titre. Jusqu'à présent la force de ses antagonistes n'entrait point dans la balance : il y avait science d'un côté, ignorance de l'autre; des desseins arrêtés contre une parfaite indifférence, toute l'impétuosité du mouvement, contre l'immense impassibilité de grandes puissances en état de repos. Qu'il aurait été facile cependant durant ces dix dernières années d'annuler cent fois les projets de la Russie! Aujourd'hui qu'elle a dissipé enfin notre indifférence, nous verrons si les

combinaisons qui ont paru si adroites et ont été si heureuses, soutiendront sa fortune, et si les plans de la Russie peuvent réussir sous l'œil vigilant de l'Angleterre.

Nous avons ainsi discuté la question entre Méhémet-Ali et Mahmoud, comme entre deux hommes privés, comme entre deux compétiteurs à égales prétentions et à droits égaux, dont les seules qualités personnelles doivent décider le choix. Mais le bien-être de la nation ottomane étant le but de ce choix, nous devons être prêts à sacrifier notre propre opinion et nos affections, si elles se trouvent opposées aux désirs, aux habitudes, aux préjugés de cette nation. Nous devons donc chercher à deviner les sentiments qu'éprouveraient les musulmans en voyant Méhémet-Ali assis sur le trône de Mahmoud, Padishah, Khan, fils de Khans, descendant en ligne directe du grand fondateur de la dynastie, Calife, successeur des Califes, Turc, chef de la race turque et plus particulièrement chef de la famille des Osmanlis, dont l'illustration provient de la suprématie de la ligne d'Othman.

Quiconque a ouvert les fastes de l'empire

ottoman, a dû être frappé du fait de la suprématie d'une seule famille, à travers trente générations et durant six siècles.

Nous n'essaierons pas de pénétrer les causes de ce fait, mais on nous permettra d'en déduire : d'abord, qu'il est très probable (pour nous c'est même certain), que le déplacement de cette famille entraînerait la ruine de tout l'empire; ensuite qu'une profonde démoralisation s'ensuivrait immanquablement si l'on détruisait dans tout un peuple, un principe qui est non seulement son seul lien politique, mais qui de plus, est tellement confondu avec leurs habitudes, leurs sentiments de devoir et de religion qu'on ne saurait jamais l'en séparer. Il n'y a pas dans ce pays de codes de lois écrites, les droits sociaux de l'homme et sa constitution politique sont réglés et conservés par des vérités simples et précieuses, profondément gravées dans le cœur de tout habitant. Apprenez-leur ou forcez-les de mettre de côté ce respect, qui vous semble n'être que politique, et vous leur arrachez tout ce qui peut les rendre estimables comme individus, vous les mettez en danger de ne plus rien respecter; de

sorte qu'en résultat de ce que vous avez supposé n'être qu'un moyen de les rallier contre un ennemi étranger, vous rendez nul tout moyen d'union, et vous affaiblissez, si vous ne détruisez pas entièrement les paisibles habitudes de soumission sans lesquelles il n'y aurait pas à parler d'un gouvernement en Turquie.

La lignée des Othmans a régné pendant six siècles, sans être appuyée par aucune de ces institutions que l'on croit être les seuls soutiens d'une dynastie régnante. Elle n'a point eu d'armée permanente, point d'aristocratie, point d'administration centralisée. Ceux qui pensent qu'ils peuvent rendre compte d'un fait pareil en supposant que les Turcs, en tant que Turcs, sont nés pour obéir à un sultan, et que le sultan n'est souverain et inviolable que parce qu'il descend du prophète, feraient bien de s'instruire, de prendre connaissance des institutions et des habitudes d'un pays si parfaitement différent du reste de l'Europe, avant d'oser décider de son sort et de ses intérêts.

Deux causes ont dans les dernières années contribué à abaisser le caractère du sultan.

La *première* c'est l'absolutisme auquel le

sultan est parvenu, depuis qu'il n'existe plus de combinaison ou d'influence capable de contrôler son pouvoir ou de le déposer, la sauvegarde du trône s'étant trouvée dans la facilité de déposer le sultan [1]. Son nouveau pouvoir sera avantageux ou nuisible selon qu'on en usera.

La *seconde* c'est le protectorat exercé sur le sultan régnant, par l'ennemi de la foi et de la domination musulmane.

Ces deux causes agissent puissamment l'une sur l'autre, sous l'influence de la Russie pour hâter l'effet du principe destructif [2].

Combien ne serait-il pas facile de les neutraliser toutes deux, si nous prenions le sultan sous notre protection pour le préserver de ses propres erreurs, et si nous l'affranchissions de la suprématie de la Russie, et en lui faisant ainsi doublement retrouver l'affection de ses peuples.

[1] Suleyman assura aux janissaires un don gratuit à chaque avénement d'un nouveau souverain, et cela dans le but exprès de les porter à déposer un sultan qui aurait perdu l'amour de ses sujets. (Voyez la *Vie de Suleyman*, par Cantemir.)

[2] Voyez la *Gazette de Berlin* du 12 septembre 1834.

Le sultan est la clef de voûte d'un arc qu'elle ne forme pas à la vérité, mais sans laquelle l'arc ne saurait subsister. C'est ce centre d'un grand système qui a, depuis la création de ce vaste empire, concilié des intérêts inconciliables, à les juger d'après les notions européennes; qui a établi des habitudes de gouvernement et des moyens d'appuyer son action; qui repose sur une longue tradition d'obéissance; qui renferme beaucoup et de grands abus, mais qui a aussi déployé d'immenses moyens de regénération intérieure. Cette dernière considération qui aurait dû assurer notre approbation au système est devenue précisément la cause de nos doutes et de sa faiblesse; car avant qu'il eût eu le temps nécessaire pour apaiser l'effervescence, pour faire ressortir les résultats, pour achever les expériences, un ennemi vigilant et insidieux est venu l'attaquer; il a saisi le moment où la nation ottomane était désarmée et en travail, pour se jeter sur elle, après avoir réussi à produire en même temps des révoltes intérieures et à détacher d'elle les puissances qui auraient dû la couvrir de leur égide, tandis que de si grandes et de si importantes réformes

commençaient à s'établir et à s'organiser dans son sein. — Voilà des motifs qui nous paraissent décisifs pour nous engager à soutenir l'indépendance de la Turquie, sans avoir même égard au danger que nous courons nous-mêmes de la voir annexée à la Russie..La Turquie ne peut être défendue qu'en défendant son chef et son gouvernement. Ce serait une bizarre illusion de croire qu'on peut défendre ce pays en détruisant son chef et son gouvernement, ou bien de compromettre leur existence, en hésitant à entreprendre ce que prescrirait la politique, dans une occurrence qui certainement ne devrait pas nous surprendre.

Nous avons pesé Méhémet-Ali et pesé Mahmoud. Il nous faut à présent apprécier le pacha d'Égypte et le sultan. Mais comment seulement les comparer? Tout le pouvoir de Méhémet-Ali n'est-il pas le résultat de l'indécision du gouvernement central qui se dissoudrait dès que Méhémet parviendrait à s'en emparer? Les préjugés, les droits imprescriptibles, les habitudes de soumission, s'évanouissent du moment où Méhémet-Ali succède au sultan, car ils se centralisent tous dans la personne de ce der-

nier. De plus, Méhémet-Ali est vieux et on ne saurait considérer Ibrahim comme son paisible successeur [1]. L'Angleterre ne peut compter ici que sur l'habileté personnelle d'un homme de soixante-cinq ans. Tout le système peut s'écrouler par une cholérine ou une esquinancie.

Quelle garantie de durée et de stabilité peut-on offrir pour appuyer une décision ou une indécision qui peut conduire à un pareil résultat, en admettant la destruction d'un système qui a duré si longtemps, qui existe aujourd'hui et qui renferme des germes d'une existence et d'un avenir prospère?

Si Méhémet-Ali eût été l'administrateur le plus habile qui eût jamais paru en Turquie; s'il eût compris les principes de la constitution de ce pays, s'il s'était fait l'idole des populations soumises à son autorité, alors encore, nous considérerions son mérite comme le plus grand malheur, s'il lui gagnait, dans la crise actuelle, les opinions favorables des alliés du sultan, puis-

[1] Ibrahim a une qualité éminente, c'est sa soumission au jugement supérieur de son père; son mérite à lui est d'être le meilleur général de la Turquie. Privé de son père, et hors de son camp, il ne lui reste que ses vices.

que même dans ce cas, le principe destructeur qui l'aurait élevé au trône, amènerait la dissolution de l'empire; chaque pacha l'envisagerait comme son égal, les causes du mécontentement actuel provenant de circonstances politiques, ne changeraient point, et l'unité de l'empire périrait. Laquelle des diverses tribus eût alors persévéré dans sa fidélité? Laquelle des charges publiques eût été abrogée? Mais à ne juger les choses que comme elles sont, puisque Méhémet, soit par les fautes de son système, soit par la violence du caractère de son successeur présumé Ibrahim, a manqué de succès, en perdant la Grèce à l'empire [1], en mécontentant les populations de toutes les provinces soumises à sa domination, en perdant, enfin, jusqu'à cette bonne renommée qu'il avait gagnée si injustement et qui lui a tant profité, l'idée même de le faire succéder au sultan ne devient aujourd'hui qu'un rêve impossible.

Quoique ce ne soit qu'un rêve de vouloir remplacer avec avantage le sultan par Méhé-

[1] Il ne saurait y avoir aucun doute, que l'indépendance de la Grèce n'est due qu'à l'énergie produite par la haine que les Grecs portaient à Ibrahim.

met, une idée plus absurde encore, c'est de croire fortifier un empire en conservant sa séparation en deux parties hostiles l'une à l'autre. La politique, si l'on peut lui donner ce nom, qui consiste à retarder une lutte inévitable, à ne faire servir les forces des puissances alliées que comme un moyen de prolonger la situation qui épuise et Méhémet et Mahmoud au profit de la Russie, cette politique est plus fatale encore que celle qui abattrait le sultan pour faire place au pacha; car, en agissant ainsi, la France et l'Angleterre useraient au moins de leurs forces en faveur d'une mesure mal calculée, mais dirigée contre la Russie encore en temps utile, tandis qu'en persévérant dans la politique actuelle, on sacrifie la Turquie, en accordant à la Russie tout ce qu'elle demande, du temps.

Si l'Angleterre et la France ne se fient pas à leurs propres lumières sur ces questions, elles peuvent être persuadées qu'elles ont raison toutes les fois qu'elles se mettront en opposition avec la Russie. Cette dernière connaît, certes, son affaire, et les intérêts qu'elle fait valoir ne sont que trop visibles. Les deux puis-

sances alliées ne se sont-elles pas encore aperçues de ce qu'elles ont gagné en faisant cause commune avec la Russie? N'ont-elles pas remarqué combien la Russie protégeait sous main Méhémet et s'opposait à sa rupture avec le sultan? L'expérience de 1821 et 1827 sera-t-elle complétement perdue?

Il est clair que nous perdrions de nos avantages chaque jour; la force de résistance en Turquie disparaîtrait peu à peu, les opinions s'y désorganiseraient de plus en plus, de manière qu'en l'absence même de toute collision et de toute grande catastrophe, nous verrions bientôt dans cet empire une démoralisation complète. Comment y remédier plus tard? Un mot, une détermination, peuvent suffire à présent. Bientôt on ne sacrifierait qu'en vain et des milliers d'hommes et des millions de numéraire, car, parler de paix, c'est montrer uniquement qu'on n'entend pas la question, et tandis que nous continuerions à craindre la guerre, les choses n'en iraient pas moins leur train, et la marche des événements ne deviendrait que plus rapide.

Nous ne prenons pas sur nous de dire ce qui

doit être fait; mais nous énonçons notre pleine conviction en soutenant que tout ce qui sera fait sera insuffisant aussi long-temps que nous ne combattrons pas la Russie, et que nous ne lui donnerons pas un frein. Méhémet n'est qu'un instrument de la Russie; empêchez-le d'être utile à cette puissance, elle trouvera un autre Méhémet. Écartez l'influence du séraskier, un nouveau Séjan surgira au profit de la Russie. Les expédients dont nous nous servirions le plus habilement ne peuvent que retarder le dénouement, mais non changer notre position, et bientôt la puissance matérielle de la Russie lui permettra de ne plus avoir recours à des ruses. Bientôt elle jettera ses vêtements et son masque de théâtre, et se montrera en armes et déployant toute sa force physique.

Mais il est à peu près hors de doute que le cabinet anglais comprend déjà la nécessité d'agir et n'est retenu que par les hésitations de la France. Il est bien singulier que l'unité de principes et d'intérêts, et la stricte alliance qui existent entre ces deux premières nations, dont chacune pourrait défier le monde entier, au lieu de doubler leurs forces, paralysent seule-

ment en quelque sorte leurs déterminations respectives. Il est bien étrange que la France, dans une question qui tient à son existence même, puisse montrer autant d'apathie!

L'Angleterre n'a pas à redouter de la Russie une invasion territoriale; ses possessions coloniales, sa supériorité maritime, sa prospérité commerciale courent du danger, mais au moins elle ne craint pas l'invasion; *la France peut la craindre*. La France ne peut être tranquille un seul moment après l'occupation des Dardanelles par la Russie; *l'Angleterre peut être tranquille* jusqu'à ce que la France ait succombé. La France doit donc sentir la nécessité la plus impérieuse de s'occuper de cette question. Comment se fait-il donc qu'elle ne soit pas ravie de voir l'Angleterre faire le premier pas? Pourquoi au contraire paralyse-t-elle les dispositions de l'Angleterre?

Nous croyons qu'en premier lieu la question est mal comprise à Paris; ensuite, il paraît que les diplomates russes sont beaucoup plus habiles que les hommes d'État qui décident de ces questions en France.

Nous ne pouvons pas aussi nous empêcher

de penser que le cabinet français prête l'oreille à des oracles trompeurs.

Au milieu de l'ignorance générale, les deux hommes qui ont exercé en France le plus d'influence sur les décisions par rapport à l'Orient, c'étaient MM. Sébastiani et de Rigny. Nous affirmons que les relations que ces messieurs ont eues ou conservent encore en Orient sont de nature à altérer la justesse présumable de leur jugement; et comme leurs opinions erronées et leurs vues, que nous nous abstenons de caractériser, exercent en France, dans le cabinet et dans les Chambres, une sorte de droit de monopole, nous allons tâcher de donner quelques indications sur les motifs qui paraissent les diriger.

Le général Sébastiani a connu Constantinople dans des circonstances très différentes de celles d'aujourd'hui. Si, chez un Turc, comme nous l'avons fait remarquer plus d'une fois, il s'opère souvent, même à un âge déjà avancé, un changement brusque et complet dans les opinions, ce n'est que parce que le cercle de ses idées est fort rétréci et le tour de son esprit fort simple. L'Européen, au contraire, qui a eu oc-

casion d'observer une seule fois l'ancien système turc, est disposé d'ordinaire à lui supposer une complète et irremédiable immobilité, et se refuse dès cet instant à consulter jusqu'à l'évidence elle-même, M. Sébastiani a prononcé que la Turquie est un cadavre, et qu'elle ne présente plus les éléments d'une résistance énergique à la Russie; ces opinions l'empêchent désormais d'accueillir des impressions plus favorables sur cet empire. Cependant, il est indubitable que le voile mystérieux qui empêchait que l'Orient et l'Occident n'apprissent plus tôt à se mieux connaître, va se lever prochainement; les relations diplomatiques entre ces deux parties du monde se resserrent chaque jour; les jeunes Turcs apprennent nos langues; bien des erreurs et des illusions se dissipent; et bientôt maint oracle et mainte réputation de connaissances spéciales sur ces matières auront perdu tout crédit. Il serait donc prudent désormais, quand on a des motifs secrets pour professer certaines opinions, de n'en pas trop provoquer l'examen par l'attitude hostile qu'on prend à l'égard d'opinions contraires.

Le comte de Rigny joue un rôle encore plus

important dans les déterminations de la France touchant la question orientale. Si, comme nous croyons l'avoir établi, rien ne sert la prépondérance russe en Turquie comme la position de Méhémet-Ali ; si les mouvements de la France, et par contre-coup ceux de l'Angleterre en faveur de la Turquie, sont paralysés par chaque arrière-pensée de protéger les intérêts ou les prétentions du pacha d'Égypte, comment la France se déciderait-elle à servir efficacement la cause du sultan, lorsqu'en dernier lieu son ministre des affaires étrangères a été non seulement l'instrument principal des succès de Méhémet, mais encore n'a dû sa propre élévation qu'aux relations qui en provenaient?

Depuis que les pages précédentes ont été écrites, un important événement a eu lieu : Méhémet-Ali s'est efforcé d'obtenir la sanction de l'Angleterre, de la France et de l'Autriche, à sa déclaration d'indépendance. Dans une note officielle adressée à ces trois cabinets, il énumère les difficultés que lui suscitent les exigences et les inimitiés de la Porte, et propose, si les puissances consentent à le reconnaître

souverain indépendant, de vouer tous ses soins à mettre sur pied une armée considérable (150,000 hommes) qu'il tiendrait à leur disposition contre la Russie.

Cette singulière tentative n'est qu'absurde, parce qu'on l'a repoussée; elle aurait paru très habile si elle eût obtenu du succès. L'objet de la note paraît avoir été d'obtenir le consentement de l'Angleterre, et, en tout cas, d'établir plus solidement l'apparence de rapports intimes entre Méhémet, et l'Angleterre et la France, afin de remplir l'esprit du sultan d'une profonde méfiance contre les deux États, dont la politique se présenterait de cette manière comme inconciliable avec la sienne. Si le cabinet anglais eût manqué de ces lumières, qu'il n'eut pas toujours dans des circonstances analogues, le plan de Méhémet aurait pu réussir, et aurait porté un coup mortel à la Turquie. Heureusement le ministère anglais vit la chose sous son vrai jour [1], répondit au pacha que les principes aussi bien que les intérêts de l'Angleterre l'empêchaient de prêter son appui à de

[1] C'était du temps du feu roi.

pareilles propositions, et lui conseilla de ne pas employer, contre son propre souverain, les forces que celui-ci lui avait confiées; mais, au contraire, d'évacuer Orfa et de payer son tribut.

La manière dont l'ambassadeur anglais a donné connaissance de cet événement à la Porte est également heureuse. Tandis que le représentant de la France ne communiquait que *confidentiellement au drogman de la Porte* la réponse de son gouvernement à Méhémet-Ali, comme s'il ne s'agissait que d'une petite affaire, lord Ponsonby fit connaître la réponse de l'Angleterre par une note officielle. C'est ainsi que, pour la première fois, les intrigues de la Russie ont tourné contre elle-même. Les moyens qu'elle avait imaginés, et qui, d'après l'expérience du passé, lui paraissaient suffisants pour brouiller le sultan avec l'Angleterre et pour envenimer la haine qui divise le sultan et son vassal, n'ont conduit qu'à une déclaration positive du désir de l'Angleterre de voir la puissance du sultan se consolider, ont démenti complétement les rumeurs contraires que la Russie prenait dès long-temps à tâche d'accré-

diter, ont décidé l'évacuation d'Orfa, donné à l'Angleterre un avant-goût de l'influence que ses conseils judicieux pouvaient exercer en Orient, ont excité enfin parmi les Turcs un sentiment de profonde indignation contre la Russie, à laquelle ils ont attribué, à tort ou à raison, cette nouvelle machination de Méhémet.

A peine une première tentative, celle que nous venons de décrire, eut-elle échoué, qu'on en imagina de suite une autre, et qu'on la fit accepter avec empressement à la Porte. Il s'agissait de déterminer l'Angleterre à ôter à Méhémet-Ali sa flotte, et à la livrer au sultan. Si une menace de l'Angleterre a suffi pour porter Méhémet à évacuer Orfa, il est évident, disait-on, qu'il se reconnaît à la merci de l'Angleterre, et que l'Angleterre connaît aussi l'empire qu'elle peut exercer sur lui.

Or, d'où vient cet empire? Uniquement de ce que Méhémet possède une flotte. C'est donc la possession de cette flotte qui épuisait ses finances, déterminait ses opérations sur terre, et le soumettait à l'influence anglaise. Si on le dépouille de cette flotte, ses finances et sa position continentale s'amélioreront; il sortira

de sa dépendance vis-à-vis de l'Angleterre, tandis que, d'un autre côté, le pouvoir lui sera enlevé de renverser un jour le sultan *par un coup de main*, et l'arsenal de Constantinople s'augmentera d'un bon nombre de vaisseaux toujours à la disposition de la Russie. Tout cela devait être fait par l'Angleterre elle-même, à laquelle on crut pouvoir faire adopter la persuasion qu'elle résoudrait ainsi la question de Méhémet-Ali ainsi que celle de la Turquie.

Quelle opinion a donc la Russie de la sagacité de l'Angleterre? Quelle faiblesse matérielle ne trahit pas un gouvernement qui a dû et doit encore journellement tout son pouvoir et tous ses avantages à de pareilles machinations, à une pareille habitude de fourberie! Quelles découvertes honteuses lui seraient réservées si son adversaire, jusqu'ici sous l'empire d'une inconcevable panique, se déterminait enfin à poser une main de fer sur ce masque de Gorgone et cette peau de lion!

Pour revenir à Méhémet-Ali, rebelle à son souverain, tyran de son peuple, traître à sa foi, à sa nation et à son pays, il n'existe que parce qu'il est, d'un côté, l'instrument dont se

servent deux puissances étrangères ; de l'autre, parce qu'il gouverne un peuple trop docile pour jamais s'exaspérer, et une contrée trop riche pour s'épuiser. Méhémet-Ali a renouvelé l'ancienne politique de Joseph : il s'est rendu propriétaire du sol, des arbres, des troupeaux et de la population de l'Égypte : seulement il n'a pas fait de provision pour les mauvaises années. L'Égypte, par sa situation physique, est destinée à subir l'oppression la moins douce ; la domination étrangère y produisait toujours du bien, car c'était le seul contrôle possible de la tyrannie d'un seul ; bref, il faut reconnaître la vérité de l'ancien proverbe : *L'Égypte est un roseau brisé.*

Jusqu'à l'automne de 1834, la Russie paraît ne pas avoir même rêvé la possibilité d'avoir à essuyer une attaque du côté de la mer Noire ; elle paraît s'être reposée sur l'indifférence de l'Europe, et sur la suffisance de ses propres moyens relativement à ses projets. Depuis cette époque, elle paraît avoir acquis des lumières nouvelles ; elle s'est décidée à la construction

de vingt-cinq vaisseaux de ligne et de trente-cinq bâtiments de guerre d'une moindre dimension, et elle a commencé à élever de vastes ouvrages de fortification à Sébastopol. Ces faits n'ont pas besoin de commentaires. Ces vaisseaux ne peuvent être destinés qu'à déboucher du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, que la Russie ordonne qu'on nous ferme. Ces fortifications ne peuvent servir qu'à résister aux représailles que nous voudrions exercer. D'après l'état actuel des dépenses de la Russie, on peut juger que de pareils sacrifices ne se font que parce qu'on croit n'avoir plus de temps à perdre.

Aux faits dont nous venons de parler, joignons ce qui suit. Il est aujourd'hui clairement établi que le traité du 8 juillet est un pacte offensif contre l'Angleterre, et qu'il contient l'abrogation du traité qu'elle avait conclu en 1809 avec la Turquie.

Pendant l'année écoulée, l'influence anglaise à Constantinople s'est soutenue par la croyance que l'Angleterre serait forcée de prendre des mesures pour annuler le traité du 8 juillet, pour réprimer la Russie et pour réorganiser la Turquie. C'était la conviction de tout le

monde, car tout cela paraissait facile, systématique, nécessaire, et même inséparable des intérêts les plus évidents de l'Angleterre; et, quoiqu'elle eût jusque-là sacrifié la Turquie, on espéra qu'une nouvelle ère allait s'ouvrir à sa politique. Les Turcs jugent des nations par les représentants qu'elles leur envoient; et à une époque où, selon la routine ordinaire, nos relations diplomatiques avec la Turquie auraient dû cesser, ces relations se sont non seulement maintenues, mais encore sont parvenues à exercer, sur les conseils du gouvernement et sur les esprits des Turcs, une influence qui n'a jamais été plus puissante. Ce résultat, quoiqu'il fût obtenu par les efforts personnels du noble lord, qui joint à des vues dignes d'un homme d'État la sagacité politique et les manières courtoises les plus propres à représenter convenablement l'Angleterre chez une nation comme la nation turque, reposait cependant toujours sur la supposition que l'Angleterre allait enfin se décider à jouer le rôle que lui attribuent les espérances de tous les pays qui éprouvent ou craignent les effets de la prépon-

L'espoir dont nous parlons s'augmentait encore par la confiance qu'inspirait dans tout l'Orient l'union de la France et l'Angleterre.

On ne peut mieux prouver l'importance de cette union qu'en rapportant les peines que la Russie s'est données pour la représenter comme rompue. Son thème constant a été que la France et l'Angleterre sont déchirées par des factions à l'intérieur, et qu'elles sont désunies au dehors. La Russie répétait sans cesse : *La France est pour nous, son roi est pour nous!* Mais ces assertions se trouvaient en contradiction manifeste avec la conduite de l'amiral Roussin, qui, à chaque occasion, prenait soin de montrer son entière approbation de la marche adoptée par lord Ponsonby. On doit remarquer, à ce sujet, que les deux derniers ambassadeurs de France ont suivi, à Constantinople, une politique dictée par les véritables intérêts de leur patrie, quoique leur gouvernement ne paraisse pas avoir sanctionné cette politique.

La Russie parvint à trouver des moyens pour neutraliser les heureux effets de l'union des ambassadeurs. Un diplomate français (M. Bois-le-Comte), envoyé auprès de Méhémet-Ali,

partisan de la restauration et de la Russie, jadis sous-secrétaire d'État sous Polignac, arrive à Constantinople, est recommandé à la Porte par le ministre d'Autriche [1], comme le vrai représentant des vues du cabinet des Tuileries, et saisit chaque occasion de désapprouver la conduite de l'ambassadeur de sa nation, et de manifester sa conviction sur la nécessité d'une union intime entre la France et la Russie, union que les soins de ce diplomate (on se le disait à l'oreille) devaient précisément amener.

[1] Presque tous les agents de la diplomatie européenne à Constantinople sont à la disposition de la Russie. La puissance que cela lui assure est incalculable. C'est par des récits mensongers que la Russie s'assure vis-à-vis des Turcs une supériorité à laquelle on les entraîne à croire aveuglément. Et comment n'y croiraient-ils pas, puisque aucun des agents européens ne contredit jamais la Russie ? Les légations d'Autriche, de Prusse, de Hollande, de Sardaigne et de Naples ont servi jusqu'à ce jour la Russie, comme si elles en étaient payées. La France a agi pour et contre. Les drogmans sont, comme de raison, pour la puissance qui paie. Le salaire du drogman de France ne lui assure pas les moyens d'une existence convenable à sa position. La Suède et le Danemarck, anciens archi-adversaires de la Russie, ne sont représentés ici, à l'endroit vital de leurs intérêts et peut-être de leur indépendance, que par des Francs, des habitants de Péra ! Le drogman anglais est le frère du drogman de la Russie.

Mais il serait superflu de s'étendre sur l'importance des raisons qui font souhaiter à la Russie son union avec la France, et les différentes facilités qu'elle trouve pour l'accomplissement de ce dessein. L'union avec la France donne à la Russie tout le temps nécessaire de fermer les Dardanelles, la rend, de cette sorte, plus puissante que son alliée, tandis que le seul fait d'une pareille alliance soulève les haines du peuple français contre son gouvernement, et précipite ce pays dans une sorte de guerre civile.

Nous croyons que si l'Angleterre eût agi lorsque dans sa propre conviction elle eût indubitablement entraîné la France dans son alliance, tous ces dangers eussent été évités. Déjà, peut-être, la désunion de la France et l'Angleterre, à laquelle la Russie tâchait si fort de faire croire en Orient, s'est-elle vraiment réalisée dans l'Occident. Dût-il en être ainsi, il faut encore agir pour résoudre cette nouvelle complication, quand même la Turquie ne se présenterait que comme le seul champ clos où la décision de l'Angleterre puisse forcément amener le gouvernement français à prendre un

parti. Au fait, tous les soins pour débrouiller les complications européennes nous mènent aux Dardanelles comme à la cause et à la solution des difficultés ; et c'est bien naturel, non seulement parce que cette position est la première sous le rapport politique et militaire, mais aussi parce que sa possession, sa prochaine possession, *est devenue une nécessité d'existence* pour le gouvernement le plus habile en Europe, dont les agents écoutent, parlent à l'oreille, raisonnent, imposent, paient, trompent, flattent ou menacent, dans tous les clubs, toutes les assemblées, toutes les cours, tous les bureaux de la presse européenne, y prennent tour à tour les couleurs légitimistes, républicaines, carlistes, pédristes, jésuites, protestantes, orangistes, tories ou radicales ; de manière que l'Europe ne saurait échapper à ce contrôle et à la prépondérance qu'il prépare, qu'en prenant un poste fixe à Constantinople, et en en faisant le point de départ de sa politique.

Il n'y a qu'une seule voie pour sortir de toutes ces complications, pour effectuer notre union avec la France, pour détacher l'Autriche et la

Prusse de la Russie, pour rétablir la Pologne, pour résoudre la question d'Egypte, pour maintenir l'indépendance de la Grèce, notre ouvrage, pour conserver les droits de l'île de Samos, que nous avons garantis (toutes ces questions, d'une importance si diverse, se lient à une seule qui réagira sur une paroisse comme sur un empire), pour sauver la Turquie, pour assurer l'indépendance des Circassiens, pour défendre l'intégrité de la Perse, pour préserver les Indes d'une nouvelle invasion de barbares; et cette voie, c'est l'apparition du pavillon et des canons anglais sur cette partie de notre élément, dont la Russie a prétendu, un peu trop tôt, pouvoir nous exclure.

Si le gouvernement français a passé à l'ennemi naturel et nécessaire de son pays, l'Angleterre se trouve dans une nécessité encore plus impérative d'agir sans aucun retard. Auparavant, le fait de l'union de la France et de l'Angleterre pouvait inspirer à la Russie un respect qui n'existerait plus dans le cas contraire, la France devenant comme l'Autriche, un instrument des efforts que la Russie fait pour nous endormir, un organe qui lui ap-

prendrait le secret de nos décisions, un masque commode pour cacher ses desseins. Que l'Angleterre ne s'imagine pas un seul moment que l'apostasie de la France puisse rendre la solution de la question d'Orient soit incertaine, soit plus difficile : la chose ne serait que simplifiée. Si l'Angleterre connaissait sa force, elle verrait qu'elle n'a pas besoin d'alliés. Peut-être le seul mot de *guerre*, substitué au mot trop souvent employé de *paix*, mettrait une fin à la prolongation de la crise européenne, et si l'on avait besoin de quelque chose de plus que de ce mot et de la détermination de le faire suivre d'effets, la destruction d'un seul arsenal, *faible et très exposé*, quoi qu'on en ait dit sous ce rapport, suffirait pour ôter à la Russie les moyens de nuire, qui nous auraient obligés à lui faire la guerre ; car, qu'avons-nous à faire avec cette puissance, sinon de prévenir son intervention active à l'égard d'un pays où elle n'a dominé que parce qu'elle a réussi à s'y assurer notre appui ?

Mais que dire du gouvernement français, qui se creuse un tombeau au mépris des leçons encore vivantes et fatales qui ont amené la

chute des gouvernements qui l'ont précédé! La Russie offre au nouveau chef de la France de le faire admettre au rang des souverains légitimes; elle peut le tenter encore par d'autres avantages, tels qu'une union continentale contre le commerce anglais et la domination française sur toute la côte d'Afrique, y compris l'Égypte, objets d'une ambition traditionnelle, en quelque sorte, chez les Français. Mais est-ce donc pour cela que le roi Louis-Philippe signerait sa propre destruction par le seul fait de son union avec la Russie (si toutefois cette union pouvait même jamais être menée à terme), sacrifierait son alliance avec l'Angleterre, son influence en Italie, sa dignité partout, afin de permettre à la Russie d'occuper Constantinople, ce qui donnerait naissance à un tout nouvel ordre de choses et amènerait la ruine de l'ordre de choses existant!

Il est singulier que la France ne se rappelle pas, pour son propre avantage, qu'il y a eu un Napoléon, dont l'ambition et la volonté d'airain ont sans doute pu faire du mal, mais dont l'esprit supérieur saisissait avec la précision de l'instinct toutes les combinaisons politiques. La

France peut-elle oublier que Napoléon, quoique en guerre avec l'Angleterre et allié de la Russie, ne voulut jamais consentir à ce que cette dernière puissance prît possession des Dardanelles, quoique en retour elle lui eût prêté son appui pour soumettre le reste de l'Europe à sa domination continentale? Peut-elle oublier que celui qui étendit l'empire de la France dans toutes les directions, qui l'éleva au faîte de la grandeur, qui méprisa la Russie restant dans ses vieilles limites, jugea cependant que la seule possession des Dardanelles assurerait à cette puissance barbare une prépondérance, que même son empire ne pourrait désormais lui ravir? Toute la vie politique de Napoléon prouve combien il tenait à cette conviction; il l'inséra dans le testament politique qu'il a laissé à son pays, et il en fit un avertissement pour l'Europe dans ces paroles dignes de fixer l'attention de tout homme éclairé : *Mon nom sera prononcé avec respect, quand la partie méridionale de l'Europe sera devenue la proie des barbares du Nord.*

FIN.

INTRODUCTION.

The Ottoman Empire is vexed with new convulsions. On this theatre, loaded with guilt and misery, crowded with passions and spectres, another drama is rehearsed with new personages, and in a new tongue. Another is to be added to the number of the agonized.

It was Greece; it was Circassia; it was Egypt; it was Syria; it was Wallachia. Now it is Serbia. Another element of discord is brought to life in Turkey,—a new source of danger is opened for Europe.

Has misfortune brought no instruction? Has perfidy unmasked, aroused no abhorrence, and revealed subserviency brought no shame? Are the powerful of the earth for ever to remain willing to be duped by the artful, unworthy to be touched by the prayer of the just, or the struggles of the brave?

Again, for the hundredth time, unprepared, a new catastrophe falls upon us. Europe, the mighty the benignant, the Christian, again appears before the altar, bedewed with the blood and tears of nations, to bind another struggling victim, and to bewail the sacrifice!

Circassia was a fable of the olden time; Greece, a scholastic dream; Egypt, a desert phantom—

words repeated because of their pleasing imagery; —they touched us only in fancy, we knew them as thoughts, cared for them (if cared for) only as rights; they did not dwell among us, they were not portions of us;—they could be agonized without pain to us,—they *might* be extinguished, and we not suffer. Not so this new suppliant that it pleases Russia to torture, and Europe to spurn. She dwells in the midst of us; and she is not alone—she is one of many. Others have warned you—she can threaten. Prostrate before her enemy, she may yet avenge herself on her betrayer. Millions whom you know not yet, will suffer in her sufferings, share in her revenge, and on the Goths, repay her present betrayal in desolation and in blood.

And what is the sacrifice required by Russia, and enforced by Europe? That a prince shall be dethroned, the will of a people annulled; and this is required, not by a sovereign or a compatriot; but by an alien—an alien and a despot! this is imposed, not required. There is no pretext of right to cloak submission, no convulsion to disguise usurpation. None are guilty; all are united; and where freedom was perfect to-day, slavery is commanded to-morrow. Princely prerogative, popular rights are laid prostrate by a foreign whisper, and that whisper falls like lightning in a clear sky, in the midst of tranquillity, confidence, and contentment. One stern, commanding, irresistible behest requires the tranquil sceptre to be broken, and the blood-bought charter to be rent, all human affections to be smothered in their breasts, dignity to be driven forth from the land; it declares that rights and law

are dead in Serbia, and that henceforth, the will of a foreign despot is to rule in their stead.

Such is the sacrifice required, and if it is not obtained it will not be because of England's honesty or sense. This sacrifice is required by Serbia's *protector;* it is required by a government adorned with the epithets "European," "civilized," "Christian." Such are the acts of a government into the sincerity of whose words an English minister declares it not to be for the public interest of Great Britain to enquire. Such are the pretensions which England sanctions, and lends her minister's voice to defend,* her moral influence to accomplish.

If there be yet so much of manhood left in British hearts as to pity the struggling patriot, or to detest the cowardly aggressor, oh! may not such sacred thoughts fruitlessly blossom, and uselessly fade. Pity will avail nothing for those, detestation effect nothing against these. Not so, if we turned home, and inwards, and knew that it was England that we had alike to pity and detest—pity for her present shame, and her future fate—detest for her crimes, which are Serbia's danger, and Russia's strength.

The England that betrays the one, and serves the other, is in each man's breast—who lives unconscious of the duties that belong to a lofty station. Justice will be vindicated and security restored only when each Englishman finds in himself the victim he has

* See Allgem. Zeit. June 30th. An Austrian writer protests, *for the sake of future contingencies,* against Sir Robert Peel's declaration, *that Russia's pretensions were founded in right.* See Lord Aberdeen's speech.

to rescue, and the criminal he has to retrieve—were but England to know what England does, England would soon become England again.

Hitherto the benevolence of Europe has been invoked to protect a Christian people from the ruthless infidel; now Europe is startled at the sight of a Christian people sheltering itself beneath that infidel's charities. This was a sight to astonish, and to arrest it in its course, but Europe having wondered, nevertheless proceeds as heretofore.

While Serbia, unlike Circassia or Greece, does really dwell in Europe, Europe comprehends it still less than those names so much misused and so little understood. Serbia was a great and powerful kingdom when Muscovy was composed of distracted provinces, and while Poland was yet an unuttered name. She now stands pre-eminent among the Sarmatian race unincorporated with the Russian empire. She is the centre within that great family of *Slaav resistance* to Muscovite *despotism*, and presents to Europe its chief security against *Russian* ambition. Upon the maintenance of the fealty of the Serbians to their sovereign depends whether that resistance shall endure or that ambition be triumphant. That fealty broken, convulsion is let in only to be appeased when the Slaavs shall be united under one crown, obey one will, and wield one sword.

Wide as is this range of interests assailed, deep as is this fountain of sympathies opened by the distraction of Serbia, these are not the only dangers entailed or passions roused. The blow levelled at this humble province of tributary Christians falls upon the rigid majesty of an empire, and in the

indignity put upon the foresters of the Morava, humiliation is heaped upon the most ancient dynasty of Europe.

In the patriotism and pride of the Turk lies the life of the Ottoman empire and the defence of Constantinople; they are the garrison of that seat of empire, and by their depression alone will it, or can it, ever be occupied. On them shame is heaped in the indignity poured upon the line of Othman, whom a Muscovite commands to betray and torture his faithful and unoffending subjects. It was the capture of that metropolis and fastness, of that arsenal and emporium, that made half a million of Turks so long the terror of Europe and of Asia, and masters of so large a portion of the one and the other. Descending from the Sarmatian wastes, and transferring thither the stores of Sevastopol, Russia plunges her hand into the South, grasping its vital parts. Then will she hold the ways that connect every region of the old world, and the channels that supply food and raiment to every people from the Adriatic to the Caspian—and thus unassailable and terribly armed, all surrounding things must fall beneath her sway. This is the mighty adamant that lures her on—this the possession which the convulsion of Serbia above all other events will hasten and ensure.

Serbia shewed herself worthy of our admiration by the courage which she displayed in the day of trial, and by the moderation which she evinced in the hour of victory. No less remarkable nor admirable is the sagacity with which she has estimated

her present position; and wonderfully has that simple and illiterate people, described as "semi-barbarous," known how to conciliate moderation with dignity, and to combine respect for their sovereign authority and for their own rights. The following words exhibit at once the picture of their state and the faculties of their mind:—"We can-"not allow that the Porte entertains either the "will to oppress us, or the disposition to make con-"cessions at our expense." "It is our first duty to "prevent the bonds that attach us *de jure* to the "Sultan from being the means of subjugating us *de* "*facto* to Russia." "It is not from the strength of "Turkey that we have to fear, it is from her weak-"ness that we have to apprehend."

Had there been ill-will between them and the Sultan, there would have been for illicit interference the pretext of "*the independence of the Ottoman Empire.*" Had there been instances of lawlessness —the pretext of "*revolutionary principles;*"—had they been inveigled into the slenderest show of appeal to the enemy of their sovereign, then would have come in "*community of faith and race,*"—"rights of man," &c. the whole catalogue of Muscovite philanthropy. But the Serbians had no contest of succession, no warring doctrines of government, no factions struggling for power; there was no invitation to the foreigner, no aggression against the neighbour, no despotism, no tumult. Alas! this avails them nothing, and as there is nothing to protect them against—and yet Russia has doomed them to protection—it is against *informality* when most

formal that they are to be shielded! This at least leaves to the coadjutors of Russia no veil for their accompliceship, no covering for their cruelty.

Serbia teaches Europe the most important truths, presents the most valuable support, offers the worthiest example. She places the cabinets of Europe, too, in the impossibility of siding against her, without becoming the foes of legitimate rights, of public law, of their own faith, of Turkish independence, and of Serbian loyalty.

In former insurrectionary operations, Russia's action was limited to the population worked upon, and she was herself no ways endangered or compromised. In the case of Serbia she is interested, not only as advancing projects, but as preventing danger.

In previous commotions, in the Ottoman Empire, there have been but two powers directly interested —Turkey and Russia. The question brought to issue in Serbia affects Austria for evil and for good, as deeply and as directly as it does Turkey.

When it was told in Europe that Austria had supported Russia, it was not believed. Austria was known to apprehend the progress of Russia, and therefore it seemed incredible that she should step forward to support her in the heaviest blow yet dealt upon the Ottoman Empire, and the nearest to herself. They ought to have read Austria's subserviency in Russia's daring!

The Sultan was firm,—the Divan not corrupted, —there was no convulsion. It was not then secretly in the East that she could proceed, *but violently through Europe;* for this purpose she must have

reckoned first on Austria—Austria being opposed, the attempt was hopeless, concurring success was ensured. It was not that Austria had ceased to fear Russia, but that she had become fearful of Serbia. It was not that Muscovite ambition had become less alarming without, but that Slaav independence had become all at once terrible within.

The Serbians abandoned by Turkey, and feared by Austria, will feel that against Russia they shall obtain no protection throughout the world; they must then look to her protection against Austria, already hostile, and Turkey which will soon be made so: out of her own aggressions, does she work a position of protectorate,—shewing first that she alone has the power to do evil—and then shewing that she alone has the will to do good. The Serbians, ultimately driven into ambition by despair, and rebellion by necessity, will provoke from these Governments acts that shall close the door to reconciliation. Then will be let in a new order of things. Russian treasures will not be expended, her blood will not be spilt, yet thirty millions of the subjects of other states will be drawn within the vortex of this convulsion.*

The antipathies of race, the fanaticism of religion, the exasperation of political principles, will contribute their separate strength and venom to contaminate and destroy. Those independent Slavonic populations, now presenting in their hatred to Russia and their love of freedom, the means to

* Emissaries from the Russian consulate at Belgrade, seized by the Serbian Government, were proclaiming restoration of Prince Michel as "*King of Illyria.*"

Europe of security and peace, even before they have become her subjects, will Russia prostrate; the Ottoman and Austrian empires, and the remainder of Europe, will have been convulsed and ruined to her hand before it is assailed.

I shadow forth the ends and objects of a power, who has evinced as much judgment in forming her plans as ability in executing them. I shadow them forth, in order that they may be prevented. They are arrested from the moment that one of the cabinets of Europe withdraws itself from the entanglements of diplomatic bonds; and again may be frustrated severally and conjointly by the bearing and conduct of the Serbians and the Porte. She cannot succeed, unless she separately reduces to subserviency each of the cabinets of Europe; unless she leads the Serbians into injudicious acts, and the Porte into either despair or injustice.

By judicious and persevering misrepresentation, Europe was brought to the belief that Turkey was decrepid; that Serbia, bound to the enemy of Turkey by race, language, and faith, was united to her in sympathies and designs. Turkey has been shewn, in acts that cannot be misrepresented, independent and firm; Serbia has shewn that she knows Russia,—that she knows Turkey, and therefore detests the one and respects the other.

Scarcely have these consolatory discoveries been made, when Europe learns that Russia has triumphed over the resistance of the Porte which she had provoked, and over the abhorrence of the Serbians which she had aroused. Was then that independence a dream, or that abhorrence a pre-

text? or was Russia powerful to trample the separate resistance, and to break the conjoint opposition? Alas! for shame and sorrow. It was the Governments of Europe that achieved for her the victory, by which the people of Europe are degraded, endangered, saddened, and debased. And *when* accomplished? When every deception had been unmasked; when every facility for comprehension and resistance was afforded. When you had found Russia treacherous, Turkey independent, Serbia peaceful and loyal. Alas! that was the moment you took to disbelieve the evidence of treachery, to assail the dignity of independence, to extinguish peace and law! Nor is this the worst we have to expect, when darkling and dishonest ignorance presumes to engage in a trial of cunning with the mature designs of foreseeing knowledge and malignant wisdom.

These results have not then been obtained because Europe was weak and powerless, or after virtuous and patriotic efforts attempted in vain. These have been obtained, as the future consequences will be *because* it has strength. It will be subdued, because it has made efforts; its strength and its efforts given to its foe against its friend, for its own destruction.

It is not then Russia that we have to fear, it is ourselves that we have to dread; it is our acts that are terrible; not by the will to injure, but because we know not what we do, and heed not what is done.

That such wrong should be perpetrated, and the world thus tortured through our means, may make us indeed sorrow and lament; but the evil being

done, it should rejoice us to discover that the source of it lies in ourselves.

Had this evil and danger proceeded from her strength, then would our case be desperate, cure impossible, and enquiry unavailing; as it is, knowledge may yet be of use, and repentance may avail. Our danger is in our crimes, our crimes are in our ignorance. Knowledge will bring repentance, and repentance safety.

July 12th.

Intelligence has reached us of the conclusion of the Serbian affair in the most satisfactory manner,* namely,—that the re-election of Prince Alexander has taken place—that it has been without tumult—that no competitor has even ventured to appear—that the illegal requirements of the Porte (in deference to Russia) have been set aside—that the Serbian ministers have not been removed—that no Russian regency has been appointed—that Austria has supported no candidate—that no quarrel had been established between Serbia and the Porte—and no protection claimed by the former from Russia. It may then be said,—"all the dangers you apprehended have vanished—Russia has only revealed powerless-

* The Augsburg Gazette thus announces the result :—

"Belgrade, 27th June.—Prince Alexander has been re-elected "to-day, by the unanimous consent of the Serbian Assembly. "It is indeed but a repetition of the election of September last, "with the difference of *its taking place in the presence of the "two Russian Commissioners, Baron Lieven and M. Wast-"chenko.*"

ness. By the exposure of her sinister purposes she has linked the Serbians and the Porte together, and inspired both with salutary detestation."

I reply.

If Russia has not worked *local* troubles and *present* convulsion out of this diplomatic drama, unparalleled, even in her annals in ability, and even ours in baseness, it is not because England has resisted her usurpations, or been wanting in civilities and service. The results obtained in Serbia I claim as our victory against England as well as Russia. *We* —those who oppose Russia—whether Englishmen, Frenchmen, Turks, Serbians, or Poles,—we have succeeded for the first time in counteracting her. This is no secret which I reveal—she knows it—she proclaims it, for she *accuses* us. It may, nevertheless, be a curiosity that will touch even the incuriousness of 1843, to hear that some Poles, and Turks, and Serbians, and a few members of European nations have been earnestly and in common engaged at Belgrade, Constantinople, Paris, London, and Vienna, in thwarting the recent attempt of Russia to convulse Serbia, and have been successful. For the first time has such a concert been called into existence, through it the immediate and local danger has been averted. Now it becomes a question of restoring *the right*. Serbia has triumphed; and against fearful odds. Let her, let Europe, reap the fruits of her victory.

England's Minister looked only to get rid of difficulties, and was ready to support whoever was successful—Russia or Serbia. At first thinking Russia strong, and expecting her to succeed, *he quibbled*

about her right, but supported her pretensions. Now that she is beaten, he may take courage to declare that she had no right, and cannot, in the next convulsion she stirs up, appeal to England's sanction of her assumed right to interference.

These pages, written when all was in jeopardy, and commenced while England was but Russia's mere instrument, are published with the view of aiding in this endeavour, for which the occasion is auspicious, for whatever there may be to deplore, at Vienna, Paris, and London, there has at least been no indication of bad faith, or of any intention of wilful error in the leading Members of these cabinets.

Unless this be done, Russia, not Serbia, will have triumphed. She will have acquired the right (in the eyes of Europe) to interfere in the affairs of Serbia, as in those of Wallachia and Moldavia. Her present discomfiture will amount merely to a momentary repulse, but she will have obtained through it the faculty of investing the fortress. To drive her out of the field it is only requisite to assert against her her own treaty of Adrianople. Then, indeed, her first retrograde step will have been made. Are the statesmen of Europe worthy of such honour, will they be terrified at such success!

DISTRIBUTION OF THE SUBJECT.

The subject with which we have to deal may be divided into three heads.

I. The people of Serbia and their country; their connection, former and present, with the Turkish Government; their internal constitution, and the influence exercised over them up to the present time by Russia.

This portion of the subject may be considered HISTORICAL.

II. The grounds, means, and ends, of Russia's interference. The rights and duties of other Powers, constitute the DIPLOMATIC portion.

III. There belongs to Serbia an interest of a novel order, by its appertaining to the great Slaav family constituted of Russia, Poland, and a large portion of Europe. The influence of Russia, through this community of origin and thought, over Serbia, and through Serbia over the Slavonic portion of Europe, intimately connects the condition of Serbia with the *Slaavs* and what is called *Slavism*.

I shall, therefore, add to the Historical and Diplomatic Parts an outline of Slaav history, and of the present position and dispositions of the SLAAV POPULATION OF EUROPE.

PART I.

HISTORY OF SERBIA.

HISTORY OF SERBIA.

CHAPTER I.

HISTORY OF SERBIA, FROM THE ENTRANCE OF THE TURKS INTO EUROPE, UNTIL THE SUBJUGATION BY THEM OF THE SERBIAN KINGDOM.

SINCE the rupture of the Empire of Charlemagne, no great change has taken place amongst the nations of Europe. To the west of the Pyrenees the Spaniards, to the south of the Alps the Italians, the Germans on the east of the Rhine, the British on their island, in the north the Scandinavians and the French in the centre of Europe, have remained for a thousand years, dwelling where they dwelt, confined by the same seas, and folded in by the same mountains. There are at present no open or secret movements, preparing within the one against the other to shake or to subdue. Not one of these nations has to fear from another that it shall be overwhelmed by military power, disorganized by secret art, or trodden down by numbers. Not so in the East. During the same period changes have occurred, and now changes threaten. The fall of the Greek Empire.—The fall of Poland. Another catastrophe, the fall of Turkey, is apprehended. Have these changes been assisted or effected by human strength or design? Has any one state

profited by these catastrophes? Will any state profit by that catastrophe which threatens? These changes in the East, may they not affect Western Europe, for so many centuries hitherto unshaken? The replies are easy and converge in one point. The two former catastrophes were effected by human strength and by concerted plan. That one, (the fall of Turkey), which is now threatened, is laboured for and will profit those that have already worked the fall of the Greek Empire and of Poland. It was the Slaavs that broke the power of the Empire of the East, and it was Russia that laid claim to its inheritance. It was Russia who, (assisted by Europe), wrought the fall of Poland, and who, with the same assistance, is preparing that of Turkey. These changes in the East, if suffered to be accomplished by Europe, must affect most gravely its condition; but as it is not by external strength, but by internal operations on its people, that those results are to be brought about, it is possible to anticipate or to prevent them, only by acquaintance with the populations which are the persons of the drama, and with the countries which are its theatre.

In adjusting our minds to the magnitude of the consequences to the human race, of the operations undertaken on the minute field we are about to examine, it must be held in view, that the fall of one Empire is not the limit of admitted danger. Two other states simultaneously sink when Turkey sinks—Persia and Austria.

The Serbians thus become of the deepest importance, by the country they inhabit, and the race

to which they belong. Among the Slaavs they stand next in rank to the Poles, and to their mountains is now transferred the struggle that lately bedewed with blood the plains of Poland, and that still water them with tears.

Serbia, with the confining districts which it commands, has been the centre of the dominion of all those military populations that have ravaged Europe. The Huns, the Avars, the Hungarians, the Bulgarians, have each in turn placed their royal camp in this region.

The Turks, when they invaded the Eastern empire, found it not inhabited by Greeks, but almost exclusively by populations of Slaav origin. The habit of designating the Eastern empire by the name of Greek, has left on us an erroneous impression of its structure. The empire was Roman, and the Greeks were only the officials, and did not constitute its people. In the earliest times, and during the height of Hellenic greatness, the Greeks extended no higher to the north, than Mount Olympus, and their settlements in Macedonia and Thrace amounted only to a few colonies upon the coast. The original Illyrian, Macedonian, and Thracian* tribes constituted the population of the Roman empire in the East. They, in common with the Greeks, suffered loss by the various invasions of northern tribes, and were then successively recruited from these stocks—Celt, Goth, and Tatar. Finally, the Slaav settlements and invasions first

* The Thracks and Dhaks (Dacians), are claimed by recent Slavian writers as compatriots.

destroyed, and then re-constituted the population of the Eastern empire.* With the exception of a small district on the Adriatic, between the rivers of Berat and Janina, which is occupied by the Skipitars, the city of Constantinople, and the Greek cities on the coast, the whole region constituting European Turkey, south of the Danube, was settled by Slaavs, or subjugated to them. Even in Greece Proper, Slavian conquest and colonies had displaced the original population; and the peasants round Athens at the present day, as those round Constantinople, are not only of Slavian blood, but speak the language of Russia.

When the Turks entered Europe, they came as the protectors of the Greek capital of Constantinople, against the Slavian kingdoms and people of Bulgaria and Serbia. But the Turks came in very small numbers; and, taking the population south of the Danube, from the Black Sea on one side, and the Adriatic on the other, down to the Egean, the non-Slaav population does not amount altogether to more than one-half of the Slaavs; the first, (Greeks, Albanians, and Turks) constituting about four millions; the latter, (Serbians, Bulgarians, Croatians, Morlakes, Montinegrians, Bosnians,) to nearly eight millions.

On the ruin of the Bulgarian kingdom in the tenth century, as elsewhere related,† that of Serbia rose to importance; it existed under one dynasty for

* In the single reign of Justinian, the numbers in life sacrificed, or in captives carried to the north of the Danube, by the Serbians and Bulgarians, is estimated at six millions.

† See *postea*, ancient history of the Slavians.

220 years; it extended from the further limit of Transylvania, over a portion of Hungary, down then to the Adriatic, through Macedonia to the Egean, and then across Thrace to the shores of the Black Sea. It established an independent patriarchate, and as its Bulgarian predecessor had assumed the title of Emperor of the Romans, so did the King of Serbia assume the title of Emperor of the Slaavs. Its most remarkable sovereign Dushan died when he was preparing a great expedition for the siege of Constantinople, and revered by his nation as a great and just prince, he is distinguished among great sovereigns as a lawgiver. One of the most valuable records of the second infancy of Europe, and the highest claim which Serbia possesses to our respect, is the code of laws framed under this prince.

The people was warlike, but disorderly. Their dominion was extended, but its bonds were lax and fluctuating. The authority of the sovereign great, when the wearer of the crown was so, but the character of the government was feudal, and its barons as turbulent as brave.

The Serbians, as the remainder of the Slavonian race, took no part in the Crusades.

It was the number and power of the Serbians and Bulgarians that broke the Greek Empire; it was the Turks that profited by their work and by its fall. The first progress of the Ottomans towards the possession of Constantinople, was, by the increase of their power in Asia, the results of the victories of the Crusaders; the Turks, called into Europe in part as a protection of the Greek Empire against them,

subdued both them and the Greek Empire; that is to say, that the blows struck by the Crusaders upon Constantinople, upon Nissa, the breaking down by them of the strength of the Greek Empire and the Turkish Seljuks, afforded occasions of change, which neither Seljuks nor Greeks had the power of remodelling to their own advantage, from which the Slaavs had not the capacity to profit, and which enabled the Ottomans, by the difference of their own character, to make their way to greatness and dominion, alike against their Turkish compeers, their Greek protegés, and their Slavian antagonists.

The first entrance of the Turks into Serbia was in 1308. A small body of them had landed in Byzantium, and beaten a detachment of imperial troops that had ravaged Thrace—and these marauders, not defeated, but breaking up amongst themselves—a portion of them offered their services to the King of Serbia. A thousand horsemen, and five hundred foot soldiers were by him colonized in Serbia.

In the year 1334 we find the Serbians and the Turks united against the Greek Emperor, and a campaign of Andronicus against the Serbians thwarted by a descent of the Turks on Chalcidide.

At this period curious relations are found subsisting between the Serbians, the Turks, and the Greek Empire. The Slaavs of Serbia and Bulgaria on the one hand, and the Turks of Brussa and Iconium on the other, forming countervailing alliances and leagues with the rival aspirants for power at Constantinople; so that one of the Slavian with one of the Turkish principalities was leagued with one of the parties at Constantinople, against the

other Slavian and Turkish prince with the other party at Constantinople. At this time there was further intermarriages, connecting the different princely houses of the Slaavs, the Greeks, and the Turks.

The seeds of future greatness, sown during the reign of Urcan, suddenly blossomed after the succession of Murat the First. The small body of Ottoman shepherds, who had been struggling their way into political existence against the Turkish tribes of Asia, the Greek empire, and the Slavian population of Europe, seemed now at once to consolidate itself within and to expand without. The young Sultan, in two successive campaigns, made himself master of the keys and the centres of Roumelia and Anatolia,—Adrianople and Angora. The Turkish power now extended to the Slavian frontiers; the Serbian King saw that he must be its next victim, or its conqueror. We might now expect a strict alliance between the Serbians and the Greeks against the common danger; but, on the contrary, the Greeks seemed delighted with the establishment of the Turks at Adrianople. Fearing more the Bulgarians and Serbians, they felt sheltered rather than endangered by the growth of Turkish strength, and by its circling settlements around their capital, from the Black Sea to the Archipelago.

The conquest of Adrianople was soon followed by that of Philipopolis. The Greek governor of that city took refuge amongst the Serbians, and urged the king of that people, Urosch the Fifth, to declare war against the Turks. At this period appeared

an enclytic from Pope Urban V., calling the Christians to a crusade against the Mussulmans, and warning Europe against the danger of this sudden growth and westerly direction of the Ottoman power. A league was consequently formed between the Princes of Hungary, Bosnia, and Wallachia, with that of Serbia. Murat, at this period, was prosecuting a precarious warfare against the Turkish princes of Asia. The allies, seizing the favourable juncture, suddenly marched an army of 20,000 men upon his then European capital, Adrianople, expecting to find it an easy prey. Their design was anticipated, as their attack; their camp was attacked and forced during the night, on the banks of the Maritza, and those who escaped the sword perished in the stream. The scene of this first struggle between Serbia and the Turks still retains the name of the "Slaughter of the Serbians" (1363).

The Sultan does not seem to have sought vengeance for this assault, but the state of warfare continued, and ten years later we find the Kings of Serbia and Bulgaria beaten again by the same Turkish general at Samakov.

The mountains of the Balkan formed a rampart in face of the Turks, from behind it the Serbians and Bulgarians could launch, in comparative security, marauding expeditions, to it they could retreat when opposed or beaten. The Turks, defeating them with ease on the plains, had not yet been able to assault these defences. The victory of Samakov enabled the Turks to effect their first

lodgment on this rampart, by the occupation of Gioustandil.*

Bulgaria and Serbia are protected by a chain of mountains extending from the Black Sea to Illyria and Epirus. These mountains were formerly known under the names of Hemus, Orbelus, and Soardius, and now by that of Balkan, Egrisotag and Tschartag. There is again a rampart which divides Bulgaria from Serbia, so that there is a succession of defences for the Serbians, in two barriers of mountains, presenting their abutments to the east and south, and furnished with a numerous garrison of tribes of the same origin as themselves, that had to be subdued before they could be assailed. Von Hammer says, "The Paleologues instead of making use of the Balkans as a powerful rampart against the invasions of the Bulgarians and Serbians, pushed their imprudence and blindness so far as to implore the succours of these very people against their exterior and interior enemies. Thus all the battles fought by the Ottomans on the Hebrus and the Tainarus were fought, properly speaking, not against the Greeks, but against the Bulgarians and the Serbians."

The Austrian writer, as is usual with him, reverses the order of things. These mountains were the possessions and were the fastnesses of the Serbians and the Bulgarians; and it was because they possessed them that they could not be used against them. It was because they possessed them, that the Greek Emperors had to fear foreign foes, and

* A city founded by Justinian, celebrated for the beauty of its site, the freshness of its springs, and for the otto of roses.

to dread internal disunion. The aggressive value of these mountains was not felt by M. V. Hammer, because they are now possessed by populations that only seek to maintain their own independence, and who assail no one. The mountains of Serbia would indeed have been available for the protection of the Greek as actually of the Turkish empire, had they appertained to it *de facto*, and had that people been united to it by sympathies.

The Slaavs were thus the important population of the Eastern empire, and Serbia was their stronghold. The establishment of the Ottoman dominion in Europe depended upon their power to resist, and on their strength when subdued. Murat the First laid the foundations of Ottoman greatness in Asia and in Europe. It was he who established those military colonies of Turks, Albanians and Greeks, that have constituted up to the present time the military frame-work of the Ottoman government. The disposition of his troops on the field was likewise become, for the Ottomans, their rule and model. These collateral evidences of his genius give value to his operations against the Serbians, as these operations exhibit the high estimate, in the man most qualified to judge, of the military strength of those tribes and positions which now again are assuming importance in the affairs of the world.

He had received from the Serbians an outrage the most flagrant. They had, unprovoked, marched an army to assault his capital. He had, however, deferred his vengeance for ten years, during which time he was actively engaged in securing the positions he had gained in Asia. It was only after he

had deprived the Serbians of allies in Asia, and given to himself the strength of such alliances by reducing the Turkish princes there to the condition of tributaries that he turned his face against the mountains of Roumeli. The plan of his operations was of an extent which indicated the importance of the enterprise; they extended from the Danube to the Gulph of Thessalonica. Three armies were at once set in motion, one directing itself to Southern Macedonia so as to take the mountains of Roumeli in the rear, one to the banks of the Danube so as to take them in flank, and one was to assault them in front. Murat himself commanded the body that attacked Nissa;* while the expeditions to the right and left restrained the separate principalities from the possibility of common action, and reduced them to a separate defence. The Serbians had no armies to bring into the plains, their strength resided in the nature of the country. The Turks had to assault them there, and simultaneously to assail Upper Macedonia, Serbia, and Bulgaria. They could assail them only after being in possession of Thrace, Lower Macedonia, and the country extending as far as Philipopolis. It was after these conquests, and with the increased means which they afforded, that this difficult and hazardous enterprise was undertaken, and the assault simultaneously made from Thrace, from the Lower Danube and Macedonia, extending over a line of 800 miles.

* Birthplace of Constantine. It was one of the most important fortresses of the Greek empire. It was fortified under Manuel Commene at the same time as Belgrade.

No sooner was Nissa carried than the resistance of the Slaavs fell before the different expeditions of the Turks. Lazar obtained peace, paying tribute, and furnishing a body of cavalry to the Turkish service. Bulgaria obtained peace without tribute. This success was followed by several years of peace, during which time Murat occupied himself in the establishment of that order, both of the army and of the administration, which constituted the mould of the Turkish empire.

A few years afterwards Macedonia was entered by a Turkish General, and the cities of Monastir, Perlepe, with the whole country to the limits of Albania, subjected to the Ottoman power. The Ottoman Sovereign was thus in possession of the Greek empire in Europe, with the exception of a semicircle round the city of Constantinople, extending from the Black Sea to the southern portion of the Sea of Marmora. The southern bank of the Lower Danube and the northern shores of the Ægean Sea bounded the Turkish possessions, which extended southwards to Thessaly, westward to Albania. But the Serbians had supplied a regular contingent to the Turkish armies, and that service afforded a field for their enterprise or their valour. Murat now turned his arms against the Caramanian Dynasty, which being the chief stock that had arisen out of the ruined Seljuks, began to be alarmed by the progress of the Ottoman strength, and was taking measures to curb and to overthrow it. The army which Murat carried into Asia was in a great measure composed of Serbians. He triumphed over his eastern rivals, and after a signal

victory on the plain of Iconium, Murat reestablished the Caramanian prince Alaadin in the principality of which he had destroyed the strength. The distribution of the troops on this occasion is minutely recorded as the model of subsequent Turkish strategy. The army was distributed into two wings and a centre—the right wing the troops of Anatoly, the left those of Roumeli, the centre of Janissaries. The troops of Roumeli must have been Christians, the Turkish population settled in Roumeli being so small that they were requisite for the defence of the regions in which they had been established as a military colony, and the centre composed of Janissaries were of course all Christians, and of Hellenic or Slaav blood.*

The great majority of the Turkish forces were not, and could not be Turkish, seeing the smallness of their number, compared with that of their subjects, while they were opposed by enemies in Asia that were entirely Turkish. The triumph of the Ottomans over the remnants of the Seljuks in Asia is rather a triumph of Christians over Mussulmans than of Turks over the Greek empire.

I have been led to particularise this contest with the Princes of Caramania, as from it directly sprung

* The supposition that the Janissaries were Mussulmans is perfectly erroneous. The body of Janissaries does not belong to any particular faith, and it is not long since a Patriarch of Armenians enrolled himself in one of the Odas of the Janissaries, and obtained their support against the Government. The enrolling of the Christians in the body of the Janissaries under the impression of forced conversion, is one of those misconceptions which has most falsified the character of the Turks, and rendered any comprehension of their early progress impossible.

the great war between the Turks and the Serbians, which opened to the Turks the barrier of the Hemus, which gave to them the full possession of the Serbian kingdom, which brought them into contact and collision with Europe, which led to the subsequent subjugation of Albania, and to that increase of power in the Sultanat of Adrianople, that enabled it to hold its ground after its power was wholly annihilated in Asia, and its Sovereign a captive to the Mogols, and then removing the seat of its empire to Constantinople, to attain that prominent position in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa, which was soon after won by Suleiman and Selim.

The Serbians, as already said, constituted the chief strength of the army with which Murat triumphed at Iconium. On their return to their own country they aroused their countrymen to vengeance against the Turks, because Murat had punished with death many of the Serbians that were found guilty of plundering.

This is a fact of very great importance. It explains the extension of the Turkish power in Europe, it explains how it was that the Greek empire dreaded less the Turks in their immediate vicinity than the Serbians at a distance.*

* It is a remarkable fact, that in every principal town the name of the Turkish General by whom it was conquered is therein preserved by works of public utility and beneficence. "During this time Evrenos conquered in the south the country of Komoolgina, Verdar * * *. His name is preserved in these towns not only by having conquered them, but because he has there founded and richly endowed several imarets and caravanserais * * *.

Universal indignation was excited amongst the Serbians, by the narrative of the executions that had taken place at Coniah, and the whole people rose in insurrection, reckoning as heretofore upon the support of the Bulgarians and the Bosnians. Twenty thousand Turks were unexpectedly assailed, and nearly wholly annihilated, by the Bosnians and the Serbians conjoined. This formidable alliance, so suddenly called into existence, was capable of overturning the Ottoman power, and a short time before would have sufficed to overthrow it. But the supremacy of Murat being now established over the princes of Iconium and Caramania and the other Turkish principalities against whom he had brought so lately to bear the arms of the Serbians, he was through their support prepared to make head against this confederacy. The two parties prepared themselves for the contest, in the full consciousness that there was now no alternative for either between triumph and destruction. The storm first fell upon the Bulgarians. Ternovo, the principal place in the kingdom, was carried; Shoomla occupied; the king, Sisman, besieged in Silistria, came to the camp of Murat to sue for peace. The Turks having turned to the west to pursue the war against the Serbians, the

"Lalas having carried his victorious standard to the foot of the Hemus, took possession of the two Sagræ and of Philipopolis, towns of most importance, and which furnished the whole country as far as Belgrade with rice * * *. Following the example of Evrenos, he immortalized his name by useful and magnificent constructions, with which he embellished the towns that had fallen under the Ottoman domination."

Hist. of Ott. Em. Von Hammer, vol. i. book v.

Bulgarians broke the compact, refused to surrender Nicopolis, and recommenced the war. Sisman was again reduced, and brought captive to the camp; his life was spared. Bulgaria was reduced to the condition of a Turkish province, its government extinguished, and Turkish legal and civil jurisdiction organised, its chain of fortresses on the Danube were occupied, and from that period it has remained unnoticed in the history of Turkey, until the late war, when it partially took part with the Russians. The reduction of Bulgaria took place in the year 1390, that is after an existence of 610 years.

Lazar, king of Serbia, was in the mean time negotiating with the Bosnians and Albanians, and Murat was assembling round him all his strength from Asia,—his heroic veterans and his gifted sons. Among the first was Evrenos—among the second Bayezid, afterwards surnamed Ilderim or lightning.

Murat reached Serbia by rapid and unexpected marches, crossing the mountains to the south, before the Serbian army was prepared to dispute the passage. They met on the plain of Cossavo. The Ottoman army was far inferior in numbers to that of the confederates, which was composed of Serbians, Bulgarians, Bosnians, Montinegrins, Albanians, Poles, Wallachians, and Hungarians. The armies remained during the afternoon in presence of each other, and next morning (June 15, 1389), the order of battle was, on either side, that of a centre and two wings, facing each other. Little stratagem was employed on either side, the masses rushed upon each other with ungovernable fury. During several hours, indiscriminate slaughter had still

left the fate of the day uncertain, when a Serbian, Milosh Cabiovitch, pretending that he surrendered, and that he had a secret to communicate to Murat, plunged a dagger in his breast. The assassination of the Sultan drove to exasperation the Turks, and the false rumour that they had been betrayed by the Bosnians, completed the rout of the Serbians. Their king, Lazar, with the Serbian nobles that had not fallen, were taken prisoners, and it was only when Lazar was conducted to the tent of Murat, that he knew of the fate that had befallen his enemy. "Great God!" he exclaimed, "take me now to thy-"self, after having permitted me to see my enemy "die before me, by the hand of a faithful Serbian." Lazar and the nobles were decapitated in the presence of the Sultan, when in his last agonies: "And," says the historian of the event, "Lazar was "able to die in the hope that the death of Murat "would shake the Ottoman Empire, scarcely yet "established; and the Sultan, before closing his "eyes, had the satisfaction of contemplating the "power of Serbia trodden down in the person of his "enemy stretched at his feet."

Notwithstanding so great a victory, and so signal a discomfiture, the Turks did not venture to convert Serbia, as they had Bulgaria, into a Turkish Eyalet — and although the provocation had been so atrocious, and their success so unparalleled, they invested Stephen, son of Lazar, with the sovereign authority, and placed him under the guardianship of his brother-in-law, George Brankovitz.

After the reduction of Serbia, and its alliance with the Turks, Bayezid pursued his conquests in

Bulgaria, and occupied the strong places upon the Danube. Wallachia and Hungary were the next menaced. Wallachia was indeed reduced in 1391 to pay tribute to the Porte, but in 1394, Sigismond of Hungary had succeeded in renewing a defensive alliance with its Prince, Myrtché, against the Turks, and succoured by six hundred French knights, under the orders of Count d'Eu, he invaded Bulgaria, and took possession of the town of Nicopolis. In the following year a formidable alliance was directed by Sigismond against the Porte. The king of France sent his highest officers, and the most renowned of the Princes of the blood, the Grand Prior of the Teutonic Order, the Grand Master of Rhodes, the Elector Palatine of Bavaria, and the Prince of Wallachia commanded in person their contingents, and the combined fleet of Venice and of Rhodes passed the Dardanelles, and presented themselves at the mouth of the Danube.

In this coalition we do not find the Serbians, but on the contrary it was upon Serbia that first fell the fury of the invasion. Bayezid was then occupied in pursuing his conquests in Asia, but returning with that speed to which he owed his surname, he fell upon the French and Christian army, amounting to sixty thousand men at Necopolis. The fate of this eventful battle, in which the Christians were annihilated, leaving fifteen thousand Turks upon the field, was determined by the Serbian prince. "Gara, "the Elector Palatine, and Herman de Cilly, at "the head of the Bavarians and the Styrians, sus- "tained alone the charge of the enemy, and after "having reinforced themselves with the French

" that had fled, to the number of 12,000 men, they " fell upon the Turks. Already had they repelled " the Janissaries, and thrown into disorder the ranks " of the Sipahis (the last reserve of the Turks) " when the Kraal of Serbia, seeing the danger of " Bayezid rushed to his support, and with five thou- " sand men decided the victory."*

While Bayezid was on the point of putting an end to the Greek Empire, and transferring the seat of his dominion to Constantinople, the fearful storm of Mogul invasion, which had been rolling over the fairest provinces of Asia, burst upon Anatoli, and the Ottoman Empire, yet unsuccessful in the subjugation of the Greek, was able to stand up to a not unequal contest with Timour and his Moguls. The fate of the Eastern world was decided upon the plains of Angora, and the details of that battle throw more light upon the character and the importance of Serbia, than are to be found elsewhere in that period of history.

Upon the very same field where the power of Mithridates was broken by the arms of Pompey, were arrayed the hostile forces of the Tartars—masters of Adrianople, and those just emerged from Tartary. On the one hand was Timour the Emperor of the Moguls, on the other Bayezid Ilderim, the Sultan of the Ottomans. The troops under these mighty chieftains, were commanded by their sons and their grandsons, and under their respective orders were assembled nearly a million of men.

Von Hammer thus describes the order of battle of the Turks. " Sooliman Shah commanded the

* Von Hammer, vol. i. 333.

" Asiatic troops, which formed the right wing; the " left wing was composed of the auxiliary troops of " Serbians who obeyed Lazar, son of Woolk and " son-in-law of Bayezid. The Sultan occupied the " centre, with his sons Isa Moossa and Mustapha; " the most experienced of his generals and ten " thousand Janissaries."

What an important part, then, has not Serbia played in the early establishment of the Ottoman dynasty, composing a wing of the army of Bayezid arrayed against the Moguls,—that wing commanded by their own chief,—and that chief the son-in-law of the Ottoman monarch. But not less remarkable than their station and importance, was their conduct and their prowess. To the left wing of the Ottomans, composed of Serbians, Timour opposed the vassals that guarded the frontiers of the Tartar empire. Amongst them were observed Ibrahim Shah, governor of Scherwan; Taherten, prince of Erzendjan; Kara-Osman-Bazender, prince of Diabekir, under their orders were all the Toorkmans, and in front of these battalions Timour had placed thirty-two elephants, which he had brought from India. The action commenced by the right wing of the Moguls, which outflanked that of the Ottomans, surrounding their army and falling upon them in the rear. The Serbians, facing about, received them with vigour and repelled their assault. " On the side of the Otto- " mans, the European troops struggled with extraor- " dinary courage, but while the Serbians exhibited, " in the left wing, prodigies of valour, the troops " of Aïdine, that formed the right wing, having " perceived their former prince in the ranks of their

" enemies, deserted to the Tartars. They were fol-
" lowed by the contingents of Saroukhan, of Men-
" teschè, of Kermian, and by the Tartar soldiers,
" whom the secret agents of Timour had already
" seduced. The Serbians were already separated
" from the body of the army commanded by
" Bayezid, when their valiant chief, Stephen, at
" the head of his horsemen heavily armed, opened
" a passage through the enemy, and succeeded,
" not without leaving many of his followers on
" the field, in reaching the Sultan, whom he ad-
" vised to fly. Bayezid rejected with indignation,
" the advice of Stephen, and continued an heroic
" resistance at the head of his ten thousand Janis-
" saries. Stephen, judging the battle to be lost and
" that it was no longer possible to save the Sultan,
" covered the retreat of his eldest son, Sooliman,
" whom the Grand Vizir, Ali Pacha, had snatched
" from the *mêlée.*" Thus, did the Serbians appear to be in strength, as well as in fidelity, the prop of the Ottoman empire, and its guardian when betrayed by its Turkish subjects, and they had the rare honour of extorting from the lips of Timour this remarkable testimony to their courage and their loyalty,—" *These Dervishes have failed in nothing!*"

Nearly half a century after this event, an insurrection was made by the Serbians, which led to a second defeat at Cossavo in 1448. The Pope was then appealed to by them, and they offered to place themselves under the Church of Rome. But this also failed: and six years after the conquest of Constantinople, in 1459, was the subjugation of Serbia com-

pleted. Then was a Pasha of Serbia appointed, and from that province were the Turks enabled to menace and to divide the kingdoms of Hungary, Transylvania, and Wallachia, and to separate these again from Albania during the heroic defence of Scanderibeg.

It was not, however, till 1521 that the Turks became masters of Belgrade.

CHAPTER II.

RELATIONS OF TURKEY WITH AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA, FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF SERBIA IN 1459, TO THE REVOLUTION IN 1804.

FROM this period until the revolution of Serbia in 1804, the history of Serbia is merged in that of Turkey. But as that Province stands important in its faculty of acting upon the three great empires, Russia, Austria, and Turkey, and as it has been the chief field of contest between the two latter, a sketch of the leading events that have filled up this interval of time may not be misplaced in a history of Serbia, and is requisite to render intelligible its present and future value.

The conquest of Serbia by the Turks led to the conquest of Transylvania and a considerable portion of Hungary. Buda, the capital of Hungary, was taken by the Turks in 1541. The Hungarian Diet was held at Presburg, and the leaders of the popular party in Hungary were in alliance with the Turks. In 1664 the Turks were defeated near Mount Gothard by Montecuculi. This is the furthest progress of their arms westward; and this period is the apogeum of their fortunes. In 1668 they were beaten by the Duke of Lorraine at Strigova. The fortress of Newheusel was taken, and soon after the city of Buda. Civil commotions broke out

in Hungary, distinguished by the names of Zriri, Frangepan, and Tekeli. Out of these events arose the last invasion of Vienna by the Turks in 1683, when they were driven back by Sobieski and his Poles. The memorable victory of Mohacz in 1687 reduced Transylvania and Slavonia under the dominion of Austria. These disasters cost the Sultan of Turkey, Mahmoud the Fourth, his life; and on the other hand, these successes conferred the hereditary succession of the kingdom of Hungary upon the monarchs of Austria.

In the following year, 1688, the tide of fortune rolled in an opposite direction—the Danube was crossed—Serbia was invaded by the Austrian troops—Belgrade and Semendria fell into their hands, and two great victories, achieved by Prince Louis of Bavaria, the one at Nissa, or the southernmost point of Serbia, the other at Viddin, on the entrance to the Danubian plains of Bulgaria, seemed to have broken entirely the power of the Ottomans in those regions, and to have established Austria in command of Serbia, Bosnia, and Bulgaria. At the same moment the Ottoman Porte was menaced by dangers within, quite as terrible as those which assailed its fabric from without; and the career of a rebel in Asia was more rapid and as triumphant as that of the Imperialists in Europe.

Against the storms approaching from the east and from the west, the capital afforded to the Sultan no place of refuge. There a formidable insurrection was discovered, and being discovered, he was unable to fly from it. Such was the destitution of the royal treasury, such the prostration

of the royal authority, that he could obtain the means of transport neither by money nor command. But then one of those events occurred which change the face of affairs. A man appeared and became Minister,—Mustapha Kupreli. The rebel camp disappeared before Scutari,—the deficiencies of the royal authority and treasury were alike made up,—the armies were reorganized,—victory flew back again to their standard,—and a year had not elapsed before that standard floated again on the walls of Nissa, Viddin, Semendria, and Belgrade.

In the following year Krupeli fell in action, and his death gave the victory in a great battle to the Imperialists—the battle of Salankemen gained by the Prince of Baden.

In the year 1697, Sultan Mustapha in person was overthrown by Prince Eugene, near Zenta, on the Teisse, with tremendous slaughter, and the Sultan himself escaped with disorderly flight to Belgrade. This event closed the war by a treaty, which became, like the Treaty of Westphalia for Europe, the commencement of a new epoch, and the basis of another order of things.

Russia had not then begun to influence the affairs of the East—she was occupied solely in preparations for the destruction of Poland. The great powers influencing the Ottoman empire, and that world which revolves round Constantinople as a centre, were Austria and Poland. Between Austria and Turkey there was a contest as between two beasts of the forest. The acknowledged will and object on the part of each was to destroy the other. There was Poland, pursuing designs against none, threat-

ening none, but ready to use her arms according to her impulses, but moved by no sympathies for any one people, but rather by antipathies.

In the hour of Austria's extremity, Poland stepped in to render the last service—to save her capital from capture, and her state from utter extinction; and, strange to narrate, this act produced no friendship between Poland and Austria, gave no benefits to Poland, and it was another—the artful one—that profited. It was with a heavy heart that Sobieski retired from the country he had saved; and the deliverer of Vienna, and the victor of the Turks, had to return home to sign *with Russia* the treaty of Moscow (1686), which he bedewed with tears of fruitless indignation.

Russia alone profited; and the reward to Poland, for her self-devotion in the cause of Europe and her signal triumph, was a usurpation over her, and a treaty, the prelude to her dismemberment. Here stands in relief the character of the two people, just as if they were two men—the one people triumphing in arms, the other successful in diplomacy; the one having a body that was strong, the other a mind that was crafty. Whence this difference between two nations springing from a common source? It matters indeed little to inquire, *why* it is so; but it is most important to know the fact, because the differences that existed between Russia and Poland exist between Russia and Europe. Unless we, or some among us, think fit to turn our minds by such care and discipline and practice as to enable us to see what she sees, and therefore to know what she does, the fate of Poland will be ours. As

the observer in 1688 might have seen in that treaty the subsequent fate of Poland, so is it useful to look back to that commencement that we may trace effects to their causes. Austria saved by Poland, Poland rescuing Austria, arresting the victorious arms of the Turks—and Russia, who had not then dared to meet the Turks, profiting by the struggle to bind and injure the victor. And, in spite of this fact, the nations of Europe occupy themselves in disciplining troops, building ships, casting cannon, and making gunpowder, and have no thought of training up a few clerks to the study of International Law and of diplomacy.

The events which preceded the peace of Carlovitz seem to indicate the importance which the disposition of the people of Serbia and Bulgaria exercised upon the relative position of these empires.

In 1664 we have the Turks masters of Transylvania, in possession of the major part of Hungary, and carrying their arms into the very centre of the Alps. A few years later (1677) we find a portion of Hungary and Austria in insurrection, appealing to the Turks, and influenced in their conduct by the decision of the Turkish Government. In 1683 the Turks are on the point of capturing Vienna; they are beaten back, but not by Austria. Discomfited, it was to be supposed that their power of aggression would be reduced,—that they would be compelled to retire within their own limits,—that they would fall back behind the Teisse and the Save, or even the Danube, and take the protection successively of the fortresses of Temisvar and Petervardin, or, finally, of Semendria and Belgrade,

behind the broad ditch of the Danube, — while again in the rear of these fortresses there were the strong mountains of Serbia and Bulgaria on the one side, and Croatia, Illyria, and Albania on the other, to serve them as a Caucasus; but instead of this, the Turks at once abandoned all these lines, and lost all these positions, without an attempt to use their shelter, or an effort to maintain their defence. The Austrians are at once in the centre of their dominions, overstepping all these difficulties, having simply to contend with armies in the field; and the fate of countries, composed of mountains intersected by passes, is decided by mere operations on the field of battle! And still further to increase our surprise, an immediate revulsion takes place; the arms of Turkey again prevail, and Austria surrenders all these strong positions with as much facility as the Porte had surrendered them. The solution of these enigmas is facile for any one who has visited the country, and seen the people. It was a change in the disposition of the Serbian people that effected a change in the fortunes of the two contending parties. The Serbians had looked to the Austrians for protection against the Turks; and the presence of the Austrian army had produced a similar effect to that which was produced by the presence of a Russian army amongst the Bulgarians in 1829.

But as Europe casts cannons and does not train diplomatists, it is natural that she should disregard the mentally predisposing causes of events; and that she should disbelieve what she does not comprehend.

The peace of Carlovitz took its name from a small town of Slavonia, lying between the two camps, the one of which was at Petervardin, the other at Belgrade. By it, Poland and Austria regained territory. The Turks ceded to the first Caminiēc, and part of the Ukraine. The Marass, the Teisse, the Save, and the Unna, were fixed as the limits between Austria and Turkey, so that Temisvar, and the fortresses of Sirmium, now in Hungary, remained to the Turks, and constituted part of the province of Serbia. Count Tekeli, with many of his followers from Hungary and Transylvania, sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire. The Venetians, by the same treaty, obtained possession of the Morea, of the Ionian Islands, of the fortresses of Dalmatia.

Soon afterwards, the first Russian and Turkish war broke out, but Austria took no part in it. This war was most unfortunate for the Czar, who owed his escape to the dexterity of the Empress. It was terminated by the celebrated convention of Falszi on the Pruth, in 1711.

The next war between Austria and Turkey occurred in 1715, which arose out of an endeavour of the Turks to recover possession of the Morea from the Venetians. This attempt was not made until the tranquillity of Europe had been re-established by the Peace of Utrecht; the Emperor was thus enabled to assist the Venetians. As a party to the treaty of Carlovitz, he declared war against the Porte, and his example was followed by the King of Spain, and by the Pope. The Turks were attacked by the confederated fleet in the Me-

diterranean, and forced to raise the siege of Corfu. The Turks likewise carried the war into Hungary, and the campaigns of 1716-17, were marked by the brilliant victories of Prince Eugene. Petervardin was the prize of one victory, Belgrade of another. A rupture ensuing between the Spaniards and the Austrians, both parties became equally desirous for peace, and they agreed to accept the mediation of England and Holland. A congress was opened for that purpose in Serbia, at Passarowitz, and a peace was there concluded, (July 21st, 1718) on the basis of *uti possidetis*, the Emperor to retain Temiswar Orsova, Belgrade, the portion of Wallachia lying westward of the Alluta, and that portion of Serbia lying northward of the Danube, that is that part of Serbia which is actually added to Hungary, together with a portion of that which actually belongs to the Turkish province. The Turks regained the Morea.

The next war between Austria and the Turks broke out in 1736;—and now commences a new order of things. The balance is changed—it is no longer a struggle between Austria and Turkey; Turkey is no longer the aggressor—it is Russia that becomes the aggressor. But this does not lead to a union as was naturally to be expected between Austria and Turkey. Russia is at once the aggressor against Turkey, and against Poland—a double inducement for Austria to have allied herself with each. Instead of that, we find concert between neither, and she, neither combining their strength, nor preventing their discord, nor supporting their weakness, but on the contrary, subserving Russia, and being her tool and instrument—nay more—

conferring by subserviency the power of injuring both. This is not an accident occurring once, and rectified when its consequences appeared, but it is a continuous state of things, silently enduring in times of tranquillity, and at periods of trouble, displaying itself in great and overwhelming action:—producing the most lamentable results, bringing upon Austria herself invariably dishonour and failure, and yet repeated with the regularity of a machine depending for the direction given to its power from an intelligence belonging to another order of existence.

The Empress Anne, on the pretext of incursions of the Tartars into the Russian provinces, sent an expedition into the Ottoman territories in 1735, and in the year after she invaded them she proclaimed war against them. The Austrian Emperor offered himself at first as a mediator between the belligerents, and a conference was held, but it was broken off without results. The Russians had taken Otchakof, and their preparations appeared so formidable, and the means of resistance on the part of the Porte so slender, that the Austrian government, which at first endeavoured to accommodate differences, now thought only of sharing in the spoil, and throwing aside the character of mediator, declared war. It is to be observed that this occurred above a century ago, when Europe had not been yet familiarized with such practices of violence and perfidy. Austria soon had reason to repent her treachery. In the campaigns of 1737-8 she was driven out of Wallachia and Serbia. The

Turks re-took Orchova, and in the following year laid siege to the city of Belgrade.

The Court of Vienna, alarmed at the sudden change of fortune, now sued for peace, which was signed under the mediation of France, in the Turkish camp before Belgrade. To the Porte were ceded Belgrade, with the possessions of Austria in Serbia and Wallachia, and Austria preserved nothing but the fortress of Temiswar out of all that she had gained by the peace of Carlovitz. Russia had been enabled to make conquests whilst Austria was being beaten, but she was constrained to surrender them for awhile. The fortress of Azof was demolished, and Russia was interdicted from having or constructing fleets, or possessing other naval stores, either in the Sea of Azof, or in the Black Sea.

The next war was undertaken by the Porte against Russia, for the purpose of maintaining Poland—it broke out in 1768, the very year in which England, recalling her old guaranteeship of the treaty, in the former century, of Oliva, (1663), interfered in common with the Protestant powers in the internal affairs of Poland, and by a treaty, verbally stipulating "*the integrity and the independence of the republic*," virtually destroyed its independence, in the name of religion and of liberty,—for the behoof of Russia. Let Englishmen take to themselves the consciousness of the succession of ignominy, which has descended to them from that act, and become humble in comparing the conduct of the Christian and the Protestant, with that of the Mussulman and the Turk. The same year that brings that infa-

mous compact (the counterpart of the Convention of July 15th, 1840), displays the Turks taking up arms in defence of right and of Poland. France, (who was no party to the treaty of July, 1840, against Turkey), was no party to the treaty of Warsaw, of 1768. France urged the Porte to take the necessary measures to counteract it,—but left the Porte unsupported and alone! Do not the acts of the Powers of Europe appear the operation of mere pieces of mechanism?—Yet while each event is occurring, they think they are acting for themselves.

The Russian operations were on the most gigantic scale; extending from the banks of the Dneister to the Caucasus. But having been restrained by the former treaty from forming a force in the Black Sea, the direct operations were confined to the land. But this deficiency was supplied by Catharine, who conceived the project of sending a naval force from the Baltic round into the Mediterranean, to attack the Turks at once by sea and in the south, and to bring into play the faculty of insurrectionizing her co-religionaries of the Eastern Church, and thus bring upon Turkey from all quarters every species of alarm and danger.

In the course of 1770 Russia was in possession of Wallachia and Moldavia; had won the victories of the Pruth and Kaminiec; and the fortresses of Ismael, Killia, and Ackermann were surrendered or carried by assault; while the Greek islands were insurrectionized by secret agency, and by the presence of the Russian fleet; and the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Chesme gave her the command

of the White Sea, and spread consternation to the city of Constantinople.

But these victories exhausted the strength of Russia, without apparently producing corresponding depression on the part of the Turks; who, Antëus-like, seemed to gain strength by the blows they endured; and that because not being at war within themselves, they are not dissolved but hardened by misfortune. Europe, however, deemed that the fall of Turkey was at hand, and Austria and Prussia interposed to mediate a peace. They rejected with disdain the conditions which the Emperor proposed. Moreover, they strongly opposed the independence of Moldavia and Wallachia, as well as of the Tartars; and, in case of the continuation of the war, they declared that they would not permit the Russians to carry the seat of it to the southern banks of the Danube.

"The Court of Vienna went even further; it "threatened to make common cause with the Turks, "to compel the Empress to restore all her conquests, "and to place matters between the Russians and "the Turks on the footing of the treaty of Belgrade. "A convention to this effect was negociated with "the Porte, and signed at Constantinople, July 6th, "1771. *This convention was, however, not ratified;* "THE COURT OF VIENNA HAVING CHANGED ITS MIND, "ON ACCOUNT OF THE FORMAL DISMEMBERMENT OF "POLAND, CONCERTED BETWEEN IT AND THE COURTS "OF BERLIN AND ST. PETERSBURGH." *

The Cabinet of Vienna had then made up its

* Koch's Revolutions of Europe, p. 154.

mind to proceed to war, in order to enforce the following conditions, (those of the treaty of Belgrade): the restoration of all the conquests of Russia in advance of the Dneister; the destruction of the fortress of Azof; of Russia's stores and maritime force on the Black Sea. This decision could have been arrived at only from alarm for the growth of the power of Russia. Suddenly Austria turns round, abandons these measures, and *supports Russia*. The reason of the change is, that to the power of injuring Turkey, she added the design of dismembering Poland! But then Austria is to get herself a portion of Poland; that is, she has been purchased with a price, and from a position of intelligence and integrity, she is reduced to one of fatuity and corruption.

Thus are inseparably connected the fate of Turkey and of Poland; so inseparably, that while Russia was unable to triumph over the one or to partition the other, she could buy off the alliances that presented themselves to support the one by the offer of the still unmastered fragments of the other.

The identity of the fate of these two countries is further brought into evidence by the partition of them being simultaneous. Austria had not taken part in the war; she had threatened to take part with the Turks. No sooner is the partition of *Poland* settled between the Three Powers, than Austria receives a benefit *in Turkey*, and is put in possession by Russia of the province of Bukovina.

The treaty of peace, by which this cession was made, was signed at Kainargi, 1774, two years after

the first treaty for the dismemberment of Poland. By that treaty, the Tartars of the Crimea, Boojak, and Kuban, were declared entirely independent of the Porte. She surrendered Bessarabia, Moldavia, Wallachia, and the Greek Islands in her possession. The chief bulwark of the Turks against Russia, the Tartars, was thus broken down. Her power of aggression was introduced into the Black Sea by the possession of the city of Azof. The right of protectorate was established over her co-religionaries in Turkey.

The next important event was the occupation of the Crimea by Russia. The Turks made preparations for war; they were restrained from making it, and they were compelled to a peace more disastrous than any war could have been, by the simple fact of the *union of the Austrian and the Russian Cabinets.* A treaty was consequently signed at Constantinople, January 8th, 1784, by which the sovereignty of the Crimea, the Island of Taman, and the territory on the Kuban were ceded to Russia, so that without war were the Turks driven across the rampart of the Caucasus, and the ditch of the Euxine. And it is, while the process for the destruction of Poland is in progress, that these mighty conquests are in another region effected, and the means by which she effects the latter, is through the use that she makes of the portion of Poland that she has not possessed. Russia has the faculty of using states that do not belong to her to greater purpose than if those states were her own. Poland dependent she could not offer, she could not offer her own territories. Austria not possessed, she could use—

she used Austria against Turkey, and purchased Austria by Poland. This is Peter's will. What could be simpler? Philip did the same. "His allies were gratified for a time with the possession of the territories of others, to be afterwards deprived of their own." In this case, there was no apparent concurrence yielded by Austria, and yet this treaty, obtained by tacit concurrence, was the greatest conquest Russia ever achieved. Through fears or lures, by forming timorous plans, or yielding to corrupt incentives, has Austria been used by Russia to bring nearer and nearer to Germany and Europe dangers from without, and weakness, because of injustice and dishonour, from within,—with a regularity as wonderful as it is lamentable.—The Diet of Hungary, as is reported in the papers of London, the very day that I am writing these lines, has broken silence upon this the master-question of the age, and has addressed to the Court of Vienna an earnest appeal to retrieve them from the position of humility and danger, entailed by this and such like concession. The greatest danger that Austria has now to incur, is the estimate of her intellectual powerlessness to grapple with her's and Europe's foe, but it will be the safety of Europe when they understand that it is an intellectual enemy that they have to meet.

Thus without war,—and by the mere fact that there were Governments in Europe that desired the spoils of Poland—was Turkey driven across the Black Sea, and the Caucasus. The treaty of 1784, did not, however, settle the differences arising out of the continuous encroachments and pretensions

of Russia; and three years afterwards, the Porte, unable to endure her aggressions, and her haughtiness, and instigated by Prussia and England, declared war against her, (16th August, 1788.)

Here again, the Austrian Emperor interfered as a mediator, but very soon dropped the mask, and took part with Russia. The Russians, assisted by the Austrians, took Cotzim and Otchakoff; the Austrians attacked and carried Belgrade without penetrating into Serbia.

Gustavus III. concluded an alliance with the Porte and attacked Russia. Russia, however, succeeded in counteracting him by internal intrigues, and by bringing upon him the Danes, and, although the English and the Prussians forced the Danes to neutrality, Gustavus was reduced to the necessity of making peace with the Empress.

Souvaroff gained a great battle at Ismael; all the events of the war were against the Turks, and in her favour. The British and the Prussians, becoming alarmed, entered into a treaty with the Porte; Frederick marched into Silesia, and threatened the Austrians with war if they did not desist. The Austrians, alarmed by this alliance, agreed to the conclusion of a definitive treaty with the Porte, which was signed at Sistova, 1791, by which Belgrade, and the other places occupied by Austria, were restored to the Porte. The Empress, however, refused to concur in that treaty, and continued the war alone, finding means of securing the neutrality of England and of Prussia, and thereby was enabled to sign the treaty of Jassi in the following year; Thus was presented the singular spectacle of

Austria, interfering as a mediator, declaring war as a party, and losing by the war which secured important advantages to the power which she had joined.

But it was not only that Russia found means of counteracting the hostility of Sweden, the resistance of Prussia, and the jealousy of England; she was further threatened by Spain and France, and over their resistance and opposition, she was in like manner able to triumph. Her progress against Turkey had excited the alarms of Prussia and England. Prussia she managed by offering to her a further dismemberment of Poland. England she cajoled by offers of commercial advantages. The danger of Poland and of Sweden did alarm France and Spain, who had been indifferent to the danger of Turkey. They sent fleets into the Mediterranean, and threatened to send one into the Baltic. These dangers she met by a coalition of England, Austria, and Prussia, combining the two latter for the purpose of dismembering Poland, and joining to her the former—England—by alarming her with fears of the maritime preponderance of the Bourbon Courts! Thus was Russia enabled to make her designs against Turkey, and against Poland, mutually subservient to each other. Austria, the power that was most interested in preventing her from attacking Turkey, and had most the means to do so, is subdued into co-operation, by being made a sharer in the spoils of Poland. England, interested in preventing her maritime ascendancy, and her aggressions against Poland, and against Turkey, rendered subservient under pretext of counteracting the maritime strength of Spain and of France; and

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thus the Courts of Constantinople, Warsaw, Stockholm, Vienna, Berlin, Versailles, Madrid, and London, all equally actuated by dangers which they had to prevent for themselves, or for others, were involved in action one against another, ending in the advancement of her designs against all.

The King of Spain, in regard to this coalition for the partition of Poland, used these words, "Ambition "and usurpation do not surprise me in the Czarina "and the King of Prussia, but from the Empress "Queen I did not expect such reserve and perfidy." He had soon afterwards to deplore injustice as great on the part of Britain, but more objectless. Austria and Prussia have gained something by their injustice, but England, through whose co-operation that injustice was effected, gained nothing, and had no more pretext for her infatuation, than recompense for her perfidy.

The peace of Sistova, 1791, between Austria and Turkey, settled the frontiers between Hungary and Serbia, as they stand at this day.

CHAPTER III.

INSURRECTION OF SERBIA AGAINST THE JANISSARIES, IN 1804.

With the present century commences the new era of Serbia; regaining a distinct existence as a people, not only without the destruction of any other, but without damage or injury to the great Empire with which it had been incorporated; nor is it only that Serbia's achievement of independence did not damage that Empire, but on the contrary, her efforts in its own cause have contributed to Turkey's well-being, and saved her from imminent peril.

The functions of the supreme Government of Turkey had been usurped by the Janissaries, who oppressed the people in the provinces, while they domineered over the Sultan in the capital. From the moment that the Sultan raised his hand upon this body every insurrectionary tendency or effort,—directed, no longer against the sovereign authority, but against those who had usurped its power or perverted its functions—became a symptom of health, and a means of restoration. From the hour of his accession the late Sultan was involved in a contest with the Janissaries. He found Serbia in arms and therefore on his side. They were at once—the Sultan and the Serbians,—embarked in the same cause, in which there was for either no

alternative between victory and destruction. During a struggle of twenty years was this alliance maintained. The Serbians from the first distinguishing, where it would appear to us that judgment was most difficult, between the Sultan, the Turkish Administration, and the local Government, and the Sultan in like manner discriminating in the Serbians between resistance to lawless acts and—rebellion.

The triumph of the Serbians and the Sultan was followed by the reconciliation of the Serbians with the Turkish Government, and thereby the reconstitution of the empire in one of its most important parts, following as the consequence of an event that would have shattered any Government of Europe.

The links connecting Serbia with the Turkish Government were four-fold, the provincial administration, the judicial, the moveable military force, and the foefships; that is, the Pasha, the Kadi, the Janissaries, and the Spahis. This subdivision of the Turkish Government has to be weighed well, it is not to be comprehended by drawing comparisons with the practice of Europe; it was a subdivision of check and control, spread over and through the whole functions of administration. It was not a separation of affairs into distinct departments.

The Pasha was appointed by the Divan, the Kadi was not appointed by the executive Government but by the chief of the law; the Janissaries who occupied Belgrade and some other fortresses, were connected with their own body at Constantinople, obeyed its instincts and followed its fortunes; the Spahis were knights according to the old feudal

constitution, *holders of foefs.* The local administration was in the hands of chiefs selected from the people by themselves, these were designated *Kmet* and *Knez.* The Spahis had a right to a tenth of the produce of fields, vineyards, and beehives. The Pasha ceived a certain aide twice in the year, (Posada), assessed by the Knez. The Kadi received a tax upon inheritances and on litigated property. The Porte received a poll-tax, with a tax on sheep and cattle, and other forest dues collected in various ways. The Janissaries had no right except to their pay from the Sultan's treasury, but they exercised a faculty of rapine and plunder, limited only by their power.

The Serbians having lost all their aristocracy in the battle of Kossova, had subsided, when they came to be constituted a merely Turkish province, into peaceful and agricultural pursuits, and had lost the use of arms, with these they had been again familiarized in the latter wars between the Austrians and the Porte, and especially in the last, when Austria raised a corps of Serbians. The Spahis were not Turks but of Slaav origin, chiefly from the province of Bosnia, who had embraced Islam, but still spoke the language of the Serbians. They wavered for a time between supporting the Janissaries as against the Serbians, and obeying the Pasha, who, as representative of the Porte, had to throw his weight into the opposite scale. The Turkish legal authorities, not under the control of the Government of Constantinople, standing distinct from all these, possessed considerable authority as preserving the traditions of law, in a country

where the laws may be infringed by violence but not destroyed by legislation.

Such was the position of the country, when after the peace of Sistova, the Serbians, familiarized with the use of arms, found themselves exposed to increased exactions on the part of the Janissaries, whilst at Constantinople, Selim III. was taking measures against that body. The peace of Sistova had stipulated an amnesty for the Serbians that had taken part with Austria. The leaders of the "Free Corps," which had served with the Austrian armies against the Turks, feeling themselves entitled to claim the intervention of the neighbouring empire, and likewise capable of righting themselves, became rallying points for popular discontent, and every indication appeared of an approaching insurrection in a province which for three centuries has evinced dispositions the most peaceful and resigned.

This insurrection was anticipated by a most daring and remarkable step on the part of the Porte, which was no less than to expel the Janissaries. A Pasha of great ability, Abu Beckir, was sent to Belgrade; he succeeded in enlisting on his side the Spahis, and in gaining the confidence of the Serbians; this effected, the Porte felt itself sufficiently strong to issue a firman for the expulsion of the Janissaries, which the Pasha did enforce. Internal tranquillity was immediately restored, and a period followed of great agricultural and commercial prosperity.

At this time Paswan Oglou had raised the standard of revolt at Viddin. The expelled Janissaries repaired thither—he received them with open arms,

and formed them into a body-guard. After he had defeated several Turkish armies, he, at the suggestion of the expelled Janissaries, invaded Serbia, and took possession of the island of Porach. The Pasha of Belgrade, who could expect no assistance from the Porte, had no resource, save that of arming the Serbians. He told them it was "better to sell some of their cattle and buy arms to defend the rest, than to allow all they possessed to be taken from them." They obeyed his call, and Paswan Oglou, finding the enterprise not so easy as he expected, retired.

The Porte, however, was soon compelled to come to terms with Paswan Oglou, and sent to him the horse-tails of Vizir. It was anxious, however, at the same time, to diminish his strength, and devised, as a means of doing so, the restoration of the Janissaries to Serbia. The Janissaries therefore obtained by peace, what they had failed to obtain by war; and after being excluded from Serbia by a firman of the Sultan, they were restored by a decision of the Sheik Islam, who held that it was not just to expel from their possessions Mussulmans in favour of rayahs. This judgment re-opened the sources of those convulsions that had appeared to have been so happily closed.

The property of the Janissaries had been confiscated to the state on their former expulsion. Being restored, they did not at first clamorously demand their own, but contented themselves with obtaining situations around the Pasha, and in the government of the country. Gradually, however, they strengthened themselves in influence and numbers, and by the increase of the power of Paswan Oglou, who had

then become by far the most powerful chieftain in Roumeli, they also strengthened themselves and flourished.

They now proceeded not only to reinstate themselves in their former possessions, but to open acts of insubordination against the Pasha, and of oppression upon the people. Serbia was again assailed by Paswan Oglou, and the Pasha had to send his son with a body of troops to the frontiers to resist him. The Janissaries seized this occasion to attack the Pasha in Belgrade, expelled him from the town, and besieged him in the fortress. The son returned to the father's rescue, but upon the very day of his arrival, the citadel being entered by treachery, the Janissaries compelled the Pasha to order the son to withdraw, and they then destroyed him.

They now represented to the Porte, that they had attacked the Pasha, because he was in league with the rayahs against the Sultan, and making a show of submission, they asked that another Pasha should be sent to them. The Porte, at that time, unable to make head against Paswan Oglou, contented itself with the show of obedience, and sent them another Pasha, who came to the fortress of which they were possessed, to be rather their prisoner than their master.

There were four chiefs amongst the Janissaries, who, though residing all at Belgrade, distributed Serbia amongst themselves. They assembled a body of mercenaries as their guards, and completely upsetting the administration of the province, they sent agents of their own to the different villages, who assumed the chief authority, and displaced the

Kadis, or judges. They did not at first displace the Spahis, but allowing them to retain their tenths, they imposed upon the people an additional tax of a ninth of the produce, and subjected the rayahs to contributions of forced labour. Imitating the process of Paswan Oglou, which was but repeating what the Mamelukes had done in Egypt, the Deys* appointed their creatures in the different districts, under the title of Soubachi, with the power of life and death, constituting themselves the proprietors of the soil, and masters of the inhabitants.

This system found imitators to the westward. Ali Beg, Sevdash of Swornick, in Bosnia, in like manner formed a body of mercenaries, and quartered them on the villagers. In passing through the country and villages, he constrained the rayahs to sign documents to the effect that they had sold themselves to him. To support himself in these usurpations, he repaired to Belgrade to be received into the body of the Deys; and as this association was in connection with Paswan Oglou, who had already succeeded in establishing at Widdin, his rebellion against the Porte, while the discontented throughout the Empire, and in Constantinople itself, looked to him as a leader, some idea may be formed, of the nature and extent of this organization, which threatened the very subversion of the Empire. The greatest of services that could be rendered to that Empire, thus afflicted, was to break or assail the system, which was at once a conspiracy against the sovereign, and a yoke upon the people.

The Spahis of Serbia were the first to attempt

* Generally called Dahis, the four chiefs.

resistance, the result of which was, that they were driven forth from the country, as the Janissaries had formerly been; and their property confiscated. The expelled Spahis now appealed to Constantinople, and the Serbian Knezes so far took courage as in like manner to address a petition. Their appeal was listened to, but the Porte was not in a position to do justice, and the attempt only led to fresh outrages. Upon this, the Sultan threatened the Deys, that unless they desisted from their present course, he "would bring an army upon them, but as he would "not set Mussulmans to fight against Mussulmans, "the army he should send would belong to another "faith." The Deys set themselves to solve this enigma. They could not believe that it was Russians or Austrians that the Sultan was going to call in, and they interpreted his words as meaning that he would raise up and arm the Serbians. To anticipate this danger they bethought themselves of destroying all the chiefs who inspired them with apprehension, and men were despatched throughout the districts to do this work.

This commenced in February, 1804. At first they met with no resistance. When the Deys or their agents entered a village, the inhabitants presenting themselves, as usual, to offer provisions, the opportunity was afforded of securing those whom they had marked out for destruction. In a short time consternation was universal, and no man was sure of his life for an hour. All the power possessed by the former Turkish administration or people was now concentrated in the hands of the Janissaries—the power of Pasha, of Kadi, of Spahi, and of Janissary

was united in those four chiefs, and exercised at once, in defiance of law, government, and people. Whatever men of worth, courage or energy, remained amongst the Serbians had fled from their habitations, to the forests and the mountains, and had swelled the bands of the Heyducks or bandits.

Three chiefs, though chiefs they could not then be called, of whom one was George Petrovich, afterwards known as Cara George, met upon the plain of Shumadia, and determining not to await the yatagan of the executioner, swore to each other to seek safety or vengeance in some desperate enterprise; sudden confidence arose from despair, and the associates soon became a band. These were joined by Heyducks under two distinguished leaders, Glavatsch and Welico. This body attacked a party of Janissaries in the village of Sibnitza, and destroyed them. They immediately despatched messengers throughout the country, to call forth every man capable of bearing arms, and requiring them everywhere to convey the women and children to the mountains, and to fall upon any Turks within their reach.

The intelligence of the massacre of Sibnitza spread as an electric shock. The call to arms was instantly answered by every Serbian name of note,—Nenadovitch, Melenco, and Dobrinatz. Every man possessed of a weapon obeyed the summons, and the Turks were driven from the whole of the open country and shut up in the fortresses. The Serbians then said, "Every house has a chief—must not the people have a chief?"—and they held an assembly to choose one. They first proposed Glavatsch, he answered, "I am a Heyduck (bandit); I have neither home

nor lands, how can the people confide in me?" They then proposed the Knez Theodose. He answered, "The Turk can forgive the Heyduck; but when the Turks return, who can forgive the Knez?" They then proposed Cara George, who had been formerly a heyduck, but who had subsequently become a peaceful rayah, and the army was composed of both. But he answered, "I don't understand government." The chiefs replied, "We will give you council." He then said, "I am a man of quick temper, and not fit to be ruler of men." They answered, "Such a temper the times require,"—and thus did Cara George become chief of Serbia. However, not that any authority was given him which infringed upon the previous habits and practice of the people—not that even any command was given him over the troops,—he was but the first among equals.

The country was now possessed by the rayahs under their different chiefs, the towns were occupied by the Janissaries, whose power was rather threatened than broken. At first the Deys thought they could come to an accommodation with the Serbians; but the hope of an adjustment soon disappearing, they prepared themselves for a vigorous defence. The mercenaries they had collected, attempted some sallies against the Serbians, but unsuccessfully, and the latter encouraged by their success, laid siege to Belgrade and the other fortresses. The Spahis, whose only hope of restoration lay in the success of the Serbians, joined them, and Mussulmans were seen fighting in the ranks of the Serbians against the Janissaries. The Porte had great difficulties to en-

counter in Mussulman prejudices no less than in Janissary power at the capital. It did not, however, leave the Serbians to their own efforts—it first supplied them with arms, then, sanctioned their acts, by conferring an administrative office on one of their chiefs, and finally sent the Pasha at Bosnia with an army to their assistance. He joined the Serbian camp before Belgrade, and the Deys saw realized at length the words of the Sultan, in a Serbian army headed by a Turkish Pasha. Finding resistance now hopeless, they surrendered; but the Serbians required that they should be sacrificed to their vengeance, and the Pasha consented. Thus was the revolution of 1804 confirmed—a revolution directed not against the Porte, but against the Janissaries; a triumph not achieved against the Turks, but by the support of the Turks given to the Serbians.

CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE REVOLUTION OF 1804 TO THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST.

The victory altered the respective position of the allies. The Serbians, instead of returning to their homes, had propositions to make which the Pasha had neither the authority to entertain, nor the power to resist. He consequently withdrew from the country, replacing the Janissaries at Belgrade by a Turkish garrison. The Serbians had put down and exterminated their internal tyrants, with the sanction of the authority of the Porte, and then the forces of the Porte were withdrawn, leaving them their own masters. They had not braved in mind either the power of the Turks or the authority that resided at Constantinople. The standard of revolt they had not raised. Now, however, the vengeance of the Turks was before their eyes. The Porte and the Serbians equally remained in suspicion of the intentions of the other, and in doubt as to their own course. But while the Turks suspected only, the Serbians feared also. In this dilemma they fell upon the expedient of addressing themselves to a *Foreign Court*, through whose intervention they should seek reconciliation with their sovereign, and by whose protection they should obtain a guarantee against future contingencies. It then came to be a matter to decide

on the power and the integrity of what Government they should rely. The first on their borders was Austria; they had taken part with her formerly against the Porte; she had organised a body of them; she had formerly stipulated in the treaty of Sistova, indemnity for her partizans. Austria was at hand, within reach, to be appealed to and to protect. Under her sceptre lived millions of Serbians, not merely their brothers in race, but the very same people as themselves, one half, in fact, of their people being subjects of Austria. Yet it was not to Austria they appealed. Their application was made to Russia, upon the simple ground that she was of the *same faith* as themselves. A mission was consequently sent to St. Petersburg, in the year 1804, and they determined to do nothing until its return;* it returned in February, 1805, with the answer, that Russia would give at Constantinople her protection and support to Serbia. Upon this an assembly was convoked at Ostrusnitza, which was partially recognized by the Porte, both by the presence of representatives from the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, and by that of Turks

* But for this unhappy step, Serbia from that very hour would have been tranquil, having readjusted its internal administration with the Porte, without affording an opening for that external influence, which has planted the seeds of dissolution in its breast, and has converted it into the fulcrum of a lever, by which many other states will be shaken, and extensive ruin be yet effected. Was there no one throughout the world ready to counsel and assist? No! There was only the genius of evil, seeing, desiring, preparing, and effecting. England, before whose face, and against whose life, such satanic schemes were and are prepared and executed, thinks itself great, wise, and honest.

from Belgrade, commanded from Constantinople to attend there. Encouraged by the condescension of the Porte, and by their communication with St. Petersburg, the Serbians at this assembly put forward the most extravagant demands; namely, the expulsion the Turks from the country, the confiscation of their property, the removal of the Turkish garrisons from the fortresses, and an indemnity for the expenses of the war. This extraordinary change in their dispositions, from the autumn of the previous year, produced a corresponding alteration in the inclinations of the Porte. It would have been unable, if willing, to comply with such demands, and must have been alienated from the Serbians by these pretensions. These demands revived the question of difference of race and religion, which had been obliterated during the struggle, when Mussulmans and Turks took part with the Serbians. The expelled Janissaries and the Soubachis appointed by the Deys, who still retained possession of the small fortresses in the south, and the Spahis who had retired beyond the frontier, were thus again, and by the act of the Christians, reunited and exasperated, and preparations were made in the fortresses and in the adjoining provinces for an assault upon the insurgents.

These demonstrations induced the Serbians to modify their demands, but at the same time they applied themselves to reduce the small forts. A neighbouring Pasha of Nissa marched against them, but was unable to break through the lines that they had formed. The position was thus

gradually brought to approach that of direct insurrection, and at length the Porte sent a Pasha with orders to disarm the rayahs.* The Serbians would not receive him and drove him away.

A question of the deepest moment now presented itself—the constituting of an internal government. We have got so much into the habit of constitutions propagated by pieces of paper, that the idea of difficulty or responsibility or effort in framing a Government is what can be realized in the mind of no modern European. It was however for the Serbians a great and noble effort to make, although they did possess for the task advantages which no nation of Europe at the present time possesses or comprehends. The basework of their Government was that which England possessed under Alfred, when that great man described the freedom of the English state, as that of a body in health, which performs its functions well.

The immemorial practice of village administration connected progressively with superior municipal councils they did not alter; they added thereto a senate for the exercise of the highest judicial and deliberative power, by whose advice the prince was

* M. Ranke, in his "Serbische Revolution," makes the question between the Porte and the Serbians to hinge on this point, *which of the two parties should bear arms*; laying it down as an obligation of the Mussulman law that Rayahs should not bear arms. There is no Mussulman law of the kind. The practice of the Ottoman Empire is very different, as will have been seen by the early part of this narrative. The larger portion of the local military establishments of European Turkey was (until the *recent* changes) Christian.

to act, and through whose authority he should obtain the means of Government, both in obedience and supply.

At this time the two communities, the Christian and the Mussulman, were living in presence of each other on the soil of Serbia. The Turks in the large fortresses of Semendria, Belgrade, &c. the remnant of the Janissaries in the smaller castles throughout the country in the southern and mountainous parts, and the Mussulman Spahis of Slaav origin were readmitted as allies of the occupiers of the castles and fortresses by the very fact of the extravagant pretensions of the Serbians. While this organization was taking place and this discussion going on between them and the Porte, the Serbians, were thus not masters of their country, but the Turks, Janissaries and Spahis did so far remain neutral as to see the Serbians refuse a Pasha sent by the Sultan and even expel him. The absence of collision between the two populations, so separated, was as it were a daily miracle that could not go on indefinitely repeated.

At length, kindled by a single spark, the flame of discord burst forth. An insult from a Turk to a Serbian was retaliated by the Serbians, by an attack upon the place, and the expulsion of the Turkish population.

In the beginning of 1806 the parties were at open war. By command of the Porte the Pashas of Bosnia and of Scodra marched to put down the insurgents, but without success. An army of 30,000 men belonging to the Grand Vizir, though not commanded by him in person, then entered Serbia, and subduing the forces opposed to them, regained pos-

session of a considerable portion of the country. The Serbian people now unexpectedly found themselves at war with the Porte. They had been hitherto assured by their leaders that it was without the Sultan's authority that the Pashas of Bosnia and of Scodra had invaded them. Now finding that they had been deceived, an insurrection in favour of the Sultan broke out against their own chiefs, many of whom were obliged to fly, and the total submission of the country would probably have taken place, had it not been for the daring and successes of Cara George at the head of small body of volunteers. In the month of August of the same year Cara George had so far restored affairs, as to be at the head of 7000 men. He was attacked by the Turkish army in an entrenched camp before Serbatz. During two days the assaults of the Turks were repulsed with heavy loss, and on the morning of the third, the Turks sent to the Serbians this message, "You have gallantly defended yourselves for two days. We are now going to attack you once more and upon the issue will depend whether or not we resign to you the country, as far as the Drino." They then encouraged the inhabitants to come out and post themselves so as to see the sight. But on this day they were equally unsuccessful; and losing a great many men, retired, were pursued, and cut to pieces in their flight.

While this great victory was achieved by Cara George, one scarcely less important was obtained by Dobrinatz, in the south. Ibrahim Pasha of Scodra, had entered the country with an army estimated at 40,000 men. He, like the army of the Grand

Vizir, had assaulted the Serbian chief in a fortified camp. Therein Dobrinatz maintained himself during six weeks, against continuous assaults; the Albanians, worn by their efforts and their failures, destitute of provisions, and harassed in their rear, were discomfited and broken.

The Porte, now began to think seriously of an accommodation; encouraged by overtures that were made to them, the Serbians deputed two Knezes, and a Bulgarian primate to Constantinople, to enter into negotiation. The conditions upon which the Porte consented to an arrangement were, that the Serbians should have complete control of their internal government, that the Spahis, Janissaries, and all Turks should be removed from the country, with the exception of a garrison at Belgrade, which was to be restricted to a hundred and fifty men, and that in lieu of all former contributions, they should pay a sum of 900,000 piastres, which was to include indemnity to the Spahis for their pay, and to other Mussulmans for their property.

These were the ostensible propositions; but to this was added another of the very highest moment, and of which we have only had recently the knowledge—it was this—that "*the Porte would allow the Serbians to obtain the guarantee of any Christian power, except Russia.*"

M. Ranke expresses his astonishment, that the proposals of the Porte were not accepted; and that an arrangement, so desirable to both parties, and when every facility for adjusting it was presented by both, should have failed without any assigned reason. Had he known that the Porte had added to her con-

cessions, the offer of the guarantee of a Christian power, how much more incomprehensible would have appeared to him the failure of such an adjustment! or, learning that Russia was excluded by this proposal, there would have been no further difficulty in comprehending *why* it had failed.

That Russia had succeeded in counteracting this proposition, is established by the very fact of its having been secret. Every *suggestion* from the power to whom they had chosen to appeal, must have been all-authoritative at the time to the Serbians. It sufficed that half-a-dozen men should believe or repeat in whispers, that--"this suggestion proved that Russia alone was their friend;"—for Serbia to make Russian protection an absolute condition, and to reject any arrangement without it. On the other hand, it required but to report at Constantinople such words as these, to convince the Porte that the Serbians were acting in collusion with the Russians. By admitting suspicion, the Porte could be led into justifying, instead of removing the suspicions of the Serbians—into frustrating, instead of pressing the adjustment it had proposed.

The settlement thus unaccountably dropping, the Serbians determined to gain possession of the fortresses. Cara George attacked the Pasha, got possession of the town, and shut up the Turks in the citadel. Having secured an island in the Danube he was enabled to blockade the place both by land and water, and in the month of December, 1806, the Turks evacuated Belgrade by capitulation, and retired to Viddin. The other chief fortresses also fell—Schabatz in the following February, and Uschize in

June. Thus in the middle of 1807 the whole country was in the hands of the Serbians. As soon as the visible yoke had been removed, one to them invisible was placed upon their necks.

In the first struggle against the Janissaries, when the mere correction of abuses and the remedying of evils was the end in view, their victory was beneficial as their war was just;—no change was effected either by violence or speculation, and had not foreign influence obtained, through religion, a hold over them, their well-being, integrity, and simplicity would have been assured and preserved by the settlement proposed to them by their lawful sovereign. In that first struggle—their sense of duty was not broken by rebellion, and their traditional customs of government were not destroyed or vitiated by that greatest curse of man—unjust success.

The second struggle was of a very different character. It was rebellion against the sovereign, and thereby broke the ties of duty in their highest attachments. This was prompted by a foreign power debasing religion into the instrument of its guilt. This rebellion was not even a common impulse of the people; they were seduced into it on false pretensions by a few chiefs who sought a rupture between the people and the Sultan to retain their own position. The people wavered between the Sultan and their chiefs, even, although they had to fear indiscriminate vengeance, and were still reeking with blood of the Sultan's servants. Victory under such circumstances, was no longer a triumph of an honest people over abusive rulers, but of the new Serbian military leaders over the Sultan, enabling them to secure

their authority over the people by whose means they had obtained it. The consequences appeared in the immediate alteration of the municipal and local government, which had been the support of the nation under all its trials, the source of its actual strength, which, during three centuries, the Ottoman power had not broken :—in the hour of victory it sank ; and tradition, duty, and custom, was exchanged for—independence !

The Knezes or village chiefs had refused, as we have already seen, to take part in the conduct of military operations, fearing to place themselves in opposition with the Turkish government, and had thus left that field open to new adventurers, or to experienced leaders of the bands of Heyducks. The peace thus found the municipal authority everywhere displaced by military chieftains, who established themselves in each district and village. These now took the title of Voivods, and with their followers, (each man becoming a chieftain only because he obtained the attachment to himself of others), formed a class, such as many Europeans have had the opportunity of observing in Greece. The municipal chiefs had, under the Turkish Government, by the separation of religion and of race, preserved their distinct authority beside or under the Turkish Kadi ;—now the Voivods stood in the place of Spahi and Kadi, possessed himself of the property of the one and assumed the functions of the other. The separation of the functions of these, as well as the separation between the Christians and Mussulmans, had secured and constituted the local rights represented by the municipal chiefs,—now the separation being effaced,

the frame-work of Government disappeared. The Voivods, according to their influence, their character, and the number of their dependants, established themselves in greater or smaller districts, and considered themselves each independent of the other. Thus each of the chieftains whom we have already named, came to be rulers over considerable portions of territory, and Cara George was only a more powerful Voivod than the rest; being at the same time master in Shumadia, Belgrade, and Kragoevatz. These abuses the people soon attempted to remedy, through the only channel open for the expression of their wishes, and the only organised body not composed of the military leaders—the Senate.

This body did consider the evil, and having come to a decision upon the remedies, did resolve to apply them. They required the restoration to the state of the Turkish property and of the Spahilics, which the Voivods had seized upon. They rescued from them the administration of justice. Unfortunately they did not restore the exercise of its functions to the municipal chiefs; but appointed judges, independent of Voivods. The Voivods were indignant at such presumption, and Cara George attempted to overawe the Senate by violence. Failing in these attempts, the Voivods adopted a surer course—that of influencing *the election* of the senators in the different provinces, as also amount of pay which they received, and which each province settled for its own representative. By these means the integrity of the Senate was corrupted, its curb was lightened, it ceased to have the faculty of carrying into effect the regulations which itself had made, and henceforward in

that body was represented the divisions of the community and the state.

The Kmets or village elders had lost their power, the senate had become valueless, as a restraint on the military chieftains. The only resource was now their yearly national assembly. In it all affairs of importance were debated, the public accounts settled, and plans formed and instructions given. This body was composed of all that was distinguished in the nation. Voivods, Knezs, Kmets, and indeed whoever would and could attend. The military chieftains could here muster their strength. Still they could not in such an assembly overawe and overrule as in their separate districts. In the establishment of the Senate the Voivods and Cara George had concurred, on distinct grounds; the first expecting to be able through it to prevent the supremacy of Cara George; he expecting to be able to make it the instrument for the establishment of that supremacy. The Senate had served the purposes of neither, and maintained the public rights against both. Assailed then by the united hostility of both factions, it had lost its weight. Cara George was more fortunate with the Scoupchina, or general assembly. The idea suggesting itself to them, of setting up one superior chief as a check over the rest, Cara George was the man looked to for the purpose, and for a time he was now enabled to gain an ascendancy in the Senate; and Mladen, a partizan of his, a man possessed of great talents and eloquence, obtained entire control over that body. But this disposition to give the supreme authority to Cara George was counteracted partly by his own rash and irreso-

lute conduct, and partly by the declared opposition of the Metropolitan Leonti, a Greek. Mladen was overthrown, and he was obliged to quit the country, and Cara George, pretending now to pre-eminent station and authority, which he was unable to assert, found himself exposed to the greatest hazards.

At the same period in which the Serbians came to be tranquil possessors of the whole of Serbia, an arrangement had taken place between Russia and France, the former having sacrificed her two allies Prussia and England, entering at once into secret alliance with her ostensible enemy. In the mutual concessions which resulted from this arrangement, the countries confining on Serbia were already disposed of by Alexander as his own, and made the means of bargaining with France. The sea-ports commanding the Montinegrins, (whom Russia had recently used to destroy a French army), were surrendered to France, together with the Ionian Islands, and Ragusa was formally incorporated with the French Empire. Napoleon, supported by Russia, established the system, called continental. They were to unite to ruin England by excluding her manufactures; that is, by upsetting the laws and injuring the prosperity of each country. England then found but two allies on the Continent—the Pope and the Sultan, the two states in which the connection being more intimate between religion and politics, there was a longer lingering of tradition and of law, and a greater power of resisting the subserviency or the confusion of the times. When Russia joined France, she left England embroiled in an objectless war with Turkey, which

was put an end to by mutual indisposition to continue it, although by no special act, until the signature of the treaty of 1809. The passage of Britain's commerce into Europe, through the Turkish dominions, (although no treaty had put an end to the state of hostility with the Ottoman Empire,) enabled her to counteract the decrees of Berlin and of Milan.

At this time Russia and France were united against all the other Powers of Europe; for, after cautious preparation, Austria dropped the mask, and Germany was about to become the theatre of a renewed struggle with France. Russia seized this moment to press her separate projects in the East, requiring the exclusion of the British Ambassador from Constantinople, and the cession by Turkey of Wallachia and Moldavia.* Failing to obtain these, she assaulted Turkey from Wallachia and Moldavia, which, by the Treaty of Tilsit, she had bound herself to evacuate.

The position of Serbia was then one of the greatest importance to all the Powers engaged in the great European conflict. The Serbians had on all sides appealed in vain. They had addressed themselves to France, offered to Napoleon a protectorate of the Slaav population of Turkey. He had contented himself with sending a sabre of honour to Czerni George. They then appealed to Austria. She treated them as rebels. Repulsed on every side, and encouraged only by Russia, it could only be to her that they could turn; and she,

* England attempted to bombard Constantinople in 1807, with the view of compelling the Porte to *cede Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia.*

was alone to profit by their successes or their reverses, and to give them success or failure as best suited their own ends. Alexander required their recognition of his sovereignty. At this the indignation of Czerni George had been aroused, and he had exclaimed, "We have freed ourselves without the assistance of the Czar, and we will maintain without his assistance the liberty we have won." The Russian Government suddenly turned round, proffered to the Serbians assistance without conditions, assumed no superiority, and placed at their absolute disposal 3000 Russian troops, who passed the Danube at Cladovo. Seeing this accession of strength placed in the hands of Cara George, the Serbian chiefs, both of the class of voiwods, and of hospodars, were startled by a new danger, for the assistance against the Turks—*thus* given—made the Turks far less dangerous than their dictator. The chiefs now addressed themselves to Russia to supplicate that a political agent should be sent to *regulate the use* of this pretorian band; thus invoking from Russia a check over the Chief whom Russia had made dangerous to them. This application was made in the first instance without the knowledge of Czerni George. The Russian Government chose for its agent, M. Rodofinikin (a Greek!) The Greek Metropolitan, Leonti, was engaged in the avowed scheme of re-subjecting Serbia to the Porte, and then of obtaining from the Porte a Government of a Greek Prince and boyars, similar to those of Wallachia and Moldavia. *The very moment of his arrival the Russian agent ostensibly coalesced with the Metropolitan.* The voiwods and hospodars

on the one hand, and the Prince on the other, were now dependent on the support which the one or other would receive from the Russian troops. Neither party dared to take any step that might be unacceptable to the Russian agent. It became the object of all to do that which should win his favour, and secure his support, whilst the direct concert of the immediate partizans of Russia with those of the Greek Metropolitan, served to make M. Rodofinikin master of the Senate. Thus, as by a few moves on a chess board, made in silence, and in rapid succession, was Serbia separated into two hostile camps, and reduced to abject prostration before a Foreign Power.

Such was the condition of the most important province of European Turkey when the Russian war of 1809 broke out.

From each face of this province, cutting deeply into the mass of the Turkish possessions, reaching to the centre of Roumeli, commanding the Balkan, and pressing upon the provinces that lay upon the Danube, and the Adriatic,—proceeded invitations* to insurrection, threatenings of assault. For a moment it was conceived, that the whole Christian population of western Roumeli was on the point of

* The Christians might be then set down at not less than ten millions, the Mussulmans at not more than two millions and a half, of which nearly one-half of Slaav blood.

The value of Slavian affinities had then first been brought into evidence by the facility with which a single order from St. Petersburg had caused a Turkish province on the Adriatic (Montinegrin) to attack a French army.

rising in arms. But different was the result. On each frontier their assaults were repelled; and this vast enterprize, in conjunction with their great European ally, ended in the loss of what single-handed they had won. Serbia was now invaded by the Turks, and a considerable portion,—that lying to the east of the Morava,—was re-occupied by them.

To increase the dismay of the Serbians, M. Rodofinikin abandoned Belgrade, and with Dobrinatz, repaired to the Russian camp. This abandonment the people attributed to ill-will between Cara George and Russia.

The power of Cara George had been created out of his victories. It was now lowered by disasters. The people were further led to attribute to him the estrangement of the ally who, by disuniting and betraying them, had won their affections. Thence an outcry was raised in the assembly against him, and the people, with one voice, demanded "the Emperor!" Cara George was compelled to appear to concur. Consequently, a deputation was sent to Russia, to endeavour, by every concession and protestation, to regain her countenance and support.

On the arrival of this deputation at the Russian camp, Dobrinatz represented to them, that they could expect no support from Russia, until Cara George, and the chief of the Senate, a partizan of his, were removed; as she apprehended that Cara George was aiming at supreme power!

In this difficulty Cara George addressed himself to Austria, requesting support;—his prayer was rejected.

It is here worthy of remark, that while Russia was engaged in a war with Turkey, it was to her a less important object to make Serbia available as an instrument againt the Porte, than to disorganize Serbia itself.

In May, 1810, the Russian General Kaminski issued a proclamation, in which, for the first time, the community of *race* between the Serbians and the Russians is declared. In it Cara George is recognized as Prince. The Serbians were required to send auxiliary troops. These to be commanded by the chief antagonist of Cara George. Four thousand five hundred of their best infantry, and fifteen hundred of picked cavalry were in consequence sent to join the Russian armies in Wallachia, and placed under the command of Dobrinatz.

By this proclamation Cara George was quite regained for Russia ; and those who, supported by her, had opposed him, were now induced to recognise him, so that he found himself beholden to Russia at once for internal and external support, after having felt to what extent she could injure him, and how completely he remained at her mercy : whilst she got into her hands a picked body of Serbians, and a rival chief who could at any time be used against the ostensible Prince.

The Serbians now made ostentatious preparation for a new assault upon the Turks. This provocation led to the invasion of Serbia, by Courshid Pasha, with an army of thirty thousand men. The chief strength of the Serbians having been withdrawn by the contingent sent to the Russian armies, they were unable to resist, and to such

a state of helplessness was Cara George reduced, that he himself addressed a letter to Dobrinatz, declaring that the existence of Serbia now depended either upon his return with the Serbians that were with him, or upon the presence of a Russian auxiliary body. The Russian General did not restore the Serbians, but sent a Russian regiment. Thus assisted, they were enabled to repel the invasion of Courshid Pasha. This danger was scarce averted when another Turkish corps entered from Bosnia; again did Cara George appeal to Russia, declaring that Serbia was reduced to the greatest danger it had ever yet run, and entreating that one moment might not be lost in sending him assistance. No assistance however came, and by the greatest efforts the advance of the Turks was arrested, and an armistice concluded.

The external danger being thus removed, the internal dissensions reappeared with greater implacability, and a new element of discord was thrown in, in the presence of the Russian regiment. Its attitude and movements served alternately to encourage and paralyse each of the factions. Cara George attempted an alteration in the constitution. He succeeded in gaining the support of the smaller chieftains by a partition amongst them of the authority of the greater ones, and obtained from them an oath of obedience to him and to no one else. He instituted a Ministry composed of the most influential members of the Senate. A civil war was on the point of breaking out, and was prevented only by the faulty arrangements of the chiefs. When the danger was over, the Russian body of auxiliaries

declared for Cara George, and he publicly *kissed the hand* of the Colonel of the Russian regiment.*

Cara George, now the partisan of a Foreign Power, could carry his measures no longer as the chief of a country, but as the leader of a faction. The opposite faction were driven forth as exiles. It was the partizans of Russia, those who had enabled her to get command of Cara George, that were thus sacrificed. The very grounds alleged for the banishment of Dobrinatz was his connection with Rodofinikin (the confidential communicant to Lord Durham of Russia's instructions to Persia!) The only exception made was in favour of Milosh, who, although afforded an opportunity of explaining away intercepted communications with the other

* It may be here worth while comparing her action in a similar sense upon other States. The following sentences in reference to the Toorkmans and the Persians, are from the pen of one of the best informed and most accurate observers.

"The Court of St. Petersburg, by the share it took in the internal and family dissensions, to which pastoral people are so prone, and by supporting the weak against the strong, the unpopular against the more acceptable candidate for superiority in the tribe gradually established an authority sanctioned by the engagements which the rivals had successively incurred as the price of her assistance, too strong to be resisted, and from which they could escape only by an emigration into a distant country." —*Progress of Russia in the East*, p. 23.

"The fleet maintained in the Caspian by Catherine, burnt all the ships, and even all the floats of timber which they happened to meet. Their commanders had, besides, positive orders to sow discord between the several Khans, and always to support the weaker against the more strong, a method which the Empress had found too successful, both in Poland and in the Crimea, to admit of her neglecting it in behalf of the Persians."—*Ibid.* p. 31.

chiefs, persisted, before the assembly, in the course that he had taken, justified it and yet was allowed to remain. These arbitrary measures produced an insurrection in various districts, but being now deprived of their leaders, the insurrection was soon put down by means as sanguinary as the measures which had given rise to it had been despotic. With all which events Russia seemed eminently satisfied. The new envoy, M. Nedoba, was at once the counsellor and confidant of Cara George.

Upon this followed the peace between Russia and Turkey.

CHAPTER V.

TREATY OF BUCHAREST.—AMNESTY STIPULATED FOR THE SERBIANS.

BEFORE proceeding to examine how the Treaty of Bucharest affected the Serbians, we must take a general review of the position of the two Empires at the time of its signature.

The invasion, by Napoleon, of Russia, whilst at war with Turkey, presented to the latter power, the first occasion on which she had found a European ally whilst in conflict with her mortal foe.

In a series of wars, and of treaties as disastrous as any war, extending over forty years, Russia had invariably obtained the concurrence of the natural allies of Turkey. Upon each occasion it was not through her own strength, and not by Turkey's weakness, that she had succeeded; but by her dexterity in managing the powers of Europe, not in intelligence her match, and by her disregard of faith in her relations with Turkey, whose honesty served her purpose equally with the incapacity of the other powers.

This position was now reversed. While war raged between Russia and Turkey, France prepared also for war with the former—prepared not merely for an ordinary war, in which a certain number of troops are advanced, and certain districts and regions assaulted, but—for AN INVASION. There was the settled plan of subjugation, with means and preparatives commensurate to the design. To

Turkey was presented unexpected and sudden escape from the continuously increasing danger; and in the same hour was opened to it restoration of affairs, vengeance for wrongs, rupture of the bonds that had been imposed upon it, and reacquisition of the possessions which during the previous half century had been extorted from it.

The invasion of Napoleon presented to the Porte the prospect of recrossing the Pruth, the Bug, the Dneiper, and the Dneister, sweeping the Ukraine, reoccupying the Crimea and the banks of the Kuban; and, supposing even the invasion to have failed, it would have required long years and great sacrifices, and great hazards for Russia to have regained the position in which she stood on the Danube at the beginning of 1812. But had Turkey taken this course, the issue of the invasion of Napoleon would have been no longer doubtful. Turkey's maritime assistance would have more than counteracted in the more vital positions of the Black Sea, the maritime defence which England spread over Russia in the Baltic. Had Turkey been with France the old association of Poles and Mussulmans, would have revived, and the restoration of Poland, the necessary price of Turkey's co-operation, would have been a greater force added to the arms and cause of France, than even the armies or the navies of the Ottoman Sultan.* But instead of this we have

* "The existence of Poland is bound up with that of Turkey. One hand of iron is laid on both. Unlock that withering grasp, and both start up simultaneously to life. The Dardanelles are the key to both. Both are to be secured by their possession and sacrificed by their loss."—*England, France, Russia and Turkey*, p. 4.

Turkey relinquishing all these mighty prospects to which her renown, her honour, her wrongs, her safety and her vengeance alike pointed. When it depended on her will alone to crush or to spare, we find her signing a treaty of peace with her inveterate foe at the dark crisis of her fate, and at the hour of her extremest peril.

By what means was so astounding a result obtained? It was the influence of England that swayed the Porte to this accommodation, and the treachery of the agents employed, perverted the conditions on which that sacrifice was made. When it discovered the deception that had been practised, it nevertheless felt itself bound in honour by the act that its Plenipotentiary had signed; it punished the fraud with death, but held the bond sacred.

While this act of magnanimous integrity was lost upon the nations of Europe, Russia, estimating alike the honour or the ignorance with which she plays, knew that she was perfectly secure of Turkey, from the moment that her faith had been pledged, whatever the means by which that word was obtained, or whatever sacrifices it imposed.*

* A late foreign Minister in London mentioned to me his astonishment at the joy, evinced at the time by a Russian Ambassador at the signature of the treaty of Bucharest. He observed to that diplomatist, that that treaty was a piece of useless paper, and probably signed only to deceive the Russians, as it was impossible that the Turks should not seize the occasion to fall upon the Russian territory to retake their own, the moment that the Russian army was withdrawn; that no Christian power could resist such a temptation, and it was not to be expected that it should be resisted by Turks. The Russian diplomatist (Prince Lieven) replied, "*Little do you know the Turks. The ink of that bond is worth to us* 100,000 *men!*"

Russia having obtained, was not content with Turkey's neutrality and abnegation. Since it was possible to prevent her from uniting with France, it was equally possible to drive her upon France. She therefore sought to enlist the Divan in her quarrel, and attempted to dazzle it with the prospect of conjoint triumphs in the noblest fields of ancient European and Asiatic chivalry. She pointed out France lining with her territory, or her tributary states, the whole northern coast of the Mediterranean, powerless then to resist any assault, while her Sovereign, and the flower of her troops, were lost in the wastes,—soon to be buried in the snows of Russia. France then commanded in Italy, she was struggling in Spain. What would have been the effect of a conjoint Russian and Turkish fleet sweeping the Mediterranean, and having in its choice to assault France itself, to insurrectionize Spain or Italy, Sardinia, Corsica; and when to this navy was to be added a Russian army, swelled by Bosnians, Serbians, Montinegrians, and other southern tribes of the same race, to whom Souvaroff had already shewn the way to the teeming plains of Lombardy! Could the Porte have been brought to consent, this plan might have been executed with ease. It would have diminished in no way Russia's available means of defence in the north—it would have been calling into play the vessels uselessly locked up in the Black Sea; and but a small body of troops would have been requisite for a nucleus to the Slavo-Turkish army, which would have been set in motion by the attraction of western spoils, and which would have come to support

the Russo-Turkish fleet, of above thirty sail of the line, aided by three hundred Greek Corsairs, which would have swept French commerce from the seas. And how was it that Turkey was not seduced by such prospects as these? Simply because the Turks are attached to their independence—they know that that independence is menaced by Russia; and that being to them the first object, no prospects of ambition gained through her can be a temptation;—but if Turkey is allowed to be broken, so that they shall despair of independence, then will these prospects become attractive. Now this was the prospect held out by Russia to Turkey, when Russia was in the very crisis of her fate. What, then, will be her means of seduction, when in the pride of her strength she can offer such prospects to Turkey, who, ceasing to trust in herself, will seek compensation for the loss of conscience, and a cloak from the sense of degradation in schemes of conquest, and in prospects of aggrandizement?

Whoever will reflect for a single moment upon the difference of the fate of mankind, had Turkey co-operated with France, or had she co-operated with Russia: and who will further consider, that the taking of the one or the other line is contingent upon the ability with which the diplomatic affairs of one with another country are managed, will then comprehend why it is that Russia finds it worth while to look for able men to conduct her affairs, and will get some glimmering of the frightful power revealed in the sentence that we are all ready to utter, "Russia is superior to every other nation in diplomacy."

The integrity of the Turks in 1812, prevented the world from witnessing and deploring the spectacle of Turks and Muscovites ravaging in common the fairest portions of the earth. The value, therefore, of Russia's naval position in the Black Sea, still remains a secret in Europe; nor will it be, till the Sound and the Dardanelles are virtually in possession of Russia, that Europe will learn by experience the tremendous aggressive power that lies concealed behind them.*

We must now return to the Treaty of Bucharest, in its bearing upon the province in whose history we are engaged. We have to ascertain, first, whether or not, Russia, in protecting her allies, the Serbians, in the prosecution of her known designs against Turkey, may not have used the position given to her by their insurrection to trench upon the sovereign authority of the Porte. Secondly, we have to see if she has, in the prosecution of her known objects of distracting each province as well as each empire, not used her influence over them, to introduce into

* In 1791 Prussia declared that there could be no peace for Europe whilst a Russian maritime force existed in the Black Sea. Since this period the aggregate maritime power of Russia and Turkey have separately very much increased. The number of sea-faring men has been augmented, as also of ships of war, and by the rapidity of the extension of Russian influence over Persia, she can take Turkey in the rear, and may, at any moment, come down upon Syria, by the source of the Euphrates, and on the Persian Gulph. This progress will not be revealed until she has brought about war between England and France, and involved Turkey with an European antagonist. But it is so simple, that any child may see it—and there is the danger. It is not that mists obscure, but it is that there is no eye to see.

that treaty, stipulations which under the air of protection, shall bring them injury, either from without or from within. Each and both of these are what we have to expect from the known character of Russia, and from the recognized inability of the Porte, or of the Porte's allies to cope with her.

But, before going to the stipulations of the Treaty, let us consider in what position the Porte and Serbia relatively stood, in order that we may understand what Russia had to do for Serbia, and what she was bound to do for her in common justice. In common justice she could not leave a province that she had embroiled with the empire to which it belonged, in a worse condition than that in which it previously stood.

When the Russo-Turkish war broke out, in 1809, the Serbians were in tranquil possession of the government of their country; they occupied the fortresses,* and were left unmolested by the Turks.

The Serbians might be apprehensive, but they were not assaulted;—they had nothing to request —made no claim; they had taken the law into their own hands, and when the Russian war broke out, they had no contest, and no quarrel with the Porte. In her behalf, and at her instigation, they invaded the Ottoman territory.

In the course of the war, the Turks offered to accommodate matters with the Serbians. This offer opened to Serbia the rightful possession of what it had previously acquired, and removed the apprehension of consequences which alone stood between Serbia and the Porte when the war commenced.

* With the exception of three or four of smaller note.

For it was Russia's interests they espoused, and to these interests they sacrificed, in the course of it, their own. The Serbians had, therefore, a right to expect that so much, at least, should be stipulated for them, as the Porte had already offered, and as Russia had prevented them from accepting.

The offer of the Porte was to place Serbia upon the same footing as the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia.

The amount of such a concession is much greater than at first sight it might appear. The government of these Provinces (Wallachia and Moldavia), is not in the hands of natives, but of Greek Boyars from Constantinople. So that their independence of the Porte was, in reality, dependence on foreign adventurers of the worst class—Greek Fanariots, who held all offices of importance, to the exclusion of the inhabitants.

The apparent independence of the Provinces brought further in its train external dependence, and in proportion as the pressure of Turkish power was displaced, in its room was substituted the crafty controul of Russia. When the Porte offered to place Serbia on the same footing as these other provinces, it meant and proposed neither Greek Boyars, nor Russian protectors, but the real possession of that independence which it had yielded to the other two provinces, and which strangers had stepped in to profit by, to the injury alike of the Sultan and his subjects. And this was no more than the restoration of the ancient constitution of the Ottoman Empire, identical with that of the feudal times in England. The Suzerain vindi-

MR. URQUHART

ON

THE SUEZ CANAL IN 185

A CHAPTER EXTRACTED FROM THE STEREOTYPED PLATE

OF THE

PROGRESS OF RUSSIA IN THE WEST NORTH, AND SOUTH.

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Progress of Russia in the South

Part II.

THE LEVANT AND THE RED SEA.

CHAPTER V.

The Canal of Suez.

"Necho commenced the digging of a Canal, but was frightened by some oracular words of the priests."

The opening up of the passage from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, a work associated with the glories of the Pharaohs, the Ptolemies, and the Caliphs, was a task which ought to have been vindicated to herself, by the ruler of the ocean and the mistress of India. The Pharaohs did not supply China with woollens, nor the Ptolemies, Hindostan with cottons; the Caliphs were not rulers of the Deccan: none of them claimed superiority in the world by mechanical enterprise, or commercial ambition. England, with the dominion and the commerce of the East, with the dominion and the command of the seas, with wealth in one hand, and steam in the other, has had no thought of bringing India and the Eastern hemisphere to her doors. If we had been ignorant of history, geography might have invited us to the attempt; and without surveys past events might have suggested the enterprise.

The physical difficulties are nothing: the dangers of the navigation of the Red Sea have disappeared; we have now the aid of locks and steam; we have illimitable capital and endless inventions. If, therefore, a canal had even proved impracticable in ancient times, that would be no argument now; what then are we to say of those who, despite the evidence of its former existence, pronounce it an impossibility?*

* Mr. Galloway was the first, I believe, to speak of "impossibility," but he qualifies it as "*financial*." Mr. Stephenson makes the matter

The canal is mentioned by all the old writers, Herodotus, Plinv, Diodorus Siculus, &c. It was in the Roman period restored under Adrian. Again closed up by the shifting sands, it was opened as soon as the Arabs had got possession and established themselves on the Nile. The conqueror of that country, Amru, completed the work,* and it remained open for 120 years, until it again fell amidst the schisms of Abassides and Ommiades.

Scarcely had Napoleon a sun-rise free, when he rode forth to the desert, in search of the traces of the ancient work, and was the first to discover it; he then ordered the well-known survey. When it was brought to him, he asked whether the reopening was a project feasible, and being answered that it was easy, and even offered greater facilities than it had presented before, he said,—"Well, it is a great undertaking; publish a report, and force the Turkish Government to find in its execution, profit and glory." If it presented greater facilities in the time of Napoleon than in those of Necho and Amru, how much greater are those it offers to-day? Then there was no steam: it was not for France, as it is for England, a domestic matter.

The total distance, by the French report, from Suez to Tyneh, on the Mediterranean, is 180,852 metres, or less than ninety miles. The cost is estimated at 30,000,000 francs, or £1,250,000 sterling (not more than a railroad from Varna to Silistria, or from Alexandria to Cairo), they further estimate at some hundred millions of acres the irrigable land that would

very difficult, by reason of an asserted want of scour, and calculates the cost at £8,000,000. Both these gentlemen were railwaymen and had counter-projects; and, besides they were both under the influence of the British consul at Alexandria, if not of the Foreign Office in Downing Street.

* The Egyptians, alarmed at the threatened *drain of provisions*, succeeded in persuading Amru that the difficulties he would have to encounter were insurmountable; probably from the reverse of "the want of scour." The Caliph, however, saw more clearly into the motives of the Egyptians than his lieutenant.

be recovered. I have not had the opportunity of examining the surveys of M. Linan, but they are understood to be even more favourable and at a lower estimate than that of the French scientific commission.

The French calculated the Red Sea about thirty feet higher in level than the Mediterranean: this the English railway engineers have taken upon themselves to deny; I am not aware upon what data: the aqueous and atmospheric currents would suggest the inference, even if the fact had not been established by positive survey, of a higher level at the western extremity of the Red Sea, than at the eastern of the Mediterranean.*

There is a competition between two lines: the one from Suez to the Nile, at the ancient city of Bubastis; the other from Suez direct to the Mediterranean, at the Pelusiac or Eastern mouth of the Nile. But it is immaterial to discuss their relative merits, as the most cumbersome and expensive would yet be sufficiently remunerative and practical. In ancient times the line to Bubastis was no doubt preferable because they were destitute of our means for shortening labour, and a passage was not required for vessels of the dimensions of those which now navigate the Indian Ocean: still the ancient canal was of depth sufficient (30 feet) to float line-of-battle ships, and the canal of Omar was finished in six months, so that on the seventh vessels floated through it,

* "The surface of all the seas that communicate one with another must be regarded as generally perfectly equal in respect of mean elevation. Prevailing winds and currents, however, in extensive land-locked seas, the Red Sea, for example, produce permanent, though still inconsiderable, differences of level. At the Isthmus of Suez, the level of the Red Sea is from 24 to 36 feet above that of the Mediterranean at different hours of the day. The form of the canal (the Straits of Babelmanded), by which the Indian Ocean communicates with the Red Sea being such, that the waters find a readier access than outlet, appears to assist in producing this remarkable, permanent, superior elevation of the surface of the Red Sea, which was already known to the ancients."—*Humboldt's Cosmos*, vol. i. p. 329.

carrying the grain of Egypt to Mecca. An English engineer officer, Captain Vetch, who has surveyed both lines decides in favour of the direct one; he points out a consideration not to be neglected, the greater specific gravity of the waters of the Red Sea, which, in the discharge at the Pelusiac mouth, would clear out the deposit from the Nile, which the current from the Mediterranean always carries eastward. His estimate, including the works at both entrances, slightly exceeds two millions sterling. *There lies dormant a sum of money sufficient for the enterprise, and which the Court of Directors, with the consent of the Government would dispose of for this purpose.*

Independently of India, and its 150 millions of inhabitants, this canal would shorten by six weeks the trade of England with nearly 420 millions of souls,* and diminish the charges on the double voyage of the large vessels by at least £2000. Amongst these populations there are none who are our rivals; they are all, or would be, our customers. The opening of this passage would be equivalent to the acquisition of a second India.

	POPULATION.
Abyssinia	2,500,000
Africa (eastern) say	10,000,000
Arabia, say	2,500,000
Australia and New Zealand	500,000
Ava	3,500,000
Borneo	1,500,000
Ceylon	1,500,000
China	350,000,000
Cochin China, and Cambodia	4,000,000
Java	10,000,000
Madagascar and Zangibar, Mauritius and Bourbon	2,500,000
Malacca	500,000
Persia	9,000,000
The Philippines	3,000,000
Siam	2,500,000
Sumatra	3,000,000
Tonquin	12,000,000
	418,500,000

If it has not been so, it is tacitly referred to indisposition upon the part of the Turkish Government—a supposition which receives weight from the resistance which it has opposed to the Cairo Railway, and to the Euphrates Expedition. That resistance is, however, attributable to other causes. The following incident will assist in judging of the dispositions of the Porte, and of the nature of the obstructions likely to be thrown in the way.

Colonel Chesney, at the close of 1834, having by unwearied exertions succeeded in *forcing* on the Foreign Office the plan for the navigation of the Euphrates, it was announced to the Embassy at Constantinople, that a demand was to be forwarded by the next messenger for a firman. Being on the point of starting for England I told Lord Ponsonby that the firman would be refused, and proposed to leave with him a sealed note to be used in that case. It turned out as I had expected, and a messenger was despatched home announcing the refusal; my note having, however, been sent to its destination, on the following day the firman came, and a second messenger was despatched with it. The matter presented this difficulty only, that it was proposed *through a Dragoman*. The Turk through whom it was subsequently obtained was no other than Achmet Pasha—against whom, from that hour the inveterate hostility of England was directed, on the score of his being "*Russian*." These facts were brought to light in the trial of the *Times*, for a libel on the Dragoman system, at the instance of M. Pisani, the Dragoman in question, who was forced by Lord Ponsonby to attempt his vindication against the statements made in that journal by Dr. Millingen, its then correspondent.

On a recent visit to Constantinople, I learnt this further incident. One of the Foreign Ministers visiting the Chief of the Dancing Dervishes, a favourite of Sultan Mahmoud, observed a snuffbox of exquisite workmanship, with a butterfly, the emblem of their order, in diamonds and enamel; it was a present from the Russian Ambassador.

The Dervish then brought out a large atlas, in which Mesopotamia, was marked to illustrate the proposed stations for the English expedition, and began to expatiate on the deep and perfidious purposes of England in her pretended desire of navigating the Euphrates. On inquiry, my friend discovered that these visits of the Russian Ambassador, which were made by night, and the presentation of these gifts, had coincided with the demand for the firman. Had the firman been refused, it would have been by the snuffbox: henceforward the principle would have been introduced into the policy of the Porte of setting its face against all schemes for communication with India through its territory.

If before the event any one had said "England with all her power will be shipwrecked in her attempt to obtain a firman for the Euphrates by an enamelled Butterfly, and after it has been refused, a traveller will obtain it by a billet of a couple of lines," would he not have been considered insane?

As to the Cairo Railway, the obstruction arose from the pretensions of the Pasha of Egypt; so soon as these were withdrawn, the firman was granted; but had the meeting in London occurred a month earlier, it would have been equal to a snuffbox; the language there held would have exasperated the Porte and encouraged the Pasha. Russia had, however, an interest in that railway which I shall presently explain.

The Government of Turkey has not been slow to appreciate the value of steam and the advantage of opening up channels of commerce; this one is especially of value, and affects her in regard to Arabia precisely as it does England in regard to India. She has at heart the incorporation of Arabia, by which she would confirm her tenure of Egypt; the matter is of importance not only in a military and political but also in a religious point of view, for the pilgrimage to the Holy Cities would be brought within reach of every inhabitant of the Empire. There is, however, one indispensable condition, that is, that it shall be proposed and

effected in a manner which shall not infringe upon the rights of the Porte or endanger its sovereignty.

How it may be asked could a man so bold and practical as Mehemet Ali, so long in possession of Egypt, so anxious to make it the seat and passage of commerce, neglect this work? It was incessantly pressed on his attention, not only by his engineer, M. Linan, but by other scientific men, and merchants, the Consuls of France and the United States, the present director of the Austrian railways, &c.; there was no want of scientific data, and no lack of offers of capital. But whenever the canal was urged he objected that there was another project which might be preferable, namely, a railway, and when that was pressed he had a hankering for the canal. Thus both were staved off, the one by the other, and this was explained as a balancing of the influence of England and France! the Canal was a *French project*,* the Railway was *the* English one; in fact it was the story of the Canal of the Danube over again.

* "Having been generally misinformed on matters of that kind in Egypt, I paid little or no attention to what I heard respecting them. It was commonly said there, that the French, Austrians, and Americans desired the canal, and that the English opposed them, on the ground that it *would facilitate the intercourse* of other nations with India."—*Letter of a Resident in Cairo.*

"He (the Pasha) was particularly careful to guard against the impression in the first instance that he wished the railway made to Suez: as I afterwards learned, the reason of that was, that the French interests are very much opposed to the establishment of a railway across the Isthmus, *believing, rightly or wrongly I do not know, that it is much better for France and all the countries lying on the Mediterranean to have a canal instead of a railway*, in order to make the Mediterranean the high road to India both for passengers and for commercial purposes; *therefore they have* for a long time been endeavouring to establish the feasibility of making a canal across the Isthmus.

"*Q.* I think you said the French interest was hostile to a line between Alexandria and Suez. Is it equally so to one between Alexandria and Cairo? *A. Quite so.*"—*Evidence of Mr. Stephenson before the select Committee for Steam Communication with India.*

The Railway, which for five and twenty years has served to stave off the Canal, is now at length being carried into execution; what is gained by it for the Indian Trade? A powerful body with local interests determinately hostile to the Canal, and in a position to render that hostility effective. The local traffic no doubt may support the Railway, and some of the lighter and more valuable goods may be conveyed by it as far as Cairo, but is that the opening up of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans through the Mediterranean and Red Seas? If the line be hereafter carried on from Cairo to Suez you will only have a Railway, ships will not pass. The distance will be 250 miles, and even at the rate of an English Railway the charge will be 10*s.* a ton in addition to the expenses of unlading and reladingt; amounting on the full freight out and in of a vessel of 1200 tons to £2500, —say that the "French project" is impracticable, at least the *English* one is absurd. Amru, the Lieutenant of the Caliph Omar, made in his day objections to the canal: but he had a master who knew better, and who said to him, "The Egyptians have persuaded thee, but I will punish thee if thou dost not dig the canal so that *ships may sail upon it*," and in the seventh month from that time they did sail upon it.

The projects of Louis Philippe ran in the line of *Mines et Forêts;* those of Louis Napoleon in that of Canals. His grand scheme was the opening of the Isthmus of Panama, and at one time he was prepared to sacrifice to its execution his European life and his Imperial prospects. When he came into power, his attention was naturally directed to Suez; being the nephew of that Napoleon who, in modern times, had revived the project. The matter was forced upon him by the rivalry of the engineers of the two countries in Egypt, and he naturally imagined that there must be some mistake: consequently he directed his Minister in London, M. Walweski, to open the matter with Lord Palmerston, and to suggest concert between the two Governments to carry this magnificent work. Imagine the bewilderment of

that diplomatist when he was met with menace and indignation, and told, "this a project of yours—England will never suffer it." The English Minister had discovered that Louis Napoleon wished to send through men-of-war to drive the English out of India!

Did it want a canal to bring Napoleon to Egypt on his intended way to India? With Malta in your hands, you are nearer than France to Egypt, if it signified one iota whether France was far or near. It is not France who menaces India; she once held extensive sway there, and lost it by England's maritime superiority. Whatever brings India nearer to Europe renders that superiority more complete; and if any measure could thwart the project of making the Mediterranean a "French Lake," it is one which should carry through it the full current of British trade.

The idea is one which can scarcely be announced with a grave countenance, and how the Franks of Cairo had been led to accept it as they have done is intelligible only through the power of inuendo and whisper. When reasons have been sought for it, people have contented themselves with referring to Napoleon's expedition, when he at once aimed at India and proposed the Canal. His projects against India were based upon the *possession of Egypt*; he proposed the Canal in the interest of Turkey after these plans were abandoned. The schemes on India are thus referred to by Thiers:—

"Egypt was the true intermediary position between Europe and India. To ruin England it sufficed for France to establish herself there. Thence she could dominate for ever the Mediterranean, and convert it, according to one of the expressions of Napoleon, into a *French lake*; thence she would be in a position either to ensure the existence of the Turkish Empire or to seize the best portion of the spoils. (The erroneousness of this position Napoleon afterwards understood and acted upon at the conference of Erfurt.) Once established in Egypt two courses were open—the first to create a marine in the Red Sea, and by means of it to destroy the British establishments in India, or to make of it a colony, and an

entrepôt by means of which Trade would abandon the route of the Cape of Good Hope."*

The statement I have made will appear incredible. It will pass belief that an English minister should have opposed such a work; but what can I urge more than I have done?—I have shown the interest of Russia, the dependence in every case of the minister; I have referred to facts, I have given names,—if what I say is not the truth it must be contradicted; if not contradicted, it is that contradiction is impossible: these details have been published before and have not been contradicted. Unless it was an object to prevent the canal, must it not have been made? It is a case in which there is no possibility of hesitation, or of a middle course. The *lay* reader may indeed object that Governments have nothing to do with promoting private enterprises; that it is enough for them to afford protection when they are formed, and that it would be an improper interference if they lent their authority to private schemes, or influenced capitalists in the placing of their funds. What then shall we say if we find the Government influence not only of this, but of other countries exerted to call into existence *a counter project*, for which favour is bespoken because realising the very ends proposed by the plan it is devised to frustrate?

It will be perceived that I refer to Panama, and the Isthmus of Darien, and doubtless it will occasion surprise that I should speak in such terms of that vast and incomparable enterprise: that surprise will be increased though diverted to another quarter, if the reader will take the trouble to examine a globe, compasses in hand: he will then make the discovery that by Panama the distance not only from London but also from New York, to the Indian Ocean is greater not only than by Suez, but also than by the Cape of Good Hope!

The local traffic of the back of America and that of the United States with China no doubt would be greatly benefited by this passage, but is it upon this basis that the

* Histoire de la Revolution, vi, 428.

scheme is constructed, or from this source that the returns are to come? It is the connection of the East and the West, that is proposed. Consequently all those who enter into the scheme, whether speculatively or practically, must be opposed to the Suez project: from the moment that the other is subscribed for, being of vast dimensions, a powerful organisation will be created, possessing the subject, controlling all the organs of publicity, counteracting in secret and scouting in public the counter scheme, if it ever comes into public notice, a circumstance scarcely to be expected seeing that the press of Europe is in the hands of Russia. This is her interest in the matter; she does not want to trade in California, but she "will not fail to take advantage of every means presented by her position to oppose the shorter and safer way to the Indian Sea, through the Euphrates or the Isthmus of Suez." * What avails it then that the Suez canal be the canal for the whole world. She is against it.

The Isthmus which unites North and South America differs from that which unites Africa and Asia, no less in the difficulties it presents than in the advantages which it affords. The Realejo was the line selected by Louis Napoleon: he calculated the cost at £4,000,000 (the distance 278 miles), and expected that 900,000 tons of shipping would pass, that from Europe paying 10*s.* a ton, that from America 20*s.* That is to say, a vessel of 1200 tons leaving London or New York for Calcutta was to take a circuit of some thousand miles for the privilege of paying some thousand pounds.

The scheme of the French Emperor is, however, a trifle compared to the one now in vogue, estimated at the sum of £12,000,000; not the estimate of those who oppose it, but of those who are engaged in promoting it.† This indeed is an "American project," to facilitate the trade and the ambition of the United States on the Pacific, but the watchful English minister is fortunately at hand. We will see how he settles this matter.

* Nebenius.

† Consult Dr. Cullen's 'Ship Canal of Darien.'

By Panama compared with Suez, the voyage from London to Calcutta would be lengthened 9,300 miles; from London to Hong Kong, 4,600; from New York to Hong Kong, 1,200; and from New York to Calcutta, 4,500.* The expenditure would be greater by three-fourths,† and the traffic less by three-fourths. Nevertheless, the English Government oversteps all form and all discretion to promote, to suggest, to call into existence the Panama Project, even seducing capitalists to investing in it: it positively enters into a treaty with the United States for this end.

When this treaty was signed, it was accepted as an evidence of the praiseworthy anxiety of those governments to hurry on the march of intellect and the progress of civilisation. No one was struck with the extraordinary nature and provisions of the act; no one looked at the map; as in the case of the Austrian Treaty for the Danube, they took from *it* their notions of Geography, and all the world imagined that this canal was to put in direct communication the East and the West. The Atlantic and Pacific were now to be joined—who cared for a communication between the *Mediterranean* and the Red Sea, by a cut across the Isthmus, the actual road from London to Calcutta, and which would join the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, and also to the Pacific? If heard of at all, it was smiled at as a cunning but defeated scheme of the envious French.

The Treaty with the United States is of so strange a nature that I cannot avoid inserting an abstract of its articles. It was signed on the 19th of April 1850, and contains the eight following stipulations.

ART. 1.—Neither Court to obtain or maintain exclusive

	Viâ Suez.		*Viâ Panama.*
* London to Calcutta . . .	7,920	—	17,280
New York „	9,800	—	14,340
London to Hong Kong . . .	9,660	—	14,340
New York „	11,460	—	12,640

† If we take the extreme calculations the Suez Canal would only cost one twelfth.

control, or occupy or erect fortifications, or form local alliances, &c.

ART. 2.—Not to be liable to blockade in case of war.

ART. 3.—To encourage and protect all enterprises for the opening of the canal.

ART. 4.—To exercise their influence with the local Government, to facilitate the enterprise, and obtain at each extremity a free port.

ART. 5.—When completed, to protect it against hostile attack.

ART. 6.—To invite all other Governments to join in this convention.

ART. 7.— To hasten by all means the execution of the work, by encouragement held out to parties propósing to undertake it.

ART. 8.—Contracting parties wish not only to effect a "particular object," but also to establish a "general principle," but a general principle limited to inter-communication *between the Atlantic and Pacific.*

There were other considerations besides those of mere statistics which one would have supposed likely to influence the British Cabinet—the relative exposure of the two channels in case of war to a *coup de main.* Any European or Transatlantic enemy of England might send an expedition, to the Isthmus of Darien with the greatest facility and secrecy; by entrenching themselves upon any one point they could stop the passage; they would have a long line to operate upon, strong positions to get possession of, no local power to impede them, extensive coasts to land upon, and the Pacific on the one side, and the Atlantic on the other, to approach or retire by: our whole navy, locked up at the two extremities, instead of affording protection, would only invite attack.

Egypt presents the exact counterpart. In case of war your Indian traffic would no longer by having to double the

Cape, be exposed either to France, or the United States. As regards the latter, the protection you would have to afford would then have to extend no further than the gut of Gibraltar. In the Mediterranean you would be exposed to France, but you have always had the supremacy in that sea, and unless you have it, you cannot carry on war with her. Hitherto you have had for *warlike purposes* to maintain your supremacy in the Mediterranean and simultaneously to employ a large portion of your navy to *protect your Indian traffic in its course of* 10,000 *miles*. From the latter drain you would be relieved by the passage through Egypt. The two seas which give access to Egypt on either side are themselves confined by a gut, both of which are in your hands, and close to which you have naval stations, so that no armament can be within reach, without at least your knowledge. But being superior at sea in the Mediterranean, Egypt is entirely in your hands; you are equally superior in the Red Sea; there is no one there to contest it with you. No attempt could be made by any foreign power on the canal, unless by an expedition of sufficient force to conquer Egypt itself. England's power of coercion over the government of Egypt is absolute: in the height of the naval strength of Mehemet Ali, a single line of battle ship with a frigate sealed up Alexandria.

In the first speech he ever made—the Demosthenian oration, which, in a short hour, brought his fame from germ to maturity, Canning exclaimed, "Secrecy is Treason!" The secrecy which he denounced bore on the motives of the English Government in respect to its dealing with other States: England, in his opinion, had no legitimate object which would not have been advanced by publicity. On the other hand, Russia has no object which publicity would not frustrate. Secrecy is, therefore, as essential a portion of her system as it is essentially opposed to England's interest and character; we may rest assured that wherever there is concealment there is a Russian hand at work, and a Russian object in view.

That secrecy is now no longer confined to the reciprocal operations of governments, but grasps also the most important of material enterprises. It must be evident to any one, that if the objection secretly made by Lord Palmerston to M. Walweski had been publicly stated, whether in Parliament, or in a document, instead of attaining its end, it would have produced the very contrary effect; the capital of England would then have effected that which the diplomacy of England prevented France from attempting.

I cannot conclude with a more striking fact. If any thing could bring home to us the nature and consequences of that indirect and un-English process, by which we are represented abroad, it would be a practical application such as this. If Englishmen could but apprehend it, they could not fail to put an end to it. It is endured only because so unlike the ordinary dealing of Englishmen, that, despite all evidence, its existence cannot be believed.

Here is a case in which the nation may rectify as well as judge. We are seeking for means of investment for superfluous capital: here is a field better than any loan or railway at home or abroad. The present traffic by the Cape amounts to 1,500,000 of tons, we may estimate it by canal at 2,000,000 which would soon be largely increased. Estimating the dues at the half of that sum proposed by Louis Napoleon, for Panama (the quarter upon American vessels), the yearly returns would amount to half a million, or 20 per cent. upon the original investment. There is no difficulty whatever in the enterprise, if those who conduct it steer clear of Downing Street in England, and the British Embassy at Constantinople.

But if English merchants are unfit to walk by themselves, is there no capital available in France?

We have heard much of the spirit of enterprise of the Anglo-Saxon race; we have heard much of what its energy was capable when planted in the New World, and freed from the

governing trammels which oppress it in the Old: if so let it appear. Here is something worthier than buccaneering expeditions against Cuba, or civilising armaments for Japan. The United States have pretensions to justify and character to regain, no less than interests to advance and fortune to pursue. The parental stock in these Islands pleases itself sometimes in the anticipation of their future greatness, strange if it should have to look to them for its own present extrication.

NOTE.

HUMBOLDT ON THE SUEZ CANAL.

"The History of the Survey of the Earth includes the narration of all the means by which nations have been drawn closer together, by which greater portions of the globe have become accessible, and the sphere of man's knowledge has been widened. One of the noblest of these means was the actual formation of a navigable route from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean by the Nile. At the point where the two Continents, which are scarcely connected together, admit the waters of the sea to the farthest extent between them, Sesostris (Ramses Miamim) according to the representations of Aristotle and Strabo, or at any rate Necho (Neku) commenced the digging of a canal, but was frightened by some oracular words of the priests, and again gave it up. Herodotus saw and described one which had been completed, opening with the Nile a little above Bubastus; it was the work of Darius Hystaspis, of the family of the Achæmenides. This canal having fallen into disuse, was afterwards so completely re-constructed by Ptolemy Philadelphus, that it kept alive the trade of Ethiopia, Arabia, and India until the time of the Roman Empire, until Marcus Aurelius, and probably as late as Septimius Severus; and this for more than four centuries and a half, even though it was not navigable at every season

of the year, in consequence of its artificial contrivances for enclosing the water. For the similar object of promoting commerce in the Red Sea, the houses at Myos Hormos and Berenice were carefully built, and connected with Coptus by means of a splendid artificial road."—*Cosmos*, vol. ii, p. 200.

THE

STORY OF THE WAR,

BY

COLLATED PASSAGES

FROM THE

"TIMES" AND "MORNING HERALD" CORRESPONDENTS,

AND THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE

SEBASTOPOL COMMITTEE.

PRICE SIXPENCE.

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1857.

N.B.—This review was interrupted in December, 1856, by the indisposition of the writer, to be perhaps resumed after the enigmatical words of the *Times*—"We have got to defend India in the Crimea"—will have received their interpretation.

THE STORY OF THE WAR.

"In the Sebastopol Committee I found the Ground under me palpitating with Corruption."—*Mr. Roebuck.*

It is a maxim of our philosophy that nations never understand what they are about at the time, and that a correct judgment can be formed only after passions have subsided, and results have appeared. That maxim has been applied to the present war by one of its authors, who compares it to prophecy, which is "intended to fall within our knowledge only after the fact." This war has, however, another peculiarity. It has been the subject-matter of prophecy, made as charge, not as prediction.

During its continuance a mass of details, in the shape of letters of correspondents, official documents, and parliamentary investigations, have been made public, which, no less in their amount than in their startling nature, have no parallel in antecedent human events. But they were read as mere news, and discussed as gossip; no one recollected the past or could conceive the end, but the peace has come to render intelligible the incidents of the war.

The passions awakened at its commencement were not of a sordid nature, and took the shape rather of hopes than lusts. The anticipations were of national power and energies exerted, of foreign ambition restrained, integrity defended, and justice maintained. The disappointment which ensued did not put on a gloomy air, or assume a sanguinary character. It was transmuted into excuses, exerted itself in palliation, and found relief in the conviction that the managers were destitute of the ability requisite to secure success, and foresight needed to avert disaster.

However, through the general candour and discomfort there has obtruded respect for the intellectual powers of the Minister, who has destroyed every other public man and the political parties, to the exclusion of imbecility, as an explanation for his acts. The war, from beginning to end, as well as the circumstances preparatory to that war, from his entrance into the cabinet a quarter of a century ago, is now attributed to him. And this is the chief of the facilities afforded for the after judgment of that "insoluble mystery" in which we have been engaged.

In the course of these mutations, the memory has recurred of words heard at a time when public confidence and enthusiasm dismissed them as vain, to the effect that this now acknowledged sole Minister was the only man of head in the State, and that his purpose was to do the reverse of what he stated, and to make the nation accomplish the reverse of what it desired.

But independently of this reminiscence, it was whispered first, and then loudly asserted, that whatever has been done, has been intentionally done; that it was by intention, and not from incapacity, that perfidious advice was given to the Porte, inefficient measures of administration adopted for the British army, that the disastrous plans of campaign, the surrender of maritime rights, the embroilments of neutral states, the sacrifice of the position and strength of the Turkish allies, were parts of a management to give Russia a triumph—to present her to the Eastern world as irresistible, and to impress upon the English nation the belief that it was destitute of all physical means of resisting her.

These accusations commenced with the war itself; they have increased in intensity since its close. They have been made or echoed in public organs of the most opposite colours in politics, and *have not been dealt with by the organs of the government.*

The point we have at present arrived at is this, that the necessity of the case being grappled with has forced itself on the mind of even the inconsiderate.

We propose in the present series to collect together passages from the official papers, and from the correspondence of the public journals, especially those of the *Times* and the *Morning Herald*, selected from the mass too large for digestion, and unheeded when they were published. Every single incident contains complete proof of pre-eminent dexterity in the managers, of baseness in the subordinates, and blindness in the victims. We undergo this task, not in order to disseminate unfavourable opinions of any man, but in the hope of forcing to a rational result the now awakened feeling that it is necessary that the case should be grappled with. Let the merit of the Minister appear, let his incapacity be established, or let his purpose be known—but let it no longer be matter of doubt whether England possesses a man of genius as her Minister, or whether she is in the hands of a fool—whether the counsels of the State are directed by patriotism or by treason.

ANTICIPATIONS.

The "*Times*' correspondent" starts from England with the first batch of troops despatched to Malta, on the 22nd of February, 1855 that is five weeks *before the declaration of war*, in such haste were they But the complaints of "mismanagement" begin at Malta; want of coals, candles, beds, and food; a famine nearly produced by no provision having been made for the troops, whose despatch we are in-

formed "*was determined on several months ago.*" "Somebody" is to blame, but "it is a delicate matter to deal with."

The dangers that had to be avoided were then perfectly seen. This newspaper-writer speaks about them as follows:—

"With our men well clothed, well fed, well housed (whether in camp or town does not much matter), and well attended, there is little to fear. They are all in the best possible spirits, and fit to go anywhere, and perhaps to do anything. But inaction brings listlessness and despondency, and in their train follows disease. What we have most to fear in an encampment is an enemy that musket and bayonet cannot meet and repel. We have a fearful lesson in the records of the Russo-Turkish campaign of 1828-9, in which 80,000 men perished by "plague, pestilence, and famine;" and let any one who has the interests of this army at heart just turn to Molke's history of that miserable invasion, and he will grudge no expense, and spare no precaution, to avoid, as far as human skill can do it, a repetition of such horrors. Let us have plenty of doctors. Let us have an overwhelming army of medical men to combat with disease. Let us have a staff—full and strong—of young and active and experienced men. . . But give the sick every chance which skill, energy, and abundance of the best specifics may afford them. The heads of departments may rest assured the country will grudge no expense on this point, or on any other connected with the interest and efficiency of the *corps d' èlite* which England has sent from her shores. I believe, indeed, that the home authorities are alive to the importance of this portion of military administration. The commissariat department is becoming more efficient every day, and, as far as I can judge, every possible effort is made to provide for the creature comforts of the troops."—(Page 16.)

GALLIPOLI.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPOL.—THIRD REPORT.

The Duke of Newcastle.—"Q. 14,382.—Can you state why Gallipoli was chosen as the first destination of the troops in Turkey?—A. Before answering that question, I think it might be desirable that I should state what steps the Government had taken in anticipation of sending any military force out of this country at all, to which my attention has not been called by any question. So early as the beginning of January, foreseeing the great probability of being obliged to send a force into that country, we sent Lieutenant-Colonel Vickers and three officers of engineers to Turkey, with general directions to inspect the country and its means of defence, especially as bearing upon the capital, and also to render any assistance in the way of preparing defences which the Turkish Government might require. Those officers left this country on the 13th of January, and Lieutenant-Colonel Vickers was taken seriously ill at Gibraltar and could

not proceed, in consequence of which we applied to Sir John Burgoyne to recommend another officer as his successor, upon which Sir John Burgoyne very handsomely proposed to go himself, which he did by the very next mail, leaving this country, I think, about the 27th or 28th of January. He made a very accurate inspection of certain parts of Turkey in Europe, and he recommended that lines should be thrown up in front of Bulahir, near Gallipoli, and also, if necessary, that the same should be done in front of Constantinople, between the Sea of Marmora, in a part described by him, and the Black Sea."

The Duke then mentions that he sent out other engineer officers subsequently, "enjoining upon them especially to examine the country with reference to its salubrity, and to ascertain what parts of the country were safe for the encampment of troops, *as regards their health, and in what parts wholesome water could be procured.*"

"Q. 14,385.—What was the result of the enquiries that were made by those officers sent as to the capabilities of the country to supply the wants of the army?—A. When the Honourable Member speaks of the capabilities of the country, of course it will be understood that the enquiries were not made in the first instance with regard to Bulgaria; but they were made with reference to Roumelia, *and the first object of the expedition, namely, sending the troops to Gallipoli and to the neighbourhood of Constantinople.*

"*Q.* 14,386.—Your Grace has not now stated the object for which the troops were sent to Gallipoli?—The reason why they were sent to Gallipoli was in consequence of the recommendation of Sir John Burgoyne, who had been sent out in themanner I have described. He recommended, on *strategical grounds*, that Gallipoli should first be occupied. I should say that he did not go alone; he went with Colonel Ardent, who was sent by the Emperor of the French with him, and it was their joint recommendation that that position should be occupied."

Sir John Burgoyne.—"*Q.* 17,622.—You had previously been out to Constantinople to view the site for Gallipoli; had you not?—I had.

"*Q.* 17,623.—Had you recommended Gallipoli as a position to take up?—When I left England I went through Paris; I found that there was a wish to assist the Turks against what was *expected to be* a very overwhelming force of the Russians coming down, but there was a doubt expressed *whether it would not be very dangerous, whether the retreat would not be cut off*, because the Russian advance would naturally be Adrianople; at Adrianople they would be nearer Gallipoli than Constantinople, and if they went down there the troops at Constantinople would be cut off.

"*Q.* 17,624.—On that account you recommended Gallipoli?—Yes; finding it a very good defensive position at Gallipoli, I recommended to hold that as a security, and you could take any measures then that you pleased."

The Times' Correspondent.—"Unless there is danger of the forces of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias getting by some means or other down on the very shores of the Dardanelles, the advantage of fixing our position at Gallipoli does not strike the unprofessional critic very forcibly.

"The geographical accidents of Gallipoli would lead one to think the army placed there is intended for *occupation* and defence. . . . It effectually commands the Dardanelles, and the entrance to the Sea of Marmora, and makes it a *mare clausum* as it lists.—(Page 24.)

"There seems to be a general impression among the French soldiers that it will be some time ere they leave Gallipoli or the Chersonese. *They are in military occupation of the place.* The tricolour floats from the old tower of Gallipoli. The cafè has been turned into an office—*Direction du Port et Commissariat de la Marine.* French soldiers patrol the town at night, and keep the soldiery of both armies in order; of course we send out a patrol also, but the regulations of the place are directly organized at the French head-quarters, and even the miserable house which served as our *Trois Frères*, or London Tavern, and where you could get a morsel of meat and a draught of country wine for dinner, is under their control." (Page 39.)

"I have great hesitation in expressing an opinion on a subject of such difficulty as the selection of a position for an army of *occupation or defence*, but in one or two important particulars the site (said to be fixed upon by Sir J. Burgoyne and Colonel Ardent) seems in my eyes unfavourable. It is obviously difficult to get supplies to the men defending it from the country—they must be brought by sea or across from Asia Minor. Next, it is not so well provided with water; and thirdly, there is a want of wood as well as of shelter. The line of entrenchments which are to be thrown up across the neck of the isthmus will take three months for our disposable force to make. Some alterations in the original plans are said to have been proposed in General Vaillant's office, in Paris; but it is understood that at or near the line passing right across the front of the British Camp from the Straits to the Gulf of Saros, are to be erected a series of field works and entrenchments of considerable magnitude." (Page 28.)

"The works at the entrenched camp at Bulari, are progressing with such speed, that our portion of them will be finished by this day fortnight at farthest. The emulation between the French and English troops at the diggings is immense, and at the same time most good humoured. As was stated in a former letter, these lines are about seven miles long, and about two and three-quarters or three miles are executed by our men. They are at present simple field works, running along the crest of a natural ridge, from the Gulf of Saros to the Sea of Marmora. They consist of a trench seven feet deep; the bottom from scarp to counterscarp six feet broad; the top thirteen feet broad. There is then a berm of three feet wide, above which is the parapet of earthwork (which will be rivetted in due course) of five feet thick, a

banquette three feet six inches broad, and a slope inside of one in two." (Page 54.)

This is the last we hear of Gallipoli until the 21st of June. On that day The *Times'* correspondent writes:—

"We learn to-day that ALL THE TROOPS from Scutari and GALLIPOLI have arrived in Varna, and that the BRITISH ARMY, minus some cavalry, is at last in BULGARIA."

MUTUAL HATRED.

It was said by Mr. Urquhart before the war, that it was worth Russia's while to get up a war, if only for the hatred to be engendered by misintelligence between those on the spot, and misjudgments created by the presence of newspaper correspondents. The accuracy of this prevision is fully borne out by the following extracts:—

The Times' Correspondent.—"To show the reckless way in which the French treat their allies, I may mention, that within view of the miserable room in which I write, there lies a burial-ground, with its white headstones shining brightly in the sun amid the green sward. Right through the centre of this, a fatigue from a French regiment is driving a road to their camp, while horror-stricken Greeks, Moslems, and Jews stand by with upraised eyes and arms. There is no people on earth who pay such reverence to the departed as these Orientals; and it is scarcely possible to imagine what their feelings are as they see these stout, active little men, with pipe in mouth, shovelling away the bones and skulls of their ancestors, to some favourite air of a camp opera."—(Page 34.)

"Opposite the commissariat stores, the other morning, I was rather amused to see a score or two of sturdy Turks working away at neat little handmills marked *Moulin de Café Subsistence Militaire, No. A., Compagnie B., &c.*, and roasting the beans in large rotatory ovens,—these Mussulmans thus, with their usual gravity, preparing this refreshing preparation for the infidel Franks—and the place selected by the latter for the operation being a burial-ground, the turbaned tombstones of which seemed to frown severely on the degenerate posterity of the Osmanli. In fact, the French appear to act uniformly on the sentiment conveyed in the phrase of one of their officers, to whom I spoke about the veneration in which the Turks hold the remains of the dead, *Mais il faut rectifier tous ces préjugés et barbarismes.*"—(Page 40.)

"As the traveller proceeds onwards, he encounters a team of ox or buffalo carts, *en route* to or from the camp. Let us stop and look at this carecrow who is driving them. He is a stout, well-made, and handsome man, with finely-shaped features, and large dark eyes; but for all that there is a dull dejected look about him which rivets the attention. There is no speculation in the orbs which gaze on you half in dread, half in wonder. And if there should be a canvas or armed Turk with you, the poor wretch dare not take his look away for a

moment, lest he should meet the ready lash, or provoke some arbitrary act of violence."—(Page 88.)

"He (the Bulgarian) is a Christian, after a fashion, but he puts far more faith in charms, in amulets, and in an uncleanly priest, and a certain saint of his village, than in prayer or works. He believes the Turks are his natural masters; that he must endure meekly what they please to inflict; and that between him and Heaven there is only one power and one man strong enough to save him from the most cruel outrages, or to withstand the sovereign sway of the Osmanli, and that power is Russia, and that man is the Czar. His whole fortune is that wretched cart, which he regards as a triumph of construction; and he has driven those lean, fierce eyed buffaloes many a mile, from some distant village, in the hope of being employed by the commissariat, who offers him what seems to him to be the most munificent remuneration of 3s. 4d. a-day for the services of himself, his beasts, and araba."—(Page 89.)

"From whatever race he springs, the Bulgarian peasant hereabouts is the veriest slave that ever tyranny created; and as he walks slowly away with downcast eyes and stooping head, by the side of his cart, the hardest heart must be touched with pity at his mute dejection, and hate the people and the rule that have ground him to the dust."—(Page 89.)

The writer of these sentences had been in Bulgaria just twelve days, and in the English camp.

Captain Slade, Admiral in the Turkish service, in a work published some years ago upon Turkey, thus describes the same people:—"No peasantry in the world are so well off. The lowest Bulgarian has abundance of everything—meat, poultry, eggs, milk, rice, cheese, wine, bread, good clothing, a warm dwelling, and a horse to ride on. It is true he has no newspapers to inflame his passions, nor a knife and fork to eat with, nor a bedstead to lie on, and therefore may be considered by some people an object of pity. A pacha, at any rate, is equally unhappy. Where, then, it may be asked, is the tyranny under which the Christian subjects of the Porte are generally supposed to groan? Not among the Bulgarians, certainly. I wish that in every country the traveller could pass from one end to the other, and find a good supper and a warm fire in every cottage, as he can in European Turkey."

Mr. Russell affords us evidence of the value of his own evidence on this subject, as follows:—

After mentioning the efforts of Brigadier-General Airey to induce the people to come to the camp with produce, he remarks—"There is much difficulty, however, in persuading them to treat, *as they look upon us as allies of their natural enemies the Turks.* The araba drivers, when they get a few days' pay, run off, cart and all, and must be guarded, or the Commissariat would be sorely hindered. In fact, as many of them are kept against their will, they may be regarded as prisoners."—(Page 92.)

(Had it been the Turks, what virtuous indignation against tyranny should we not have had!) He had told us, a few pages back, what we have already quoted, that the "poor Bulgarian came many a mile in the hope of being employed by the Commissariat." Only six lines before, the following occurs:—

"It is with much regret that I have to record several instances of outrage on the part of our men towards the inhabitants of the little village of Allahdeen (or Aladyn), which is about half-a-mile from the camp, on the borders of the lake. Stragglers from the camp have, on several occasions, broken into the houses, and ill-used the people inside. A guard of 20 men was placed to protect the inhabitants, but for some reason or other, it was withdrawn, and the complaints of outrage have been renewed." (Page 91.)

"The people are so shy, it is impossible to establish friendly relations with them. The inhabitants of the Bulgarian village of Aladyn, close to us below the camp at the borders of the lake, have abandoned their houses altogether. Not one living creature remains out of 350 or 400 people who were there on our arrival. Their houses are left wide open, and such of their household goods as they could not remove, and a few cocks and hens that could not be caught, are all that are left behind. The cause generally assigned for this exodus is the violence of a few ruffians, on two or three occasions, coupled with *groundless* apprehension of further violence; others say it is *because we established our slaughter-house there. Certainly, the smell was abominable, and I trust it alone was the cause of the departure of those stupid but harmless people.*"—(Page 74.)

"As I sat at the door of my tent a fine-looking old Turk, who carried his ragged garments with the dignity of a Prince, after two or three circles of investigation around, closed in and squatted himself down beside me, in order to commence a conversation, in which I listened with all my ears, but understood nothing, *for my knowledge of Turkish is as yet very rudimentary.* However, a pipe of tobacco established a good understanding between us, and after a little while Mr. Turrell, Sir George Brown's interpreter, came up on his way to Devna, and we found an old Turk a most entertaining companion." He turns out to be the doctor of the district. "He then went on, to my infinite regret, to confirm the stories I had heard of some ruffians among the soldiery having committed such acts of violence in the village below that all the inhabitants had fled. They had broken into his house, had beaten him because he had no wine to give them, and had smashed open his strong box and robbed him of all his wealth—forty piastres, or 6s. 8d. English. Had my sons, who are fighting for God and the Prophet, been with me, they had not done it so easily," added he. He said he had gone to our "Pashas" to complain, but he could not make them understand. We were glad to be able to inform him that several of these rascals had been severely flogged, and that in future such excesses could not occur."—(Page 106.)

"And as for the Turks, they sit so obstinately on their shelves, and

smoke their apathetic pipes so pertinaciously,—they are so determined in resenting the impulses of curiosity—that one's fingers are perpetually itching to indulge in the luxury of giving them a slap in the face, and it is all but impossible to resist the impulse of trying what effect a good sound kick would have in disturbing such irritating equanimity."—(Page 57.)

Here is a description of the model Turk of the *Times'* Correspondent:—"He," Dejemel Pacha, "a very enlightened Turk, and possessing a fund of information, has a grasp of intellect not at all common among his countrymen, is very much of the opinion of General Canrobert, who at the close of a splendid reception by the Pachas, at Constantinople, in which pipes, mounted with diamonds, and begemmed coffee cups were handed about by a numerous retinue, said, 'I am much obliged by your attention, but you will forgive me for saying I should be much better pleased if all these diamonds and gold were turned into money to pay your troops, and if you sent away all these servants of yours, except two or three, to fight against your enemy!' Dejemel Pacha declares there is no good in tanzimats or in new laws, unless steps be taken to carry them out and administer them. The Pachas in distant provinces will never give them effect until they are forced to do so, and therefore it will be necessary, in his opinion, to *have the Ambassadors of great Powers admitted as members of the Turkish Council of State for some years*, in order that these reforms may be productive of good. *The Koran, he considers, as little suitable to be the basis and text-book of civil law now in Turkey, as the Old Testament would be in England.* It will be long, indeed, ere the doctrines of this enlightened Turk prevail among his countrymen, and when they do the Osmanlis will have ceased to be a nation."—(Will cease.)—(Page 43.)

The Morning Herald's Correspondent.—"During the afternoon a dashing young officer in one of our Highland regiments, whom I need not further particularise, was walking at the back of the Sultan's Kiosk when he met three handsome young Turkish ladies attended by their black eunuch. The ladies were endeavouring to cross a little shallow brook in which some stepping stones were placed, and the gallant Scot immediately advanced to proffer his assistance. The ladies at first drew back, though evidently not displeased, and after some tittering and laughing accepted his offer. He accordingly took each of them up in his arms and carried them across, apparently much to their amusement. Arrived safe at the other side, he continued his attentions, and the ladies, nothing loth, showed him their hands, and where their nails were dyed with henna, and at length suffered him, though not without some reluctance and appearance of alarm, to undo their yack-macks in succession, and look at the faces of each uncovered. The rare sight of a frank officer with Turkish ladies at last attracted the attention of the bystanders, who began to murmur and express unequivocal signs of deep indignation and anger. Upon this their black slave, who had seemed most impatient all along, advanced, and apparently began expostulating on their conduct with the officer

in the most angry terms. Nothing daunted by his interference, the fair Mahommedans seemed to return his reproaches with equal vigour, and as it was only a question of talking loud and long, the ladies, as may be readily imagined, soon had the best of it, though the black seemed to carry his point of insisting on returning to the Caique. The four accordingly moved down to the water-side, when our officer also accompanied them, and having handed the ladies to their seats, was about to enter the Caique himself when all the Turks in sight of the boat sprang to their feet, with such shouts of rage and execration as made even the bold Scot pause and relinquish his design. The Caique accordingly shoved off without him, amidst the angry vituperations of all the Turkish men and women near—the *latter in particular being loudly indignant.*"—(Page 48.)

The Times' Correspondent.—"*It is a great pity that it is not permitted to us to hate the Turks and Turkey;* certainly it is done to a vast extent without permission of the British army. The bravery of the Turks we admire and respect. Their indomitable courage in defence of their country, or rather in defence of the boundaries of their empire, we applaud and wonder at; but their manners, and customs, their physical peculiarities and their tastes, we can neither appreciate nor endure. When our "enthusiasts" can hear the "experiences" of these British officers, who are now on their way home, they may lose a little of their present virulence in favour of the Osmanli, and be disenchanted of the delusion in which ignorance and distance unite in plunging them."—(Page 134.)

"They (the Turkish soldiers) are at it (eating melon) all day, except when they are smoking, or (listen to this!) *sic*, saying their prayers, for the poor fellows are for the most part very regular in their devotions, and when they have finished them, *they glare and scowl at Christians, in a fashion fearful to behold, for ten minutes afterwards.*"—(Page 140.)

DEVNA.

THE PESTILENCE.

The Morning Herald's Correspondent.—"Lord de Ros, (Quarter-Master-General) it was said, reported *most unfavourably* of Varna as a site for camping; yet still the preparations for an advance went forward, and it soon leaked out that at the village of Devna, and in its neighbourhood, it was intended to concentrate the English portion of the Contingent. When this was known, I applied to some English merchants who were well acquainted with the Principalities, as to the nature of the country selected as the point for concentrating. From every gentleman whom I consulted, without one single exception, I heard the same accounts—that it was beyond all doubt one of the very worst spots which could by any possibility have been chosen. Some were quite indignant; all were surprised to the last degree; and the

common expression was, that it was sheer madness to think of putting even a Turkish camp there, much less an English one, in which the soldiers would of course suffer still more. I was told that the whole country round Varna was unhealthy; but that the worst part of all was Devna, where the exhalations which rose from the stagnant lakes were perfectly poisonous, and so much dreaded, that even the natives feared the autumn.

"The water, also, was unwholesome, and caused both dysentery and ague. One or two of the gentlemen to whom I spoke of this matter, expressed their determination of writing to Lord Raglan on this subject, whether they did, or no, of course I cannot say; and I merely mention the fact, to show how notorious was the unhealthiness of the place decided on. When, at last, the troops did arrive at Varna, the few Franks there stared as if we had ten heads on, when we told them that the English generals intended forming a camp round Devna.

"In the examination of the Duke of Newcastle before Mr. Roebuck's Committee, it was elicited that Omer Pacha had cautioned the English generals against camping at or near Devna; and the Duke of Newcastle, in reply to the question whether the caution was attended to or not, is reported to have said, 'I am not aware.'

"Since this volume was written, my attention has been called to a very able article on the campaign in the Crimea, which appeared in the 'Quarterly Review' of December last. In that article the writer states, 'That before a position for encamping our troops was selected a German doctor who had been long connected with the Turkish quarantine establishment in Bulgaria, and was consequently well acquainted with the climate in most parts of that province, was requested to frame a sanitary map of the country. On this map, while many places were indicated as '*tres malsain*,' Devna and the neighbourhood of Varna were marked '*pestilentieux*.'"—(Page 54.)

The Times' Correspondent.—"Camp at Aladyn, June 26th.—The sickness and diarrhœa in the camp here are greatly on the decline."—(Page 102.)

"July 1st.—On Friday morning (June 30) the Light Division, under Sir George Brown, left their quarters on the plateau, near Aladyn, and marched to Devna, about eight and a-half or nine miles off, where they are now encamped, and, on Saturday morning, the First Division, under his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, marched from their encampment outside Varna, and pitched their tents on the plateau of Aladyn."—(Page 104.)

"July 8th.—*The British army is slowly advancing.* (!) The Light Division remains at Devna, and the First Division is still at Aladyn, but Sir de Lacy Evans has pushed up his division to a position half-way between the Guards and Sir G. Brown's camp, and Sir R. England has advanced his division to a position half-way between Aladyn and Varna. *The line of lakes, which stretch from Varna up to Devna* for a distance of nearly twenty miles, is occupied by the four divisions of the British army."—(Page 111.)

The nature of these lakes are thus indicated:—

"The British camp is pitched on a plain, half a mile from the fresh-water lake. The water of the lake, however, is not good for drinking; it abounds in animalculæ, not to mention enormous leeches."—(Page 82.)

"July 26th.—The cholera has crept from the camps into the town, and has exhibited great malignity. On Monday, July 24th, it broke out in the *camp of the Light Division.* Upwards of twenty men died in twenty-four hours. Several fresh cases of cholera occurred during the night, and, on Tuesday, the division, to our great joy, struck tents, and marched off from Devna to Monastir, a village about eight miles further on. The First Division has suffered from both cholera and typhus. The Third Division has been attacked with severity. The 44th Regiment, *which is encamped on a high ground at the other side of the bay, opposite Varna, has escaped, but fatigue parties belonging to it, at work near the town, have afforded several cases.*

"The French are losing many men by the disease, but not in proportion to their numbers. However, their officers have taken perhaps the best plan of checking the progress of the pestilence. They have given the men something to do. They have embarked the greater portion of the Zouaves, and sent them to sea."—(Page 129.)

"Some people say we pitch our camps too closely; but Sir G. Brown's division covered nearly twice the space occupied by the encampment of a Roman legion, consisting of very much the same number of men, and yet there is no account in history of any of these camp epidemics in Gaul, or Thrace, or Roumania, or in any of the standing camps of the Romans, and we must believe that the cholera and its cognate pests arise out of some combination of atmospherical and physical conditions which did not occur in former times."—(Page 140.)

"*It appears*, that notwithstanding the exquisite beauty of the country round Aladyn, it is a hot-bed of fever and dysentery. The same is true of Devna, which is called by the Turks the 'Valley of Death,' and had we consulted the natives ere we pitched our camps, we assuredly should never have gone either to Aladyn or Devna, notwithstanding the charms of their position, and the temptations offered by the abundant supply of water (full of leeches and animalculæ) and by the adjacent woods. No blame, perhaps, is to be attached to any one for neglecting to ascertain whether these great natural advantages were counter-balanced by any peculiar sanitary evils. These meadows nurture the fever, ague, and dysentery in their bosom—the lake and the stream exhale death.

"So completely exhausted, on last Thursday, was the Brigade of Guards, these 3000 of the flower of England, that they had to make two marches in order to get over the distance from Aladyn to Varna, which is not more than (not so much, many people say) as ten miles. But that is not all. Their packs were carried for them. Just think of this, good people of England, who are sitting anxiously in your

homes day after day, expecting every morning to gladden your eyes with the sight of the announcement in large type, of 'Fall of Sebastopol.' Your Guards, your *corps d'elite*, the pride of your hearts, the delight of your eyes, these Anakim, whose stature, strength, and massive bulk you exhibit to kingly visitors as no inapt symbols of your nation, have been so reduced by sickness, disease, and depressing climate, that it was judged inexpedient to allow them to carry their own packs, or to permit them to march more than five miles a-day, even though these packs were carried for them! Think of this, and then judge whether these men are fit in their present state to go to Sebastopol, or undertake any great operation of war."—(Page 144.)

The Morning Herald's Correspondent.—"The unhealthy situations which, in spite of all warnings, had been chosen for the English camps, had seriously affected the general stamina of the men. At the very lowest computation, two-thirds of the entire army had suffered from fever or diarrhœa, while at least 1200 had been carried off by the cholera."—(Page 297.)

Mr. W. H. Russell, correspondent of *The Times*, is ingenious. He finds an explanation for the fact of the army being seized with typhus, dysentery, and cholera, when encamped in marshy meadows, and near stagnant lakes, in "a combination of atmospherical and physical conditions, which did not occur in former times." Doubtless there is "no account in history of any of these *camp epidemics* in any of the standing camps of the Romans." Nevertheless, "no blame is to be attached to any one for *neglecting to ascertain* the sanitary condition" of a place called by the inhabitants the "Valley of Death." This follows up the already-quoted passage of exultation on the condition of those who did not die in consequence of this blameless neglect; yet, at Malta, Mr. Russell had propounded the maxim that "what we have most to fear in an encampment is an enemy that musket or bayonet cannot meet or repel." The exulting passage no Englishman could have penned. It is just as necessary for Russia to have an agent as correspondent for *The Times*, as to have one as Minister of England.

We conclude the history of Devna by the evidence of the Duke of Newcastle, taken from the Sebastopol Committee Blue Book.

"Q. You say you desired the officers sent out, to inquire into the sanitary condition of Gallipoli?—A. No specific instructions were given, but general instructions were given to Major Dickson to inquire into the state of the country, to ascertain whether there existed any malaria, to find out the most suitable spots for encamping, and the supply of water.

"Q. What was the result?—A. *I am unable to say what was the result as to Varna;* but I can say this, that Lord Raglan had *from Omer Pacha the strongest assurances of the peculiar salubrity of Varna* before the troops encamped there. [His Grace referred to a passage in a letter dated Shumla, April, 2, 1854, addressed to Lord Stratford, by Colonel Simmons, on behalf of Omer Pacha:—'If you disembark at Varna, *by keeping clear of the lake of Devna*, and encamping on the

heights to the south of the town, you will find a healthy situation, surrounded by abundance of good water, with a fine climate to restore the men and horses after their sea voyage, and the barrack in the town can be made use of as an hospital, if necessary.]

"Q. Did the army avoid the lake of Devna?—A. *I cannot say* whether the directions of Omer Pacha were followed.

Mr. Layard.—"Q. Was not a part of the army actually encamped on the lake?—A. It *was near the lake undoubtedly.*

"Q. Were not the Guards actually encamped on the lake?—A. *I am not aware of that.*"

THE PORTER EPISODE.

The Times' Correspondent.—"Sir George Brown will not allow the porter, which had been sent up to Varna, for the use of the troops, to be forwarded to the camp."—(Page 91.)

"On Monday, the Rifles had upwards of sixty men ill from diarrhœa; and the 17th, forty men ill from the same cause. Much of this increase of disease must be attributed to the use of the red wine of the country, sold at the canteens of the camp; but as the men can get nothing else, they think it better to drink than the water of the place. There are loud complaints from officers and men on this score, and especially on account of the porter and ale they were promised not being dealt out to them; and the blame is laid, as a matter of course, on the shoulders of Sir George Brown. It is within my own knowledge that several officers have made formal written applications to the proper quarter, stating that if the Commissariat at Varna be instructed to issue the porter, they will find the means of carrying it out at their own expense. *To these applications the authorities have not given any specific replies.*"—(Page 95.)

The Morning Herald's Correspondent.—"The principal regimental officers accordingly addressed Sir George Brown upon the subject, and volunteered to bring out the porter to Alydeen, at their own expense, if he would sanction it; but the answer was a firm refusal to permit its being brought out at all."

Keeping the "firm refusal" and the "no specific answer in mind," let us return to the inimitable *Times Correspondent*:—"The subject is so difficult that I shall not offer any observations on it, but merely content myself by saying, that I am certain Sir George Brown is a man who would not deprive the soldiers of the division which he commands so ably, and views with such just pride, of a comfort provided for them by Government, at the expense of the people of England, without some sound *and all-powerful reasons best known to himself.* The real efficiency of this division *must* be the object nearest to his heart; night and day he strives to secure it by every means in his power, and there *can be no possible motive for his subjecting them to inconvenience and physical suffering*, amid all the evils of bad living, poor meat, poor water, poor wine, and no vegetables. A draught of

good porter, with the thermometer at 93 degrees or 95 degrees in the shade, would be a luxury which a thirsty soul in London can never understand. There must be some wholesome drink provided for the men, or they will fall before the attacks of sickness in such a climate, and with such feeling as they have at present; and having expressed *an opinion*, which is shared by the most experienced medical men out here, I shall close the subject, and leave the consideration of it to those most concerned at home."—(Page 96.)

"With regard to the porter question, of which we have heard so much, it is proper to say that Sir George Brown, in an order dated Saturday last, offers some explanations, in order to 'set himself right' with the light division. He informs the men that his instructions to colonels of regiments have always been—first, to provide for the conveyance of rations and forage; secondly, for the carriage of groceries; and thirdly, for that of porter, whenever it was practicable to do so. This order has been read to the men as a matter of course, but *the fact is that thirsty men will not listen to reason.*"—(Page 107.)

PROVIDENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT.

By keeping the army at Varna, two things were gained. The best chance was afforded for the fall of Silistria, and, in case it should not fall, the army was rendered "unfit to undertake any great operation of war," *(The Times' Correspondent)* and consequently rendered fit to go to Sebastopol.

The Morning Herald's Correspondent.—"Whether these attacks (of the London papers on the Generals and Admirals for doing nothing) were founded on the state of public opinion in England, *or merely put forward for the sake of averting the national indignation from the Government*, no one in Constantinople knew, though all knew well that they were, at that time, in the highest degree unreasonable and unjust. Even at the time these strictures reached Constantinople, the English Generals were in want of almost every essential for an army taking the field. Of our cavalry, only 54 men and horses of the 17th Lancers had arrived, and very little more than half our artillery; so many horses belonging to the latter corps had died during the tedious passage from England in sailing transports; that many of the guns had not their proper complement, while some were without them altogether. The places of these animals could not be filled up in Turkey, as the country horses were much too small and too fierce for the purpose. There was entire want of proper medical stores. No tents had come for the Second Division; and for an army on active service we were so deficient in that most important of all requirements —ammunition—that even when the Light Division was pushed on to Bulgaria, and within three or four days' march of the enemy, its whole supply of small-arm cartridge was only 240,000 rounds, or about 85 rounds per man. Of land transport, of every kind and description whatsoever, we were entirely destitute. Yet this state of

things continued for some time after the dates when, to judge from the English journals, the Allies ought to have been gathering immortal laurels on the Danube. If the baggage would walk off itself; if the Minié musket would provide its own ammunition; if soldiers would march without food; fractured limbs heal without dressing; and, above all, if battles could be won without cavalry or artillery, then, indeed, the English troops might have done something immediately. But, as our commanders were not justified in reckoning upon these remote probabilities, and as the *Government left them no choice between that and doing nothing*, they resigned themselves to unavoidable necessity, *and did nothing accordingly.*"—(Page 59.)

"The French, with their usual prudence, had, for some time, been preparing for a regular campaign in the East, while our Government was only intent upon making contracts with the transports for bringing back the troops from Malta and Gallipoli. Even before our Allies had arrived at Gallipoli, their agents at Constantinople were busily engaged in seeking out all the travelling agents, correspondents, and commercial clerks of the principal firms of the Levant. The services of some 200 of these gentlemen were secured upon their own terms, and the value of the assistance which they rendered to the French cannot be over-estimated.

"All these precautions were as open to the English as to their allies; yet none were taken, and a few cattle-drivers and commissariat clerks, from Malta, were the highest recognised authorities with the English army, upon the nature of the country in which it was then believed we were to campaign. All the information which our commissariat authorities possessed of Varna, Schoumla, and the towns on the Danube, appears to have been derived from the report of Mr. Deputy-Commissary General Strickland, who was despatched for the purpose of making his inquiries, at the close of February, 1854. When this active and indefatigable officer arrived in Bulgaria, he found, to his surprise, that all the arrangements of the French were already finished, and large contracts effected for the supply of all kinds of provisions. But, nothing daunted, he set to work vigorously; and after some two or three months' hard labour, sent in his report upon the general resources of Bulgaria. I believe I am right in stating that every suggestion which this officer's experience enabled him to make upon the best method of meeting the requirements of the troops, was afterwards *systematically disregarded.*"—(Page 85.)

After the arrival of the army at Varna, the systematical disregard flourishes in full force, Silistria being at that time the hardest pressed.

The Morning Herald's Correspondent.—"In spite of the repeated assertions which at this time were made in England, that the English forces were fully provided with every requisite for a campaign, they were deficient in almost every essential. For the land transport of the British army alone, 13,000 horses were required; and at this time we had very little more than 1,200, and what was worse there seemed very little prospect of getting any. The Turkish

Government officials and Omer Pasha made an effort to help the English over this difficulty, by sending in 350 Arabas with their drivers to Varna. The Ottoman authorities, knowing with whom they had to deal, offered to give a guard to watch that neither carts nor drivers escaped. The English declined this. They took the waggons, but laughed at the idea of a guard; and in the course of a fortnight, out of the 350, scarcely 50 remained. The fact was, that the drivers of the Arabas were not only not paid daily according to agreement, but *were sometimes kept a week or a fortnight without any money* at all; they consequently deserted whenever they could, and put their waggons to more profitable uses. These carts were allowed to slip through our fingers when we were trying to buy them, or get them made in all directions. *Any number might have been got from Constantinople, yet that seems to have been the only place where we never sought for them.*"—(Page 85.)

Then follow accounts of how the men "seldom got their full rations; of their being frequently without breakfast altogether, and spending their day's pay in buying small black loaves and some wine." This is said specially of the Light Division, of whom Sir George Brown was so proud, who were encamped at Devna, and whom he prevented from getting porter.

The Times' Correspondent.—"The people of England who are impatiently waiting to hear of Silistria relieved, of the Danube released, of the Dobrudscha cleared of the Russians, must wait a little longer. The generals are all 'tied by the leg,' for the Commissariat can get no carts—at least they cannot succeed in procuring a tithe of what is required. Had but the nature of the country been but a little better inquired into before the army was sent here, all these delays and vexatious disappointments would not have taken place. The Commissariat ought to have been weeks out here before the troops landed. They (only two of them) came to Varna but a few days before the arrival of the Light Division. If I am not misinformed, *the authorities were told some time ago of the difficulties likely to arise if they did not send out commissariat carts and waggons.*"—(Page 98.)

A nation whose army could not be moved from Varna to Silistria four months after it had left England, can find no words strong enough to abuse the Turks, because their Pachas are incompetent and corrupt, and undertake to govern them themselves.

SEBASTOPOL COMMITTEE REPORT.

Mr. Roebuck.—"Q. What was the precise object of the expedition to Varna?"

The Duke of Newcastle.—"A. IT WAS FOR THE PROTECTION OF SILISTRIA."

VARNA AND THE TWO POWDER MAGAZINES.

The Morning Herald's Correspondent.—"It may give my readers a good idea of the management of the Turkish officials when I tell

them that, in the centre of the town, close to the Market-place, in one of the most bustling parts of Varna, is situated a large one-storied stone building, perforated in about a dozen places with window apertures, across which were placed a few iron bars. This was the powder magazine, then containing, I am afraid to say how many tons of powder and loaded shells. Until the arrival of the allied troops, it remained in this state, and the walls and doors of the building formed favourite lounges for the idle portion of the community (always the majority in Turkish towns) who used to assemble all round the magazine in crowds, smoking their chibouks and narghileas on the shady dunghills. No one could comprehend how the safety of the town was hourly jeopardised by the unprotected magazine. But Sir George Brown comprehended the matter in a moment." We are then told how he blocked up the windows, placed sentries, and drove away the smokers.—(Page 76.)

"On the evening of the 10th of August a fire broke out in a canteen at Varna. Both French and English troops were instantly on the spot; yet in spite of their unwearied exertions, the flames continued to spread, and before twenty-four hours, two-thirds of Varna was a mass of red-hot embers. The flames first appeared in the neighbourhood of the English powder magazine; and nothing but a sudden change of wind saved the large storehouse from taking fire. After that the conflagration raged for nine hours round three sides of the French and Turkish powder stores; and during this time, the safety not only of all that remained of Varna, but of the whole expeditionary force, hung as by a hair. Two-hundred storehouses belonging to the allies, with all their contents, were destroyed, and also Turkish. The English lost all their magazines of biscuits, barley, sugar, coffee, tea, soap, &c." "The whole fire was, of course, attributed to the Greeks, but there never appeared to be any foundation for the rumour. If Greeks had so arranged matters as to have got immense powder stores formed in *wretched barns in the centre of the town*, we might well have suspected them of sinister intentions; but *as the hazardous sites for depositing the ammunition were selected by the allied generals*, we can hardly blame the Greeks for the risk incurred when the fire did take place." —(Page 20.)

The Times' Correspondent—"On the night of Thursday, Aug. 10, a great fire broke out at Varna which has utterly destroyed more than one quarter of the town. It is said to have been the work of incendiary Greeks, some of whom, who were found with matches on their persons, have been arrested. It is asserted that others of these incendiaries were shot on the spot by the French soldiers. The fire broke out near the French commissariat stores."—(Page 138.)

There is not a word said of the position or dangers of the English powder magazine.

ENGLISH NATIONALITY.

Major Butler's Journal.—"At midnight I was awoke from a sound

sleep, and heard a rattling fire of musketry proceeding from the direction of Arab Tabia. The alarm had been sounded, and we hastened to the Stamboul gate. Found another night attack on Ylanli and Arab Tabia going on. At first the enemy's batteries were silent, whilst ours continued to throw shell in all directions, but they soon opened likewise. The musketry from the forts rattled without interruption for nearly an hour, then a pause of about ten minutes, and it recommenced with increased force, the fire flashing and extending all round the position, and continued incessantly without slackening till after daybreak, when the reports arrived that the enemy had been repulsed in three attacks, with great slaughter, and we retired to our tents. Firing, mixed with the cries of "*Allah-il Allah*" of the Albanians and Egyptians, still continuing, and ringing in our ears till we fell asleep.

"29th.—On going to the Stamboul gate this morning we found Moosa Pacha receiving the arms and other trophies taken from the Russian dead, noting them, and issuing rewards for each. It seems that the affair of last night was a bloody one, the garrison of Arab Tabia being taken by surprise in the first instance. No alarm was given till the enemy was actually in the redoubt. the first to enter was a Russian officer, who cut down a Turkish Lieutenant of Artillery, but was immediately knocked over with a handspike and killed by the men about. A fierce hand-to-hand combat ensued with the enemy, who clambered up from the ditch and passed in through the embrasures and over the ramparts. They were driven out back into the ditch, where a terrific slaughter took place, our guns pouring grape and canister among them. They retired, re-formed, and again advanced, with drums beating, whilst their nearest batteries now opened with shells, rocket, and grape. They were again repulsed. After a pause a third attack was made; this time from the front as well as on the left flank, against which the two first had been directed. It met with a similar fate, and the enemy was again driven back with tremendous havoc. The Albanians leaping from the entrenchments, pursued them towards their batteries."

This was the only assault which took place while Major Butler was in Silistria. It occurred fourteen days after his arrival, and eighteen days before his death. The abandonment of Arab Tabia had been proposed by Grach, a Prussian engineer. Butler says, "I did my best to oppose the measure, and much was said *pro* and *con*, and the Pacha, who inclined to yield to Grach's representations finally decided on holding them, at all events, until the case had been referred to Omer Pacha."

Now listen to the *Morning Herald's Correspondent.*—"*The whole conduct of the defence devolved upon them*—Butler and Nasmyth. On his arrival at Silistria, Butler found two small detached earth-works on the slope before the town leading down towards the Danube. These were Arab Tabia and Ylanti Tabia; with his *unerring* military judgment he instantly recognised their importance, *and undertook the defence of them himself.*"—(Page 82.)

This was not written in ignorance of Major Butler's journal, for the journal is published by him. What monsters of absurdity and pretence would be the Turks if they claimed for a Turkish Subaltern the honour of the successful defence of an English fortress, but that for them would be impossible. When such a claim is set up for one who pretends to nothing for himself, we may be prepared for Williams and Kars, even although the honour be that of betrayal and defeat.

ENGLISH AND FRENCH.

The Times' Correspondent.—"The French are losing many men by the disease, but not in proportion to their numbers. However, their officers have taken, perhaps, the best plan of checking the progress of the pestilence. *They have given the men something to do.* They have embarked the greater portion of the Zouaves, and sent them on sea."—(Page 127.)

"Very, very hard, indeed, set are we to kill time, while waiting for the harvest of laurels to land. For the last week there has been a delightful change in the weather—it rains, thunders, lightens, and blows, for a great portion of each day—anything is better than being baked alive. The rain falls down from the heavens in sparkling streams; the thunder is ear-splitting, and rattles for hours through the mountains; the lightning is forked, fierce and vivid; and the wind is strong enough to shake tent-poles to their foundation, and sometimes to overturn the saturated canvass on its unhappy occupant. It is at such times that *ennui* comes on a man like a demon, aided very often by diarrhœa or a gentle dysentery."—(Page 119.)

"It is a pity—*if it can be helped*—to send out the whole disposable British army here, to linger for months in inactivity—to push them on for a few miles from camp to camp—and then to let them remain 'eating their hearts' for week after week of idleness—till they sicken and die."—(Page 133.)

The Morning Herald's Correspondent.—"On the retreat of the Russians from Silistria, a general opinion obtained among our officers, that the war had virtually terminated; and it was strengthened by seeing that *almost all the preparations for taking the field were either given up entirely, or pushed with little vigour.* Long odds were, therefore, freely given in favour of at least the English portion of the contingent spending their Christmas in England.

"The French, however, never relaxed their efforts. Their preparations for a campaign went forward as steadily as if the enemy were within ten miles of their cantonments. *Immense stores of provisions* of all kinds were collected at Bourgas, Varna, Sinope, Sampsoun, and other places on the shores of the Black Sea, to provide against the exigencies of *a winter campaign.*"

DISCONTENT OF THE ARMY.

The Morning Herald's Correspondent.—"About the time when the

siege of Silistria was raised, the English troops, from a variety of causes, were discontented. They were idle, their rations were irregular, and badly managed; and above all, the men of the Light Division were harrassed and quite worn out by their repeated and heavy drills during the great heats of the day. * * * Things thus dragged on till about the 20th of June, by which time part of Prince Napoleon's division, with the whole of the Second Division, under Sir de Lacy Evans, and part of the Third Division, under Sir R. England, had arrived at Varna. But though these troops strengthened the hands of the allied commanders, things lessened still further their already small chances of being able to advance. Each day diminished the quantity, and increased the demand for arabas, of which we had now almost drained the country. The poor native Bulgarians were rather alarmed than tempted by the high offers we made for their services, and evidently looked upon aiding us in any way as a service of no common risk. The dangerous condition of Silistria was well known; and it was also as well known that there was as much chance of the allies going towards it, as there was of its coming towards us. * * * The reasons, though considered unanswerable, did not at all lead to weaken the general feeling that great faults had been committed somewhere or other, and, as I have said, something akin to deep discontent was general throughout the army."

PREPARATIONS MADE TO ENABLE THE ARMY TO TAKE THE FIELD IN BULGARIA.

PUBLIC ANIMALS.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPOL.—THIRD REPORT.

Sir C. Trevelyan.—"Q. 13,482.—Can you tell the Committee whether, at any time, Mr. Commissary-General Filder said that he had a sufficient number of baggage animals provided to move the army from Varna? Did he ever give you that information?—A. Yes; I have just read a passage to the Committee from a letter from Commissary-General Filder, stating for how many days he was able to furnish provisions.

"Q. 13,483.—My question is, whether he ever told you that he had baggage animals in sufficient numbers to move the army?—A. He never stated that in so many words, but he never stated anything to the contrary.

"Q. 13,484.—From that you conclude that he had provided a sufficient number of animals to move the army from Varna with the baggage, as well as provisions and medicines?—A. I cannot undertake to say that he had enough to enter upon the campaign in a satisfactory manner, but he had made large provision.

"Q. 13,485.—Did he not write to the authorities, under whose supervision he was, in regard to the mode in which he intended to

meet those services if called upon to meet them; for he had to furnish transport for the stores, for the ammunition, for the field equipment, and for the conveyance of sick and wounded? A. *As he was never called upon to provide transport, to enable the army to take the field in Bulgaria*, he never furnished to the treasury a statement of the manner in which he proposed to provide the transport.

"Q. 13,486.—But surely it was the intention to take the army into Bulgaria; was it not?—A. That intention was entertained for a considerable period, and Commissary-General Filder made great exertions.

"Q. 13,487.—Had not Lord Raglan acquainted Commissary-General Filder that he might be called upon to prepare for active operations in the field?—A. *I presume he had done so.*

"Q. 13,488.—Are you not aware that he had done so?—A. *I entertain no doubt that he did.*

"Q. 13,489.—Then do you know whether or not Commissary-General Filder, having those orders given to him, was prepared to meet those orders?—A. *The contingency did not arise.*

"Q. 13,490.—The contingency might have arisen any day, and he was liable to be called upon any day to provide for that contingency: did he ever provide for it?—A. I can give the extent to which he provided for it.

"Q. 13,491.—The question is, whether he provided the army with sufficient transport to undertake a campaign in Bulgaria?—A. I cannot state positively he did. He had provided a large amount of transport; far more than sufficient for the Crimean expedition.

"Q. 13,492.—Suppose the army had been compelled to advance to the relief of Silistria, could it have done so with the transport at his disposal?—A. *He never reported to me either that it was sufficient or that it was not;* but he had a large amount of transport.

"Q. 13,493.—Did not that contingency suggest itself to your mind, that it might happen that the army might want to move which was at Varna?—A. Certainly; and Commissary-General Filder was making every possible exertion to get together the requisite amount of transport, and we supported him in every possible manner.

"Q. 13,494.—Did he get it together?—A. He got together sufficient to convey the provisions in the manner I have described.

"Q. 13,495.—You have referred to these authorities who have written upon the amount of transport required for moving an army. Do you believe that he had anything like the amount of transport which they lay down in these books, as being necessary for the movement of such an army?—A. I find at page 37 of Sir John Bissett's Treatise, an estimate of the amount of transport required for moving 53,000 men, which amounts to 16,000 horses, and baggage mules and commissariat mules attached, 8,815.

"Q. 13,496.—That makes 24,000 animals, therefore, if we divide that by about half, that would leave about 12,000 as necessary, according to that authority, would it not?—A. Yes.

"Q. 13,197.—As yet we have only heard of 5,000 being pro-

vided?—A. Nearly 6,000; 5,659 was the total number of animals that he had at Varna, and he had besides upwards of 1,000 arabas, equal to upwards of 3,000 horses.

"Q. 13,498.—Were not a great many of these animals private property, belonging to the officers?—A. No; those were all *public animals:* the whole of the animals belonging to the officers were quite independent of them.

"Q. 13,499.—It has been stated on evidence that the 5,000 odd included the officers' animals?—A. It included the regimental bat animals; twenty-four were attached to each regiment for carrying the tents and the quarter-master's stores."

"Q. 13,622.—There were one or two points in the evidence given by you yesterday which you wished to have an opportunity of considering before you gave your answers?—A. There were two points as to which my memory did not quite serve me, namely, the distinction between the officers' baggage horses and the regimental bat horses; next, the degree of preparation made by the commissariat to enable the army to take the field in Bulgaria.

"Q. 13,675.—That (the 5,000 or 6,000 baggage animals) did not include the horses that belonged to the officers, and were used for their own private baggage?—A. No, it did not, and those horses were very numerous, and they formed an important component part of the means of conveyance of the baggage and equipments of the army, as I shall be able to show hereafter. The number of the regimental bat horses is settled by a general order of the Commander-in-Chief, at the commencement of a campaign. The Duke of Wellington fixed a certain number for each regiment at the commencement of the Peninsular Campaign, and Lord Raglan fixed a certain number, twenty-four, for each regiment.

"Q. 13,676.—Does not that include the horses of the officers?—A. No; they are quite distinct; they are purchased by the commissariat.

"Q. 13,677.—Then your statement that they were a great number, has nothing to do with that proportion?—A. It has nothing to do with the regimental bat horses; twenty-four bat horses were assigned to convey the tents, the Quartermaster-General's stores, and the entrenching tools. The other statement I have to make is this: the following is contained in an official memorandum, submitted by the Commissary-General Filder, to Lord Raglan, on the 16th of February last. "If the British army, when in Bulgaria, had advanced to the Danube, it would have required for its use 5,000 pack-horses (that number was actually purchased), and 3,000 waggons, or, if all the transport had consisted of pack-horses, 14,000 would have been necessary." The calculation is that one cart and horse are equal to three pack-horses; a cart and horse will carry 600 pounds, and a pack-horse 200 pounds. Mr. Filder had 5657 animals belonging to the Government, when he left Varna; and as he had ceased to make further purchases, except of mules, from the time when it was determined to go to the Crimea,

the number might have been considerably increased, if it had been necessary to provide for a campaign on the Danube. As regards arabas, Mr. Filder was dependent upon Omer Pacha, who had the entire resources of Bulgaria at his command. He made an application to Omer Pacha before he left Constantinople, through Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and the Turkish Government, for 2,000 arabas, stating at the same time, that if the troops moved in advance of Devna, 3,000 would be required. He observed in a letter to me, that as the transport existed, that is existed in the country, and Omer Pacha was desirous to enable the army to move, he had every hope of a successful result. On July the 18th, he wrote to me from Varna:—"We could have moved on from this, had it been necessary, although we are far from having such a transport establishment as I could wish, or can rely on."

"Q. 13,679.—What is the meaning of the word "could;" that is the past tense?—A. It was written after the change of plan had taken place, and it was determined to go to the Crimea; he was speaking of it as a past transaction. I received a great deal more from him upon the subject in my demi-official correspondence.

"Q. 13,680.—But that is altogether opposed to the evidence the committee has received?—A. It is entirely confirmed by the whole tenor of Commissary-General Filder's communications to me. I had the most ample information from him, not only public, but demi-official, written from mail to mail; he had never less than 1,000 arabas on hire, sometimes more; the transport in the possession of the Commissariat at Varna, was irrespective of the ambulance, which was under the War-Office, and of the officers' baggage horses. Mr. Filder also observes in his official memorandum, furnished to the Commander of the Forces, on the 27th of July:—"Had it been deemed necessary to continue the formation of a depot in advance of Devna, it would have further facilitated any movement it might be intended to make, whether it advanced or not."

"Q. 13,681.—When you state that the ambulance was under the direction of the War Office, who was the representative of the War Office on the spot, giving orders respecting the ambulance?—A. Indeed I do not know; we received no communication on the subject.

"Q. 13,684.—You have stated that those 5,600 pack animals would have been sufficient for the army moving in Bulgaria, considering that they moved with arabas?—A. Yes, in addition to the 3,000 arabas; and I may mention that Commissary-General Filder never put forth his strength as to the arabas; they were his main-stay and his great reserve. The arabas of the country, the carts of the country, abounding as they do in every village, were entirely at Omer Pacha's disposal, and the moment it was determined, if it had been determined, to have a campaign on the Danube, Omer Pacha's means would have been put in force.

"Q. 13,685.—You stated yesterday, did you not, that they applied to Omer Pacha for a large number of arabas, but they did not obtain

above half the number they wanted?—A. They applied for 2,000, and they got upwards of 1,000, but there was no great pressure applied.

"Q. 13,686.—Could they have obtained 3,000?—A. I have no doubt of it; the Russians had almost a fabulous number. They did not get them, *because the time was not come.*

"Q. 13,687.—Where had the Russians obtained this fabulous number?—A. In the Principalities.

"Q. 13,688.—How could we get them from the Principalities?—A. They brought a great number from Bessarabia; they pressed all the transport of the Principalities; with submission, I believe every village abounds in carts of some sort, in that part of the country.

"Q. 13,689.—But why do you illustrate our position by referring to that of the Russians?—A. Bulgaria is a rich country. I believe it abounds in villages in the plains bordering on the Danube.

The evidence of Sir Charles Trevelyan proves that it never was intended to relieve Silistria. We give it at length, that our readers may be able to judge for themselves. We will now put it succinctly: —"He (the Commissary-General) was never called upon to provide transport to enable the army to take the field in Bulgaria." The question whether he was ready in case the army had been called upon to take the field is answered by "the contingency did not arise"; the "contingency" is the fall of Silistria. The Government justifies the want of transport, after the thing is over, by saying they did not want it; they did not want to do anything. The newspaper correspondents on the spot at the time write home that nothing is done, because, for want of transport nothing *can be done.* Meanwhile, Omer Pacha is led to believe that Silistria was to be relieved, as we know from Major Butler's journal. His words are too important not to be quoted:—"24th of May, in the forenoon, Moussa Pacha came and informed us that he had received news from Omer Pacha, with the cheering assurance that within *eight days* at farthest, we should see red jackets on the heights above the town." This is just after the first great council of war, at which Omer Pacha was present, and the Commanders-in-Chief and principal officers of both the allied armies.

It would be but a continuation of the scheme by which this army was rendered useless in Turkey, to cast it on a barren coast of Russia, at the beginning of winter; to encamp it on the wrong side of the fortress it was commissioned to take, and to leave it there for the winter, for which it was unprepared. Failure was ensured by the sending it to the Crimea; the ingenious details of mismanagement into which we shall now have to enter, were not requisite to prevent success, but followed of necessity from the course in which the Government were involved, and each in itself monstrous and incredible, they serve to prove the existence of a general design of an analagous nature.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION OF RUSSIA.

The Sebastopol Committee obtained (Q. 14,422) the ostensible instructions issued in June, 1854, for the operations against Sebastopol as follows:—

[EXTRACT.]

"War department, 29th June, 1854.

"*It is probable that a large part of the Russian Army, now retreating from the Turkish territory, may be poured into the Crimea* to reinforce Sebastopol; as all communications by sea are now in the hands of the allied powers, *it becomes of importance* TO ENDEAVOUR *to cut off all communications by land between the Crimea and the other parts of the Russian dominions.* This would be effectually done by the occupation of the Isthmus of Perekop; and I would suggest to you that if a sufficient number of the Turkish Army can now be spared for this purpose, it would be highly important that measures should be taken without delay for sending an adequate force to that point; and associating with the troops of the Sultan, such English and French officers as would assist, by their advice, in holding permanently this position. With the same object, important assistance might be rendered by Admiral Dundas, if he has yet been able to obtain any vessels of a light draught, which would prevent the passage of Russian troops to the Crimea through the Sea of Azoff."

On the following day the Committee resume the examination of this despatch:—

The Duke of Newcastle.—"Q. 14,768.—In that letter, which you placed before the committee yesterday, there is a plan of operations in the Sea of Azoff, and elsewhere, in which the fleet was to take a prominent part; was that letter communicated to the Admiralty?—A. Certainly.

"Q. 14,767.—Was it acted upon?—A. *That I am unable to say.* I am aware of this, that Sir James Graham, in consequence of the despatch which I wrote to Lord Raglan, wrote a similar despatch to the admiral of the fleet; I mean similar upon that point.

"Q. 14,770.—Was any blockade enforced in the Black Sea?—A. No.

"Q. 14,771.—In whose department would the enforcement of a blockade have been; in the department of the Secretary for War, or of the Admiralty?—A. The Admiralty.

"Q. 14,772.—Supposing the non-enforcement of a blockade had interfered with military operations, would it have been the duty of the Minister of War to remonstrate with the Admiralty?—A. Certainly; *it must, of course, be understood that in all those matters it is assumed that there is a co-operation among the existing Members of the Cabinet;* that there would not be a disposition on the part of the First

Lord of the Admiralty to use his fleet to thwart the operations of the army, which was under the more immediate direction of the Secretary for War.

"Q. 14,773.—Are you aware whether any blockade was kept up until lately?—A. I have already said that it was not.

"Q. 14,774.—Were not the orders to the English navy, to act in all matters of blockade, and things of that kind, in conjunction only with the French navy?—A. They were.

"Q. 14,777.—Your Grace has stated that there was no blockade of the Black Sea, although it had been stated in the House of Commons that orders had been sent to institute a blockade. Do you believe that the reasons why that blockade was not enforced arose from political, and not merely from naval circumstances?—A. Chiefly political circumstances.

"Q.—14,778.—Who judged of those political circumstances which led to the non-fulfilment of the order?—A. *That would be entering into a variety of matters* connected with arrangements between the English fleet and the French fleet, and communications between the heads of both fleets and the ambassadors at Constantinople, and other matters. I think it would be more proper, if the committee think it desirable to obtain that information, that they should obtain it from the present Ministers of the Crown than from me. I think that there might be inconvenience in my answering the question. I am able to answer it, and have no personal objection.

"Q. 14,779.—My object was to learn whether the admirals were responsible for the determination of the Government?—A. *I think we ought to say that Government was responsible principally;* there were difficulties raised out there. Orders were sent, as I have already admitted, to institute a blockade. Difficulties arose at the seat of war of a political character, not connected with any disobedience on the part of the admiral of our fleet, of the orders sent out by the Government from home, into which I hardly think it would be right for me to enter. The committee will, of course, have the power of obtaining the information *if they think it of importance.*

"Q. 14,780,—Were any reasons sent to you from the East which were considered satisfactory by the Government for not enforcing the blockade?—A. Reasons were sent: that they were in all respects entirely satisfactory, I think I cannot say. Again, I would really rather not say why I consider that they were not satisfactory; *they would not apply merely to those departments into which the honourable gentleman wishes to inquire.*"

Vice-Admiral Dundas.—"Q. 20,417.—You did not proceed to the Crimea till the beginning of September?—A. We did not lie there all the time; we went to sea afterwards. I had nothing to do with the enterprise; I was to blockade Sebastopol; I *knew nothing of the army coming till it arrived at Varna. I was to take care of Sebastopol, and protect the Euxine; that was my duty.*

"Q. 20,418.—Do you mean by that that you were to blockade the Russian ports?—Yes.

"Q. 20,417.—Were all the ports blockaded?—A. *Not to merchantmen; to men of war then were blockaded.*

"Q. 20,420.—Did not the enemy's fleet come out of Sebastopol?—A. *Very often;* two or three of them.

"Q. 20,421.—Did not one Russian steamer come to the Bosphorus?—A. I never heard of her coming to the Bosphorus; one of them came on the coast of Anatolia, *and I am only surprised that more did not come;* if they had been an enterprising enemy they would have come out.

"Q. 20,422.—In spite of your blockade?—A. *Certainly; you cannot blockade a port so close as that; it is impossible.*"

The Morning Herald's Correspondent.—"A short time before and after the declaration of war the English and French fleets cruised in sight of Sebastopol. Finding the Russians did not attempt to come forth while they were there, the squadron gradually moved away; and, shortly after the allies came to Varna, the blockade, or rather the appearance of a blockade, was raised; and, beyond a war-steamer 'sighting' the place once a week or so, the Russians were left to themselves." He then gives various incidents; such as three transports sent from Sebastopol to Nicholaieff for timber arriving there in safety. The Vladimir making seven voyages in the Black sea after the declaration of war, and capturing small Turkish vessels on the coast of Asia Minor; burning two coal hulks at Heraclea, and going up to the mouth of the Bosphorus. Another steam-frigate made three trips in the Black Sea. "In the beginning of July, four sail of the line, with two or three frigates and steamers, quitted the harbour, and cruised for two or three days off Sebastopol, out of sight of land." One of them, an 84-gun ship, got on shore out of the range of the Russian batteries, and remained there for two days and three nights, and was eventually floated off, undisturbed, in the sight of a French or English ship. "The guns and boilers of the Tiger steam frigate were recovered from the wreck by the Russians; the former were kept at Odessa; the latter were placed on board a small vessel, which coasted along till she reached Sebastopol."

"My duty," says Admiral Dundas, "was to take care of Sebastopol, and protect the Euxine." One might suppose from the above statement, and his own, that he had failed in executing that duty. But the gallant admiral was recalled, only to be rewarded.

Sir James Graham.—"21,273.—Did the Turkish admiral purpose to take the Turkish fleet to the Circassian coast, to your knowledge, before the affair at Sinope?—A. No. I think, after that, immediately (!) I know that the Turkish admiral, before the affair of Sinope, insisted on going into the Black Sea, in spite of the remonstrances of the French and English admirals.

"Q. 21,275.—Afterwards, did not the Turks propose to effect a landing, or to blockade the coast of Circassia?—A. Yes. I believe they did, and *after the experience of Sinope, it was considered a most dangerous operation for them to go alone.*

"Q. 21,276.—Who prevented them going?—A. I believe the *common sense of all the authorities other than the Turkish.*"

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.—(5th of November).—"I have *succeeded in dissuading the Porte from sending* a detachment of line-of-battle ships and sailing frigates into the Black Sea at this moment." The Turkish fleet, being thus prevented from entering the Black Sea, seven small Turkish frigates were exposed to the attack of the whole Russian fleet; and, refusing to surrender, fought on till their vessels blew up, so that, to quote the Russian despatch, "the Russian squadron suffered considerably." *After* that affair, Lord Clarendon writes to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, "Her Majesty's Government consider it indispensable that no naval operation should be undertaken by the Turkish fleet without the previous knowledge and sanction of the British and French Admirals. Nor do her Majesty's Government think it just, so long as England and France are not actually at war with Russia, that the combined fleets should aid and protect *the Turkish forces in acts of aggression upon the Russian territory*, while the Russian fleet is prevented from repelling such attacks, or conveying the means necessary for the defence of that territory. Her Majesty's Government have not hesitated to adopt the course which the honour and dignity of this country prescribed, but, at the same time, they do not disguise from themselves that it may, at no distant period, involve England and France in war with Russia, and they consider it equally for the honour and dignity of the two Powers *not to allow the peace of Europe to be dependent upon that national spirit in Turkey*, which, however admirable in itself, and *however useful against the aggressor*, is now evidently beyond the control of the Turkish Government." . . . . .

The Russian fleet was not kept out of the Black Sea, the Turkish was. Even Admiral Dundas considers the Russians not to be enterprising enemies. Lord Clarendon does not hesitate to avow his fears of the spirit of the Turks, after the affair of Sinope, and yet the British public will persist in believing that it was from the Russian fleet and not the Turkish that the Euxine was to be protected.

Vice-Admiral Dundas.—"Q. 20,603.—Did you ever receive orders from the Admiralty respecting the blockade of the Euxine?—A. Yes; very often.

"Q. 20,604.—Did those orders complain that the blockade was not complete?—A. No; they never complained of it.

"Q. 20,451.—A despatch was read to this committee, by the Duke of Newcastle, in which he states, with regard to the Crimea, 'Important assistance might be rendered by Admiral Dundas, if he has yet been able to obtain any vessels of a light draught, which would

prevent the passage of Russian troops to the Crimea, through the Sea of Azoff;' was your attention, at an early period, called to that subject?—A. Perfectly.

"Q. 20,452.—Having heard from the Government at home that it was considered desirable that the passage of Russian troops to the Crimea through the Sea of Azoff should be prevented, you considered, of course, whether or not it was possible to prevent it—A. It was not possible.

"Q. 20,453.—Even if you had had vessels of light draught of water, you could not have done it?—A. Without troops to take possession of Kertch, you could not have done it."

Sir James Graham.—"Q. 21,194.—It was stated in the House of Commons that the strict blockade of the Black Sea had been ordered; will you state to the committee whether or not such a strict blockade had been ordered?—A. In the strongest possible manner it had been called to the attention of the naval Commander-in-Chief, and if I should not weary the committee I should like to read a series of despatches on the subject of the blockade; Lord Palmerston has no objection to my reading what I am about to read. This is dated the 25th of October.

"Q. 21,195.—Is that the first?—A. No; there are others. I was going to show the *regret* of the Admiralty that the blockade had not taken place *earlier*.

"Q. 21,196.—Will you state when the first despatch was sent?—A. On the 5th of April, war being declared on the 29th of March. The admiral is ordered to use the largest discretionary powers in blockading the Russian ports in the Black Sea. On the 29th of May, reports from the Advocate-General were transmitted to Admiral Dundas, with orders to furnish, without delay, precise information of the blockades actually established

"Q. 21,197.—Did he furnish that information?—A. I have already stated in Parliament that a scheme of blockade was prepared by Admiral Dundas and Admiral Hamelin, which contemplated the stoppage at the Bosphorus of the entrance of trading vessels into the Black Sea, which was sent to England and to Paris by the respective ambassadors, and was negatived by the two Governments as inconsistent with the law of nations, and that led to a considerable loss of time.

"Q. 21,198.—Was that done in pursuance of those instructions?—A. Yes; then came the expedition to Varna, and from Varna to the Crimea, which occupied the whole of the available force; and that will bring me pretty nearly to the time when we *expressed regret* that the blockade had not been established. The letter of the 25th of October is the first expressing regret that it had not been done before. 'Sir,—I am commanded by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to express to you the regret of their lordships that the blockade of the Russian ports in the Black Sea has never yet been *generally and vigorously established*. (!) The plan proposed by Admiral Hamelin

and yourself of stopping the trade to and from the Russian ports at the entrance of the Bosphorus was inadmissible under the law of nations, and was consequently rejected. The failure of this plan rendered still more imperative the immediate adoption of the accustomed modes of blockade, by the presence of a sufficient force, at the entrance of the principal harbours and estuaries belonging to the enemy, by the proclamation of each blockade in due form, and by its rigid enforcement by adequate naval means. *With the exception of the Mouths of the Danube*, no such blockade in the Black Sea has yet been established. Odessa is open; Kertch is open; the whole coast from Sebastopol to the entrance of the Sea of Azoff has remained unmolested and unwatched by the cruisers of the allies. The preparation of the means of transport for the allied army from Varna to the Crimea, the embarkation and disembarkation of troops, and co-operation with the army in the siege of Sebastopol, are reasons why these measures of blockade, and of watching the enemy's ports may have been necessarily suspended or interrupted. But your attention is now specially called to this subject. You must concert your measures with the French Admiral immediately; and their lordships desire that a strict blockade of all the enemy's principal ports in the Black Sea be forthwith established.' Then the next letter that I would wish to read is dated the 3rd of November.

"Q. 21,199.—Did you receive any reply to this despatch to Admiral Dundas?—A. *The time of this was very near the surrender of his command; and he did not receive it till about the end of November. There are some replies.*

"Q. 21,200.—During the months of September and October, did Admiral Dundas give you any information on the subject of the blockade?—A. No; *this letter admits the reason* why the blockade during those months was impossible.

"Q. 21,201.—Did you not ask for information upon that subject, and was it given?—A. The first letter expressing regret that no blockade had been generally and rigorously established, was dated the 25th of October, which I have just read.

"Q. 21,202.—Did not the Government express *surprise* that no information was given to it on the subject.—A. *I have read the first letter in which regret was expressed.*

"Q. 21,203.—Beginning from September, or the latter end of August, when the army went from Varna to the Crimea, and while the naval forces were employed in that transport, there seems to have been good reason why there should have been no blockade during those months; but in the month previously to that, when there was nothing to be done, there was no blockade?—A. It was all suspended on account of the plan which was under consideration, namely, the plan which Admiral Hamelin and Admiral Dundas had framed, which would have been quite *effectual*, but which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and the French Ambassador thought *inadmissible*, and time was lost by

reference home, and the result of the reference was the rejection of the scheme, and *in the mean time nothing was done.*

"Q, 21,205.—Are the committee to understand that the expression of regret in that despatch was not intended to convey any *censure* upon the Admiral?—A. Quite so; it admits the *validity* of the reasons, but it regrets *the fact* that a blockade had not been instituted, and it ends with the *desire* that a strict blockade shall be forthwith established.

"Q. 21,206.—When was that received by Admiral Dundas?—A. *I cannot tell.* It was written on the 25th of October.

"Q. 21,208.—During what time was it that the Russian steamer came out of the harbour of Sebastopol, and appeared on the Turkish coast, and committed some acts of aggression there?—A. The question of a steamer having so appeared is not clearly established; it may have taken place, but I am not satisfied that it did take place.

"Q. 21,200.—Admiral Dundas said that she did come out?—A. Then of course that is the best authority. If he says so, no doubt it was so.

"Q. 21,210.—You have referred to the scheme of blockade, which was disapproved by the diplomatic authorities at Constantinople?—A. *They thought that they should refer it* to their respective Governments.

"Q. 21,212.—Did that prevent them, if they did not blockade the Bosphorus, from keeping up some kind of blockade on the coast of Turkey, or the Crimea?—A. *They did not take that responsibility upon themselves.*"

Sir James Graham begins on the subject of the blockades by producing a despatch which he is anxious to read, with the preface, "Lord Palmerston has no objection to my reading what I am about to read." The despatch so selected gives the reasons why his orders had not been executed by his subordinate, and is addressed to that subordinate. It then expresses regret—regret for the past and desire for the future. When asked if there was a reply to it, he answered, "There are some replies"—he does not give them. When asked when it was received by Admiral Dundas, he answers, "I cannot tell; it was *written* on the 25th of October." Clearly, then, that despatch was written to be read in London, not to be received by Admiral Dundas; and was never received by him. The reason given in it for no blockade having been established from the 29th of March to the end of August, a period of five months, is, that a plan was proposed by the Admirals, which the Government rejected, and consequently, which failed. If the Admiral had been ordered to blockade, and, instead of doing so, proposed another plan, it was disobedience of orders—a case not to be met by "regret." *He had never been ordered*, or what means "they did not take the responsibility upon themselves." The responsibility of obeying their orders! Admiral Dundas had already been examined, and there is

not a word from him of this "plan." We have given every syllable reported of his on the subject.

But this "scheme" of "stopping the trade to and from the Russian ports at the entrance to the Bosphorus," was the thing to be done, but it was for *Turkey* to do it. It was what she always had done in all previous wars. Not to do it, was to have the trade of her enemy passing in and out under her very nose, between her own shores, passing by her own capital. Nothing but the presence of the allied fleets could have sufficed to prevent her from using that power of injuring her enemy which she held in her hands. This very power, was put forth in 1828, as an argument for attacking Turkey. "Our existence," said Prince Lieven to Lord Aberdeen, "depends on the order of a port-captain of Constantinople."

Sir James Graham "cannot tell when the despatch of the 25th of October, was received;" Admiral Dundas is not recalled to be asked whether he had received it. Admiral Dundas had given the lie direct to the Duke of Newcastle the day before. He was smarting as the scape-goat of the Ministry. Who could tell what he might not have let out? The clubs were in consternation, and the words used were, that it was dangerous to allow such astounding revelations. After this, accordingly, the committee wisely confined itself to its proper province of enquiring into "the state of the army before Sebastopol."

THE INFORMATION ON WHICH THE BRITISH ARMY WAS SENT TO THE CRIMEA.

The Duke of Newcastle.—"Q. 14,417.—When the siege of Silistria was raised, another expedition was determined upon?—A. It was.

"Q. 14,418.—At what time of the year was the expedition to the Crimea determined on?—A. We received by telegraph the intelligence of the siege of Silistria having been raised on the 27th of June. On the following day a mail left this country for Constantinople, and I wrote privately to Lord Raglan informing him *that he would receive by the next mail a despatch, as I would prepare on the following day a despatch for the decision of the Cabinet*, directing him, under certain circumstances, to cross to the Crimea and besiege Sebastopol.

"Q. 14,419.—Was that order to Lord Raglan peremptory, or was any discretion left with him, as to deciding upon the expedition to the Crimea?—A. That is a question the answer to which might be so easily misunderstood, that I think the better way would be, if it is not irregular, to read the instructions.

"Q. 14,422.—Will your Grace be good enough to read those instructions?—A. In order to put the Committee in complete possession of the instructions with reference to the expedition to Sebastopol, it will be necessary that I should first read a second despatch, containing instructions to Lord Raglan, which I addressed to him on

the 10th of April. In the first despatch the instructions were of *a general* nature, and *applied to the operations which were to be immediately undertaken.** The despatch of the same date, the 10TH OF APRIL, was to this effect:—"With reference to my despatch of this date, I have to direct your lordship to lose no time after your arrival in Turkey in making careful but secret inquiry into the present amount and condition of the Russian force in the Crimea, and the strength of the fortress of Sebastopol. Your first duty will be to prevent, by every means in your power, the advance of the Russian army on Constantinople, if it should appear that there is any present serious intention of making such an attempt; but you must bear in mind, that *if the Russian general should make no demonstrations of any further onward movement*, it may become essential for the attainment of the objects of the war that some operations of an *offensive* character should be undertaken by the allied armies. No blow which could be struck at the extremities of the Russian Empire would be so effective for this purpose as the taking of Sebastopol. It is unnecessary to point out *that the destruction of the Russian fleet is one of the certain consequences* (!) and that a solid guarantee for the future maintenance of peace would be thus obtained. *Before, however, the siege of a fortress reported to be so strong, can be attempted, it is necessary that information which can be relied upon shall be obtained* on many points on which little or nothing is at present known in England, or it would appear, even in Turkey. Captain Drummond, in her Majesty's ship Retribution, lately examined and reported upon the strength of the sea defences; but your lordship will have to ascertain whether, in the last few months, the works have been materially strengthened on the land side, both on the south and north of the harbour, and what facilities for landing troops may exist on any part of the shore between the fortress and Kaffa on the one side, and Eupatoria on the other. The number of men in the Crimea and Sebastopol is variously estimated, but 30,000 is generally believed to be the largest force which can *at present* have been *sent there*. It will be necessary to ascertain, not only whether this is the number, (sent?) but how that force is constituted. It is reported that the main, if not the only supply of water, is derived from a source eight miles distant. This is an important fact to establish if it should be considered advisable to invest the town. The amount of provisions in the garrison is another subject of enquiry."

The Duke of Newcastle then read the despatch of the 29th of June, which commences by recapitulating the beginning of the despatch of April 10th; and then goes on—"The events which have recently occurred, and which had become known to her Majesty's Government, by means of the telegraph from Belgrade, the gallant and successful resistance of the Turkish army, the raising of the siege of Silistria, the

* This despatch is not asked for, yet as no "operations" were immediately undertaken, one would have expected that curiosity would prompt the question.

retreat of the Russian army across the Danube, and the anticipated evacuation of the Principalities, have given a new character to the war, and will render it necessary for you to concert measures with Marshal St. Arnaud, and with Admirals Dundas and Hamelin, suited to the circumstances in which events have placed the allied forces. The safety of Constantinople from any invasion of the Russian army is now *for a time at least* secured, *and the advance of the English and French forces to Varna and Pravadi, has succeeded in its object, without their being called upon to meet the enemy in action. Any further advance of the allied forces should on no account be contemplated.* To occupy the Dobrudscha would be productive of no beneficial results, (!) and would be fatally prejudicial to the health of the troops; *and even if the Russian army should not cross the Pruth, but continue in occupation of the Principalities, it is the decided opinion of her Majesty's Government, that, for the present at least, no measures should be taken to dislodge them.* The circumstances *anticipated in my despatch* before referred to, have therefore arrived, and I have on the part of her Majesty's Government, to instruct your lordship to concert measures for the siege of Sebastopol, *unless with the information in your possession, but at present unknown in this country*, you should be decidedly of opinion that it could not be undertaken with reasonable prospect of success. The confidence with which her Majesty placed under your command the gallant army now in Turkey is unabated; and if upon mature reflection you should consider that the united strength of the two armies is insufficient for this undertaking, you are not to be precluded from the exercise of the discretion originally vested in you; though her Majesty's Government will learn with regret that an attack, from which such important consequences are anticipated, *must be any longer delayed.* The difficulties of the siege of Sebastopol appear to her Majesty's Government to be more likely to increase than diminish by delay, and as there is no prospect of a safe and honourable peace until the fortress is reduced, and the fleet taken or destroyed, it is on all accounts most important *that nothing but insuperable impediments, such as the want of ample preparation by either army, or the possession, by Russia, of a force in the Crimea greatly outnumbering that which can be brought against it, should be allowed to prevent the early decision to undertake these operations.*"

The Duke of Newcastle preferred reading his despatch to answering the question whether the order to Lord Raglan, to besiege Sebastopol, was or was not peremptory, because the answer to that question "might be so easily misunderstood!" The question is, could any of the members of the committee have answered the enquiry after they had heard the despatch, or rather the two despatches? Lord Raglan is told that he is not precluded from the exercise of his discretion, and at the same time is told that there is nothing else to be done. He is expressly forbidden to dislodge the Russian army from the Principalities. This is after their defeat by the Turks before Silistria. But his discretion had been long before taken from him. The troops had scarcely arrived

in Turkey when he is pointed to Sebastopol, and this at the very moment when, according to Lord Clarendon, the most the Government expected to be able to do, was to rescue Constantinople. This despatch, of the 10th of April, however, ends by declaring that "before the siege of a fortress reported to be so strong can be attempted, it is *necessary* that information that can be relied upon shall be obtained." Let us see what was obtained.

"Q. 14,434.—Has your Grace Lord Raglan's answer to that despatch?—A. I have. The answer to my despatch is dated the 19th of July, from Varna.

"Q. 14,435.—Is there any objection to your Grace reading it?—A. I have glanced over it hurriedly at this moment, and I do not think there is; but not recollecting it quite as accurately as I did my own, I had, perhaps, better look over it again. *(His Grace referred to the despatch.)* I should say that this despatch embraces much more extensive allusions to the operations of the French than my despatch did, which was intended solely to be directions to Lord Raglan himself; but I am not aware that there is anything to which the French Government could object."

A discussion then ensues as to the reading of the despatch. The Duke thinks it is unfair to throw upon him the "responsibility" of deciding. He is "not an impartial judge."

"Q. 14,440.—Your Grace considers that the despatch you have read contained sufficient authority to Lord Raglan to proceed to the Crimea without any further reference to you, if he considered the circumstances of the case justified it? (The question is whether he had sufficient authority to *refuse* to proceed.)—A. Certainly; *but then I am bound to say that this despatch is a very fair statement on the part of Lord Raglan, of his views of the expedition, so far as he was able to form them.*

"Q. 14,441.—And the despatch which you now hold in your hand is Lord Raglan's explanation of the circumstances which induced him to delay or postpone complying with your Grace's *recommendation*? A.—*No. He does not speak of delay*; but I think the committee having decided that my despatch should be read, unless the Government sees any objection, that they ought to have Lord Raglan's answer, in fairness to Lord Raglan.

"Q. 14,442.—There is one question which I would put to your Grace. You stated just now that in your despatch to Lord Raglan, of the 10th of April, you suggested several important enquiries, with regard to the force of the Russian army in the Crimea, the strength of the fortress of Sebastopol, and other points of that nature. Will you state whether, between the 10th of April and the 27th of June, you ever received any information in answer to these enquiries?—A. No; in *the very despatch which I understand the committee have decided to move for, Lord Raglan states that he had not been able to obtain any of the information which was required in that despatch.*"

The nature of Lord Raglan's despatch is therefore evident—so evi-

dent that the committee ask no more questions, and the despatch never appears. In the 3rd examination of the Duke, however, the subject is reverted to by Mr. Drummond.

"Q. 15,275.—Your Grace has stated in an answer, that Lord Raglan stated that he was about to undertake the expedition. *Did he state that he was about to undertake it in consequence of orders, or in conformity with his own judgment?*—A. *He said he was about to undertake it in consequence of orders*, and not in consequence of any information which he had been able to obtain, for he had not obtained any.

"Q. 15,276.—Did he state that he did not know the force he was going against, the strength of the place, nor even whether he should find water?—A. No; I do not think he stated the latter; but he said what was the case, that he did not know the strength of the place, nor the forces that were there. That was necessarily inferred in the answer which I last gave, that he had not obtained that information which the Government had directed him to obtain, *and whatever information he had was sent by me, having been collected by me in this country.*

"Q. 15,277.—Then, if it has been stated by anybody that the commanders in the Black Sea conceived the project of that expedition, and resolved upon its execution, that is not true?—A. I hardly know what that can refer to; there is no doubt that it was undertaken under the circumstances which I have described. It was undertaken under the directions of the two Governments of France and England.

"Q. 15,278.—By orders from home?—A. Certainly."

This is the third time the subject is returned to; the last time it had been by Mr. Layard.

"Q. 15,269.—*When it was first contemplated that the army should winter in the Crimea, did not Lord Raglan protest against so doing, observing that the army was unprovided for such an event, and that it would be fatal to it?*—A. *The observations of Lord Raglan on that subject are contained in the despatch to which I have already drawn the attention of the committee, that of July 19th*, which, as I have before said, I do not feel myself authorised to produce, but for which, I think, the committee will do right in applying to the Government, for I think, in justice to Lord Raglan, the committee ought to be in possession of his despatch of July the 19th; *but that will not bear out in any respect the question which has been put to me.*"

If anything more were wanted it is furnished by the account of the *Morning Herald's* correspondent, of the state of the army during the period between the fall of Silistria and the reception of the orders for that expedition.

"On the retreat of the Russians from Silistria, a general opinion obtained among our officers that the war had virtually terminated; and it was strengthened by *seeing that almost all preparations for taking the field were either given up entirely, or pushed with little vigour.*" (pp. 130.) The very day after the date of that despatch, July 20th, we

find in his journal these words. "After the troops had remained some time in much the same state as that described at the close of my last chapter, *symptoms were suddenly manifested of preparations for active hostilities on a larger scale.*"

Duty is now made to consist in obedience, not to the law, but to your immediate superior, and in the military service, as well as the diplomatic; although the soldier takes an oath to obey only "lawful" orders, and can apply to a court martial, instead of being crushed in the dark. As Lord Stratford de Redcliffe obeyed the orders he remonstrated against to prevent Turkey from using her fleets and armies in her own defence, so Lord Raglan obeyed his orders to risk the existence of the only British army by invading an enemy's country in utter ignorance of the resistance it would meet with.

The wording of the despatch which brought him to this point is too remarkable not to be dwelt upon. On the 10th of April, he had been told that it was necessary such information should be obtained. Now, when the time is come, he is given to understand that it must be done *unless he had information which proved it to be impossible.*

"I have to instruct your lordship to concert measures for the siege of Sebastopol, UNLESS WITH THE INFORMATION IN YOUR POSSESSION, but at present unknown in this country, YOU SHOULD BE DECIDEDLY OF OPINION THAT IT COULD NOT BE UNDERTAKEN WITH A REASONABLE PROSPECT OF SUCCESS." He writes back that he had no information. The Government do not countermand the expedition, They do not reprove him for having obtained none. No; he is to go because he has none, and that is to be his justification and theirs. But how was it he had failed in obtaining any? The Russian soldiers were clothed in no coats of enchantment to conceal them from mortal eyes; Sebastopol was not a castle in the air. "The army and fortress were themselves in an enemy's country, the inhabitants of which did receive us when we landed as friends, and were most ready with information regarding their Russian masters." (*Times'* correspondent, p. 166.) The provident care of the English Government appears nowhere more conspicuous, and was in no case more successful. We are not left to judge merely from the result. How they did actually prevent the military and naval commanders from obtaining the information which they themselves possessed, will appear from the following evidence of the Duke of Newcastle, Admiral Dundas, and Sir James Graham:—

The Duke of Newcastle.—"Q. 11,443.—Is your Grace aware whether you had ever received information of Admiral Dundas having made an offer to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, before war was declared, to send a confidential person to the Crimea, naming the person, to ascertain all those very points?—A. *I never heard of it till this moment*, and I can hardly believe that any such communication can have been made; because the most urgent instructions were sent by me to Lord Raglan, as the committee have heard, and by Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, to obtain all the information which it was in their power to obtain.

"Q. 14,444.—When were those instructions sent?—A. The despatch that I have read was sent on the 10th of April.

"Q. 14,445.—I referred to the period before the declaration of war? —A. War was declared on the 29th of March, but the orders to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe must have come out from the Foreign Office, so immediately after the event to which the hon. member has referred, supposing it to have occurred, that I think the hon. member cannot have been correctly informed.

"Q. 14,446.—Was your Grace not informed that Captain Drummond went a second time to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, with that very person to whom the hon. baronet referred, and entreated him to allow him to go to the Crimea and ascertain the nature of the fortifications, and the strength of the force in the town of Sebastopol?—A. *I never heard of it.*

"Q. 14,447.—Was your Grace not informed that while two Russian ships were being repaired here, Admiral Dundas having one of his ships with a hole in her bottom, requested Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's leave to send that ship into Sebastopol, in order to be repaired there?—A. *I never heard of it.*

"Q. 14,448.—Were copies of the despatches sent to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe as Ambassador at Constantinople?—A. I cannot answer that question. I should think not, but my practice was, that in the case of every despatch of so important a character as those I have read, I always sent a copy of it to the Foreign Office, and therefore, it was competent to Lord Clarendon to have sent a copy. I cannot say that he did.

"Q. 14,449.—To the best of your belief Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was fully informed of that which passed between the Government and Lord Raglan?—A. I have no doubt of it."

Admiral Dundas.—"Q. 20,355.—Did the Admiralty give you a statement of the strength of the fleet against which you were going? —A. A very rough statement. I was possessed of a list, *but a very old one*, not a recent one.

"Q. 23,356. Did you know its strength better when you moved into the Black Sea?—A. Not a bit.

"Q. 20,357.—Did you apply to the Ambassador at Constantinople to know if he had any information about it?—A. Yes.

"Q. 20,358.—What did he say?—A. He sent me much such another list as I had.

"Q. 20,359.—As you had from the Admiralty?—A. Yes.

"Q. 20,360.—Has he not a large establishment of Secretaries, and paid and unpaid attachés, and interpreters, and consuls and vice-consuls, and all sorts of people from whom you might get information? —A. We had no consul or vice-consul at Sebastopol; we had consuls all over the Black Sea.

"Q. 20,361.—What steps did you take, yourself, to procure information with regard to the Russian fleet?—A. The first three weeks

I enquired at the Consulate of the Dardanelles. I sent up to enquire at Constantinople; but finding that failed, and that nobody knew anything about Sebastopol, I then wrote some letters.

"Q. 20,362.—To whom were those letters directed?—A. The one in my hand is addressed to Lord Stratford.

"Q. 20,363.—What is the date of it?—A. The 11th of July, 1853, before I sailed for the Bosphorus; then I wrote to Captain Drummond.

"Q. 20,364.—Did you get any answer to the letter of Lord Stratford?—A. I got an answer from Captain Drummond; it was tantamount to it.

"Q. 20,365.—*But you got no answer from Lord Stratford to that letter*?—A. *No*; Captain Drummond was employed by me very near to the Ambassador's house, upon business.

"Q. 20,366.—After having received no answer from the Ambassador to that letter, requiring information, you then sent Captain Drummond again to him to endeavour still to get the information?—A. Yes; and I have no answer from Captain Drummond.

"Q. 20,367.—Did Captain Drummond state to you the answer he received from Lord Stratford?—A. Yes; *that there was some doubt about the passport, and he referred the gentleman to me; and he came back in ten days.* (This reply is unintelligible by itself. It is evident that previous questions and replies have been omitted, as no explanation is asked.)

"Q. 20,369.—It has been stated in evidence before this committee, in answer to a question which I believe I put to the Duke of Newcastle (Q. 15,261), "Did Admiral Dundas take any steps to acquaint himself with the force in Sebastopol, either the fleet or the defences which protected that fleet?—A. The *Retribution*, as is well known, went in with a message at one time into Sebastopol, and by that means obtained a very clever sketch of the place, so far as it could be seen from the deck of the *Retribution*. That was the only step that he took that I am aware of." Is that answer correct or not? A.—No; it is not.

"Q. 20,370.—It is correct as far as the Duke was concerned, but not as far as you were concerned?—A. As far as I am concerned I took more steps.

"Q. 20,371.—Will you state in general terms what they were?—A. I sent my interpreter, a Maltese gentleman, to Constantinople.

"Q. 20,372.—When was that?—A. On the 18th of July, 1853, requesting Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Captain Drummond that they would, if possible, forward him on to Odessa and Sebastopol, but difficulties arose about the passport, and he returned to me at Besika; and I then pointed out to Sir James Graham the great necessity of obtaining information; that was on the 1st of September, 1853, and during my stay at Constantinople, in November and December, 1853, I endeavoured to collect information relative to the Crimea, Circassia,

and so forth, from persons of all nations and all classes, but with little success; and I attribute the failure to the systematic vigilance and precaution of the Russian Government and the hostility of the Greeks.

"Q. 20,373.—During 1853 you had obtained very little information? —A. Hardly any; of Sebastopol none.

"Q. 20,373.—Did you obtain any information as to the fleet?—A. None.

"Q. 20,374.—Were you hindered in so obtaining information by any backwardness on the part of our authorities during 1853?—A. YES; I think there was a backwardness.

"Q. 20,375.—You think that during the year 1853, the English authorities impeded your obtaining information?—A. No; I think that the English authorities were exceedingly slow in obtaining information, when you remember that in Russia you can get anything for money.

"Q. 20,377.—There were great difficulties in obtaining information? —A. I think that if travellers had been sent up to the Crimea they might have got in somehow, and that you might have got information in 1853.

"Q. 20,378.—*Were you prevented, or in any way impeded, in obtaining that information by the conduct of our authorities abroad?*—A. Yes. I think that if they had sent my interpreter on, they would have obtained that information.

"Q. 20,380.—Who were the authorities who ought to have sent your interpreter?—A. The Ambassador.

"Q. 20,381.—Did they or not assign reasons for not carrying out your object?—A. Certainly: Captain Drummond wrote to say that *the Ambassador saw reasons why he should not go.* I was under the Ambassador's orders.

"Q. 20,382.—What were the reasons that Captain Drummond stated?—A. *The answer was, that difficulties had arisen about the passports,* and he returned to me.

"Q. 20,383.—Was the difficulty of the passport the only difficulty? Was any objection raised to the character of the person whom you proposed?—A. Certainly the contrary. He has a first-rate character; this man had been offered a post under the Russians.

"Q. 20,384.—This is your opinion. Did the Ambassador state any objection to him?—A. No, no objection; the objection was about the passport.

"Q. 20,385.—The alleged reason was about the passport?—A. Yes.

"Q. 20,386.—Did any other public servant, any consul, offer to procure information?—A. *I never applied to them. My master, my commanding officer, was the Ambassador till the war broke out; after that I was my own master.*"

Then follows mention of Mr. Seam's information, which it is said only amounted to "It is confirmed to me that works have been con-

structed at Sebastopol for the defence on its land side." That was in March, 1854,

"Q. 20,901.—*You stated that the impediment thrown in your way by the ambassador, in procuring information, arose from not granting a passport to the person whom you proposed to send?*—A. *Yes. I did say impediment.* I said that I sent up the man to the minister under whose orders I was, and he did not choose to send him on. Captain Drummond wrote to me to say, *the reason why he was not sent out had, he believed, something to do with his passport.*"

The Duke of Newcastle's Third Examination.—"Q. 15,261.—Did Admiral Dundas take any steps to acquaint himself with the force in Sebastopol, either the fleet or the forces which protected that fleet?—A. The "Retribution," as is well-known, went in with a message at one time into Sebastopol, and by that means obtained a very clever sketch of the place, so far as it could be seen from the deck of the "Retribution"; that was the only step that he took that I am aware of.

"Q. 15,262.—Were all his despatches to the Admiralty shown to your Grace?—A. I believe so. I saw a great number; and I have no reason to suppose that any were not sent to me; it was the constant practice that they should be sent. The rule was to send all his despatches to me.

"Q. 15,263—You do not recollect seeing in any of those despatches any account of those steps which he had taken or urged to be taken, to acquaint himself?—A. *I do not say that he did not urge any to be taken,* but I certainly do not think that he stated that he had taken any. I recollect his stating what he believed to be the amount of the Russian forces in the Crimea, *which certainly was extremely inaccurate.*

"Q. 15,264.—But does your Grace not recollect any steps which he recommended to be taken in order to ascertain the amount of the force there?—A. *No; I recollect nothing of the kind.*

"Q. 15,265.—Did any public servant of the Crown offer to obtain a complete plan of the fortification of Sebastopol; and if so, what notice was taken of that offer?—A. I stated yesterday, that I never heard of any such proposal. It certainly was not made to me, and I am convinced that it was not made to any other member of the Government; if it had been I should have heard of it. I give a most positive contradiction of any such proposal having been communicated to the Government. *I think it most essential to the honour of the Government that it should be peremptorily contradicted that any such proposal was ever made. Whatever blame may attach to the Government, the notion that in undertaking an expedition of that kind we should have neglected an offer of such a nature is nothing short of monstrous.*

"Q. 15,267.—The proper course for the Ambassador would have been to send it to Lord Clarendon, would it not?—A. Yes.

"Q. 15,268.—And Lord Clarendon ought to have sent it to you?—A. Yes, certainly; and it would have been brought before the Cabinet. That nothing of the kind was proposed to the Government, I am

confident. It may turn out that this proposal was made to the Ambassador, and it may have been of a visionary description—*it may have been a proposal for balloons.* I have had a great many schemes for taking Sebastopol by balloons—not less than one hundred; and the Ambassador may have thought it so extremely absurd, that he did not refer it home to the Government. I speak only of what I know—that no proposal of the kind was made to the Government."

Admiral Dundas Re-examined.—"A. 20,454.—I should like to state my reasons for wishing to read the letter which I hold in my hand. The Duke of Newcastle in his evidence, says that my information was erroneous. I wish to prove that my information was not erroneous, and that the information sent by his grace to Lord Raglan before the embarkation, WAS ERRONEOUS.

"A. 20,455.—(In answer to the question whether the information was contained in a despatch or a private letter.) A private letter to Lord Raglan, dated May 10th, 1854, before Lord Raglan thought of ever coming into the Black Sea.

"Q. 20,456.—Will you read the letter?—A. Yes. I was then on a cruise off Sebastopol. 'Sebastopol is a second Gibraltar. We see many new works erecting, and from prisoners learn that the land side is being equally strengthened. An encampment is seen, of large size, close to the south of the town; and we are told that 120,900 men are in the Crimea, 30,000 of whom are in Sebastopol. * * I hope your lordship has better information respecting Russian matters than I have been able to get. I enclose a copy of a confidential letter which I felt obliged to write to Sir James Graham. It is said that Russians are easily bought and bribed; if so, our diplomatic agents have been very remiss. The Turks, I find, know nothing.' With the permission of the committee, I will read a letter I addressed to Sir James Graham.

"Q. 20,457.—*Chairman: Have you got Sir James Graham's leave to read that letter?*—A. No. I have not.

"Q. 20,458.—*Did you ask leave of the Government.*—A. No. I am now contradicting the Duke of Newcastle. *I want to prove that his information is wrong.*

"Q. 20,459.—That is a public despatch which you propose to read?—A. *No*; all my correspondence with the First Lord is *confidential.*

"Q. 20,460.—You have not inquired of any member of the present Government whether or not you are at liberty to use this confidential letter?—A. I do not think the present Government has anything to do with it; this is a letter to Sir James Graham from me.

"Q. 20,461.—Do you think that *because you were in command of the fleet,* if you wrote a private letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty, *that the letter is your property to do as you please with it?*—A. Yes; for this reason: I find one of the late Government saying that I sent him wrong information, and to prove that I did send him right information, I wish to read this letter."

The letter is not read.

„ Q. 20,462.—The Duke of Newcastle, in the answer to which I have referred, stated that the letter which you have just read gave inaccurate information; how do you substantiate now, the allegation which you have made that the information which you have just read was accurate?—A. The information which the Duke of Newcastle sends himself to Lord Raglan *gives more men in Sebastopol than I did.*

"Q. 20,463.—That does not prove that you gave the right number, because you might both be wrong.—A. The Duke says this, that I had sent him erroneous information, or information by a balloon, or some nonsense.

"Q. 20,466.—Then, the Duke of Newcastle says that about that time (the 10th of May, the date of the letter to Lord Raglan) there were about 45,000 men?—A. In March or April he says so; a month before.

"Q. 20,468.—And you say that there are 120,000? A.—Yes."

At the end of his examination, Admiral Dundas volunteered this further statement.

"A. 20,627.—There is one thing I shall mention about the Crimean force; I speak of that, to show that my informer was really a very good man; he was from Ragusa, and not at all attached to the Russian service; he said plainly there was a large force in the Crimea; and I thought it my duty to write and tell Lord Raglan, as I considered that we might be going to the Crimea; there was then a doubt whether we should go or not."

Sir James Graham.—"Q. 21,266.—Did Admiral Dundas receive every assistance from her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople in the prosecution of the public service?—A. I am not aware that the Ambassador failed in his duty in rendering every assistance in his power.

"Q. 21,267.—There was no difference between Admiral Dundas, and her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, to your knowledge, in consequence of which the public service was interfered with?—A. If the question implies that the public service was damnified by the nature of the communications between the Ambassador and the Admiral, I cannot put my finger upon any real detriment that was sustained.

"Q. 21,263.—Was there a difference of opinion between the two? —A. I have no doubt there was.

"Q. 21,269.—Did that come *officially* to your knowledge?—A. As a member of the administration, I should say "Yes," but as First Lord of the Admiralty, I should say "No."

"Q. 21,271.—Did Admiral Dundas complain that he did not receive instructions or *information* which was destined for him, and which he ought to have received, to have enabled him to act?—A. I think there was one complaint of that kind, that *information which he thought ought to have been communicated to him was not communicated;* I think there was one instance of that kind, but I cannot say that my *recol-*

lection of the investigation of that case led me to the conclusion that the public service was damnified by the absence of that communication."

The Earl of Aberdeen.—"Q. 21,352.—Had her Majesty's Government obtained as much information as could have been obtained under the circumstances, of the numbers of the enemy in the Crimea, the condition of Sebastopol, and information upon other subjects connected with the expedition to the Crimea?—A. We obtained very different information leading to very different conclusions, and it was not easy to ascertain the respective degree of credit that we ought to give to the different informations which we received. On the whole, I think that the most correct information that we received, was received in this country from a gentleman who had recently been in the Crimea, and that information turned out to be pretty correct as to the amount of the force of the enemy, and the state of the country, and the defences.

"Q. 24,353.—*In your lordship's opinion*, as much information was obtained as was necessary to authorise the expedition?—A. That was the opinion, I believe, of the *military authorities.*

"Q. 21,354.—Can you state how long that individual was in the Crimea who gave the information that was most relied upon?—A. Many years; I do not know how many.

"Q. 21,355.—The purport of that information was, that the numerical force of the Russians in the Crimea, amounted to about 70,000 men?—A. Altogether.

"Q. 21,356.—40,000 in Sebastopol, and 30,000 dispersed about the country? A.—Yes.

"Q. 21,364.—Is your lordship aware whether the individual from whom you received the information, on which you relied, had been in Sebastopol itself shortly before he gave that information? A.—I think so. I did not see this gentleman myself; but I know that the Duke of Newcastle and Sir James Graham examined him very minutely, and obtained from him all the information that he had to give.

"Q. 21,421.—Does your lordship *remember* that in that information, the individual stated that he had only been for one day in Sebastopol, and that that was as long ago as 1846? A.—*I do not recollect that.* My attention was principally directed to the force of the enemy, and the defences of the place."

Who this individual was who "had recently been in the Crimea," had resided there for "many years," had been "only for one day in Sebastopol, and that in the year 1846," and whose information the First Lord of the Treasury was inclined to believe was the most correct of any they had received, is not asked, and of course not said. Was he English, French, German, Greek, or Russian? Count Pahlen about this time was enjoying the hospitality of the President of the Council; or is it the same person referred to by the Duke of Newcastle in the following reply which we give at length.

The Duke of Newcastle.—"A 15,041.—I said yesterday that Lord Raglan having received instructions to make every possible inquiry as to the state of Sebastopol, and the number and condition of the British army in the Crimea, stated to me that he had been unable to obtain any such information; and I felt it equally my duty at the commencement of the war, to do everything I could to obtain it in this country, and every exertion was made through the means, not merely of consuls in that part of the world, but of ministers at the other courts of Europe, to ascertain the condition and the position, and the relative strength of all the corps of the Russian army, and those reports were made through the Foreign Office and sent to me, and they were always sent to me, *with such comments* as I was able *to offer* to Lord Raglan. After the declaration of war the consuls, of course, in the Russian Empire were sent home and I saw them as they arrived, and from them I obtained the best information we could as to what was supposed to be the strength of the Russian army; they did not very much vary, and they were of course invariably sent to Lord Raglan. I should say that the most valuable information I received upon that point from anybody, was from a gentleman *who, I regret to say, is no more, Colonel Du Plat, whom I saw constantly and repeatedly day after day, and who in fact, assisted me in investigating and testing all the other information I received;* and that was also sent to Lord Raglan."

Sir John Burgoyne.—"Q. 17,536.—*At that time* (the decision to attack Sebastopol), as I understand you, *there was no knowledge whatever on the part of any of the authorities with the British army, of the strength either of the Russian forces, or of the fortress of Sebastopol?* —*A. I believe there was not; I had no knowledge of it.*"

Colonel Du Plat is then the Mentor of the Duke of Newcastle, the confidential adviser of that Minister of War, to whom is due, according to himself, the expedition to the Crimea. We are here let in a little behind the scenes. Lord Auckland had also his confidential non-official advisers. The Affghan War was undertaken in the teeth of the remonstrance of Sir Alexander Burnes, just as the Crimean evidently was in spite of the fears of Lord Raglan. But who is Colonel Du Plat? Those of our readers who follow such matters cannot fail to recollect the circumstances of his appointment to the Consulship of Warshaw, and how Lord Palmerston's choice was justified by his false report to Sir Robert Peel on the affair of the Nuns of Minsk. That it is his name that now starts up is only what they would expect. Men at once unscrupulous and expert are not so common, and must be made the most of, and with such a plan as Lord Palmerston is engaged in, every appointment must be made to advance, as well as every statement to disguise its progress.

As to the "information," that wonderful thing, to be classed only with unexplained natural phenomena; at one moment Lord Raglan

has none; at another, he is possessed of all obtained by the Government. This "information" had not been obtained by Lord Raglan on the spot; it had been obtained by the Government in "this country." Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had information which he does not communicate to Admiral Dundas. Admiral Dundas makes great exertions to get information; he is prevented from getting it by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; however, he does get some; it is different from that obtained by the Government. One conclusion, however, the reader will have arrived at, namely, that the *committee* are perfectly resolved that the information, whatever it was, shall not transpire. What delinquency may not be covered by 20,000 questions, put with the purpose, not of detecting, but of cloaking, the truth?

THE ADVICE ON WHICH THE BRITISH ARMY WAS SENT TO THE CRIMEA.

When disaster at Caubul followed the first success, the question immediately arose, of who ordered the expedition—the Court of Directors or the Indian Council? The statement officially made by the British Government was that the orders from home crossed in the desert those from Calcutta. It, however, subsequently came out, that neither the Court of Directors in London nor the Council at Calcutta, had been as much as consulted, and that the whole had been planned by an occult influence, despite the remonstrance and *protest* of every authority—military, political, and diplomatic.*

In the present case we have a Committee of Enquiry; the Generals who execute, and the Ministers who order, are brought before it and examined; and yet it proves impossible to extract a single direct answer with reference to the source of the Crimean expedition, or even in reference to the opinions on the subject, expressed or entertained by the persons holding military and naval commands. We cannot even get the "opinions" of the political authorities, respecting the "opinion" of the military authorities, from the very head of the Government itself, or so much as a statement of their own. There is not a word not evasive, ambiguous, or contradictory.

The Earl of Aberdeen.—"Q. 21,353.—In your Lordship's opinion, as much information was obtained as was necessary to authorise the expedition?—A. That was, *I believe*, the opinion of the military authorities."

Lord Aberdeen here brings in the opinion of the military authorities when asked for his own. He brings it in because he will not give his own. What he will not say is this: whether he had grounds for his own expedition. What he implies is, that the military authorities were for the expedition, and that he had yielded to them.

The chief of the department by which the expedition was carried

* The Duke of Wellington, the Marquis of Wellesley, Sir H. N. Bridges, Sir Gore Ouseley, Mr. George Jackson, Mr. Melville, Col. Sykes, &c.

out puts the military authorities altogether aside. He makes out all prior judgment to be impossible.

The Duke of Newcastle.—"Q. 15,287.—If they (the lines) have occupied greater extent than was contemplated, does not it follow that the force sent there was not sufficient to reduce the place?—A. As I said before, no extent was contemplated; until they arrived there, they had no knowledge of what length of line would be necessary . . . . there could have been no calculation before they arrived.

"Q. 15,288.—Did not the Commanders all say before they left Varna, that they had not sufficient force to reduce the fortress? —A. *Are you speaking now of the Commanders who were responsible to the Government, namely, the Commanders-in-Chief?*

15,289.—Yes.—A. Certainly not."

Mr. Drummond, when he put this question, must have had some grounds for suspecting that some, if not all, the superior officers who formed the Council of War were of the opinion that they were about to be engaged in a mad expedition. The answer of the Duke of Newcastle must have given to him, and also to the other members of the Committee, the certainty of the correctness of their surmise. By putting the question in the form—"Did not the Commanders *all* say," he gave the Duke the opportunity of answering "No," if any one of them had dissented; and what the Duke was struggling for was, to destroy the effect of the repudiation by the military authorities of all responsibility in the expedition. The ingenuity developed by the necessity of evil courses is here exhibited in a striking manner. He draws a distinction which has no meaning, in order to let in the French Commander-in-Chief; and when the less astute questioner falls into the trap, he boldly answers, "Certainly not;" and thereby conveys the impression that the British military authorities were favourable to the expedition, through the fact that these authorities were coerced by the French Commander-in-Chief. If the Committee had been puzzled by this answer, they must necessarily have gone on putting further questions, But they were not puzzled; they were appalled. Feeling, in the words of Mr. Roebuck, the ground palpitating beneath them with a corruption which they dare not fathom, Mr. Drummond saves their honour by the next question—"To return, for a moment, to the wooden huts!" This is Q. 15,290. Q. 15,291 is about the beasts to draw the huts.

The Duke of Newcastle has once the question put to him, No. 15,073, —"Were any military opinions against the expedition to Sebastopol tendered to you? His answer is "NEVER!"

In cases of inquiry witnesses are independent persons; and if principals are examined, their statements are considered, but are not taken as proof. It is a matter of notoriety that the chief military men were opposed to the expedition. We know of a certainty, from what has

transpired in the inquiry—first, that information was not obtained; indeed, that the obtaining of it was prevented respecting the amount and disposition of the Russian forces. Secondly, that the Chief of the War Department would not say that *all* the military authorities on the spot had not objected to the expedition. It follows that military men could not sanction an expedition regarding which they had no information, and that *the* military men had not sanctioned it, and had disapproved of it. If, then, the Duke of Newcastle can be in a position to say that "no military opinions had ever been tendered to the Government against the expedition," it only proves an absence of moral courage in our military men as remarkable as the presence of physical courage.

But the Duke of Newcastle takes grounds on this denial, which he is suffered to give, of the denial of military opinions against the expedition for the assumption of military opinion in favour of the expedition. Introducing in the same answer the name of the Commander-in-Chief, he says:—

"*If he had disapproved of the expedition to Sebastopol, and his remonstrance had failed, he would have resigned the position which he held.*"

This is certainly a very common-place view of the question, but it is that of a Cabinet Minister. He assumes remonstrance to follow as a consequence upon disapproval, and resignation as equally to follow as a consequence on its failure. The Committee are, however, not quite satisfied with respect to this Ministerial maxim, and they proceed to inform themselves more extensively. They apply to the individual himself, and put to Lord Hardinge the following question, which receives the following answer:—

"Q. 20,749.—As Commander-in-Chief, do you feel it your duty to offer opinions upon current events?—A. I should feel it my duty *to speak* to the Secretary for War, and *inform him* what my *impressions* were. *I should not carry it to the extent of withdrawing from the office of Commander-in-Chief*, because I am expressly instructed by her Majesty, in the letter of Service, not to have anything to say to the operations."

So then it comes out that the maxim of the Duke of Newcastle is flatly contradicted by Viscount Hardinge, and of course the inference drawn from it must be erroneous. Strange that the Committee under such circumstances abstain from asking Lord Hardinge whether or not he did approve of that particular "current event" which was referred to.

Can any man imagine a Government planning a military expedition and not consulting the military authorities? If they were not consulted they knew that that opinion was not wanted. Military men look to preferment. Their ambition is to command troops and deal hard blows; it requires no Œdipus to tell them that to tender uninvited advice would be to stop preferment. We have all this as plain as the sun at noon-day given in half-a-dozen replies by *Sir John Burgoyne:*

"Q. 17,529.—Were you consulted with regard to the expedition to the Crimea, before it was resolved upon?—A. *I was so far consulted that I was sent into the country to make reports*, and those reports were, in the first instance, acted upon.

"Q. 17,530.—Were you out with the army?—A. I was out before the army came out.

"Q. 17,531.—Will you state whether, after the raising of the siege of Silistria you were consulted as to the proposed attack on Sebastopol?—A. No.

"Q. 17,532.—When you heard that the attack on Sebastopol was resolved upon, did you offer any opinion on the subject?—A. Not *officially*; certainly not.

"Q. 17,533.—Were you of opinion that the strength and resources of the British army, at that time, were adequate to such an attack?—A. That depended so much on the force of the enemy; I do not know that I apprehended what the resources were, but it was always understood with the military resources which Russia possessed, that the force that they would have there would be very considerable.

"Q. 17,534.—Are the Committee to understand from that answer, that you thought it probable their force would be so considerable as to make it very doubtful whether the strength and resources of the British army were sufficient to cope with them?—A. *Yes*; the British and French combined.

"Q. 17,535.—You thought the Allied forces taken to the Crimea were not sufficient?—A. I would rather not give an opinion upon that *if I can avoid it*. I did not regulate the operation, therefore, I do not wish to say that it was or was not right."

These extracts are after all but specimens of incessant subterfuge and prevarication to suppress the truth, which glares through every line, and which besides is perfectly well-known—that the military authorities were all against the expedition, whilst at the same time they are made to stand responsible for it, because the political authorities cannot avow their political objects in forcing on the military authorities that expedition; that object being neither more nor less than the necessity of obedience to the will of the Emperor, not of France, but of Russia, whose gain therein is revealed even already. The task of the compiler in summing up is reduced to very narrow limits by the answer above quoted, of the then head of the Government, Lord Aberdeen, who cannot give a direct answer to the simple question—whether, "in *his* opinion, so much information was obtained as was necessary to justify the expedition." This inability to answer, coupled with the evidence already adduced of the steps taken by the political authorities to prevent the military and naval authorities from obtaining information respecting the amount and disposition of the Russian forces in the Crimea, can leave no impartial doubt as to the correctness of the above explanation, which resolves all the other ambiguities presented by the case, and fully justifies the words of Sir James Graham, who, in speaking of an English army

sacrificed, declares "that the order (for the expedition) was given at the right time, and executed at the right time."

THE LANDING IN THE CRIMEA.

AN order of the day was issued by Marshal St. Arnaud, at Varna, on the 26th of August, 1854, which contained these words:—

"The enemy has not waited *for us* on the Danube. His demoralised columns *destroyed by disease*, are making their painful retreat. It is *Providence* who seems willing to spare us the trial of these unhealthy countries. It is she also *who calls us to the Crimea*, a country salubrious as our own, and to Sebastopol, *seat of the Russian power*, within whose walls we shall seek *the pledge of peace* and of our return to our native shores."

The enemy did await the Allies on the Danube, but the Allies did not come. The enemy retired when his columns had been destroyed, not by sickness but by the Turks. The Russian power was not what the Allies so much as pretended to attack, for they had commenced by guaranteeing the integrity of the Russian territory, and had it been so, Sebastopol was not "the seat" of its power. The "Providence" that called the Allies to the Crimea was the Providence not of good but of evil; that Providence which prevented there being coals for the steamers,* hay for the horses, huts for the men, communication for supplies, medicines for the sick, clothing and food for all. That Providence which directed our forces where the enemy alone possessed and had accumulated defensive means, and which had spared him our attack wherever we were strong and he was vulnerable. That Providence which can be alleged to explain what is inexplicable, to account for what is incredible, and to justify what is atrocious.†

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* "Providence was the cause of there not being coals,"—*Answer of Admiral Dundas to Q.* 20,555.

† "Why is it to be proclaimed to all the world that a Declaration which they might possibly think made in the cause of common humanity, is merely a base piece of truckling to this Power or that? It has been made deliberately enough. The British public and all the world have been prepared for it by Orders in Council, issued two years ago. * * * PROVIDENCE ITSELF HAS DICTATED AND COMPELLED THE SURRENDER." *Times*, May 26th, 1856.

The *Morning Herald* thus commented on the above passage:—

"This is the same Providence which foresaw that by the Orders in Council Russia would be supported with the means of carrying on the war.

"This is the Providence which did not blockade the Baltic till the Prussian trade was established—which did not blockade the Bosphorus at all, and which, having declared a blockade in the White Sea for the 1st of August, altered it to the 13th—that being the 1st according to the Russian calendar, to accommodate the ships that were clearing out.

"It is this Providence which poisoned the army at Devna—which left the pass at Perekop unguarded, and then starved the troops in the Crimea—which prevented the relief of Kars, and then made the capture of Kars the pivot for a Russian peace—which suggests Russia as the arbitrator between us and the United States—which has by treaty convulsed Turkey, abandoned the Circassians, betrayed Italy, prepared the Baltic to be a Russian lake, and leagued Persia and America together against England, and under Russian auspices.

The Allied forces reached Turkey in March, 1854. The Russians had invaded Turkey in July, 1853. It was on the 14th of September that they landed in the Crimea. How wonderfully "Providence" had arranged the Russian affairs!

Again. The Russian force had been for two months engaged in an attempt against Silistria, "Russia's whole power against one unsupported division of the Turkish army." (*Times.*) The Allies had awaited in inaction the issue. The Russians had been beaten by this unsupported division, and on the 7th of July commenced their retreat. The "Providence that had seemed willing to spare the Allies the trials of those unhealthy countries, and which now called them to the Crimea," had been careful to delay that call during the exact period of time requisite for the march of these troops from the country where they must have been crushed, if the unsupported Turks had not been also restrained, to the Crimea, where the Allied forces were to arrive just in time to be caught by the winter. This was truly, in the words of Sir James Graham, "the order (for the invasion) being sent at the right time, and executed at the right time," for the object in view. Here is the whole Story of the War.

In the *Times* of September 24th, we have from its Moscow correspondent, who is also its Crimean correspondent, the following remarkable revelation.

"It was a few hours later than this that the Czar received at first with incredulity, and then with an anger and astonishment which shook that giant frame like a child's, the news of the descent on the Crimea. Bursting into the Empress's apartment, he exclaimed, 'This, this is more than a man can bear!' for up to the last he had neglected the warnings and entreaties of Prince Menschikoff, and had obstinately insisted that the Allies would operate on the Danube, and not against Sebastopol. His pride, his self-confidence, had received a rude shock—his Guards were in Poland, his armies were gathering on the frontier, and suddenly an active enemy strikes him where he was least prepared and little expected the blow."

The present Emperor on his accession, in a proclamation to his people, told them that the war had been concluded according to the wishes of his august Father; either then the Russian people is hoaxed by its government or the English people by its instructors. We now turn to the recording pages of

Times' Correspondent.—"Few of us will ever forget last night (the night of the landing). Seldom were 27,000 Englishmen more miserable. No tents were sent on shore, partly because there had been no time to land them, partly because there was no certainty of our being able to find carriage for them." (Page 167.) "Our

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"In this Providence Lord Clarendon made his confession of faith when he declared his perfect reliance on the word of Count Orloff; as, on the 23rd March, 1853, he, with similar piety, declared 'that the word of his Imperial Majesty would be preferable to any convention that could be framed.'"

French Allies close at hand, deficient as they had been in the means of transport, had yet managed to land their little scraps of tents the day they disembarked, whilst our poor fellows were soaked through and through, their blankets and great-coats saturated with wet, and without any change of raiment; the French close at hand, and the Turks, whose tents were much more bulky than our own, were lying snugly under covers. *The most serious result of this was, however, a great increase of illness among the troops to-day.* Several cases of cholera occurred. (Page 169).

Morning Herald's Correspondent. "*What added to the misery of the night was, that many of our poor fellows were attacked with cholera, and died upon the bare ground* in the course of a few hours. For these unfortunates there was neither shelter, warmth, or light, and in many cases not even medicine. The terrible disease, therefore, had its own way in a very short time. The cries and groans of these poor men in their agony added much to the gloom of the rest of the troops, who, numbed and weary, waited in bitter silence—a silence more expressive than any murmurs—for the break of day."

The 15th the surf prevented the disembarkation from being continued, and the sickness increased. On the 16th the greater part of the cavalry were landed, notwithstanding which they were not able to prevent the Cossacks from driving away cattle from before their eyes. *While the Allied army was thus not encamped but squatted in disorder and misery on the open beach, the army which afterwards offered such formidable opposition to its impetuous attack on the Alma, was close at hand and did nothing.* The fact is thus described and accounted for by the *Morning Herald's* correspondent.

Morning Herald's Correspondent.—"It is now admitted by our officers that beyond all doubt the greatest military fault Prince Menschikoff committed, was in not attacking the Allies the first night of their landing. 20,000 troops were already encamped upon the Alma, and, with the means which Prince Menschikoff possessed, it was perfectly easy for him to have trebled this force two days before the Allies landed. From Alma he could have marched after dark and reached Kalamita Bay by two or three o'clock on the following morning, when he would have found the English and French perfectly numbed with cold and wet. It is true he would still have had to encounter at least 40,000 infantry, the *elite* of the English and French armies. But still the chances were in favour of an attack. The Allies had only thirty pieces of light field artillery, and no cavalry of any description whatever. Menschikoff had 4,000 cavalry, and upwards of sixty guns. * * * As it was, the Russian general missed this, his first and greatest opportunity, and it never came again. It is more true, that "man makes the hour," than that "the hour makes the man."

HEALTH OF THE INVADING ARMY—PREPARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THAT RESPECT.

Morning Herald's Correspondent.—"The night following that on which the Allies had landed, the cholera resumed its ravages with increased intensity. During the day a signal had been made from the Emperor steamer for all transports to send their sick on board the Kangaroo. This signal must have been made in utter ignorance of our numbers of invalids, as, soon after it was hoisted, scores of boats laden with men suffering under fever, ague, dysentery, and other diseases peculiar to the climate, thronged round the Kangaroo in all directions. The Kangaroo had accommodation for about 250 sick; yet it will scarcely be credited that nearly 1200 were crammed on board; they were almost piled one over another, until the crew of the ship were unable to move. These poor sufferers, some in the last stages of cholera, others delirious with fever, or sinking from the exhaustion of dysentery, their supplications for water, and efforts to free themselves from the pressure of their companions in misery, were described to me as appalling and heart-rending to behold. While the crew of the vessel were vainly endeavouring to place the unfortunate men along the deck, in such a manner as would be least inconvenient to themselves and hurtful to one another, signal was made from the Emperor for the Kangaroo to proceed to sea; to which the Kangaroo replied, 'It is a dangerous experiment!' The Emperor asked by signal, 'What do you mean?' and the Kangaroo answered, 'The ship is totally unmanageable.' All this occurred at about one in the day; and though the Kangaroo remained with the signal flying, 'Send boats to our assistance,' it was not till evening that other vessels were appointed to relieve her of the greater part of the suffering beings, who had been thrust on board of her with all the cruelty of ignorance and mismanagement."—(Page 310.)

The same story is told, in almost the same words, by the *Times'* Correspondent.

Morning Herald's Correspondent.—"A very large number of the men (some 150), had been attacked with cholera during the night; (this is written on the 19th, the day of the advance on the Alma) and the medical officers were in vain insisting upon the officers of the Commissariat giving up their arobas for the transport of these poor fellows to the beach. As I have said *only one aroba was allowed for this purpose to each division, and as each held no more than two persons, moving the sick was out of the question.* Eventually the sick, who were lying on the damp ground saturated with dew, and in all the fearful agonies of cholera, were collected on some loose piles of hay near the Commissariat stores of the First Division, and there they remained. With some the struggle was nearly over and they were quiet; but the majority were in the crisis of the dread disease, and their moans, cries, and the hollow plaintive accents in which they besought the

passers by to rub their cramped limbs, makes my blood run cold at the bare recollection. Now and then some comrade would come, and, stooping over a half unconscious form, ask whether Tom, or Bill, or Mike was better then; but beyond such visits, few and far between, none came near or appeared to concern themselves about the dying men. The truth is, that even at that time there were not half the requisite number of surgeons with the army, and a medical officer could not have found time to either drink, eat, or sleep, had he even looked at all who required his attendance." (Page 314.)

"The English did not move until about half-past six. When they did, all the poor cholera patients and a large supply of stores, such as barrels of beef, pork and rum, bags of biscuit, trusses of hay, &c. for all of which there were no means of conveyance, were left behind." (Page 318.)

"Many since starting in the morning had been seized with the remorseless epidemic which hung upon our little army, and the first of such victims were carried on stretchers by the bandsmen in the rear. By and bye there were no stretchers unoccupied, and those who were sick were left upon the ground, on the small chance of the rear-guard being able to bring them on." (Page 319.)

Times' Correspondent. "Many sick men fell out and were carried to the rear. It was a painful sight—a sad contrast to the magnificent appearance of the army in front, to behold litter after litter borne past to the carts, with the poor sufferers who had dropped from illness and fatigue." (Page 173.)

These are not the statements of malignant critics, but of writers corresponding with journals, to be sold to a nation enthusiastic for the enterprise. They were published at the time and received no contradiction; one of these journals being the Government's own paper, if it would not be more correct to call the Government that paper's administration. The details of the means employed at Varna and Devna to impair the efficiency of the Expeditionary force, no less than the casting of these troops, inoculated with disease, on a hostile coast, at a season too late for a campaign, but just in time for pestilence, bring the neglect of medical means at once within the scope of the general purpose and withdraw it from the account of mismanagement and the chapter of accidents.

At the battle of Friedland and during the three weeks operations that preceded it, Russia sacrificed 60,000 of her own subjects to ensure her own defeat.* It was her object to be defeated, and she spared not the lives of her men; that object was to prevent the great war coming then to a close: having secured this pretext for abandoning England, which was preponderating, she cast her weight into the scale of France, and so caused the Europeans to destroy one another for seven years longer. Had the English Government sacrificed the lives of their fellow-subjects in a similar pursuit of aggrandisement

* See Vol. III. of Bell's Russia in *Lardner's Encyclopedia.*

and ambition, it would have been secure of impunity, not by the nation's concurrence in the object, but by its incredulity in the possibility of such a plan. How much more secure must they then be, when, whoever demands of them an account of these lives, has to charge them with a purpose of sacrificing them to advance the ambition of a foreign State, and of that very State with which we were nominally at war? This is England's secret, a secret which cannot transpire because no one dares to utter it.

BATTLE OF THE ALMA.

Times' Correspondent.—"And now came the turning point of the battle, in which Lord Raglan, by his sagacity and military skill, probably secured the victory at a smaller sacrifice than would otherwise have been the case. He dashed over the bridge followed by his staff. From the road over it under the Russian guns he saw the state of the action. The British line which he had ordered to advance, was struggling through the river and up the heights in masses, firm indeed, but mowed down by the murderous fire of the batteries, and by grape, round shot, shell, canister, case shot, and musketry, from some of the guns of the central battery, and from an immense and compact mass of Russian infantry. Then commenced one of the most bloody and determined struggles in the annals of war." (Page 180.) "The 7th, diminished by one-half, fell back to re-form their columns, lost for a time; the 23rd, with eight officers dead and four wounded, were still rushing to the front, aided by the 15th, 33rd, 77th, and 88th. Meantime the guards on the right of the light division, and the brigade of Highlanders, were storming the heights on the left. Their line was almost as regular as though they were in Hyde Park. Suddenly a tornado of round and grape rushed through from the terrible battery, and a roar of musketry from behind thinned their front ranks by dozens. It was evident *that we were just able to contend against the Russians, favoured as they were by a great position.* At this very time an immense mass of Russian infantry were seen moving down towards the battery. They halted. It was the crisis of the day. Sharp, angular, and solid, they looked as if they were cut out of the solid rock. It was beyond all doubt that if our infantry, harassed and thinned as they were, got into the battery, they would have to encounter again a formidable fire, which they were but ill calculated to bear. Lord Raglan saw the difficulties of the situation. He asked if it would be possible to get a couple of guns to bear on these masses. The reply was "yes," and an artillery officer, whose name I do not now know, brought up two guns to fire on the Russian squares; after a few rounds the columns of the square became broken, wavered two and fro, broke and fled over the brow of the hill, leaving behind them six or seven distinct lines of dead, lying as close as possible to each other, marking the passage of the fatal messengers. This act relieved our infantry of a deadly incubus, and they continued their magnificent and

fearful progress up the hill." (Page 181.) "When the light division advanced across the stream of the Alma, they were in some confusion, they were not formed or dressed up, and the 7th, 23rd, and 33rd went up pell-mell, so that it was almost hopeless for them to attempt to force the entrenched works. They and the brigade of the 2nd division, consisting of the 30th, 55th, and 95th regiments were literally pressed down by the weight of the enemy's fire." (Page 182.) "The battle of the Alma was won. *It was won with a loss of nearly* 3,000 *killed and wounded on our side.* The Russian retreat was covered by their cavalry, but if we had had an adequate force, we could have captured many guns and multitudes of prisoners." (Page 182.)

Morning Herald's Correspondent.—"All the Russian bank of the stream had been originally covered with trees, but these were felled, their twigs topped off, and the branches left sticking out against the faces of assailants. For about 200 yards to the rear of the bank were vineyards, the holes of which, with the thick close tangles of the vine were formidable obstacles to the advance of troops. The vineyards were commanded by four or five rows of low stone walls lined with sharp-shooters. Close in rear, on the extreme right of the enemy's position, the heights rose so steep that attack on that point was almost useless. The centre of this position over the Burliuk road was the strongest point of all, as far as regarded artificial means of defence. Here, about midway up the heights, were several strong batteries, mounting in all about twenty guns, which swept the bridge and the road leading from it to the heights. Almost at the summit of the latter, at the left hand side of the road, was the largest battery. It was a semicircular bank of earth, defended by seven brass thirty-two pounders. Above it were about 8,000 infantry, ranged line over line to the top of the hill, where five field-pieces were stationed. In front of this battery, midway between it and the river, was a long breast-work held by about 2,000 men. The hills commanding the right-hand side of the road were defended by five guns in battery, commanding not only the bridge, but the English side of the river, and exposing to a murderous cross-fire those who should succeed in passing either into the road beyond. In front of these batteries were sharp-shooters, behind them masses of infantry to the crown of the hills, on which were the reserves, with another range of field artillery. On the Russian left, and our extreme right facing the French, the hills were so steep that they could not easily be occupied by regular troops, but, in their stead, they swarmed with riflemen and skirmishers. On the top of these heights was a strong earthwork similar to the great battery on the English left, but only mounting three guns. Commanding the plateau of land above the heights opposed to the French was an unfinished martello tower, about ten feet of the walls of which had been completed. A bank had been thrown up round this, and it was occupied by Russian infantry, with one brass twenty-four pounder. This gun had been firing on our fleet all the morning." (Page 338.) "The total Russian force was estimated at about 52,000 men, of which 5,000

were not engaged, and seventy guns. The total force of the Allies, English, French, and Turks, was, deducting the garrison which had been left at Eupatoria, about 57,000 men." (Page 339.) As our artillery commenced, all the Russian guns fired with dreadful effect. The Allies replied, and the cannonade from nearly 200 guns became close and restrained, its roar was awful. For the next three-quarters of an hour, except when the French were fighting for the hills, the battle was entirely one of artillery. Our ordnance suffered much and was enabled to effect but little. From the nature of the ground they were unable to come within range of the masses of the enemy's troops, so principally threw shells where their sharp-shooters lay. The Russian guns on the contrary, being sheltered by redoubts, and much longer and heavier than ours, did severe execution among our men. Mutilated soldiers and horses began to strew the field closely. It was evident that the position could only be carried by the point of the bayonet, and that our cannon could render but little assistance." (Page 345.) "As they closed with the earthwork, its volleys of case and round-shot stretched whole companies on the earth, and now a most bloody contest ensued. The 19th, 23rd, 33rd, and 7th, attacked the battery; sometimes they entered it, and sometimes they were forced back. The 30th, 55th, and 95th, joined in the assault, but still the Russians held their ground. Several of the enemy's field-pieces were brought down to the ground, in rear of the work, and firing into our close masses, at point blank range, committed frightful havoc. • Confusion began to spread among the troops, and the mass of the division moved to the right of the battery, and came full in range of the guns on the right of the Burliuk road. They were cut down by scores. Sir George Brown had his horse killed, and it was at first thought that he himself had fallen, and the men began to waver. Some advanced against the battery again, while others tried to reform their ranks, and close the gaps the artillery was making each moment. The enemy rushed out of their battery, and commenced a deadly file fire, which increased the confusion. The whole division became disordered. An order was given to halt and reform, or to retire and reform, which is now a disputed point; but a very good authority, Mr. Russell, the correspondent of the *Times*, stated that Colonel Yea, of the 7th, swore he would not retire an inch, and remained firing with some of his men until supports came up. The only inference to be derived from this statement is, that the order given *was* to retire. But whatever dispute there may be about the order, there can be none about the actual fact; and that the light division was compelled to retire cannot be denied." (Page 353.) "The enemy fled from the field, and this was the only battle we fought in which they did so; *at Balaklava of course they remained on the ground*, and at Inkerman they retired in better order; but at Alma they fairly ran. They left the field in two bodies, or rather crowds. One of about 7,000 or 8,000 men, with several pieces of artillery, kept off to the left, into the interior of the country; the other, about 22,000 strong, *rushed into a deep hollow behind the hills*,

and from which there was only one narrow outlet—the road leading to Sebastopol. They were some time getting out of this basin, but we could do nothing to prevent their escape, as between 3,000 and 4,000 cavalry covered them. Our men with the Minié fired at them at long range, and two or three of our guns did so also, but that was all. Had the cavalry which we left behind at Varna been present, it was the opinion of our officers that nothing could have saved the great bulk of the Russian army from being taken prisoners with all their guns. They would have closed the outlet from the valley on the enemy, and surrounded as they then were on two sides by our ininfantry, they must either have surrendered at discretion or have been cut to pieces. It may seem useless to speculate on what we might have done under certain circumstances which never occurred; yet when we know how entirely and certainly the Russian army could have been destroyed in this battle, and how much such a total defeat would have influenced the speedy capture of Sebastopol, one cannot help feeling bitter chagrin to think that *a miserable economy in the matter of transports* (!) rendered the fruits of our first victory useless, and almost made the precious lives which it had cost to gain it a useless sacrifice." (Page 359.)

"On the very evening of the victory—indeed almost before the troops moved off the battle-field—our attempting no pursuit of the enemy was a matter of grave and serious comment among most of the officers of the Allies. There is not the least doubt but that, in the course of half an hour after gaining the battle, it could have been easily done. The whole of the Fourth Division, under Sir George Cathcart, with the Light Cavalry, the Turkish troops, 8,000 strong, one French division (the fourth), and half of another, had taken no part in the contest. The Third Division, under Sir R. England, had, as I have already mentioned, scarcely been under fire at all. These troops, with artillery, would have given an effective force of some 24,000 men, all, comparatively speaking, fresh,—certainly fresh enough to pursue the enemy. We now know well that, so far from the Russians getting more into order as they increased their distance from the field of battle, the contrary was the case. An instinct of self-preservation gave them some solidity while leaving the field; but, when night fell on their hurried march,—a march which they felt certain was being closely followed by the Allies, their confusion augmented."—(Page 369.)

"It was said (though I cannot vouch for the truth of the rumour), that General Bosquet, with several other distinguished officers, English and French, were for an immediate pursuit, and that Lord Raglan was against it, principally on account of the wounded whom he would have been forced to leave behind. But there were ample troops with which to pursue the enemy without taking from the proper protection of the wounded." (Page 371.)

"If we except the glaring oversight of an expedition so miserably provided having been sent into the Crimea at all, then certainly the

next great oversight was our failing to follow the enemy after the Alma. *It quite balanced the error committed by Prince Menschikoff in not attacking the Allies the first night of their landing.*" (Page 372.)

"Both these generals (the two Russian generals taken prisoners), attributed the loss of the battle entirely to the bad management of the Russian cavalry, in not attacking the English left flank the instant they began to move against the heights." (Page 367.)

The miserable fate of our wounded, and the still more frightful one of the Russian wounded, 600 of whom were left on the field by us under the care of *one* surgeon, are described by both Correspondents, together with the contrast presented by the French army in this respect. "Before dark," says the *Morning Herald's* Correspondent, "not a single wounded Frenchman remained upon the field." (Page 372), "and they were removed in comfortable ambulances or hospital stretchers. I am certain that I speak within bounds when I say that not more than 200 or 300 of the English were moved from the spots where they fell during the night which followed the battle. The rest had not a soul to soothe their agony or mitigate their sufferings by so much as a drink of cold water. But this was not the case on the night of the 20th only, but during the day and night of the 21st." (Page 374.) That the supply of medical assistance for the army was extremely small is what everybody knows. But the fact is that it almost amounted to nothing. On the occasion of this battle the *Morning Herald's Correspondent* writes, "So limited was the supply of our medical officers, that, on the 21st and 22nd, *young assistant surgeons were left in charge of brigades* 3000 *strong*, and not only to attend to the slightly wounded, and the numerous cases of fever and cholera, but to prescribe for all the men suffering from diarrhœa—generally half or two-thirds of the whole brigade." The following incident we give just as it stands in the pages of Mr. Word, as it does seem almost incredible.

"*On the morning after the battle, all the naval surgeons on board our fleet instantly volunteered their assistance to the army on shore;* one surgeon was left on board each ship, and thirty-one proceeded to tender their services in whatever manner they could be most useful to the army medical staff. *Their offer*, which could only have been dictated by motives of the purest zeal and good feeling, *was met with a cold and even an ungracious refusal.*

"*Whoever was to blame for it, the facts are as I have stated.* They were told to me by at least twenty different naval surgeons whom I saw walking about the field of battle among the English and Russian wounded, *looking on at the sufferings they were forbidden to alleviate.* This was at a time when our own wounded were each imploring the army surgeons to dress their injuries first. One naval surgeon, now holding a high and responsible situation, told me he did assist the army surgeons, but it was only by taking a piece of chalk and marking the clothes of the men not mortally wounded with a 'cross,' and those who could not recover with a 'nought,' in order that

such as would benefit by timely assistance might be at once discerned." (Page 377.)

"There were no ambulances for the wounded, and of the jolting arabas, only one was allowed to each division, each of which held only two persons." (Page 315.)

Many battles have been on both sides claimed as victories. This is a battle which is a victory for both. It was a complete achievement of success for each according to their ideas; for the Briton it was the storming of a hostile position; for the Russian the gaining of an end. At once were crowned unparalleled valour and matchless ambition. Mr. Sydney Herbert qualified it amidst the cheers of the House of Commons, as "the soldier's battle;" the future historian of Russia's greatness may designate it the diplomatist's test. While each asserted its claim, neither grudged that of the other. The Englishman, indeed, knew not what the Russian thought, and the Russian's chief exultation consisted in this, that the English conceived it a triumph. And whilst this people gloried that the whole power "active or moral"* of the Western world was combined against Russia, the Russian breast swelled thereat with joy and exultation. They who had just been discomfited by the Turks, not only unassisted but held down; they who knew that "their whole state could be convulsed by an order of a port-captain "of Constantinople;" that their resources could be extinguished by a dozen British privateers; that a single honest cannon-shot would have torn from them every subjugated people, and enveloped them in a flame of insurrection from Abo to Astrachan—had placed their guns in array against the combined forces of the Western World—forces which they knew to have been led there for slaughter, and so to domineer over the real antagonist by whom they had been worsted, no less than over the false allies who had come to his succour!

It is impossible for the small to comprehend the great; we must have a mind equal to that of Russia before we can understand Russia, in which case she would be powerless, and our intelligence would not even be called into play. But without aiming at impossibilities, there is a point of view from which the battle of the Alma may be considered, even by those who can see no further than military details, and that is the part it had in diverting the expedition from its original purpose—purpose as far as the public was concerned—of destroying the Russian squadron in the harbour of Sebastopol, and converting it into an impossible siege of that fortress itself.

Before the war commenced, certain conditions were laid down for its conduct. They were not agreed to in common by all parties, but self imposed by the Allies, namely, that no conquests were to be made. Conquest then, as a result of the expedition to the Crimea, was out of the question. The protection of Constantinople or Turkey from a land attack on the part of Russia, was equally out of the ques-

* Lord Palmerston at Manchester, Nov. 6th, 1856.

tion, for the whole available force of Russia beyond the Pruth had already been discomfited "by one unassisted division of the Turkish army," and had, in consequence, been forced to evacuate the Turkish soil; and what then remained, if not to prompt, to justify, if not to justify, to excuse, the throwing of that force which had been deemed necessary to send for the protection of Turkey, into the deserts included within the Russian frontier? It must have been a prospective object. The diminution of the aggressive power that Russia at a future time might exert, when the supposed protectors of Turkey were to be withdrawn. The nation and Europe had been daily assured, until finally they were brought to believe, that Constantinople was in danger from Sebastopol. But even despite the words of Lord Clarendon,* no one did believe that it was the earth of the Crimea, or the stones of the Redan that menaced it. In Sebastopol, what was looked to was the fleet. The instructions to Lord Raglan contain the following passage:—

"*It is unnecessary to point out* that the destruction of the Russian fleet is one of the certain consequences, and that a solid guarantee for the future maintenance of peace would thus be obtained."

In the order of the day of St. Arnaud, from Varna, the army is told that the guarantee of peace is to be found within the walls of Sebastopol. There is no mention there of the fleet. So Lord John Russell, on the 28th of October, 1854, explained the operation by the decision of the Government "*to occupy* the Crimea and to *capture* Sebastopol," as being the result of the raising of the siege of Silistria—and no word of the fleet. But the instructions to Lord Raglan were of April, and before the British troops had reached Turkey. Where there is an object to mystify, we must look closely to first announcements. Now the first ministerial announcement of this operation was made under circumstances no less remarkable than were its terms. The person selected for this delicate office, was neither the head of the Government nor the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but the President of the Council. The scene chosen was a Staffordshire yeomanry dinner, were Lord Granville expressed himself in these terms.

"Government does not conceal from themselves the great responsibility of their urging on the commanders of both services the attack on Sebastopol. They are not ignorant of the opinion entertained by many distinguished officers of every country in Europe, that, if not impracticable, the attempt is of a very difficult nature. But they feel that the integrity and independence of Turkey is a mere joke so long as that fortress is deemed impregnable, situated as it is in the very centre of the Black Sea (!) as the only point from which vessels can come in and go out with safety (!) they felt it was the very key of the position." These "bedlamite sentences" as they were charac-

* "The manner in which Russia, not being able to bring a single man or a single gun by sea (!), has relied solely on the defences of the place to defend Sebastopol for many months, shows the danger to which Turkey is exposed."—Lord Clarendon, May 25, 1855.

terised by a writer at the time, are pregnant with one unmistakeable sense, that the British nation should see in the operation nothing but its naval force.

Had it been the intention of the British Government to diminish the aggressive means of Russia, the vessels lying in Sebastopol never would have been thought of, both because they were the source of no danger, and because Russia would have been struck in so many vital parts, and had been, indeed, at the moment utterly discomfited by the Turks alone. And if it was not the intention of the Government to destroy the aggressive means of Russia, then it follows that the instructions to Lord Raglan and the articles of the *Times* were pretexts to get the army into the Crimea, pretexts to be dropped as soon as it got there. Here the co-operation of the Russian army was necessary. It required some such manufactured event to account for the diverging from the natural line of march to the north side, and for leading it into the trap of Balaklava.

If the case be as so stated, the position taken up on the Alma by Prince Menschikoff is the masterpiece of combinations in the most complicated intellectual game in which the genius of man has ever been exerted. But that case falls through, as indeed it will not be so much as considered if the public opinion that the naval power of Russia was great and of Turkey small, be correct. Were Russia really menacing to Turkey it is not dexterity but imbecility that would be the character she would win by the presence of third parties upon the field. Her genius in calling them there is contingent upon the fact of her physical weakness. It is, therefore, necessary to pause upon this point and to examine.

RELATIVE NAVAL STRENGTH OF RUSSIA AND TURKEY.

We may assume as axioms not liable to dispute.

1st. That Russia desires to get Constantinople.

2nd. That she will get it as soon as ever she is able.

3rd. That she would have got it already had she been able.

Now as Russia has not got Constantinople, it follows that she neither has been nor is able.

There are two ways of getting from Russia to Constantinople. The land and the sea; it may be reached by either. It follows that Russia has not the naval means of occupying Constantinople.

Sebastopol has existed in pretty nearly the state in which the Allies found it, for fifty years. The Russian fleet was not increased at the beginning of this war beyond its strength during the last war. During the last war the Turks kept the sea, and in the only naval action that took place, took a Russian frigate. The Turkish navy had then been next to annihilated at Navarino; it has since been restored.

No expedition ever sailed from Sebastopol against Turkey until the British squadron had passed the Dardanelles. It was then only

able, after collecting its entire force, to attack the small division of Turkish frigates at Sinope, because the English Ambassador prevented the Turkish navy from proceeding to its rescue. Even on that occasion, the best Russian line-of-battle ship, the Rostock, perished, reducing to five the number of seaworthy line-of-battle ships out of the thirteen composing the Black Sea squadron.

The Russians are not sailors. The crews who are so, are drafted from the shores of the Baltic, and the Black Sea, and Poland, and cannot be got, as proved in the last war, to engage an enemy of Russia.

The Russian squadron in the Black Sea is a type, not a naval demonstration: it is a myth.

When the Porte breaking away from its councillors of the two Western Embassies, declared war against Russia, her (Russia's) Southern provinces were thrown into consternation, dreading a naval descent, against which they knew they had no protection in their fleet. The inhabitants of the maritime towns fled into the interior. Even into the published documents, passages have slipped which leave no doubt as to how the case stood. We select the following:—

Consul Yeames, Sept. 31*st*, 1853.—"The steam-packets from Constantinople have of late brought accounts, successively, more disquieting."

"The intelligence received the day before yesterday, by private letters of the 26th, is of the most alarming nature, for it is stated that in a great Divan the resolution was carried, to summon the Russian Commander-in-chief to evacuate . . . and in case of non-compliance, to proceed to a declaration of war."

(The despatch goes on to announce military movements on both sides of the Black Sea, which it attributes to no design of assuming a menacing attitude, but to the embarrassments of Russia, which it explains by the presence of Turkish emissaries, or the "mere vicinity of a Mussulman army.")

Oct. 28th.—"It is certain that many of the inhabitants of Ismael have, in their alarm, fled into the country."

"Apprehensions are manifested even here, (Odessa) of a possible hostile demonstration by sea."

(It will be recollected that when our fleet approached Odessa, the most perfect indifference was manifested by authorities and inhabitants.)

M. E. Pisani, Nov. 3*rd*, 1853.—(Communication from Reshid Pasha.) "The Turkish squadron, *with the exception of the three-deckers*, is to proceed to the Black Sea, and will probably be ready by Sunday. It is intended to cruise along the Asiatic shore, returning round by the Crimea and the European coast. Should it fall in with the enemy's squadron an attack is contemplated."

Sir G. H. Seymour, Nov. 11*th*, 1853.—"Count Nesselrode spoke with *calmness* as to the chances of war, and admitted that in the first instance these might prove unfavourable to the Russian arms."

In fact, if the case were otherwise than as we state it, there could be no Turkey at all. If the people of this country were logical, they would have to believe Constantinople already in possession of Russia, before acting on the grounds assigned to them for undertaking its defence.

The only official words not false throughout the whole of this affair have been those spoken by Russia herself, and this is quite natural; England and France having "adopted the interests of Russia as their own,"* it became her part to put them in the wrong. The way in which she forced from the English Government the publication of the "Secret and Confidential" correspondence is a striking instance. No less so is the disclosure of her weakness by herself at the Conference of Vienna. Having for fifty years made the world believe in her preponderance in the Black Sea, now when the object of that belief is attained she shivers it with a blow. The following is the statement of her Plenipotentiaries.

"Before all, it is necessary to mention that that which it has been thought proper to call the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, has been the result of the nature and the whole system of the political relations of the two Empires bordering thereon. It was a superiority of authority which Russia exercised rather by the ascendency which her special Treaties with the Ottoman Empire gave her, than by her maritime supremacy. It resulted from the isolation of the Porte much more than from its inferiority on the sea.

"Developed by the influence of circumstances unconnected with Russia, such as the regeneration of Greece, the battle of Navarino, the conquest of Algeria by France, the independent tendencies of the Pasha of Egypt, of the Beys of Tunis and Tripoli, which deprived the Porte of sufficiently important maritime assistance, that inferiority was not brought on by Russia. It had formed the object of no stipulation. It could have ceased at the will of the Porte.

"The topographical configuration of the Bosphorus, so favourable to the organisation of an impregnable system of defence; the possession of fortresses and ports such as Varna, Sisépolis, Bourgas, Trebizond, &c.; the advantage of being able to group all her forces round three contiguous basins—these were and they still are striking advantages which the Porte possessed and still possesses over Russia, who, obliged to maintain naval forces in four seas separated by immense distances, could only give its navy in the Black Sea a restricted development.

"If, notwithstanding the mistrust which for twenty years past has been excited against Russia, the Porte should not make use of its advantages, would it not be because instead of seeing a danger for herself in the maritime development of Russia, she had suspicion of those which would menace her elsewhere, and against which, in time of need, the forces of Russia might serve as a means of defence?

* Words of M. Thiers.

"Morally as well as materially facts seemed to justify that view.

"People have strangely deceived themselves in regard to the dangers to which the Ottoman Empire might be exposed from the Russian fleet.

"In affirming in his work on Southern Russia, that with her fleet, *rated, it is true, at thirty vessels,* * Russia could at will occupy Constantinople, Marshal Marmont has committed a double error; on the one hand because the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea can never reach that number without uniting with those of the Baltic—a junction which is impossible; on the other, because if even so gigantic a maritime development could be effected, it would be very far from leading to the dangers which appear to be apprehended. That which is now passing in the Crimea would be sufficient to prove this.

"The real facts are, indeed, otherwise opposed to these hypotheses. Let us take for instance what passed in 1833. At that epoch the Russian fleet appears in the Bosphorus and effects a descent, but under what conditions? It is with the consent of the Sultan, and to come to his aid. Moreover, availing itself of all its shipping, the Russian fleet could only transport on that occasion from 10,000 to 12,000 men. And it will be admitted that this force, important as an auxiliary, would have been entirely insufficient if it had presented itself as an enemy.

"Since that time much has been said of the development of the Russian navy. Notwithstanding all that has been said, what do we see twenty years after, that is to say, in 1853? The Russian fleet takes about fifteen days for the embarkation, the transport, and the disembarkation of a division of infantry, that is to say, from 15,000 to 16,000 men, from Sebastopol to Redoute Kalé.

"On taking into consideration the proximity of the maritime establishments of Russia, 20,000 men at most can be reckoned as the number of troops for descent which the Russian navy of the Black Sea, in its greatest development, would be in a position to transport on any given point of the Ottoman territory, in the space of about three weeks.

"Is that a very great danger? Does it justify the apprehensions which have been conceived? Is not a risk incurred, in endeavouring to avoid it, of sacrificing to a chimerical danger the true conditions of the security of the East and of the European equilibrium?

"Dangers have many times menaced the Ottoman Empire from other quarters than the north. An Admiral of the Sultan has even been seen to lead his fleet to his rebellious vassal. Who answers that facts of this nature shall not again occur?

"Moreover, the English and French fleets taken, not collectively but singly, are neither less powerful nor less dangerous than those of Russia. Because the maritime establishments of France and England are further off, they are not on that account more inoffensive. *Europe is less able to watch the evolutions of the fleets that leave them.*

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* Lord J. Russell makes them nineteen.

"By means of the rapidity of electric communications, they could by setting sail from Toulon and Malta at the same time that the Russian fleet should leave Sebastopol, arrive in time sufficient to ward off danger from the Porte. But who engages that they may not one day present themselves with the same celerity, whether singly or collectively, before the Seraglio, as enemies of the Porte?

"The rapidity with which the French fleet sailed towards Salamis in 1853, shows the material possibility of this on the part of France. The threats of which M. de Lavalette made use, prove its moral possibility. *As regards England, we will limit ourselves to mentioning the violation of the Straits in* 1849, *under pretext of tempests.*

"Where, if the Black Sea were disarmed, would be the security against such attempts? Where the counterpoise to prevent their being lightly undertaken?

"These simple reflections are sufficient to show that whatever system may be adopted in revising the Treaty of 1841, with the view of connecting the Ottoman Empire with the balance of power in Europe, the maintenance in the Black Sea of respectable Russian naval forces, would not only not be of a nature to raise serious apprehensions, but would even be one of the conditions necessary to secure, by way of counterpoise to naval forces that may happen to be in the waters of the Levant, the intact observance of the stipulations concluded in the interest of the European equilibrium. And let it not be objected that this would be the maintenance of the *status quo*, and that, in consequence, the preponderance which Russia has exercised in the Black Sea would not come to an end.

"It has before been demonstrated that that preponderance arises from the isolation of Turkey; it will, therefore, cease with the entry of the latter under the public law of Europe.

"*The Porte would preserve not only the faculty which she has always had of giving at will to her navy the development which appeared to it needful;* but would acquire another moral guarantee against all attack on the part of Russia, who, of a surety, would not risk, for the sake of a most hazardous undertaking, to draw on herself, by a violation of the public law of Europe, a general coalition.

"Moreover, Russia would not refuse on her part to offer new guarantees by a revision of the Treaty of 1841, if this were desired by the Sultan.

"The transactions of Russia concluded directly with the Porte have never made of the Black Sea a closed sea. On the contrary, the Treaty of Adrianople has had the merit of having opened that sea to mercantile shipping of all nations without distinction.

"The closing of the Straits to war flags has not been the result of agreements of Russia with the Porte. It has arisen solely from the ancient legislation of the Ottoman Empire.

"The Treaty of 1841 has only served to recognise and to confirm this principle, established by the Sultans in their quality of Sovereigns of the territory adjoining the two Straits.

"They are free to open the passage, as they were to keep it closed.

"So long as the Straits remained closed, it followed naturally that the navigation of the Black Sea became accessible solely to the ships of war of the two bordering Powers: the one, Russia—the other, Turkey.

"*The Russian Plenipotentiaries are the first to admit the faculty which the Sultan possesses, in right and in fact, to open the passage of the Straits to the war flag of the Powers with whom the Porte is at peace;* but reciprocally, in opening the Straits on like terms, to authorise the passage from one sea to the other, and that in favour of all nations."—(Eastern Papers, No. XIII., p.p. 77-78.)

All that we state now and all that Russia has confessed was stated before the issue was tried, and received no contradiction. The persons by whom it was stated were neither insignificant, unknown, nor unofficial men. They were no other than the former Ambassador and Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople—Lord Ponsonby and Mr. Urquhart: the former, after a long life of personal and political connection with the present Premier and his party, broke, at the close of his career, through all ties and all restraints, to warn his countrymen that the British squadron had been sent into the Black Sea "FOR THE PROTECTION, NOT OF TURKEY, BUT OF RUSSIA." The solitary judgment of the latter, on the military qualities of the Turks, has received in every letter the confirmation of events.* His judgment on the naval part of the question, the Cabinet of St James' has taken good care to prevent from being tested in a similar manner. We close this part of the subject with these words of his:—

"If there could be a question regarding the military superiority of the Turks in a single-handed contest with Russia, at least there could not as regarded their naval superiority, and that would equally be the case did the Porte not possess a single line of-battle ship, for the Porte holds Constantinople, the key of the position, and can introduce any amount of steam power she chooses."

We have here considered the normal condition, as between the real belligerents, before the interference of the Allies. We have now to look at it during the war, in the shape of

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* "If the Russian Empire, so far from threatening the balance of power and the liberties of more civilised States—so far from menacing the Turkish Empire with absorption in its own—is actually unable to cope with Omer Pasha on the Danubian Principalities, the most arduous and alarming question of modern States' politics will have been resolved at once. Mr. David Urquhart may then claim such triumph for political foresight as never before fell to the lot of man."—*Times*, Nov. 11th, 1853—(after the Turkish victory at Oltenitza.)

"Swift and terrible has been the retribution which has fallen on the Russian army engaged in this shameful and unprovoked aggression, and the chastisement is rendered the more signal, owing to the pride of the Czar, and the more important to the political independence of the Porte, by the fact that a division of the Turkish army, unassisted by European troops, has sufficed to repel the invader with unexampled losses. These glorious results belong to the Turkish arms exclusively, and the soldiers of the Sultan never fought with more devoted success and bravery than on this occasion."—*Times*, June 22, 1854—[illegible] of Silistria.

RELATIVE STRENGTH OF RUSSIA AND THE ALLIES IN THE BLACK SEA.

We have not yet got to argue the superiority of the English or even the French maritime force to that of Russia, although, indeed, there is no more reason for the assumption of Russia's superiority to Turkey than to England. We know that not only the squadron sent to the Baltic, under orders which according to the Admiral, must if obeyed, have insured its destruction, might have been sent into the Black Sea, but, also, that the whole available navy of England and of France might have been sent there. But let us take the force actually assembled in these waters as described in the news of the time.

ENGLISH SQUADRON. — *Morning Herald's Correspondent.* — "At half-past ten a general signal was made from the Britannia, the flag-ship of Rear Admiral Dundas, for all vessels of war to weigh anchor and stand out. Everything had been ready for the start for some time, so that in five minutes afterwards the signal had been answered and all were under weigh. Sailors sprung aloft, and the great sails of the Albion, Queen, Rodney, Britannia, Vengeance, Trafalgar, London, Bellerophon, Arethusa, Leander, Diamond, and all the other large sailing craft were soon shaken over their tall tapering spars, and almost hid their formidable dark hulls under a cloud of canvass. At the same time the fleet of steam-frigates and sloops, consisting, among others, of the Terrible, Sidon, Samson, Cyclops, Vulcan, Spitfire, Retribution, Tribune, Simoom, Inflexible, Firebrand, Vesuvius, Fury, Megæra, Furious, Harpy, Triton, Highflyer, &c., were all in motion. The Tribune, Highflyer, and other screw vessels glided through the water like arrows, without noise or ripple, and apparently without the least effort or motion of their own. After them went splashing and thundering on our great paddle-frigates, the Terrible, Sidon, Retribution, &c., running ten and eleven knots an hour under steam, and carrying batteries heavy enough to sink a three-decker.

FRENCH AND TURKISH SQUADRONS.—"Admiral Hamelin led the way in the Ville de Paris, 120, followed in perfect line by the Friedland, 120, Marseille, 90, Marengo, 100, Montebello (screw), 120, Valmy, 120, Jupiter, 80, Henry IV. (screw), 100, Jena, 90. Jemappes, 90, Napoleon (screw), 100, Charlemagne, 90, Bayard, 90, Suffren, 90, Algiers, 84, and two other vessels of 90 guns each, the names of which I could not ascertain. *The weather-line was formed by the Turkish fleet, composed of seven sail of the line, three of them three-deckers, and the rear of each was brought up by a crowd of sailing and steam frigates, corvettes, sloops, and brigs.* Among the French steam frigates were some magnificent vessels, each carrying from 20 to 30 heavy guns, and having troop-accommodation for 1,500, and some even 2,000 men. They are beyond all doubt, the best troop-ships in the world; and, as vessels of war, quite as formidable as our own renowned Terrible. It was a fleet of vessels of this class,—the Mogador, Magellan, Descartes, Panama, Vauban,

Pluton, Cacique, Asmodee, Prometheus, Infernel, Caton, Promone, Inflexible, Berthollet, Medine, &c., which closed the rear of the French line. The Turks had some fine steam and sailing frigates after them also.

"The Niger and Spitfire laid to to await the coming up of the fleet, so that we had ample time to contemplate the magnificence of the warlike spectacle around us, and which certainly was one of surpassing grandeur."—(Page 255.)

Here are some fifty line-of-battle ships, or steamers fit to sink line-of-battle ships, arrayed against a numerical Russian force of thirteen sail of the line, more than one-half of which was not seaworthy. But one vessel would have served the purpose as well as the thirteen. Lord Ponsonby's words only shadowed forth the truth. So many vessels were not required for the protection of Russia, unless that protection had to be accomplished by the coercion of Turkey. In truth it was a "spectacle," but one neither warlike nor magnificent.

Before these vessels quitted the shore of England, it was as well known as while they were cruising in the Black Sea, that the Russian vessels would take refuge in Sebastopol, where they were protected from attack seaward, consequently, as far as Russia was concerned, in the sense of injury, their display was perfectly useless. The Russian squadron was, therefore, in the case of the Allied squadrons, only a pretext. Can it have been anything else in reference to the land expedition to the Crimea?

THE FLANK MARCH.

Morning Herald's Correspondent.—"It was said the instructions of the Allied commanders directed them (subject of course to their own military judgment) to attack Sebastopol from the north side. This plan Lord Raglan was ready and willing to carry out, but Marshal St. Arnaud, General Bosquet, and General Bizot (the chief of the French Engineers), strongly objected. I have very little other authority than that of general rumour for speaking on this point; but the objections of the French commanders were reasonable enough, and all could see their validity. Marshal St. Arnaud declared that the position which the French would have to occupy on the left bank of the Belbek was quite commanded by the enemy's earthworks, thrown up near the mouth of that river. They also hindered the river itself being ever used as our base of operations, and all our shipping would have to wait at, and our supplies be drawn from, the Katcha, which was at least *seven* or *eight miles* distant. There was no possibility of being able to protect even two miles of this road. The French general of engineers contended strongly in favour of Balaklava and the Bay of Kamiesch, as leaving the Allies *secure in their rear*, close to their supports, and above all *affording perfect shelter to the combined fleets*, (?) Still it is whispered that Lord Raglan would not have given way, had not General Bizot insisted and declared that the position which the

French must occupy was and always would be untenable. The English commander then desisted from his opposition, and consented to the famous flank march on Balaklava."

"It is no wonder that Lord Raglan had objected to such a movement, as, in addition to the great distance to be accomplished in one march, there were no roads for a great part of the way, and the whole army and its baggage would have to pass through dense woods almost without paths. Besides these difficulties, General Airey, the English Quarter-master General, was utterly ignorant of the country to be traversed, what roads we ought to take or what to avoid." (Page 400)

"At about one in the day, we gained the summit of a lofty eminence, near the upper Inkermann Light, and from this point saw for the first time, as on a map at our feet, the great stronghold, to the destruction of which we were pledged and irrevocably committed. Nothing betokened that the enemy was aware of our flank movement; the town seemed clear and quiet; the harbour was unruffled, except by one or two small sailing boats, which were moving leisurely about. Off the mouth of the great harbour, *outside the ships which the Russians had sunk across the entrance two days before*, were several of our frigates, firing at long range. These, and the occasional guns with which Wasp Fort and Constantine replied, were the only symptoms of warfare about Sebastopol. *No hurry in the town —no appearance of preparation showed that the enemy knew the Allies were advancing*; and that at furthest, only a few days intervened before the greatest struggle which the world has ever witnessed would be commenced. At about three o'clock, the troops emerged from the brushwood upon a narrow track through the forest, some four or five feet wide. To move along this the men were obliged to form in sections of threes, and as a quantity of the baggage and artillery was already upon the same route, stoppages were continual. The men straggled from the ranks, searching everywhere for water. Some threw away their arms, and lay down on the road, declaring themselves unable to proceed any further; others, ill from diarrhœa and cholera, crawled into the wood, and seemed to resign themselves to their fate." (Page 407.)

Times' Correspondent.—"And now commenced a march which deserves to be classed among the boldest movements ever made by any military commander in the face of an enemy. As it had been ascertained by reconnaissance that the enemy had posted strong batteries along the north-west of the harbour of Sebastopol, in conjunction with the Star Fort and Fort Constantine, which would cause us loss and delay in an attempt to invest the town on that face, it *occurred to our commanders, that by a flank movement performed with energy and decision on Balaklava, we would turn and neutralize the effect of the three batteries, secure a new base of operations*, (of which we were in want, having abandoned that of the Katcha,) *and completely distract the enemy, who would find the weakest part of Sebastopol exposed to the fire of our batteries*, and our attacks directed against a point where they

had least reason to expect, and which they might have imagined free from all assault. The whole army accordingly marched towards the south-east, on the Black River, and as they were obliged to pass through a thickly-wooded country, intersected by narrow lanes winding up and down the hills, the troops were necessarily in some disorder, and *had the enemy possessed the smallest enterprise they might have inflicted on us severe loss and caused great annoyance by a spirited attack on our flank, whilst we were rounding the head of the harbour.* At times, from the top of the hills, we could see the town quite plainly, its white houses shining in the sun. All the afternoon the steamers effected a diversion by shelling the Star Fort and Fort Constantine, but at such a long range they could do but little execution; however, the fire had the effect of engaging the attention of the Russians. They made not the smallest attempt to interrupt our progress." (Page 192).

"There are some military critics who imagine that if we had marched immediately after the battle of the Alma on the track of the defeated army, we might, by a forced march to Balaklava, have entered the town on the south side, and have carried the works by storm. *The forts on the north side,* Fort Constantine and the Star Fort, *command the town,* and could inflict great injury on an army in occupation, should such an attempt be crowned with success." (Page 281.)

"Oct. 13.—It is now eighteen days since our army by *a brilliant and daring forced march on Balaklava obtained its magnificent position on the heights which envelope Sebastopol on the south side* from the sea to the Tchernaya; *sixteen days have elapsed since our troops occupied these heights,* and in conjunction with the French proceeded to invest the town as closely as its extent would allow them to perform that operation. The public must not be indignant when they are told that up to this moment not a British or French gun has replied to the fire of the enemy, and that *the Russians have employed the interval in throwing up earthworks, trenches, and batteries to cover the south side of the town, which have made it almost, if not altogether, as formidable as the opposite side of the creek on which the town is situated, which have gone far to neutralize the advantages we had gained by our masterly flank movement from the Belbek to Balaklava and* which promise to increase very considerably the difficulties and dangers of the siege. The delay has been, *I honestly* believe quite unavoidably. Any officer who has been present at great operations of this nature will understand what it is, for an army to land in narrow and widely-separated creeks all its munitions of war—its shells, its cannon shot, its heavy guns, mortars, its powder, its gun carriages, its platforms, its fascines, gabions, sandbags, its trenching tools, and all the various *matériel* requisite for the siege of extensive and formidable lines of fortifications and batteries *But few ships can come in at a time to Balaklava or Arrow Bay; in the former there is only one small ordnance wharf, and yet it is there that every British cannon must be landed.*" (Page 211.)

We now beg the reader to recall what we have already stated re-

garding the object of the expedition—the destruction of the naval force lying at Sebastopol; and here let us admit for argument sake, that the simple expedient of sinking the vessels was not foreseen. For the destruction of these vessels it was a *coup-de-main* had to be executed, the term is their own, and that *coup-de-main* could only apply to the fleet, and for such a *coup-de-main* the ground was most convenient. The harbour of Sebastopol is a deep inlet with precipitate rocks overhanging it on the north, and these undefended. You had but to reach the crest of the escarpment, and with the plunging fire of half-a-dozen guns sink the vessels, if not sunk already, and destroy from the rear the batteries of the north-side entrance, which then opened the way to your vessels if you wished to dismantle entirely the place. Afterwards nothing remained to do but to re-embark.

This was not, however, the purpose of Russia. She had succeeded in "dragging our forces to her shores;" she had got them there only after they had awaited quietly two months at Varna to allow her to do her best against the Turks at Silistria—only after they had allowed her two months to transfer her defeated troops to the Crimea, in order that these troops might there be opposed to themselves. * Having got them so far, good care was taken not to attack and discomfit them during their landing, a fact significantly passed over by the Correspondent of the *Times*, but presented to the British nation by the Correspondent of the *Morning Herald*, as "the greatest military fault of Prince Menschikoff." † They were then allowed to advance into the Crimea; but it was the *south* side, not the north, that Russia had fixed on for their attack. To effect this change of destination, her military force on the spot was called in, in aid of her diplomatic contrivances in Paris and London; they found batteries erected and troops stationed to bar their passage on towards the north side, just as a troop of wild elephants in India are met by stakes to drive them in the appointed direction of the battue. The Russian cavalry never appear; Lord Raglan prevents pursuit. On both sides, after the action, the inferior generals charge their superiors with not annihilating the enemy when in their power. The Russian position is not turned but stormed; had it been turned, the way was open.

After the "victory" the nation is intoxicated, and looks no further curiously into operations. It seemed unconscious that those operations were changed from the destruction of a fleet, and the surprise of the forts that protected it, to the investment of a city by an army so

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* "The prisoners (taken at the battle of the Alma) told us they belonged to the army of Moldavia, and had only arrived in the Crimea within the last twelve or fourteen days." —*Times' Correspondent*, Page. 185.

† "*Menschikoff, it is true, was not aware of the movement, until it was made known to him by ourselves in the course of the day* (!) when he must also have been apprised, by means of his Cossacks, that one of our Divisions, only 5,000 strong, remained behind, and were not likely to march till the following day. *It is quite unpleasant to think with what ease this Division might have been cut off had the Russians only displayed a moiety of the persistence and courage they exhibited at Inkermann, and round Sebastopol.*"

small that that investment was impossible, and in face of a force outside the walls, by which it became itself invested. This, when the fleet in question had disappeared by the act of the enemy himself, disappeared as a fleet to be turned into a portion of the defences. This is not a fairy tale: we are but re-capitulating events which took place two years ago, and formed part of the news of the time. The two great powers of Europe go to war to protect the Ottoman Empire from a fleet, and the first appearance of this fleet in the operations is when its guns form part of the double fire, which they set themselves down to receive on the barren coast of a detached Peninsula. The operation by which they did so was called "a brilliant and daring forced march," by which the army "attained a magnificent position"; was said to be undertaken to distract the enemy, who would find the weakest part of Sebastopol exposed to the fire of our batteries." The truth being, *as was also published at the time*, that the army, having so arrived at the "weakest part," could not venture to enter it, because to do so was to expose themselves to the over-hanging fire of those forts, which, by this "brilliant and daring" exploit, they refused to attack. This is the "famous flank march" (*Times*) by which the Allies pass to the South to be trapped within Balaklava, from which escape becomes henceforward impossible, until, by the capitulation called a peace, they undertake to enforce the Menschikoff note on the Porte, and are in return suffered to embark from the harbour of Sebastopol, which fortress the nations of England and France believe they have captured.* This inability to embark, save by Russia's sufferance, after the two years' operations, and the capture of the place depending entirely on the same North side forts, which had they marched to that side, they would have destroyed at their pleasure.

The events of an ordinary war are made up of skill and chance; but the events of a collusive war are like the results of a game with pricked cards or cogged dice. The skill of the General on neither side is of any avail, nor the valour of the soldier; chance is set at defiance, and the chapter of accidents is closed; the whole then depends upon the skill of the originating Government, and the power of the conniving one.

The events which we have rapidly traced must have all been planned before-hand, exactly as they have occurred. The Russian Cabinet in sitting down to assort them, had to provide against no other danger than the incredulity of the British nation. It had to combine so as to preserve that nation's credulity, and thereby render practicable that Government's connivance. These terms Mr. Disraeli had the sagacity to find, and the courage to apply even before the plot began to unfold itself.

* "The Plenipotentiaries of Russia announce that they have received orders to declare in reply to the request which had been made to them on the subject, that the port of Sebastopol will be opened to the vessels of the Allied Powers, in order to accelerate the embarkation of their troops and of their material."—*Protocol No. 22 of the Conference of Paris.*

Extracts from "A VOICE FROM WITHIN THE WALLS OF SEBASTOPOL," by Captain Hodasevitch, (a Polish officer, who deserted to the British.)

"On the north side, or Severnaya, is Fort Constantine (Plan II., 10), built in the same manner as Fort Nicholas, except that the upper line of guns is open. The battery of St. Michael (Plan II., 11) is better built, except that the arches are rather thin, but not to any great extent. Fort Severnaya (Plan II., 12) is useless, or worse than useless, as it is not properly commanded by other works, but by the high ground around it, so that at the *distance of a grape-shot it is possible to see all the interior, even the barbette of the guns.* Major-General Pavlovsky, who had charge of the fortifications of Sevastopol, proposed to destroy the North Fort as perfectly useless, as it was impossible to increase the wall, because the buildings (hospital, barracks, &c.) inside the fort were too near the wall. The citadel of the fort was in a state of neglect; not a single gun was mounted; the only thing remarkable was a subterranean passage from the citadel to the Soukhaya Balka (Plan II., 13). The length of this passage is about 4000 feet. In the whole North Fort there were not more than eight guns, and these in a very dilapidated state."—pp. 9-10.

"Up to the 27th of August the following additions had been made to the fortifications of the town:—The full number of guns had been placed in the lower tier of Fort St Nicholas; in the second tier guns had been placed in every second embrasure facing the entrance to the harbour (Plan II., *a*); while on the side to the north, which is three stories high (Plan II., *b*), the second tier had guns only in the third and sometimes fourth embrasures; in the third tier it was considered dangerous to place any guns, and consequently very few were placed there. Every third gun was fired for practice, which shook the whole fort, and the embrasures were spoilt by the falling of a great many stones, so that the next day parties of workmen were ordered to repair the damage caused, and then I saw that the walls were only *faced* with stone, the space between which was filled up with rubbish."—p. 13.

HOW

RUSSIA

TRIES TO GET INTO HER HANDS

THE

SUPPLY OF CORN

OF THE

WHOLE OF EUROPE.

THE ENGLISH TURKISH TREATY OF 1838.

LONDON:
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SELECTIONS

FROM

PROGRESS

OF

RUSSIA,

IN THE

WEST, NORTH, AND SOUTH.

BY

DAVID URQUHART.

THE SOUTH.

PART I.—THE DANUBE AND THE EUXINE.

PART II.—THE COMMERCE OF THE LEVANT AND THE RED SEA.

"I offer you the half of Europe, I will help you to obtain it, secure you in the possession of it, and all I ask in return is the possession of a single Strait, which is also the key of my House."—ALEXANDER TO NAPOLEON.

REPRINTED FROM THE STEREOTYPE EDITION.

PART I.

THE DANUBE AND EUXINE.

CHAPTER I.

The Commerce of Europe and Asia.

"Peter had long meditated the project of the occupation of the Caspian, thus to draw the commerce of Asia and a part of India within his dominions."—VOLTAIRE.

WHILE so many lives are risked to find out the sources of the Niger, and the currents of the Pole, what discoveries in the centre of Europe await the enterprising navigator in his library chair! The course of the Danube is indeed laid down upon our maps; the volume of its waters, and their velocity minutely determined on our statistical tables; but mystery, deeper than Colchian darkness, envelopes the hidden sources of its fictitious nullity, and the frigifying processes of its Arctic obstructions.

The paramount importance of the freedom of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the well-being of the people, and the independence of the nations, of Europe, none will deny. The Black Sea linking these to the Danube, and that river joined by railway to the Rhine, we have a system of communication by internal waters, which armies can span and batteries close, capable of realising the old maxim of Neptune's lordship of the land. That ancient supremacy rested upon the joining of rafters and the man-

ning of ships: this was no commonplace or practical affair; the element itself was to be created. The Danube pursued its tranquil course through the picturesque Teutonic valleys, the vast plains of the descendants of the Avars, and the teeming granaries, the inheritance of the Dacians; the Euxine nestled in the bosom of the Othmanic King;* the Bosphorus and Dardanelles bisected his states. These water courses, dispersed to many nations, were clung to by each, and all had to surrender up their patrimonies before this unity could appear. It was not by any of the partners that this new edifice was planned; a stranger conceived it; possessed herself of the ground for its erection; has gone on from foundation to parapet, from story to story, buttress to buttress; the covering in is all that is now wanting to this creation of enchantment, surrounded, as it has risen, by that cloud of invisibility which conducted Eneas into the Tyrian citadel; here has been surpassed the invention of the bards of Etruria and Samos, and by illusion the means have been found of acquiring such command of the will of the world as they have achieved of its admiration.

At the time that this project was first formed the frontiers of Russia on the west were restrained behind the Dnieper, and on the east fell far short of the Caucasus; she had no port whatever, or outlet, upon the Black Sea, and touched the Caspian only by uninhabited wastes. Yet the first basis of operations required that she should be in possession of the Danubian provinces and of the control of that river; that she should be in possession of the trans-Caucasian provinces, and have the control of the Araxes; also that rival flags should be excluded from the Caspian and the Euxine.

The sudden expansion of Russian power under Peter the Great does not require repetition. Sir John M'Neill has traced it with a masterly hand, and after referring to the disaster on the Pruth, and the recovery of Persia under Nadir Shah, he concludes his sketch in these words: "The

* "Populum late regem."

projects of Russia were thus for a time abandoned to be renewed at a later period with better success." The events of that later period I now propose to trace in respect to the Danube and the coast of Circassia, referring the curious reader to the above-mentioned author for the various histories of her advances in Georgia and Persia, and her establishment on the southern banks of the Phasis, the Cyrus, and the Araxes.

In 1812, Turkey had the opportunity of recovering all the ground she had lost; but England, who only thought of the war with France, induced her to sign the treaty of Bucharest; by it Russia got possession of nearly a half of Moldavia, and reached the Pruth.

Her advance eastward alarmed England, who, on that side, concluded with her neighbour a defensive treaty. Nevertheless, under the mediation of England, she extorted in 1814, from Persia, the exclusive navigation of the Caspian, and overstepped, despite her own and England's pledge, the Araxes.* Her usurpation of a further district brought the war of 1827; then England broke the engagement of her defensive treaty, left Persia single-handed, and abrogated the treaty itself.† Her frontier was again advanced, and the

* "General Ritescheff—then Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in Georgia, and Plenipotentiary—solemnly pledged himself, if the Persian Ambassador would accept it (the basis of *uti possidetis*), to procure from his Court the restitution of Talish, and deliberately held out the hope that other provinces also would be restored. The British ambassador felt himself justified in confirming the confidence of the Persians, and in undertaking that the good offices of his Government should be exerted at the Court of St. Petersburg to procure an adjustment of the stipulation respecting the territory, which might fulfil not only the positive promises of General Ritescheff, but the larger hopes he had held out.

"The Persians, accustomed to place the most implicit reliance on the honour of Europeans, and not ignorant of the liberal assistance that England had extended to Russia in the hour of her humiliation and distress, never for a moment doubted, &c."—*Progress of Russia*, p. 64.

† It applied only in case of Russia being the aggressor, and that

suppression of the Persian flag on the Caspian as, *ab antiquo*, was stipulated in the Treaty of Turkman Chai.

In 1829, in defiance of solemn engagements to England and France not to acquire territory, she did extort, and by their aid, from Turkey, the mouth of the Danube. In 1831, she established a nominal quarantine on the Caucasian coast *not in her possession*. In 1833, by threatening the lives of the Ministers of the Sultan, she obtained the exclusion from the Euxine, *in time of war*, of foreign men-of-war. In the same year, she obtained a new accession of territory in Asia, bringing her frontier within nine miles of the route by which English commerce reaches Persia. In 1836, she established a quarantine to intercept vessels entering the Danube, and arrogated the right of sending them to Odessa to perform quarantine.

In 1838, she found means secretly to frustrate a Treaty between England and Turkey, which would have diminished the export, and abrogated the transit, duties in the latter country. The same year she frustrated a Treaty between England, Turkey, and Austria, which would have secured and opened the navigation of the Danube. In 1841, by a Treaty signed at London, she made all nations exclude their men-of-war in peace as well as in war from the Black Sea, the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi having then lapsed *one week*. In 1844 she frustrated, by bribes, a proposal of Austria to open by canal the old mouth of the Danube. In 1849, she made Turkey sign a Treaty for the occupation of the Provinces during seven years by her troops. In 1850, she frustrated the revived project of the Danube Canal. She is now endeavouring to impose on the Danubian Principalities

case is made out in the 'Progress of Russia in the East.' The authorities there used are official: the author at the time of its publication was the designated Envoy to the Shah; the pamphlet was as official as any mere publication could be. Yet on the 1st March, 1848, Lord Palmerston said:—"Now, what had happened to Persia? In 1827 she had, very foolishly, and thoughtlessly, *against advice*, rushed into a conflict with Russia, &c."

the English Commercial Treaty, from which they have hitherto been exempt, and which must extinguish their exportation.

Several of these steps have been infractions of general law; several of positive treaty engagements; all have been in opposition to the avowed interests and declared policy of England. The subordinate agents of the British Government have been unremitting in efforts meanwhile to thwart and expose her, and have been advanced or rewarded for zeal displayed in urging that course.

In one character alone do the systems of England and Russia correspond, and that is in extent. There is no point where the one has an interest that the other has not an object, and defeat or triumph upon any one field, affects the relative balance between the two upon every other. In the unit, England is vigorous and intelligent; in the mass, passive and inert. Russia, individually, is sluggish and incapable; but as a state, active and able. England pursues the profits of speculation, and looks no further than trade; but in both cases Russia is exactly the reverse.

The feelings with which they regard every other country are exactly the converse the one to the other. England rejoices in the prosperity of all countries which supply raw produce; Russia looks on them with hatred, because with fear; wherever there is a land which does produce, or is fitted to produce, grain, timber, oil, tallow, hides, or hemp, thither England sends her merchants to buy; Russia her emissaries to convulse. The contest, however, will be determined, not by their respective interests or power, but according to their respective characters.

Europe contains two great basins, watered by two magnificent streams, which present in their natures a corresponding contrast to that of the two systems. From the mountains of Switzerland to the mouths of the Scheldt extends a mechanical reticulation, identical with that of the manufacturing counties of Great Britain. From the reverse of the mountains which supply the Rhine, down to the mouths of the

Danube and the Black Sea (a vast region of unbounded exuberance), there is a total absence of mechanical power. This region competes with Russia in the production of the sources of her wealth, as the basin of the Rhine does with England. It would be in the interests of England to thwart the enterprise of the one no less than to call forth the energies of the other; but neither is in her character. It is in Russia's character to do that which her interests require, and while turning to account the activity of the one, she has almost exterminated the producing power of the other.

The banks of the Rhine, inhabited by a free people of Germans, divided into distinct governments, may appear to be little exposed to the action of diplomacy, as far as material interests are concerned; but, in fact, these populations have, as regards duties, been united into one system, professedly organised with the view of giving strength to Germany against foreign aggression; but the agent of this unity is a Government, described by a Russian diplomatist "as seeking to strengthen, with Russia, the already existing bonds of blood by those of policy." Indeed, the "Customs Union" could not have come into existence if Russia had thought proper to prevent it, which is equivalent to saying that she suggested it. A *German* as distinct from a Saxon, or a Prussian trade, is called into existence, and finds itself hampered on every side; it is cut off from England, and stopped by Russia; its competition being thus with the first it must turn to Russia; seeking to propitiate her, it will argue, demonstrate, and project; Russia will gradually yield to be brought to understand, that being unable herself to supply the demand of Asia, she may exclude England by favouring German exports. Germany, desiring the commercial progress of Russia eastward, becomes associated with her against England's political power in the west: the establishment of Russia on the Bosphorus, the Christianising of the Turks and the "Japhetising of the Orientals,"* will become the profound aspiration of the labouring German mind. All this

* Chevalier Bunsen.

was urged on the English Government at the time the Zollverein was preparing, when a word from her would have sufficed to have frustrated it.*

Since that period a semi-official work has appeared at a German Court under Russian dependence, which so undisguisedly reveals the whole scheme that I hesitate not in quoting it:—

"The Asiatic commerce of Russia stands both directly and indirectly in competition with the intercourse which the western countries, including North America, entertain in various ways with that quarter of the globe, which surpasses all the rest in size, and density of population. The Levantine, East Indian, and Chinese trade of the English, North Americans, French, and Dutch, has not yet so deeply felt the effects of the competition of the Russian land trade extending far into Asia from the frontier walls of the Chinese Empire to the Caspian and Black Seas, as it ultimately must, from the vastly increasing means of this colossal empire.

"The acquisition, in 1829, of a district of 10,000 square miles, inhabited by nomadic tribes, has promoted its connection with the interior of Asia, and particularly with Bukharia; and though the British East Indian trade has not been much decreased, yet in the opinion of many even the position of Russia threatens the British dominion in that quarter. Its speedy destruction is not probable, and the contingency, when it arises, will spring out of internal disturbance; but it is to be hoped that the active emulation in peaceful undertakings of the two Powers will promote progress in the East, and that the balance shall preponderate in favour of Russia.

* See 'The Prussian League,' in the first number of the 'British and Foreign Review.'

Mr. Poulett Thompson quoted false figures in the House of Commons to prove that it would be beneficial to British Trade, and Lord Palmerston vouched for its having no political end.

"England, who turns all Asia into a source of profit, supplying, by means of Smyrna, Trebizond, and the Persian Gulf, the markets of Asiatic Turkey, Persia, and the neighbouring countries, now seeks to extend her China trade even to the Northern coasts of that Empire, while for the longer passage of the Indian Sea she substitutes the Euphrates, or a railroad across the Isthmus of Suez. *In opposition to this*, Russia will not fail to take advantage *of every facility presented by her position*, and the extension of her dominion in Asia. But the most effectual means is to open a passage to German commerce, so as conjointly to reap the harvest of British commerce which contributes nothing to the Russian transit and carrying trade. By handing it over to Germany, its own transit and carrying trade would be much benefited, and the means are in her hands by the navigation of the Danube, in connection with Trebizond.

"It is clear that to obtain this end, there must take place *a decrease of mutual duties between Prussia and Russia.* Russia will find an equivalent in the produce of its trans-Caucasian provinces, particularly silk and cotton; and in the increasing demand for the produce of those countries it will find the surest means for a more rapid development of its production and its *power*. The Russian *land trade*, will rival the sea trade, only in so far as it can offer European goods cheaper in the Asiatic market, and the more active the intercourse upon the whole line of transport, the more economical will be the exchanges. The time is come which invites to this concurrent enterprise, and a series of favourable events promise rapid results. These are: the *extension and the strengthening of the Russian dominion on the Black Sea*, the acquisition of *the eastern ports of the same sea*, confirmed by the peace of 1829; the *decided dependence of the Persian empire;* the *exclusive navigation* of the Caspian; the recently-effected *complete subjection of the Caucasian tribes;* and finally the extension of the Russian dominion, which within these few years has spread its frontiers

eastward from the Caspian, and nearer to the British possessions in the East Indies, 280 leagues.

"The re-establishment of that ancient channel of commerce through the Black Sea, and in connection with the Danube, would give to EUROPE the important advantage in its intercourse with Asia of having entire independence of the Naval Powers. Should ever the time again return in which Great Britain shall rule the ocean, and enact a maritime law, dictated by her own exclusive advantage, the Black Sea, at least, will be closed to her, and commerce with that division of the world will not only remain undisturbed, but furnish us in great abundance with all the produce she can offer us herself, or prevent us by a blockade from procuring. We need but call to remembrance the years 1808-1812, particularly with respect to cotton, to perceive the full importance of this matter." *

It was said by one of the plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Reichenbach that the Black Sea was more important to England than all Asia: this is no paradox; in the words of Sir John M'Neill, "the policy of Russia is based upon the certainty of spoiling England of her Indian dominion:" this spoliation can be prevented only in the Black Sea. Were the space filled by that water, dry land, or were it, like the Caspian, girt round with coasts, England would probably have had nothing in Asia to possess; at all events, she would be now without the means of defending what she has. If you stop up the passage by a parchment chain, it is just as if in the Euxine there remained no water to float your vessels, and in the Bosphorus no soundings for them to pass.

To close the entrance against you, is to open the passage to the Indus to Russia. To that end it is that the fabulous darkness of the ancient Pontus has been diplomatically extended over the modern Euxine, and that no Jason is to be found in the British Navy. How resolute and intent has she been during your languid slumber, or somnambulent

* These extracts are from Dr. Nebenius.

convulsions! During the great European war, in which her very existence seemed at stake, Russia would not concede one point in reference to the Danubian Principalities. In 1812 she would not, when struck home by Napoleon, relieve herself from the Ottoman Empire as a foe by the slightest surrender.* The pertinacity with which she clung to what appeared useless and unintelligible clauses bearing upon wilds and deserts, so far from awakening the curiosity of European statesmen, raised only a smile of pity at her expense.

Up to the year 1833, no direct trade had been carried on between England and the Euxine. Whether, however, a large quantity of her goods were sent by Constantinople and Germany, at the fair of Leipsic alone, the demand amounted to £300,000. In the following year two British vessels entered the Danube, in the next year fifteen, in the course of 1836 twice that number were expected; the native traffic in small vessels amounting to between 700 and 800 cargoes. This rapid development roused Russia to the adoption of decisive measures, which were as minute as they were daring, as intricate as comprehensive; now discrediting a firm, now firing on a brig, now fingering kegs of butter and skins of tallow, now grasping an estuary: at last came the "crowning work,"—the robbery from Europe of its principal river by care for its health!

The exports are raw and heavy produce, for which water carriage is essential. The return manufactured articles might bear the charges of land carriage, but the demand is limited by the amount of exportation. The Danube is not only the only water communication, but it is the only road. *Ores of metals* (its mines were the richest of the Roman empire); *rocksalt* (of which it contains mountains); *timber* (with which the sides of its mountains are clothed); *hides*, *wool*, *tallow*, *sheep*, *goatskins* (flocks and herds may be multiplied to any extent), *grain* (in 1833 and 1834, when Russia, suffering from famine, was supplied by them, although

* In 1806 she made these Principalities the occasion of replunging England and France in war, and in 1812, *gained* Bessarabia.

recently relieved from occupation, and still suffering from the effect of a war, which had drawn from them five millions sterling, and destroyed one quarter of the cattle); *hemp* of the finest quality (in the year 1835, it competed in London with that of St. Petersburg, notwithstanding the quadruple charge of transport): such were the products they could offer to England. Nor are these all: the Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia, were anxious to rival the Pasha of Egypt in the production of cotton (upon the importance to England of multiplying the sources, and augmenting the amount of that raw material, it is needless to dwell), and a vast region is available for the culture of the mulberry.

This traffic would have been of peculiar advantage to the English shipping interest; the freight to the Danube is 60*s.* when that to the Baltic is 15*s.* and to Canada 30*s.*; thus the hemp, tallow, grain, or timber, coming from the Provinces, would have given, as compared with Canada, an increased employment of shipping of *one-half*, and as compared with the Baltic of *three-fourths*.

The natural difficulties of the navigation were indeed great, but capable of being easily removed; and notwithstanding their existence, this commerce, till arrested by extraneous means, was rapidly increasing, and might by this time have exceeded that which we carry on with France. If it has not been entirely crushed, it is owing to the enormous resources of the country,—its exuberant fertility, the lowness of price, and the laboriousness and parsimony of the people.

The basin of the Danube producing, as we have seen, exactly the same articles as Russia, every ton exported from the Danube was a ton less exported from Odessa or St. Petersburg. But besides the difference in the source, competition would have affected the price; one shilling reduction on the cwt. of tallow or the quarter of grain, is a loss to Russia of from £50,000 to £100,000. A document published at Odessa under the authority of Count Woronzow, at a time when no danger was anticipated, is plain and conclusive on these points.

"Although the three principal mouths of the Danube are in the power of Russia, it is only a small number of her products that are exported by the two ports of Bessarabia,—Ismail, and Reni. The towns of Galatz and Ibrail, the only 'débouches' of Moldavia and Wallachia, pour the superfluity of these rich provinces into the commerce of the Black Sea. The protecting sceptre of Russia has created these formidable rivals of herself. If the obstacles which have hitherto impeded the navigation of the Danube come to be entirely removed, this will much facilitate the vent of Austrian articles of merchandise in the provinces, and will *open up for some of them a way to arrive at other countries.*

"The advantages of this navigation for the trade of the Principalities, which consists principally in exchanges for the products of Austria, are incalculable. Galatz especially will gain by it greatly as an entrepôt for Austrian goods, which will be sent thence to the Levant and to the ports of the Black Sea. *Austria may even export by the Danube the wheat of the Banat, which can be bought on the spot at eleven roubles the tchetwert,* and is said to be of a superior quality. The hemp of Hungary, of which the English have already made great purchases and formed depôts at Apathin and at Eszek (whence it is sent by water to Siszeck and Carlstadt, and from these places by land to Trieste), might here find perhaps an easier route than by Trieste, as well as timber, which is at present sent with difficulty to Fium. Galatz and Ibrail are about to cultivate virgin countries and of great extent. Ismail and Reni (the Russian ports) must of necessity attach themselves to these giants who threaten to overwhelm them. *So long as those who are engaged in the trade of Ibrail and Galatz shall be free from every impost,* it would be necessary at least to reserve to the merchants of Bessarabia the same immunity, to prevent their leaving the country, as many of them have already done.

"Trebizond has always been of importance as the port nearest to Erzerum, and its commerce may be estimated at twenty million roubles per annum. By this route, England

and Germany supply Persia and Anatolia with cloths, ladies' cloths, calicos, cotton yarn, paper, sugar, coffee, glass ware, porcelain, iron, tin, and steel goods. France takes but little share in this trade; but England will soon have crushed her rivals by the great establishment which she has formed at this point. A single caravan, despatched for Tabriz in 1834, was composed of 650 camel loads, 450 of which were pillaged by the Kurds on the road from Erzerum to Tabriz. What means can Russia adopt for rivalling the English in this locality?"

These last words indicate the purpose of all Russia's commercial efforts. She is no rival of England, as far as manufactures or commerce go; her rivalry is political. The question really means, "How can an end be put to English commerce, and what other commerce is to be substituted in its place?" This, like the statement I have before quoted, is addressed to Germany, and it says—Russia is open to an offer.

I shall now proceed to the means of execution. No history has recorded, no fable has devised, things more marvellous than the events connected with this river. Here will be seen how Russia bends every will, Procrusteses every measure to suit and fit her purposes. I shall have to record my own failures; but, in this case, failure, of necessity, is parent of success. It was not her sight but our blindness that was terrible. There is a time when evil measures prevail, but that time comes, too, when they are brought to light. The series of facts now completed—disconnected during their course by time and distance, here brought together, may furnish that light, and enable eyes to see that have long been closed.

PART II.

THE LEVANT AND RED SEA.

CHAPTER I.

Commercial Resources and Legislation of Turkey.

THE Greek Byzantine Emperors, whom the populace of Constantinople raised at pleasure to the throne, or hurled into the dust, had above all things to provide—*cheap bread.* The neighbouring provinces were consequently prohibited from exporting wheat; but this, like all other attempts against nature, instead of supplying the capital, depressed and exasperated the provinces, and ended by ruining the Empire.

The Turkish system was simplicity itself; it enacted by law, and sealed by religion, that rule of administration which belongs to the earliest times. Unfortunately, however, the Greek system was not entirely blotted out with the Greek Empire, and, without the necessity, the Sultans followed the practice of their predecessors, so far as to prohibit the exportation of grain.

This state of things lasted 376 years, from 1453 till 1829, when, after many ages of security, Constantinople was once more placed between foes on the North and South, traffic by sea was stopped, and she was in want of bread. She had still the two continents open, but the corn administration (Moubaya), invented to feed the capital, blockaded it as effectually by land as the Russian squadrons by sea. Under the presence of absolute famine the old laws were suspended, and instantly plenty reappeared.

Since Russia obtained access to the Black Sea, her attention has been given to the cultivation of wheat. Her soil, her climate, the distance at which she is placed, a difficult navigation, and a frozen sea during several months of the year, presented to such an enterprise great obstacles: the Bosphorus, too, was then closed against this commerce. Her perseverance has triumphed over all, even to the causing of the prohibition to be repealed by the Porte for the passage outward of her corn, while for that of Turkey it was retained in force. Across the narrow seas of the Ottomans, and between their vast uncultivated plains, Russia sent her cargoes to the markets of Europe, and received in return those monies which place her in the position to aim at the empire of a reasoning but stupid age—a warlike but venal world.

The Turkish Empire is composed of countries that in former times were the most flourishing on earth. The conditions of the tenure of land, the relations between proprietor and occupier, present no systematic impediment to prosperity. It possesses the most remarkable natural facilities for transport. The sea, which only washes the borders of other states, penetrates into its centre, and gives it a maritime coast of about 1200 leagues, or twice and a half that of England, and five times that of France. The rivers communicating with these seas traverse the most fertile regions. Egypt has her Nile: the rich plains of Syria touch or approach the sea coast, reaching the Gulf of Acre to the south, and joining the Orontes on the north; to the east flows the Euphrates. The mountain chains of Asia Minor run all east and west, so as to allow the plains and watercourses to penetrate from the sea to the interior; by the four rivers that run to the west and the two that run to the north, the elements are afforded of a system of internal water-carriage through its whole extent. Roumelia is traversed by the great artery of Central Europe, the Danube, which a canal of five leagues would cover with craft, letting the Black Sea into the land, carrying it right up to Hungary, and so uniting to the Bosphorus, the repose and prosperity of the Austrian Empire.

These provinces are placed under the most happy sky: they neither know the rigours of winter, nor the intensity of summer: a frugal and docile population of nearly forty millions is sprinkled over a soil not yet broken to labour, or fashioned by art.

With such a surface for the growth of corn, with such facilities for its transport, Turkey would unquestionably have seized upon the commerce of the world, if the sentence had not gone forth against her: "You shall not traffic in the stores of your granaries, the flax shall dry upon the stalk, the olive shall rot under its tree, the forests shall never descend from the mountains, nor the brass and iron, the gold and silver, emerge from their entrails." This sentence the Sultan Mahmoud undertook to reverse, but the times were no longer when an Ottoman Sultan was his own master. He did not dare to say to his people, "Enjoy the gifts of Providence;" he did not dare to say to the nations, "Come and trade with my people."*

Turkey nevertheless had for the basis of her system freedom of trade: this freedom was avowed and consecrated in

* A recent work on Turkey has the following:—

"If some of our enterprising countrymen, acquainted with commercial pursuits were to visit these provinces of European Turkey, they would find a rich field, as yet unexplored: I found a most anxious desire on the part of the inhabitants to establish a more intimate commercial connection with Great Britain for the disposal of their timber, corn, and cattle, which seemed to lie upon their hands without the possibility of a sale.

"In the interior of Bulgaria and Upper Moesia, the low prices of provisions and cattle of every description is almost fabulous compared with the prices of Western Europe. A fat sheep or lamb usually costs from eighteenpence to two shillings, an ox forty shillings, cows thirty shillings, and a horse, in the best possible travelling condition, from four to five pounds sterling. Wool, hides, tallow, wax, and honey, are equally low. In the town and hans by the road side, everything is sold by weight; you can get a pound of meat for a halfpenny, a pound of bread for the same, and wine, which is also sold by weight, costs about the same money."

the treaties with all countries. The productions of foreigners were not loaded with duties; she did not wage a war of exchange against her neighbours; she did not dream of the protection of national industry; the talons of the fisc did not gripe salt and tobacco; and no *octroi* blockaded the dwellings of men.

Whence the mysterious contrast? Why this monstrous yoking of a living man and a carcass? The cause is explained by its effects: in Turkey nothing could be bought that Russia sold; but for all articles which Russia did not sell, the markets were open without stint or limit. This prohibition has made Russia what she is; it was a singular effect of her greatest military triumph, that the war which placed in her hands the second capital of the empire ended with reversing the balance between the victor and the vanquished; for after the removal of the restriction on the corn trade occasioned by the pressure of her blockade, no European vessel would have passed on to the Black Sea, but would have laden on the shores of the Mediterranean.

The reimposition of the restriction was now a new enterprise, and its accomplishment a new victory: it was achieved in the Treaty of Adnoupe, by means of a stipulation *for unlimited freedom of trade*. Every Russian, or every subject of the Porte, who chose to go to Odessa for a passport, or to seek the protection of a Russian consulate, might traffic far and near free from all charges, save that of the nominal Russian tariff. Russia at the time had not one native subject or merchant in Turkey, but soon the whole country was covered with her "subjects;" they possessed themselves of all the channels of industry; they broke through the whole order of administration; every difference was solved in their favour by a threat, for to this commercial stipulation Russia had appended for any remissness or neglect the unparalleled penalty of "reprisals."* The Porte at last fell back on

* VIIth Article of the Treaty of Adrianople.—Russian subjects will enjoy throughout the whole extent of the Ottoman Empire, as

Prohibition; the old capitulations, while they conferred on strangers the privilege to come to buy and sell whatever they chose, were not enunciations of principles but merely grants of favour, and they specially reserved the right of prohibiting the exportation of any article in cases of scarcity. The revival of such a pretension may appear a very weak device, and one which would only expose Turkey to new humiliations and embarrassments. The prohibition of the article was of course with a view to the sale of firmans for its exportation, those who purchased them stood in the light of servants of the government. As article after article came thus to be monopolised, the dissensions with Russia were brought to a close by the extinction of the trade out of which they had originated, or by the transfer of the individuals from the class of Russian subjects to that of Turkish farmers. The Treaty of Adrianople was now more flagrantly violated than by the small abnormal duties hitherto imposed; nevertheless the terrors of the "casus belli" clause were

well on land as at sea, the full and entire liberty of Commerce which the Treaties assure to them. The liberty cannot be infringed in any case or under any pretext, by any prohibition or restriction of whatever kind, nor *as the consequence of any regulation or measures whether of interior administration or legislation.* The Russian subjects' ships of merchandise shall be protected against every violence and every fraud. The first will remain under the exclusive jurisdiction and police of the Minister and Consuls of Russia; the Russian vessels will never be subjected to any visit on board whatever, on the part of the Ottoman authorities, neither in the open sea, nor in any of its ports or anchorages, and *merchandise or produce belonging to the Russian subjects,* after having acquitted the duties established by the tariff shall be freely sold, deposited or transported, from one vessel to another, whatever nation that vessel may belong to, without the Russian subject having need to notify the fact to the local authorities, and still less to ask them their permission; and if, which God forbid, any one of these stipulations should be infringed without full and prompt satisfaction being made, *the Sublime Porte recognises, beforehand, the right of the Russian Court to consider such infraction an act of hostility, and to have recourse immediately to reprisals against the Ottoman Empire.*

left to slumber. Russia ceased to be the patron of liberty of commerce, sacrificed her *protegés*, retracted her demands, and smoothed down her countenance. "Her end was gained."*

But at this moment the Ottomon Empire, shaken from without and agitated from within, was floating upon the tide of experiment: if old institutions were in danger, habitual abuses had also lost their hold. The results of 1829 could not be forgotten: the incessant vexations connected with trade, surrounded the doors of every minister with hosts of harassing supplicants; disorder would not be silenced, the precariousness of the position in reference to Russia by the very measures into which she had driven them, could not fail to obtrude itself upon graver minds. Above all the necessities of the Sultan, then intently engaged in creating an army, forced the Divan to devise, or at least to listen to schemes by which the restoration of commerce might be made subservient to the replenishing of the Treasury.† Thus arose the proposal made by Turkey, who had never before proposed any novelty, and the mission of a special Ambassador to England with no less an object than the revision of the whole system of commercial legislation.

At this time, England's trade with her ancient customers had been cut off, by the avowal of her minister, the ancient channels had been blocked up, and she required to bring new trafficing worlds into existence. The countries of the Con-

* See "England, France, Russia, and Turkey," where these facts will be found published, in 1835, under the sanction of the then English Ambassador at Constantinople. It has been urged on me by persons who would be esteemed the first authorities in the matter that I am wholly mistaken in attributing Russia's conduct on this occasion to such deep design, or indeed to any design at all; and that it is to be explained by the fact that these *Apaltators*, were chiefly Russian agents, and that largely profiting in the system, had found means to induce the Russian Government to overlook it. All I can say is, that in this case, as in many others, accident favours the skilful, as fortune does the brave.

† This idea was afterwards followed in the Budget of 1841, when it was proposed to meet a deficiency by a reduction of taxes.

tinent had in peace combined to make commercial war on this nation, which, during the last struggle, had saved most of them from subjugation, subsidised while protecting them, and had been in the hour of victory as heedless of her interests, as in that of danger, she had been prodigal of her blood. Mistaken theories in some, political animosities in others, in many both conjoined, had prompted a blockade of custom-houses, inflicting loss, implanting notions inimical to her prosperity and feelings dangerous to her power.

Against this concert we had striven by arguments, professions, statistics, and reduction; we appealed to resemblances of manners, community of science and literature, friendly recollections for benefits conferred, gratitude from Dynasties, who owed to us their thrones or their existence—we planned thirty-two commercial treaties; but all in vain. Repulsed and discomfited, we turned from the East to the West, and from the North to the South. The House of Brunswick arrayed all Germany in a hostile league, sympathetic France rejected our yarns: subsidies, auxiliaries, and all the muskets in the Tower could obtain no hospitality for our wares, from the Houses of Bourbon and Braganza: the new continent, rivalling meanwhile the antipathies of the old, was equally deaf to the charms of Downing Street. At last, sick of defeats, and worn with toil, the President of the Board of Trade exclaimed, amid the cheers and laughter of the House, "Thank God, we have done with commercial treaties."

How now stood the matter with Turkey? What sympathy had we to expect who had attempted to burn her capital, who stood the avowed patron of her revolted subjects and the close ally of her deadly foe? Whose professed community of interest, had ever been exhibited in hostility of act? We burdened with duty her wares, and refused her reciprocity, who alone in Europe, or the world, gave free admission to our industry, who suffered us to enjoy the carrying trade of her coasts, conceded to us the faculty of internal traffic, and permitted to our subjects settled in her dominions the exercise

of every municipal, commercial, and judicial function, unshackled, unwatched, and untaxed.

Turkey and Russia stand in commercial legislation, as the north and south poles. The one prohibits nearly all the manufactures of England, and seeks to enforce the imports of her raw produce; the other admits all the manufactures of England and prohibits the export of her raw produce. The foreign merchant in Russia is surrounded and hampered by the most minute and oppressive restrictions: he is in every point inferior to the native. The foreign merchant in Turkey enjoys the fullest immunities, and is placed above the native. The Russian system is the result of no theories, it is a mere calculation as to how commerce is to be used for political purposes. The Turkish system, in as far as it is restrictive, proceeds from no theories, but is the result of the success of Russia in interfering with her internal regulations. Turkey is engaged in no design against any neighbour to carry thither either political influence or restrictive system. Russia is engaged in designs against all her neighbours, and wherever she establishes her power, there follows her system. Against Russia England takes no step, either to enlighten the people or to resist the Government; but favours her commerce, befriends her political ends, lends to her the whole weight of her power to support her aggressions, and extend her system. Yet these two systems stood in balance because the two empires did so, and we ought have thought of Turkey a little while, serving Russia so much. With her activity pervading the world England had no time to consider what might be effected with the empire through which flowed the Danube, and the Nile, the Tigris, and the Euphrates; which held in its hands the Isthmus of Suez and the Strait of the Dardanelles; which extended from the torrid zone to the snows of the Caucasus, from the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf,—whose dominions in Europe, Africa, and Asia (exclusive of Arabia), equalled France, Germany, Italy, and Spain; which was all agricultural, and where freedom of trade was the law of the State. This empire had to come to her to propose that mutual

abolition of restriction which she in vain had been preaching all round the globe.

This appeal, strange to say, was not from the Porte to the English Government, but from Sultan Mahmoud to William the Fourth. The Ambassador was charged to say:—

"The Sublime Porte, who appreciates and esteems at its true value the importance of these relations with one of the most enlightened and powerful nations of the world, knows also, Sire, that they have already secured the attention of *your Majesty*, and doubts not that a benevolent system of reciprocity *will soon come* to be considered by *the Government* of your Majesty as a means of fortifying and increasing that desirable union which exists between these two high Courts."

So that it would appear that the Turkish Government relied more on the friendship of the King, than on the principles of the Administration.

To the Porte it was not a simple matter of regulation: had it been so, it needed not to send to England. It was a delicate and precarious negotiation, in which it was essential to succeed if once they adventured upon a step; their position was alarmingly insecure at home, they were under the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi, and the Russian debt was unliquidated. They could not venture on a rupture with Russia without the assurance of the support of England, and without that support so assured beforehand, they knew by hard experience that a rupture with Russia would be a rupture with England. They wished then that England would make one of those proposals to them, that she was scattering over the earth, so that they might appear only to consent.

CHAPTER II.

Negotiations with Turkey.

BETWEEN the period when this mission was planned, and that when it arrived in England a discouraging change of administration had taken place. The party favourable to Free Trade had fallen from power, and the Duke of Wellington, whom the nations of the East had been taught to consider as a servant of the Emperor, was Prime Minister.* The two grounds of hope were thus cut off, and it proved impossible to effect anything. I owe it, however, to the Duke of Wellington to say, that he neither closed the door to discussions, nor wrapped himself up in mystery and reserve. He entered frankly into the subject, and even laboriously perused statements of the case both with reference to the matters of trade and with respect to the means of political existence of that empire; and then rejected the overtures upon two grounds: First, his theoretic opinions upon taxation which were in favour of those upon trade; secondly, on his conclusion, which nothing could shake, that Turkey was past salvation. He hesitated not to charge upon Lord Grey the ruin of that Empire in his admission of the Treaty of Adrianople, and subsequently of that of Hunkiar Skelessi.† That, however deplorable such a result might be,

* The change of Administration was announced from St. Petersburgh in these terms: "A marshal of the Emperor is now minister in England."

† Lord Grey with whom discussions were simultaneously carried on, concurred with the Duke of Wellington in his opinion respecting Turkey, but attributed to *him* the catastrophe, saying, that it had been sacrificed by his own misjudgment of the war of 1828, and the conduct of the Government of which he was a member during that war.

it was now incontestible and accomplished, and England could not undertake the Quixotic task of setting up a dead body upon its feet. He denied, moreover, that England was possessed of faculties to carry out any system whatever, and did not wish that it should be otherwise. "England," said he, "has done nothing great save by insubordination." I may further add that he was greatly rejoiced at the publication of Mr. Cobden's pamphlet, and exulted in my having been "answered."

Soon, however, the other party came into office, and we anticipated an immediate and a joyful acceptance of our proposals, for the last measure of Lord Palmerston on leaving office had been one which implied the fullest approval of all the steps I had taken at Constantinople in reference to this matter.

I know not in what terms to describe the reception of the proposal by the new Administration. Reception! it was scouted and branded, with what withering epithet will the reader imagine, or believe?—Russian.* The Porte of course hastened to withdraw its proposal.

Fortunately there was then on the Throne a Sovereign who believed it to be his right and duty to attend to those matters which especially are confided to his prerogative. Then also

* "TO SIR HERBERT TAYLOR.

(Extract.) "*January* 20, 1835.

"I have just been dismayed to learn that Nouri Effendi has written to Constantinople, expressing all the discouragement and despair that Lord Palmerston had filled him with in their last interview, particularly his Lordship's observation, that my proposal for the tariff, that has cost so much to bring to the pitch where it now is, was a *Russian proposal*. This indeed is an act of suicide, and I am most anxious to know your opinion on the subject. Unless you have gained Lord Palmerston entirely—unless he understands the fault he has committed, I do not see what chance there is of my being of any—the slightest use, as serving the Government; and, on the other hand, I am sacrificing myself and the question.

"I have just learnt, also, that the mission of Ellis is in a state of abeyance, and that Mac Neill has come to the resolution of resigning his situation, unless the government adopts a more worthy policy."

the King had a Private Secretary who applied to the subject his clear, judicious, and vigorous mind, and devoted to it his unwearying assiduity. The ambassador at Constantinople most heartily entered into the same views.* I need not enumerate further; suffice it say that, excepting the two chiefs of the Foreign and Trade Departments, the whole official body concurred in the plan as originally sketched at Constantinople. Several months of intense labour ensued, nor did I shrink from attributing the opposition of the Foreign Secretary to the only intelligible cause. At last he gave in, and unfortunately I accepted the change as a *bona fide* one, and was, therefore, willing to resign my previous convictions. It was now resolved that the proposal which the English Government had rejected when it came from the Turkish should be presented to it as an English one, and I was commissioned to discuss it with the Board of Trade.

Here difficulties of an unexpected nature arose; at the Foreign Office it had been hateful as a *Russian* project, at the Board of Trade it was obnoxious as an *Anti-Baltic one*. The President of the Board of Trade was a Baltic merchant, and the same process had to be adopted with respect to him as with his colleague. After a futile attempt to bargain for the imposition of an export duty of ten per cent. on Turkish

* "My dear Sir,—By Mr. Urquhart's desire, I forward to you a Letter for Moosheer Ahmed Pasha, and also a copy of a Memoir respecting the commercial system of this country, &c.

"This Memoir, I think, deserves to be minutely explained to the Pasha, and studied by him.

"I am of opinion, that were it acted upon in its main points, it would produce the most magnificent results to the Ottomon Empire.

"The latter part of the Memoir states the mode of acting, to which I have always looked as the certain and effectual means whereby to defeat Russia—means most easy to be applied by us, and which, in the application, will produce great benefit to England; independent of their political action.

"I have the honour to be, dear Sir,

"Yours, very faithfully,

"Ponsonby."

produce, which he conceived would protect the Baltic trade, he gave in.

The chiefs of the two departments had, however, yielded only to necessity, and under the dread of exposure during the lifetime of the King. I pass over the painful interval. In little more than two years this Treaty, nominally the same but really changed into that which Mr. Poulett Thomson had desired for the prohibiting of Turkish exports, was imposed on the Porte as the condition of that aid against Mehemet Ali, which subsequently furnished the pretext for the Syrian Intervention.

CHAPTER III.

Commercial Treaty with Turkey of 1838.

This Treaty as it stands merely doubles the duties of import upon British goods, and quadruples the duty on export of Turkish produce, and this concession is made on the condition of abolishing all prohibitions and monopolies.

Two questions naturally arise: First, Was an equivalent required? Second, Was the concession so hampered of any value? That no equivalent was requisite must have already appeared; what illegal vexations could counterbalance this legal burden it is difficult to imagine.

Turkish exports must be classed in two categories. Many articles were nowhere subject to monopolies, and provinces containing ten millions of souls, were subject to no monopoly of any article. Silk, cotton, opium, tobacco, gums, dyes, &c. were perfectly free everywhere: grain, tallow, wool, timber, were free in Syria,* Egypt, Wallachia, Servia, Moldavia, and Samos. In regard, then, to the first class of articles and to all articles in the cited provinces, the increased duty was a mere surrender of the rights of British subjects, and a gratuitous imposition on Turkish trade. The Treaty was assumed to be a substitution of one kind of import for

Aleppo, August 3d, 1843.

* "The trade of the north of Syria, nor of Syria generally, derives no benefit by the abolition of monopolies; because previous to the Convention, no commercial monopolies existed. The Convention in relation thereto cannot be considered a boon, nor in fact a compensation of any kind, to the trade of Great Britain with Syria; certainly not for having inflicted on its produce an exportation duty of 12 per cent., after the grower has paid on the spot the usher of 10 per cent. to the government."—Mr. Werry.

another, but the relief of a taxed article could not be obtained by the burdening of an untaxed one.*

The Prohibitions were not permanent or universal, and might any day be unconditionally raised; firmans could be obtained on the payment of a certain sum; and if it would not pay they were not purchased. Firmans were yearly purchased for Mitylene, and oil was exported: grain was at times exported by firmans. Under the new system Mitylene exports no oil, and Constantinople *imports* grain! Thus, then, the equivalent has placed on the free goods an uncompensated burden, on the monopolised goods a tax which is a prohibition! In the restricted provinces it has replaced a partial by a general impost, and into the free provinces introduced the prohibitive system. The articles which were obstructed before are obstructed now, and the articles that were free before are burdened now.†

It required not to wait for the result to be certain that a duty of twelve per cent. was more than heavy articles, such as grain, Indian corn, oil, and the like, could bear. The absence of roads had been the subject of lamentation to all those who had taken an interest in the Ottoman Empire, and what are bad roads, save a charge on heavy goods. By them, the country, 150 miles from a point of shipment, was doomed, as far as external traffic went, to sterility. The new duty was equivalent to lengthening the journey by fifty miles, and reduced to that extent the area of productive land. This is the result of a change introduced by system at the very moment that you are endeavouring to induce Turkey to call science to her aid.

* "The duty of 12 per cent. amounts, in reality, on many of the products of Turkey—especially the coarse ones—to a total prohibition. It is, therefore, a matter of trifling consideration to merchants, what estimate the tariff places on objects which the convention has now set without the sphere of speculation."—*Times.*

† What grain has been exported since 1839, has either been from provinces where the Treaty has not come into operation, or during an increase of price sufficient to over-ride the tariff.

But this was not all:

The twelve per cent. was not left to be paid in kind, or at a local valuation, but the amount in money was fixed by a Tariff for all the Empire. At Constantinople, the price of grain is raised by a consumption duty of eight per cent., and by heavy transport charges. The price of Constantinople was taken as the basis of the Tariff, and the twelve became twenty-five per cent. At this time England was under the sliding scale, fixed every fortnight by averages taken all over England; she *proposed this scale*. She also suggested the specification of the Constantinople kilo,—the smallest measure, the highest price.

Nor was this all.

Goods derive in Turkey their nationality from the trader, not from the place of production. Whatever the foreigner buys is "foreign." The word "exportation" was thus accepted in its first intention, and applied in its natural sense, and whatever was "carried out" paid the duty, whether it went to the next town or to Canton. But foreign goods came in for the subjects of Russia, who did not join in the Treaty, at one and a half per cent.: consequently, at Constantinople, or the other ports, Russian grain was charged but a third or a fourth of the duty imposed on Turkish grain. Constantinople now imports from Odessa to the value of 40,000,000 of piastres of wheat and flour. Such things may appear incredible to a person who reads them in Europe: they are so even in Turkey. The late Minister for Foreign Affairs would not believe the fact here stated, till he had it confirmed to him by the Customer. In fact the Turkish Government were utterly in the dark respecting this negotiation from the beginning to the end.

It is the same with respect to every other article. Tobacco is charged in the tariff two piastres, all but four paras. The tobacco exported from Syria to Alexandria averages two piastres in value; the duty amounts to *ninety-five per cent.*; consequently the tobacco of America, which at Alexandria

pays but three per cent. (the additional two per cent. is only when sent into the interior), is brought across the Atlantic to undersell in the ports of Turkey its own produce. Take again a manufactured article, silk. The people of the Lebanon pay an *export* duty of twelve per cent. (in reality fifteen,) on sending it to the towns where it is manufactured. Manufactured it is considered a new produce and is again subject to an *export* duty, which amounts to twenty per cent. so that an inhabitant of the Lebanon before he can wear his own silk, manufactured in a neighbouring town, has to pay *thirty-five per cent.* He therefore buys the silk, or the silk and cotton imitations of Switzerland and Prussia, which are charged but five per cent.

So far then the two preliminary questions are answered, and as no equivalent was required for the abrogation of monopolies, so has their abrogation on such conditions proved entirely sterile of all advantage. The commerce of the country has increased, but it has not been in those articles in which it was desired to open it, nor in those provinces on which it has been imposed.

But England had the right in Turkey by the capitulations of exporting and importing all articles, on the payment of three per cent. and "nothing more."* No vexation could therefore exist save by sufferance; and to resist these no new Treaty was required:† what use could there be in new Treaties, if the old ones were not executed? But let us grant that the stipulations were not precise and specific enough—then England possessed the right of the "most favoured nation:" this Turkey did not desire to contest, the seventh article of the Treaty of Adrianople was framed to meet every supposable case. ‡

* "CLAUSE 30.—That having once paid the customs at the ports, not an asper more shall be taken or demanded." See also Clauses 31, 34, 50, 51, 52, 53.

† "CLAUSE 18.—All the capitulations, privileges, and articles granted to the French government, and other powers, having been in like manner granted to the English." See also Clauses 44, 48.

‡ "See this article cited at p. 376.

The object professed was to develope the resources of Turkey; if an equivalent in augmented duties was necessary, surely it must have been laid on British imports. Why invent a distinction between imports and exports to apply it the wrong way? The aggregate increase is ten per cent.; why not halve it, and place five on imports, and five on exports?* The explanation offered is that on no other terms could it be obtained. "You cannot," said Lord Palmerston, on the 1st March, 1847; "go to the minister of a foreign power with a draft in one hand, and a pen in the other, and say, 'there sir, sign that or jump out of the window.'" This was said in reference to the additional two per cent. on British goods; there is no explanation for the burden on Turkish produce, and for the best of reasons, for it was enforced by the process above described.

Finally: the Treaty does not abrogate monopolies, nor being abrogated does it prevent their reimposition. They were abrogated by the act of the Turkish Government,† and the wording of the Treaty, as we shall presently see, deprives England of all powers under it, of resisting the imposition of any and every tax; and further deprives her of those rights which she possessed under the old Capitulations.

The negotiation, which commenced with the view of setting free the ports of Turkey, has ended with sealing them up. It has, at the moment when Turkey was about to abandon its prohibitions, substituted for them prohibitory duties. This is the measure for which the English minister has

* This was the original proposal of the Turkish government itself, and which it gave up on my urgent remonstrance, adopting in lieu of it that suggestion of the distinction between exports and imports, which will be hereafter explained, and which has been so artfully perverted.

† "En effet, après l'abolition de tous les drois intérieurs qui ont été remplacé par le droit de 9 per cent., payable à l'exportation, et de deux sur l'emportation, nous voyons resusciter tous les jours les anciens *droits qui etoient tombés en desuetude avant d'être supprimés par les traités.*"—*The Consul General of Russia to the Pasha of Beyrout, 26 March*, 1850.

claimed from applauding England and Europe, the credit of having over-mastered and outwitted the cabinet of St. Petersburgh on the field of all its triumphs; this is the Treaty which all Europe has rushed to join, believing it to be a masterpiece of commercial legislation and of political design.

I must now state what the principles of the Treaty were, which I proposed and which the English Government adopted, and sent out to Constantinople in 1837.

1st. The "most favoured nation" clause.

2d. The privileges of the British merchants to be extended to subjects of Turkey.

3d. The duty on imports to be retained at three per cent.; those on exports *to rise or fall on each article according to the difference between its value in the markets of Turkey and Europe:* a commission of merchants at intervals of years to fix the scale: in no case the sum to exceed that previously paid.

4th. Transit free.

5th. To come into operation only when all powers had joined.

The negotiation was to have been secret, and when settled between England and the Porte, they were conjointly to address themselves to the other powers to obtain their adhesion. No one would have gained by standing aloof.

The Treaty as signed stipulates,

1st. The "most favoured nation" clause.

2d. Subjection of the English merchants in regard to internal trade to the duties paid by the subjects of the Porte, and not paid by other nations.

3d. The concession of the right of internal legislation as against Treaties with foreign Powers.

4th. Imports raised from three to five per cent. Exports from three to twelve: one and the same sum for all articles whether they could bear it or not.

5th. Transit charged at three per cent.

6th. To come into operation although no other nation joined.

Such were the Treaties which, according to Lord Palmerston,

"differed in no material respect." * The changes were made under the pretext of securing additional advantages. The British merchant is made to pay "as much" as the Turkish subject, by means of the words he shall pay "no more:" appearing to gain the privileges of the *most favoured subject*, he loses those of "the most favoured nation."

On the Treaty coming into operation, the Porte made arrangements to indemnify the farmers of customs, imagining that the English duties were to be reduced to the level of those of Russia, according to the 1st Article. One of our consuls fell into the same mistake, and demanded the repayment of duties on a cargo already shipped, and obtained it.

The truly marvellous portion of this negotiation is, after all, the adhesion of the other Powers. The abolition of monopolies being effected, was effected once for all, why then should France submit to a gratuitous charge on the ground that it was the price of their abolition? The French Ambassador had received instructions to negotiate a Treaty similar to the English, but on a memorial from the merchants, he wrote home to say that he could obtain more favourable terms. He was answered by peremptory orders, the reason assigned being that the French Government, "had yielded this point to England."

The French merchants, so soon as their Treaty was signed, demanded the execution of the first clause. They were answered that a "*tacit agreement* existed between the Powers not to require in that respect the execution of the Treaty!" One of them exclaimed, "had Turkey no friend when she signed that Treaty?"

Austria's repugnance was openly avowed, she indeed yielded as regarded the trade of the Mediterranean; but retained her old rights for the trade of the adjoining provinces as Serbia, Moldavia, and Wallachia.

Every cabinet of Europe was brought to surrender its rights, and betray its people's interest; not a single power, however great, or however small, stood out. Russia was left

* Lord Palmerston's statement in Parliament will be found at the end of this Chapter.

alone to play the part of antagonist, and to realise the profits of their self-imposed disabilities.

It thus appears that whenever England takes a course, supposed to have in view the maintenance of public law, she is immediately followed by every state and government of Europe. A fact like this shows that the originality of design, or the hostility of dispositions, we lend to France, are but supposititious; and that the obstructions we there meet with, or the dangers we may thence apprehend, are solely, in as far as they may be or become real, of our own creating.

It will be recollected that this had been treated by Russia, not merely as a hostile, but as a perfidious measure. She coupled it with the occupation of Carack, as acts forcing her to have recourse to arms, laying "on England the terrible responsibility of such a conflagration." * In her avowed, as in her official organs, she threatened to retrieve at Calcutta the *defeat* she had experienced on the Bosphorus; but in the manner of these threats she could not suppress her exultation, and on the very day that the Treaty was settled at the Board of Trade, these words were published in the *Frankfort Journal*—

"We will make their profoundest combinations and master-strokes of design, the pivots of our policy, and the instruments of our greatness."

On the other hand the English Journals, and especially those connected with the Foreign Department,† asserted that

* Odessa Gazette.

† "It may be assumed, without any unseemly exaggeration of self-deluding triumph, that by the prudence of Lord Palmerston and the efforts of Lord Ponsonby, seconded by fortunate dispositions in the Court of Vienna and of the Porte, Russian influence has sustained a signal defeat—a defeat which arms cannot retrieve, which bravado cannot efface, nor menace, nor perversion repair."—*British and Foreign Review.*

"Lord Ponsonby, in a letter to me, quoted in the published correspondence, says:—"I wrote to you when you were away that I was sure the agitation of it (the Treaty) would lead to nothing like a settlement. I say, that I have not the smallest expectation of its

it would transfer to Turkey from Russia that European demand of raw materials by which she had been enriched within the century to the amount of two hundred and sixty millions sterling. When concluded, it was pompously announced from the throne, extolled by the opposition, rapturously hailed by the nation. Was it not then natural for the statesmen of Europe, ignorant save in opinions, blind save for print, to believe that England had taken the lead in a great work which was to secure permanent tranquillity?

If Russia stood aloof, was it by mere indifference? The Treaty either served her, or threatened her. In the one case, why did she not join—in the other, why did she not oppose? While any power stood out, the Treaty was inoperative, because the merchants of the dissenting power, and through them all other merchants, rode right over it. Had she not influence with one? If not *one* stood out, clearly she was not opposed. Why then did she not join? Because by her simulated opposition she ensured its success, and justified the impression that the falsified Treaty was the original one. When they had all joined, her position was magnificent: her merchants could import at one quarter of the duty paid by all others, and export at one quarter; all her triumphs had conferred upon her no privileges to be compared with those which she reaped from a Treaty, levelled at her existence.

A new administration comes into power in England; remonstrances pour in from every quarter: the monstrous fact was proclaimed of English Merchants being forced to borrow the names of Russian firms.* The necessity of a remedy was

being accepted. Russian interests would be deeply affected by it. The Russians are not, I must presume, ignorant of the consequences of it; and I know they are at this moment *all powerful*."

* Col. Rose writes, on the 7th September, 1843:—"An unanswerable fact proves the superiority of the advantage which the Russian merchant now enjoys over the British merchant. I know that a British merchant gave 1 per cent. to a person trading as a

so evident that the Turkish government prepared for it. * But means were found to set them on a false track, that of devising a process for equalising the duty between the British and Russian by *making the native dealer who sold to or bought from the Russian, pay an illegal tax.* The plan is designated by one of our own agents, "a bold and unexpected attempt:" he attributed it to Turkey. It was met by a Russian "armed janissary" being sent to embark the goods "by force." †

Russian merchant, whom I also know to trade as a Russian merchant in his name; and I further know, that a sort of national pride alone has prevented the rest of the British merchants in Syria from doing the same."

* "Even the Custom-house appaltators here, sensible of the advantages enjoyed by the Russian trade, and forseeing the probability in consequence of a modification of the English Convention, have *stipulated with the Government that they are to be indemnified* for the loss they will sustain should the modification take place. . . . .

"Need a clearer proof be adduced of the advantages which Russia has gained by the Treaty, than the fact that *a crowd of nominal Russian merchants has sprung up one hardly knows from where, since it came into operation.*"—*Conjoint Despatch of* COLONEL ROSE and MR. MOORE (*Consul-General for Syria and Consul of Beyrout.*)

† THE AMBASSADOR.—"Upon my inquiring of the Minister of Foreign Affairs *in what manner the really important difference* between 12 and 5 per cent. paid by British merchants on exports and imports respectively, and the uniform duty of 3 per cent. paid on both by Russian traders *was removed*, his Excellency assured me that in BOTH cases *that difference* (!) was levied upon the Turkish subject —in the former as a seller, in the latter as a purchaser."—*Sir Stratford Canning* (18*th Nov.* 1842.)

THE CONSUL-GENERAL.—"A Russian merchant, or at any rate trading as such, purchased lately a large quantity of silk, but the appaltator having been unable to discover the sellers or producers thereof, in order to exact the 9 per cent. export duty from them, objected to his so doing. . . . The cancellier proceeded to the Custom-house with a janissary armed, and declared his determination to embark the silk by force. . . . The Custom-house officer applied to Assad Pascha for support, to prevent its embarkation; but in consequence of a communication from the Russian cancellier, his Excellency ordered the appaltators to allow the embarkation of the bales on the payment *of* 3 *per cent. only!*"—*Col. Rose, 7th Sept.*, 1842.

Puzzled and confounded by the working of a measure which, when in opposition, they had hastened to extol, the new administration now sent about to the consuls and merchants to ask their opinion; this was the unanswerable question which they put "Shall we keep the third clause, or, abandoning it, take to the first?" Here are the very words of the inevitable Lord Aberdeen:—

"WHETHER the *dis*advantages under which British merchants labour are of such an *extent* AS to render it *more* advantageous to claim the *benefit* of the First Article, AND insist upon British merchants being placed on the same footing with Russian merchants, ALTHOUGH such a course might lead to the sacrifice of *whatever* advantages the British trader now enjoys under the Convention, BY the substitution of fixed and for variable and arbitrary duties of import and export, and by the abolition of monopolies and other ancient sources of vexation and annoyance?"

There can be no alternative between two clauses of a Treaty; if you have something to choose between, you have nothing to stand upon, for there must be contradiction. But you had none by the first article, for it is general, and the obligations incurred by the third are special. The three volumes of correspondence tally with their text. They contain, however, one passage of sense.

"We cannot see how our being placed 'on the footing of the most favoured nation' can in any way subject us to 'variable and arbitrary duties of import and export.' The Russian Merchants and others, under Russian protection, are liable to no variable or arbitrary duty."*

When Lord Palmerston is at length charged in the House with surrendering the rights of the "most favoured nation," he answers:—

"The hon. and learned gentleman really has not read the the Treaty. He may lift up his eyes at that statement; but I repeat that he cannot have read the Treaty, or, if he has,

* Mr. Scott of Shrnlan.

he has not read it correctly. He stated, that by the Treaty as signed, British subjects and ships were not placed upon the footing of the most favoured nation; if the hon. Member will only look at the Treaty itself, he will see that the first Article states—

'All former rights and privileges are confirmed, and all rights, privileges, and immunities, which the Sublime Porte now grants, or may hereafter grant, to the ships and subjects of any other foreign Power, or which it may suffer [not merely grant] the ships and subjects of any other foreign Power to enjoy, shall equally be granted, exercised, and enjoyed by the subjects and the ships of Great Britain.'

If that is not securing to British subjects and ships all the advantages enjoyed by the most favoured nation, I do not know how the grant of those advantages could have been expressed in words more clear or more comprehensive. It is not only so in the plain meaning of the words, *But it has been so acknowledged since by both parties. We have acted upon that interpretation.* Indeed, there could have been no interpretation required in the matter, because the words are as clear and as plain as words can be, and from them it is clear that British subjects and ships are upon the footing of the most favoured nation."

This statement was received with loud cheers, Good God! why print volumes of correspondence! Varro did not despair after Cannæ; who can hope after this?

The British officials put up their prayers for one, one only, boon,—that Russia may join; then would be covered all their sin and hidden all their shame. Little did they see, and less did they care, that her adhesion would withdraw one immunity from British trade, for Russian subjects trafficked in our goods, and lent their names to our merchants. When a favourable reception was to be managed for the Czar in London, the Russian Cabinet *promised* to gratify their wishes. Lord Aberdeen solemnly announced the event to Parliament, assuring it that "Her Majesty's government had not been

idle in this matter." The temporary end obtained, she continued to adhere to her "*base, positive et invariable,*" through a fire of Blue Books, until in the midst of the din of the Spanish marriages, and the annexation of Cracow, she quietly, without the observation of a single soul, or the comment of a single journal—joined the Treaty.

English Diplomacy now entered the haven of repose: the English Merchants were contented: in what age do we live when such a fact could not awaken even curiosity? Could stultification be more perfect, or demonstration complete?

But already, in 1838, the Russian Cabinet was preparing the occasion to shift its ground. An elaborate exposée of its ideas was transmitted to its ambassador at Constantinople and communicated to the consuls. In this document the same basis was assumed as that of the English Treaty, but doubts were entertained in consequences of its "loose wording," through which the Turkish Government might slip: the "isolation" of Russia is represented as a pause until she has seen "what results shall manifest themselves."

In 1846 the desired results had consequently been manifested—were they favourable or unfavourable? If the first, why impose on her trade a gratuitous burden of 12 per cent. and sacrifice all her exclusive advantages? In that year she had usurped Cracow, while England and France were protesting against each other about a Treaty (Utrecht) which had ceased for fifty years to exist. If the second—if, in the words of one of her consuls "worse than the abuses were now reappearing, which had fallen into desuetude even before the Treaty was signed;" why give up the stringent clauses of the Treaty of Adrianople? If she who has proclaimed that clause the chief reward of her campaign of 1829, abandons the faculty it confers to interfere in the internal administration of the Porte, it must be for something even better still.

Against Russia England will never strike a blow. The contest of the strong mind and the weak is not determined by the relative power of their bodies or by their bodies at all.

Therefore did paramount importance attach to a measure which would have altered the relative bases of the power of Russia and Turkey.

Every remarkable man for the last fifty years has prognosticated the extinction of the Western States and the triumph over them of Russia. Several of these were themselves Sovereigns and Ministers, and had practical means of working out their thoughts. Not one of them has succeeded —not one of them has even approached towards the way to success. Russia owes infinitely more to the energy with which she has been opposed by men of first-rate genius and highest station, than to the devotedness with which she has been served either by her own officials or by the traitors whom she has at all times had at her disposal in foreign Cabinets. It is not the difficulty of the enterprise that has caused these failures. I take an illustration from the other hemisphere:

Fourteen years ago, the plains watered by the Parana and the Plata, fertile as they are vast, where herds might multiply like the sands of the sea, towards which a tide of emigration had set in from Europe, gave promise of an enormous supply of hides and tallow. Internal dissensions arose, and England and France commenced thereupon a series of the strangest freaks that have ever been seen. One of the leading merchants was sent over in 1847 to see what could be done. He came to me with his case. After he had concluded his narrative, he asked me if I could explain the source of the malignity of which they were the object. I asked him in turn what were the articles of export—to what amount—what the probable increase without the interference, &c.? He replied, that a million and a quarter sterling worth of hides, tallow, &c., were exported, and had they been let alone, or the matter once for all settled, they would be now exporting to the value of six, eight or ten millions. I then asked him the amount and nature of the exports from the Baltic. He commenced to reply, when suddenly, he stopped, and after a pause, exclaimed, "Sir!

you have caused the scales to fall from my eyes." He then informed me of a variety of circumstances which had never struck him before, all indicating the connection of Russia with those countries, and it even appeared that the brig of war which had been captured by the blockading squadron was a present from the Czar to Rosas. If a merchant did not understand the diplomatic value of the disturbance of the Plata, how should statesmen?

Thus have Pitt, Napoleon, Talleyrand, Gustavus III, failed. They knew nothing of commerce, and could not counteract a system of which commerce formed the basis. The proposed Treaty met her on this ground.

Let it not be supposed that any wrong was here intended to Russia: there was no purpose to injure the legitimate Baltic trade, and all that was proposed was, to allow the English merchant to buy on the same terms as in Russia. The project might have its political side: it had also its commercial. It opened to England a new and a vast supply derived from a country where our export trade is only hampered by our inability to obtain returns. From Syria, we take one and sell forty. Russia, for her raw materials, requires gold, and affords no market, far less a prospective field for our wares. With Turkey the whole transport would be effected in British bottoms.

Had the British Minister been *constrained*, in 1838, to admit these high duties, he would subsequently have made some endeavours to reduce them. France and Austria had yielded unwillingly: he was sure of their backing: Russia assumed to be on the same line: not only she professed to desire unlimited freedom of trade, but she exacted it. How, then, is it that England could never obtain a single reduction? The little king of Greece was not so helpless.*

* The British consul of Janina (12th July, 1843) arguing that it is easy to obtain reductions by taking advantage of *concessions made by other States*, mentions "a secret understanding come to with a Hellenic merchant in 1841, for an abatement of duty on a cargo of wool;" another reduction of the duty on wool in favour of the in-

The Governments of Europe have lost the tithes, so that it is with the greatest difficulty that they can impose direct taxes, and they are driven to tax trade. The Turkish Treasury receives the tithes: what then would be its profit were grain free? Ten per cent. is paid in every case on exportation, independently of any Customs' duty. The interest of the Turkish Government is therefore that of proprietor not of tax-gatherer; the tax-gatherer stops demand, renders unsaleable its goods and unrealisable its revenue.

The English Minister then could have no scruples in seeking for a reduction which would have encountered no obstacle. Every province of the Ottoman Empire has become by this Treaty a foreign state for its neighbour, every change in the nature of an article subjects it to a new duty, and every change effected in a foreign article subjects it to the duty of a native produce. The Customers roam throughout the land levying Black Mail upon the villages, for to no other form of taxation can this imposition be compared.*

Whether Turkey could supply grain to Europe or not, would have remained a problem had it not been for the dearth of 1846.

The price of grain in Roumelia, on the threshing-floor, averages seven piastres the kilo, or one shilling and threepence the English bushel. At the end of 1846, it began to rise, and soon attained twenty piastres; and the outpouring commenced. From the walls of Vienna might be traced, along the plain, as far as eye could reach, double lines of waggons, the one arriving full, the other returning empty; night and day, week after week, month after month, this stream continued to flow, and when the price no longer

habitants from 24 piastres 24 paras to 21-10, "which privilege was also shared by Hellenic merchants," and that "the same rule was followed in a reduction of the duty on valonia to 40 piastres from 68 piastres as established by our tariff:" and he says that he had, in consequence, claimed and obtained the same concessions for British merchants.

* In a table of the farms belonging to the Grand Vizier, drawn up by Jonesco, *Gumbruk* is a regular entry.

permitted exportation, the granaries were still full. By the Black Sea alone * twenty millions of kilos were exported, and Turkey received between two or three millions sterling. Had this supply not been forthcoming, this money would have gone to Russia, while she might have increased the price, and thereby, the severity of the famine in Europe This exportation was not the result of a particularly favourable season—the high price had tided traffic over the bar of the Tariff. It was on this that Russia hastened to renounce the suggestive privileges which she had hitherto maintained.

England has now put herself in Russia's shoes. It is England that has to exert her influence to obstruct the development of the territorial resources of Turkey. Every attempt to facilitate trade is now broken by the interposition of the English embassy. "You have," said M. Thiers, on a memorable occasion, "adopted the interests of Russia for your own. You have nothing more to do." Say rather you have much to do.

I trust that the foregoing pages will justify my declaration in the House of Commons the 23d of February, 1848.

"I am prepared to prove, and I stake my character upon it, and the house will be justified in applying any censure to me if I fail, that in one negotiation which has been referred to to-night, viz., that of the Treaty of Turkey, there have been changes made in the stipulations, with the view and with the effect of securing the interests of Russia. Sir, I am possessed of documents so numerous and minute, and of

* During the year 1847, 1224 vessel were despatched with cargoes from the former, and 1638 from the latter,—a great part of which were British bottoms. The exports of grain from Ibraila, which, in 1837, amounted to only 220,000 quarters, and in 1840, to 325,000 quarters, attained in 1846, 750,000 quarters, and in 1847, 1,338,138 quarters; to which if we add about two-thirds for Galatz, and about the same quantity for the Turkish ports, we have a total of nearly three millions of quarters exported to Constantinople and different ports in Europe in the course of one year.—(Report of a Cornfactor of Constantinople.) This statement is exclusive of Varna and Roumelia.

testimony so consecutive, that no body of men, sitting down with the purpose of ascertaining the facts, can arrive at any other conclusion, save that of intentional falsification to serve the interests of a Foreign Power."

It was in the course of the foregoing transaction that was brought home to me the idea of treachery in the bosom of the British State and Cabinet. In this volume it is used as the Key of all transactions. It therefore appears to me that this is the place where I may be justified in approaching it directly, explaining the position in which I have been placed—the motives under which I have acted, and the steps which I have taken. I owe this as a duty to the reader, and I conceive that an impartial consideration of my statement is a duty which he owes to me.

In the course I have pursued I had no option. I had the misfortune to know what it would have been guilty to conceal. I was fully convinced that by discharging my duty I must incur obloquy; whilst by closing my lips I could have secured the highest objects of personal ambition. I was as one who by accident found himself in the midst of a conspiracy, or witness to the preparation of a murder. A portion of the circumstances to which I refer is before the reader. I may have been mistaken in my conclusions, but I acted upon them so as to bring to evidence their truth or my mistake. I laid them before my Sovereign.

The Minister, the object of the charge, immediately changed his course, and adopted the very measures which he had repudiated. It was my misfortune to believe this change to be real, within two years he had frustrated every measure he had adopted and had reverted to the course he had abandoned. It was then that I publicly proclaimed to the Nation what I had before privately presented to its Sovereign.

I now repaired a neglect of which I had been guilty—that of examining this Minister's previous conduct. It was not

till the month of June, 1838, that I read his speech delivered on the 1st of June, 1829, and which if it had fallen into my hands two years before would have entirely altered the Foreign Policy of this country; that speech was delivered when there was no suspicion abroad, yet that and similar speeches were of so striking a nature as to create suspicion even in the mind of Sir Robert Peel, who went so far as to insinuate that Lord Palmerston was then the Representative of Russia in the British Parliament. I next turned to his conduct on other fields; for this inquiry materials were supplied by the documents which then began to be poured forth, in consequence of the sudden expansion of England's diplomatic action. In every one I found the same result. Of these I published elaborate expositions which were re-echoed in the columns of the Leading Journals. No refutation in any case was attempted. I endeavoured by every means to bring the matter to adjudication. I appealed to Lord Melbourne, as head of the Government, and as member of the Privy Council: I did so to Sir R. Peel. The charge was made not figuratively, or in the spirit of invective; but practically, with a view to forcing an inquiry. Finally, after long endeavours, I succeeded in bringing it into the House.

These circumstances are at least evidence that my conviction was complete, and such a conviction had it regarded only the life or property of an individual, no conscientious man could despise.

The reception which the charge met with in the House affects neither my conduct nor the merits of the case; that belongs to the character of the body. "It is impossible to deny," says Mr. Macaulay, "that impeachment, though it is a fine ceremony, and though it may have been useful in the seventeenth century, is not a proceeding from which much good can now be expected. Whatever confidence may be placed in the decision of the Peers on an appeal arising out of ordinary litigation, it is certain that no man has the least confidence in their impartiality, when a great public func-

tionary, charged with a great state crime, is brought to their bar. They are all politicians. There is hardly one among them whose vote on an impeachment may not be confidently predicted before a witness has been examined: and, even if it were possible to rely on their justice, they would still be quite unfit to try such a cause." The authority of this writer will not be questioned as regards his knowledge of his time; and according to him the men who for all moral or political purposes control, or rather constitute England, are without character, and when not frivolous, dishonest. This is his judgment, not mine; for less than this he cannot imply when he denies the capacity of Parliament to entertain the gravest of charges and to perform the most solemn of duties.

The matter, however, was not dismissed as frivolous or vexatious, far less were proceedings taken against the two members by whom it was brought forward: public morality had not sunk to the pitch of pretending to inquire where they had resolved not to examine. The subject was simply dropped, and committed to the charge of the future historian.

Towards that history, however, a valuable contribution is furnished in Lord Palmerston's five hours' reply. It was continued during two sittings of the 28th of February and the 1st of March, and in it preeminently shine the elaborate memory and consummate tact of the speaker. But there is not a single assertion of his accuser refuted, or even met. It is composed of three portions—Silence, mystification, and superfluity: Silence where the charge was of a nature intelligible to the audience, such as, for instance, the note to Prince Talleyrand rejecting the proposed intervention on the part of France and Austria for the support of Poland, on the betrayal to the Russian Embassy of the Turkish communication of the draft of the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi; Mystification in respect to matters of which his audience knew nothing, a specimen of which we have just seen in reference to the Turkish Commercial Treaty; Superfluity, in

defending himself against a variety of charges not made, eight or nine in number.

By a process, "Parliamentary, but perhaps not the less discreditable," I was forced into speaking before him, and it was only after I was thus deprived of the faculty of reply, that he commenced his speech, in full security against any possibility of exposure.

A circumstance most significant is, that the accused Minister sought the member by whom the charge was made, and was content to accept his public co-operation and private friendship without the forms of recantation or apology. This is a fact to have weight, even in times when law is without force and public character a marketable commodity.

The member in question (Mr. Anstey) did not derive from me his judgment of the Minister: he to me expressed that judgment before he was aware of mine. In respect to matters which he derived from me, nothing could exceed the labour which he devoted to their examination, nor the close scrutiny which he applied to their details. Other legal gentlemen assisted in preparing the case. My entire correspondence, without the reservation of a single letter was placed conjointly in their hands, and whatever the motives which may now be attributed to Mr. Anstey, it is evident that his first object must have been to assure himself of the truth: his recent legal appointment by the present Government speaks for itself.

I cannot dismiss this matter without bearing my testimony to the admirable manner in which the case was handled. As an effort of memory it was stated by a veteran and most influential politician, to have exceeded any he had ever listened to in that House. It was no doubt called "a failure" by those who if they had capacity to comprehend had not courage to listen; but it will remain for aftertimes a landmark to guide the future historian through the mazes of their selfish dexterity and the quagmires of their ephemeral success.

Hallam has elaborately shown how the secrecy involved in

the Cabinet Council, renders judicial proof of malversation, or of treason next to an impossibility; but there is a still greater obstacle to moral evidence in the present admitted practice of carrying on public business by private letters, and giving, when they are given, public documents in extract; so that it is only in exceptional cases that in carrying out a purpose, the intention would require to be manifested, or that a trace of the proceeding need be left, after it has been effected.

Those exceptional cases, however, are sufficiently numerous and important to furnish all the proof that would be required were it not that the self-love of colleagues and opponents, and indeed of all the statesmen of this country and of the other countries of Europe is enlisted against the charge. The parties among the public cannot endure a reference of events to causes independent of those maxims by which each would rule the world; and the morality of the day reveals itself not in susceptibility for the honour of an accused Statesman, but in candour that denies the possibility of guilt.

The charge that is considered too heinous to be possible, is that of being "Russian," but certainly it has no claim to originality. It has for years been ringing through Europe, and turn by turn applied to Emperors, Editors, Sultans, Chartists, Viziers, Arch-Chancellors, Ministers, Ambassadors, Regents, Palatines, Primates, Bishops, Kings, and Dragomans. On no lips has it been found more often, or with more deadly effect, than on those of Lord Palmerston; he was, in fact, the first to give to it its odious character: by it he upset a dynasty in France; expelled a Regency from Greece; destroyed, or attempted to destroy, a ministry in Turkey, and always using it for Russia's ends. He has brought it against myself, but there is this difference between the two allegations, his was made in a whisper—mine openly proclaimed.

Nor do I stand alone in this. There are several members of the public service who have come to this conclusion, severally on their own grounds. If not universal it is a

very common opinion amongst European residents in the East. It was for a time at last entertained by Prince Metternich; a document published during the troubles of Vienna, show that it is entertained by M. Prokesch; it has been unhesitatingly asserted in the German Encyclopædia (Conversatzions Lexicon) and finally the present Government in England, constrained to admit him into the Cabinet, dare not confide to him the Foreign Department. What Minister has ever before been exposed to the like suspicions, and how could an English Minister be suspected without grounds?

The question is not one of condemnation but of inquiry—whether or not there be a *prima facie* case.

Note I.

DIFFERENCE OF THE TWO TREATIES ACCORDING TO LORD PALMERSTON, March 1, 1848.

(See p. 392.)

"This I will say, that the Treaty *as concluded does not differ in any material respect from the draft of the Treaty* as settled by the Board of Trade and by the Foreign Office, and as sent to Mr. Urquhart to be proposed to the Turkish Government."

"I can state to the house the differences between the draft of the Treaty sent out in consequence of communications between Mr. Urquhart, the Board of Trade, and the Foreign Office, and the treaty concluded by Lord Ponsonby. The draft provided that British goods should pay only the import duty of 3 per cent. after which they might be transported to, and sold in, any part of the Ottoman dominions, without any further payments. The Treaty in addition to the 3 per cent. import duty, laid on a further duty of 2 per cent. upon the transport and sale of goods; and beyond that no other duty is to be paid in any part of the Ottoman dominions. *This was one of the things to which in negotiation we were obliged to submit.* Nobody can suppose, especially in arranging commercial transactions between two countries, that you can go with a draft treaty in one hand, and a pen in the

other, and say to a Foreign Minister, 'There, Sir, sign that treaty, or jump out of the window.' You cannot do that, therefore, you must negotiate. *The draft makes no provisions with regard to foreign goods purchased* in Turkey by British subjects with the view of their being again sold in Turkey. *This was an omission in the draft* (!) but the Treaty provides that foreign goods so purchased may be resold upon the same conditions as Turkish goods (!). The draft allows the Porte to levy upon goods exported a duty *not exceeding the rate of* 3 *per cent.* (!); and in return it allows British subjects to purchase all kinds of goods in the Ottoman dominions either for resale or exportation, subject only to the payment of the transport duty on such goods, and to the tolls demanded for the maintenance of the roads along which the goods are conveyed: the *Treaty limits the export duty to* 3 *per cent.* (!), and admits of duties being levied upon goods purchased by British subjects for resale in Turkey to the same amount as those *levied upon subjects of the most favoured nations* (!). It further stipulates with *regard to goods re-exported*, and which may not have paid interior duties, that British subjects shall pay in lieu of such interior duties, one fixed duty of 9 per cent. (!). It was a great object with us *to abolish these interior duties* (!), which were a great obstacle *to the progress of British manufactured goods in Turkey*, and which, being made arbitrarily at the caprice of the Governors of the provinces, were uncertain in their amount, and excessively vexatious in their mode of being levied. The draft provides that NO duties shall be levied on goods *in transitu:* the Treaty *limits* the duties on goods *in transitu* to the 3 per cent. impost (!). The draft does not allude to the point I am now about to state. *The Treaty* specifies in detail the various ports of the Ottoman Empire at which it is applicable (!), and *records the consent of the Porte to other powers* settling their commercial matters upon the same basis (!). Of course it was intended to bring all other Powers within the same regulations; and this is the memorandum I have upon the draft (!). The above seems to be the essential points to be discussed. I think I have now stated enough with regard to the commercial Treaty."

Note II.

TURKISH COMMERCE.

The Prussian statistician, Hubner, makes the total exports of Turkey, for the year 1850, 13 millions, and its imports 10½ millions sterling.

	Imports from Turkey.	Exports to Turkey.
England	29,903,772	26,895,160
Austria	22,058,666	22,515,333
France	17,027,420	11,256,000
Russia	5,434,418	7,479,484
Belgium	293,330	1,036,533
Netherlands	571,360	458,000
Greece	1,312,500	333,000
United States	1,351,854	341,599
Hamburg	694,940	57,105
Bremen	70,601	5,635
Portugal	9,946	—
Prussian thalers	78,728,807	70,377,849

The exports from England have increased from 1830 to 1850 sixfold, the declared value being in the last year £3,100,000.

Since the opening of our ports for foreign grain our trade with Russia has diminished 50 per cent., that with Turkey has increased 50 per cent.; but no grain comes from those provinces of Turkey where the English Treaty has taken effect. We imported directly and indirectly, in 1850, from the Danube, above two millions of quarters, and sent to Brail and Galatz £998,000 value of goods.

LIMITATION OF THE SUPPLY OF GRAIN,

BY THE ACTION OF

BRITISH DIPLOMACY.

REPORT

OF THE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE,

NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE.

REPORT

OF THE

NEWCASTLE COMMITTEE.

15TH MARCH, 1855.

RESOLVED :—

1st. That the remedy for the wrongs from which this nation suffers in the restriction of the supply of grain, and other diplomatic malversations, cannot be waited for in the issue of speculative alterations in the constitution of the House of Commons, but must be promptly and efficaciously sought in the Laws enacted for the prevention and punishment of public crime.

2nd. That the important evidence of David Urquhart, Esq., taken in November last, as to the remedial resources which the legitimate institutions of this realm supply, be printed and published to guide the people in their present search for means of safety.

LIMITATION OF THE SUPPLY OF GRAIN BY THE PAST ACTION OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY.

EVIDENCE OF DAVID URQUHART, Esq.,

NOVEMBER, 1854.

The Chairman.—You stated at the public meeting on Wednesday, that the supply of grain had been cut off by the act of the English Government. In what countries, and to what facts did you refer?

Ans.—I referred to Poland, to the communication through the Danube, and to the Ottoman empire.

Qu.—In what position did the trade of Poland and England stand in 1830, and in what position afterwards?

Ans.—Before 1830 the Polish trade was free; that is to say it was not subject to the Russian tariff. By the treaty of Vienna the free interchange of the different portions of Poland was established; and consequently the commerce of England with Poland was a commerce based on regulations

independent of Russia; and the commerce of Poland was not subject to the restrictions of Russia, nor was the commerce of Poland part of the public wealth of the Russian empire. After the revolution the reverse was the case. Our treaty rights in Poland were extinguished; the power of Poland to regulate itself was destroyed; and it became matter of option to the Russian government to restrict exportation or to suffer it; itself benefiting by the wealth acquired, and by the taxes imposed.

Qu.—Do you believe that Poland could have maintained her independence if the English Government had remained quiescent?

Ans.—I do. I do not know if the Committee would wish me to illustrate the point.

Mr. Richardson:—If you please.

Ans.—At the period of the insurrection, and when the armies of Poland alone withstood the power of Russia, and maintained the contest for a considerable period balanced, the powers of Asia and of Europe, including all the neighbours of Russia became sorely alarmed, and in course of time prepared for an unconcerted but simultaneous action in support of Poland. Austria, who had long been alarming to Russia by the dread that she—Austria—might seek to establish an independent Poland for her own defence, (evidence of which will be found in the secret documents lately published by Prince Czartoryski and of which I may afterwards read a passage or two), Austria, I say, herself, joined in the plan of seizing an opportunity to restore Poland to a real independence. Negociations were entered into between that State and France, and the plan was only frustrated by the interposition of the British government. The British government in like manner withheld Sweden and Turkey; and moreover withheld Persia, causing her armies which had already marched, to return to their own territory under threat of war from England. So that, that spontaneous confederacy of nations to support Poland, still erect, was broken upon its several points by a secret threat of war directed against them by an English minister: all of which facts are of public record, that respecting Austria and Russia having been published; the whole statement which I now make having been made in the House of Commons on the 23rd of February, 1818, and having been replied to most elaborately by Lord Palmerston on the 1st of March in the same year,—in the course of which he does not deny one of these statements, but justifies them on this ground, that severally these states being weaker than Russia, by preventing them from attacking her, he had saved them from the consequences of their after partition. That debate with Lord Palmerston's reply I have had reprinted, and I have given several copies of it for the perusal of the members of this association.

Qu.—Do you believe that the independence of Poland might have been saved without having recourse to war?

Ans.—Certainly. I may farther add, that Russia could have designed nothing against Poland unless she was perfectly secure of the English government.

Qu.—Supposing it was requisite, do you believe it to have been the duty of England to undertake a war for the maintenance of Poland?

Ans.—I do, Sir, but perhaps you wish me, as in the last question, to go beyond a mere affirmative. It is upon the sacrifice of Poland that depends the power of Russia—not material power which she legitimately possesses, but that insidious power which she holds without any legitimate claim, and which resides in the prostration of law throughout Europe. It is by implicating partners in the guilt of the sacrifice of Poland that she has got possession of the cabinets of the continent, and independently of the corruption she has established in their

breasts, has laid prostrate all ideas of resistance to her from the dread of her power being associated with internal revolution. Poland is therefore a millstone around the neck of Europe, which in course of time, and with proper management, must sink it. The danger was that Poland was too far gone for any resuscitating effort. But when the chance was afforded to governments that had not shared in its spoils, of an effort of the people itself to recover its life—and when those governments, or at least one of those governments who had shared in its spoils, came to offer a surrender of its share, and urge the reconstruction of the whole—the danger was over, and a facile triumph offered. The question of war was not therefore one that would have entailed any sacrifices: but I say if there were any sacrifices that could have been entailed by a war to restore the rights of Poland, and England did not make these, then it was useless for her to have fleets and armies, and vain for her to speak of public law.

Qu.—Do you believe that in submitting to this new system introduced by Russia into Poland the English government was guilty of a misdemeanour or a crime?

Ans.—I imagine that you refer, not to the political, but to the commercial part, a distinction most essential. The violation of the independence of Poland was a matter not connected with the treaty of Vienna, or any other treaty in the world; it touched our perfect rights, the surrender of which involved a great crime. But besides this there was another unobserved crime: to suffer the Russian government to impose on its Polish provinces, even after conquering and incorporating them, its own tariff, was a violation of the laws of England—was a high crime and misdemeanour, and consequently ought to have been punished as such.

Qu.—Is the public law of Europe applicable to such circumstances?

Ans.—The public law of Europe is virtually null, because we do not understand its application. I refer to that public law which gives to every State the power of resisting wrong. But there is another law, the written one—based upon treaties; and as at the treaty of Vienna all prior contracts were deliberately and of *purpose prepense* set aside, the whole of that written law consists in these mere enactments. In the treaty of Vienna the most salient point, the constructive point on which the whole rested, was the establishment of the kingdom of Poland; this being swept away you of course have no public law at all.

Qu.—In what consists the interruption of the navigation of the Danube?

Ans.—The navigation of that river has been interrupted by three causes. The one is the interference of Russia with the internal regulations of the Turkish provinces of the Danube; another is the obstruction of the river itself; and the third is the direct interference of the Russian government by enactments. The first is based upon rights supposed to be deduced from the treaty of Adrianople, a treaty created by a war in which England destroyed the naval forces of Turkey, and left her open to the attacks of her assailant; that assailant was bound by the most solemn of compacts with England and France not to seek, and not to acquire any privileges, possessions, or advantages of any kind. The second is connected with the same cause, for the Delta at the mouth of the Danube is held under the treaty of Adrianople. Having this position she has allowed the sand to accumulate. She has either allowed nature to do its work or she has assisted it, so as to obstruct the passage for vessels; being bound at the same time to England to observe the same conditions as were observed by the Turks in the possession of this territory before she occupied it. For you must know that a territory passing from the posses-

sion of one government to another carries with it any obligation with which it was charged. The third is the Ukase of February 1836, commanding all vessels trading to the Danube to repair to the port of Odessa, 150 miles distant, and in Russian territory, there to perform quarantine. This manifest violation of the law of nations at the time roused general indignation throughout the country—more than any act which occurred before or since. Numerous petitions were presented to the House of Commons on the subject, and a motion was made by Patrick Stewart, equivalent to pledging the government to resist the aggression. The government obtained the withdrawal of this motion by declaring itself ready to do that which was required of them of their own impulse. Nothing was done, the excitement died away; it was forgotten. The Ukase remained in force; a charge was made by the Russian consulate upon vessels leaving Liverpool and London. For small vessels of 150 tons to be allowed to pass without undergoing the quarantine at Odessa as much as £50 was paid. The effect of these measures has been to impose a charge amounting to two dollars per ton upon vessels navigating that river—to diminish the size of the vessels that are able to enter, and to increase immensely the charges for insurance, not only because of the increased difficulty of the navigation, but from the prolongation of the period of service in so unhealthy a spot. The effects on the corn trade can only be approximately estimated; but they are dependent entirely on the submission of England to the illegal acts of Russia, directed not against Turkey, but against England herself. Let me add, that this case is detailed in one of the blue books published in the year 1853, entitled "Correspondence in reference to the navigation of the Danube," the perusal of which I would suggest, and the examination of which should be part of the business of the Committee. They will there find that there was no attempt at resistance on the part of the English government to any of the measures of Russia; but on the contrary, that the English government takes its ground on every act of Russia to enforce submission on the part of Turkey and of Austria. And it has gone to this extent. It effaced the Vice-consulate at the mouths of the Danube as dependent on the Ottoman dominions, and positively made it dependent on the English Consul-general of Odessa, thereby transferring the jurisdiction, as far as it could, to the Russian government. But in this remarkable series of letters (they are not long), I would call attention to this—that all knowledge of the Ukase was suppressed, as also all the attempts of the nation to obtain redress, the submission of the case to the law officers of the crown, and their opinions upon it—in fact the whole question is suppressed in this correspondence? for this case took place in 1836—the remainder are but the corollaries. The correspondence *opens with the year* 1849.

Qu.—What was the amount of the trade so interrupted?

Ans.—I have anticipated this question to a certain degree. The trade so restricted has increased enormously, but it otherwise might have been doubled. It is this vast importation, amounting to 1,500,000 quarters, which has chiefly urged Russia on her present invasion.

Qu.—You stated at the public meeting, that the resources of Turkey are very great and undeveloped; that the Turkish government wish to open its ports, but fearing Russia, applied to England for her co-operation; and that the English minister frustrated the objects of the Porte, and forced it to sign a treaty imposing prohibitory duties on its own exports. Have you any documents to substantiate these assertions? This being a very important question to the people of this country, of course it is natural that we should like to know on what basis these assertions rest.

Ans.—The documents connected with this transaction are public. They are contained in three blue books, under the title of "Correspondence relative to the Turkish Commercial Convention;" they are questions addressed by the English government in various subsequent years after the conclusion of the treaty to merchants and consuls, in order that they might get some understanding of their own treaty; and in the course of some of those questions and answers, some of which are from the ambassador, and some from the consuls general, consuls, and merchants—you gain a knowledge of all the facts. The treaty itself is published. The allegations which I made the other evening were made in the House of Commons. There they stand, and beside them may be placed Lord Palmerston's replies, which were given on the same day, and in continuation on the 1st March, 1848. So much for the transaction itself. These are the documents to which I refer, but I also detailed the circumstances connected with the history of this affair, which of course are not published;—they are, I may almost say, the principal materials which I had prepared for the impeachment of that minister, if the House of Commons had not escaped from the dilemma by dropping the matter. But there are many of the documents connected with this transaction in my possession—quite enough to substantiate in every point my statement. Some few have been published, but all those that are in my possession, have at various times been open to the study of individuals coming to me for information. They are open to any one whom the Committee may appoint in London to examine, read, report, or even to make extracts from them; but as there have been one or two statements of these documents which have appeared at different times, I may refer you to the pamphlet which is on your table, ("Mystery of the Danube") as containing an authentic statement in so far as it goes—not as merely flying words pronounced at the public meeting, but as deliberately set down and consigned to print. That statement is in the hands of the Committee, and they can judge of its credibility from its contents; they can then interpret according to their wisdom, the absence of a reply to these charges. And as in that pamphlet, there is Lord Palmerston's own reply, they have both sides of the question before them.

Qu.—You have anticipated the question I was going to ask—whether any of these documents were available. Had you any part in these negotiations?

Ans.—Yes. The matter was one which originated with myself, and was adopted neither in the first instance by the Turkish government, nor in the second by the English, except after a very great amount of labour had been expended, and after, of course, all the fallacies had been exposed, and all the objections removed, which have always to be met in urging measures great and new, and which at the same time, directly strike at powerful interests no less than powerful prejudices. I state this, to show that it was not lightly undertaken, to be abandoned with equal facility, but a grave and serious decision.

Qu.—In what capacity did you act, or in what position?

Ans.—When I first formed the plan, I was employed on a secret mission by the English government—a mission which gave me large roving power, so to say, and in accordance with it, I ought to have proceeded in my inquiries through Central Asia; but the interest that arose on that subject, and various others connected with our relations with Turkey, caused my delay, and finally postponed my journey eastward: so that the sanction of the English government was entirely given to the measures which I was urging on the Porte—though these measures were entirely my own—though adopted without the suggestion of the Cabinet—I may say in opposition to all its opinions; but for some reason or other they found it necessary to support me, some by convic-

tion, others by necessity. In that pamphlet there is a letter which will justify what I say, and as such I will read it. It is addressed by Lord Ponsonby, the English Ambassador in Turkey, to Dr. Millingen, physician to the seraglio, and who was at the time employed by the English government as intermediary. This letter is at page 60 in the pamphlet, it is as follows:—

"My Dear Sir,—By Mr. Urquhart's desire, I forward you a letter for Moosheer Ahmed Pasha, and also a copy of a memoir respecting the commercial system of this country, &c.

"This memoir, I think, deserves to be minutely explained to the Pasha, and studied by him.

"I am of opinion, that were it acted upon in its main points, it would produce the most magnificent results to the Ottoman Empire.

"The latter part of the memoir states the mode of acting, to which I have always looked as the certain and effectual means whereby to defeat Russia—means most easy to be applied by us, and which, in the application, will produce great benefit to England: independent of their political action.

"Yours' very faithfully,

"Ponsonby."

This was my position when the Turkish government decided to apply to England for her concurrence to a treaty of commerce, by which the trade of Turkey should be emancipated, and the export of raw materials permitted, the prohibition of which had been obtained by secret means by Russia. At the very moment this matter was brought to a head, I was removed from Constantinople by a private order from Lord Palmerston to the effect that I was disturbing the peace of Europe. I returned to this country, but I found on my way, they had displaced Mr. Cartwright, a distinguished functionary, and appointed me to the consulate at Constantinople. That post was of course a most important one in commercial affairs, and it seemed a complete justification of my views with regard to trade. However, on my rejection of that office, I found myself completely destitute of any means of enforcing this matter, so long as the government of the Duke of Wellington remained in power. On the return of the other government to office, the Turkish Ambassador having in the meantime come to England, and being directed to act as I should tell him—that being in fact his only instruction—after I had succeeded in getting the favourable disposition of a number of persons connected with the foreign department, and influential members of the government—the two under Secretaries of State, the designated envoy in Persia, two of the principal persons in the Board of Trade; these, with the King himself and his private Secretary, being all warmly and zealously engaged in the same matter, I thought the time was come to present the project to the Government formally. The foreign minister being then Lord Palmerston, the answer which he gave to Nouri Effendi, the Turkish Ambassador, was, that this project was a Russian Project. It was of course to be supposed that the ambassador would not communicate such a fact to me. But there was a person connected with the embassy who was so indignant, and so suspicious of the truth, that he came to me, and informed me of what had occurred. There has been brought out on another occasion, a letter of mine written within a couple of days, and addressed to the private Secretary of the King. If you please, I will read it.

[*Extract.*] "To Sir Herbert Taylor.

"*January 20th*, 1835."

"I have just been dismayed to learn that Nouri Effendi has written to Constantinople, expressing all the discouragement and despair, that Lord Palmerston had filled him with at their last interview, particularly his Lordship's observation, that my proposal for the tariff, that has cost so much to bring to the pitch where it now is, was a *Russian proposal*. This indeed is an act of suicide, and I am most anxious to know your opinion on the subject. Unless you have gained Lord Palmerston entirely—unless he understands the fault he has committed, I do not see what chance there is of my being of any the slightest use, as serving the Government, and on the other hand, I am sacrificing myself and the question.

"I have just learnt, also, that the mission of Ellis is in a state of abeyance, and that MacNeill has come to the resolution of resigning his situation, unless the government adopts a more worthy policy."

The sovereign of England still possesses complete power over his servants, to the limit of his own knowledge.—This letter was nothing less than a charge of betrayal—there was no interval for the minister between averting the consequences of the discovery, or undergoing them. It so happened that this charge, that the treaty of commerce was a Russian proposal, led to my being appointed Secretary of Embassy of Constantinople. When I was appointed, I then urged its resumption on the part of England—or it might have been before—because the fact of my appointment was immaterial, considering the relations in which I stood with the Government. I never executed any official duty, and therefore I may be mistaken in the order of precedence in the facts I am now referring to; but before or after this appointment, I was engaged in urging the adoption of this treaty of commerce as an English measure, and so proposing it to Turkey—that is, to make the English Government adopt as its own, and propose to Turkey this very measure, which when proposed by Turkey to England, it had rejected as a Russian proposal. After a time, and after this circumstance—and after a still graver one, the treaty was so adopted. To my surprise I was then told, that having been adopted by the Foreign Office, I must fight now with the Board of Trade. I had, therefore, to commence the whole thing over again. I had to draw out tables and explanations—to stand and wait days and weeks, for a moment of interview with one and another, and use many other means requisite—I had to soften, to mollify and influence Mr. Poulett Thomson, and not without success. However, after some two or three months, on my forcing my way unwillingly into his presence, he said to me with great vehemence, (striking his hand on a copy of the Portfolio, in which was an article of mine on the facility of controlling Russia by means of her trade) "thank God for every hundred-weight of tallow from Russia; every such hundred-weight is an additional pledge of peace." I have given enough to show the general nature of the conversation; and on retiring, I went straight to the foreign office, and detailed it to Mr. Backhouse. So strictly do I remember the circumstances, that I have the impression of his countenance now drawn before me. He submitted what seemed a fit suggestion—that I should draw up a statement of the conversation, and of the facts, and address it to Lord Palmerston to be put in circulation. The word "put in circulation" means a communication which passes from one cabinet minister to another. I consequently drew up upon the spot a letter—I am not sure whether it was to Mr. Backhouse or Lord Palmerston—I rather think it was to Mr. Backhouse himself. It is on record, and if you conduct this inquiry, so as to give it

character and worth, you can have it. In that letter the charge is as fairly made as words can make it. It was put in circulation, and Mr. Poulett Thomson required my dismissal or threatened his own resignation. But the result of accusing Mr. Poulett Thomson of serving the Emperor of Russia was exactly the same as in the case of Lord Palmerston. In three days the Board of Trade accepts the treaty. Now the treaty was to the effect, that the exports of Turkey should be subject to a duty to be regulated for each particular article by a commission of merchants, who should take as their rule the margin of difference of price between Turkey and Europe; so that the Turkish government might have the benefit of the export duty on articles which were peculiarly the produce of that country—exactly as England puts a heavy duty on cinnamon in Ceylon—while at the same time it left entirely free those articles which competed with the trade of the rest of the world. This was the clause, by the insidious change of which, this treaty was altered to what you now see it, an alteration which only a Russian hand could have effected, because no other man understood it. That clause was altered to this—that in addition to three per cent. hitherto received, an additional rate of nine per cent. should be levied as compensation for monopolies and transport duties abolished, a committee of merchants, appointed every five years, to establish the tariff according to this rate. In the course of the negociation with Mr. Poulett Thomson, he had offered to abandon his hostility to the treaty, and so enable it to pass, if I would concur in imposing ten per cent. on Turkish produce. The treaty, as it passed was with two per cent. more than the proposed duty of Mr. Poulett Thomson. But then in estimating the rate, the sum in money at twelve per cent. a novel process was tried. They took the prices at Constantinople, which are much higher than in the rest of the empire. They have no canals or railways there—communications are difficult, and transport is carried on at great expense. Besides there are toll charges as in London, and there are peculiar forms which are cumbersome as well as expensive; and therefore provisions are very high in the capital—the common average price of grain is double that of the threshing floors throughout the country. Now the English government required that the scale should be adopted according to the prices of Constantinople. Thus the duty upon grain instead of being twelve per cent. became in reality twenty-five per cent. But I am answering a question in reference to the position I occupied. I see I have gone beyond it.

Mr. Wake.—With regard to these merchants: Were they merchants in London—merchants of this country?

Ans.—British merchants of the country. I was saying that I was acting, in the second period, as Secretary of Embassy of the English Government. I had thus not merely a connexion with the question as having originated it, but also an official connexion. I also had the fortune to enjoy the confidence of the monarchs of both countries. This gave me the means of knowing the secret action on both sides. I have now given the history of the transaction, as well as my own connexion with it, but I should leave it incomplete if I were not to add the reason why the Turkish Government accepted this treaty, so contrary to the one I had proposed. I am able to give that reason from the mouth of the minister himself. On my last visit to Constantinople—on seeing the Grand Vizier—my first words were, "How was it possible for you to sign that treaty?" His reply was, "We did not know;" and then he added, "And what could we do?" I said, "Which was it—ignorance or bribery?" He answered with bitterness, "We were told that upon that condition alone we

should be supported against Egypt." With this I think I have completed the case.

Mr. Richardson.—What would have been the effect upon the corn trade of the adoption of this treaty, as originally designed?

Ans.—The effect would have been to change the elements of that trade, The idea occurred to me first of the availability of Turkey in the course of the year 1834. A famine having afflicted Southern Russia, the neighbouring Turkish districts, which never before had exported any grain, sent in immense quantities to supply the necessities of Russia. On examining further into the matter, I saw that there was no restriction of that description which, in Europe, embarrasses agricultural enterprise, either in reference to fiscal system or tenure; the extent of arable land was immense. I then came to inquire what cause had chained and concealed these resources, and found, at last, that their non-employment depended upon small and minute cob-webs, in the shape of regulations which had to be searched for with microscopic eyes. In the course of this inquiry I was put in possession, by the Turkish Government, of all the communications which had passed since the year 1798, in matters of trade, with Austria, England, and Russia. Now as the countries, under the sway of the Sultan, lie much nearer to the ports of Europe than Russia; as the rich countries of Russia lie further from the ports of Europe than the limits of her own terrritories; there is a difference of transport, both by sea and land, which would always give the preference, *cæteris paribus*, to Turkish produce. The Turkish system of taxes is more simple than the Russian, and the merchants' returns are effected without those obstructions by a high tariff which, interrupting the one trade, interferes with the other. If there be a cargo of grain in a Turkish port, and another in a Russian port, and the cargo in the Turkish port is 5 per cent. dearer than in the Russian port, and the distance and freight are equal, still this Turkish cargo is sold in preference to the Russian, because in the return value for the latter, more than the difference of 5 per cent. is lost by the English remitter. Russia does not take or purchase goods to an amount equivalent to what she sends, but only one-fifth. She prohibits your goods, only seeking to sell the raw material. Turkey does the reverse; so that the amount of her imports is always the amount of her ability to purchase. If you put together cheapness, climate, distance, and facility of return, you will see that the cobweb obstructions being removed, and the removal of course could be effected by a word from England, the corn trade would have passed to Turkey—passed at one swoop. But all the other raw produce of Russia was equally furnishable by Turkey. It is a remarkable fact that the prohibitions in Turkey are solely on those articles which come in competition with Russia, leaving free all that does not. Your question refers to grain, I said the supply in Turkey was equal to any demand; take the year 1847, the scarcity of Europe was relieved solely by Turkey; that is, the amount supplied on that occasion unexpectedly by Turkey, prevented famine from becoming perfectly frightful. The supply from Turkey amounted to as much, and one quarter more, than that of Russia from her southern ports. Turkey supplied all this corn because the increase of price was equal to the 25 per cent. tax. The increase of price in Europe, had just the effect of abrogating the Turkish duty for that year. Now in the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, you have seen that they have the year before last exported one and a-half million quarters. Egypt exported to England alone 700,000 qrs.; the Provinces south of the Danube exported in 1847, 2,000,000 qrs. We may thus estimate Turkey, independently of Asia Minor or Syria, as able at present to furnish between 3 and 4,000,000 quarters. The productive power of Turkey in conse-

quence of the tariff does not admit of exportation from a greater distance than fifty miles from the ports of shipment. In Wallachia and Moldavia, it does not range more than ten miles from the water communication with the Danube. By the calculations of Mr. Joanesco an increase of ten per cent. in the price would suffice to double the amount of grain for exportation. In regard therefore to quantity, Turkey, under my treaty, would have been now supplying the whole of Europe. Now as to price; I have already referred to this point in one sense, namely, the lowness of price comparatively with Russia, as transferring the trade which Russia now enjoys to Turkey. But this supposes the maintenance of prices at their present level, or at all events the non-interference with ordinary rates by the relative supply of Russia and Turkey. But the amount which Turkey can supply, and the variety of fields from which it is derived, would make the competition no longer between Russia and Turkey, but between the different parts of Turkey itself. This opens a matter, which casts into insignificance every question which has been discussed for the last twenty years. It was stated by me at one of these recent public meetings, and I now restate it, that on Mr. Cobden's visit to Turkey in 1840, these facts were placed within his knowledge; and I have the authority of Mr. Whittle, principal British merchant at Smyrna, for what I am about to state. He himself placed in his hands a statement of charges in case the trade had been free, by which it appeared that average wheat from Asia Minor could be landed at the port of Dublin at nineteen shillings and, I think, sixpence a quarter. With such a remunerative price, and the field so extensive, it is clear that the price of grain must have greatly fallen, and that fluctuations in England would henceforward have depended only on a failure of harvests in Turkey; you had only not to frustrate insidiously what was already in your hand, to obtain a gigantic reservoir of corn. You might have had the grain of Europe permanently at—say 30 or 35 shillings a quarter. The effect of shutting out this trade might be supposed to be only leaving things as they were. But it was not so: the condition of Europe was undergoing a change since 1836. There is a demand—an enormous demand, which did not exist then—a demand for grain grown in lands foreign to the people who eat it. The facilities obtained by machinery do not equally extend to agriculture; consequently, we must have a constant over-reaching of our manufacturing population beyond our agricultural resources. I am not entering into the reasons for not having a supply of food within ourselves, I refer to no measure of policy, but to the absolute necessity of having the means of supplying the demand for food present and future, from other sources than Russia. By stopping the export of grain from Turkey, you are placing this country at the mercy of that power which will have a monopoly of this commodity in proportion as you become more and more dependent on foreign supplies. Poland was the great supplying country of Europe; you have given Poland to Russia: next to that region come those, the outlet of which is by the Danube; you have allowed Russia to usurp the Danube. Now you have given Turkey also to her. The process employed on each field can only be rendered familiar by the analogy of forgery or assassination. However, there was a portion of Turkey that did export grain, because your minister could not reach it, that was Egypt. Mehemet Ali was a man among puppets, and could not be played with as the—Sultan, or the Queen, or the people of England. He laughed your Treaty to scorn. In Wallachia and Moldavia too it was not accepted, because Austria would not admit of it. Austria is the only power that has ever resisted Russia. The control of Russia over the Lower Danube so disturbed her internal tranquility that she could not endure it. Now Russia has purchased her off, on this very point. By that very act, which you imagine to be a proof of Austria's opposition to Russia, she receives the price of her fidelity to Russia.

In 1834, when as yet not a cargo of grain had reached England from the Danube, I dared to say—give me Wallachia and Moldavia and I will extinguish Russia. In the following year the first vessel came—the year after, fifteen—the year after that, thirty-seven. Preparations were made for the most unbounded shipments, when down came the Russian Ukase of the 7th February. But after a pause, again exportation recommenced, and grain went pouring out until in the beginning of last year there was ready for shipment one million and a half of quarters. The Russian troops came in and ate it. The grain trade was ruined in those provinces, but it went to Odessa, the streets of which were deserted the day before. The Russian trade had been swamped by the Wallachian trade—by the trade of those provinces now taken possession of by Austria. Every step is complete for the accomplishment of the work of Russia, whether in extinguishing the power of producing or in taking the produce as her own; depriving you of grain except through her sufferance, and making you pay for it the highest.

Qu.—By the Secretary.—You mean that the English minister effected an alteration of the law so inimical to the interests of England and Turkey, for the sole purpose of advancing the ends of Russia?

Ans.—For that sole purpose.

Qu.—Is it your opinion that the export duties upon the produce of Turkey would materially diminish the demand and remuneration for labour in this country?

Ans.—Most certainly. It would diminish the demand for labour in as far as it diminished its remuneration, affecting the direct trade with Turkey, and the trade of England with other parts of the world. You will observe, that the export of our goods depends entirely on the rate at which we can sell them; and the rate at which we can sell them depends on many considerations; but one is, the price of food. The effect of rendering food very dear would be, to stop the exportation of manufactures altogether, and would force every country and every village to manufacture for itself. The increase of the price of grain by means of these duties, is one thing, but without ever being levied, they prevent the existence of a mass of grain on the fields of Turkey. They therefore prevent the introduction of that grain into England. They therefore prevent the exportation of the manufactures that would be called into existence to pay for this grain. These duties, in annihilating by anticipation this mass of grain, raise the price of all grain more or less—it may be as we see—to a very great degree. It has been calculated that last year £25,000,000 were sacrificed in England alone by the increase in the value of grain, created by the entrance of Russia into the Danubian provinces. Consequently, every working man throughout the land was made to pay to the Emperor of Russia, or by his act £4 10s. It is a curious fact that at the present moment, you have the direct export trade to the Levant not diminished, and the export trade to most other countries of the world, in the last few months, diminished. At the present moment you are suffering in consequence of a restriction of orders, connected of course with the increase in the price of grain.

Qu.—Would it not be the interest of the landowners of this country to impede the introduction of grain into the country?

Ans.—This is a very important question, but it is general. Make your question specific.

Mr. Bain.—Has not our government, being composed of landed aristocracy, an object in conniving with Russia to prevent exports of grain from Turkey?

Ans.—You mean to say that the government acts for one class of the interests of British subjects.

Qu.—Was the object of frustrating the Turkish treaty to serve the landed aristocracy by preventing grain from coming in cheap?

Ans.—No. The landed aristocracy had no more to say in the matter than the people or the crown, or the colleagues of the minister. There were in the matter but two purposes and two persons—the one the connexion, whatever it may be, of Lord Palmerston with Russia, and the other the connexion of Mr. Poulett Thomson with the Baltic trade. But I can give an answer conclusive in fact; at the time that this treaty was frustrated, and during the four years of anxious negociation in the course of which this affair was managed, corn was not admitted free into England, nor did any man imagine at the time the possibility of its being admitted free; for the aristocracy in this country was supposed to be a powerful body, and it was not its interest that corn should be admitted free.

Qu.—By the Secretary.—Is the treaty in operation at the present time?

Ans.—Yes.

Mr. Wakc.—It extends to all countries, as well as England?

Ans.—The most remarkable part of the transaction is this. The treaty professes to be a concession made by England of a higher duty in consequence of the Porte abolishing its monopolies and internal duties. That is the pretence.

Qu.—Is it made in that form, that it appears to be a Turkish project?

Ans.—It appears as though it were a demand made by England for the benefit of Turkish trade. As if she had said,—here I will make a concession of my rights. If you will give up internal duties, I will give up my rights, and pay a large sum. So soon as the Porte consented to this treaty, it gave up all monopolies for all nations as well as England. Therefore there was no reason why any nation should go and impose on their own trade with Turkey a threefold duty, when the equivalent was already granted. I do not mean to say there was a *bonâ fide* negociation, because it was the Turks who wanted to, and did abolish their monopolies before the treaty was executed. The terms of the treaty are false. You gave the additional 9 and 2 per cent. for nothing at all, because Turkey had already abolished monopolies. But how comes it that France—Austria—all the powers of Europe rush in crying, "We will join too; pray do not leave us out." No romance was ever penned or devised equal to this.

Qu.—But had not the Turks themselves power not to levy this twelve per cent?

Ans.—Allow me to go on with the story you have opened. Of course it was Russia's object to get the treaty generally accepted. She has agents in every cabinet. She manages everything throughout the world. It is difficult for you to understand this; but observe here is a suicidal treaty, and every power joins it except Russia! You have the subjects of every other power going to Russian subjects and paying a per centage to allow their goods to pass in their names. The story of the adhesion of France is as follows,—the French merchants held a meeting and protested against the adoption of it by France, the Ambassador sent it home; he then received orders to sign a treaty similar to the English. He delayed doing so, and wrote again stating that the English treaty was very objectionable, and that much better terms could be obtained. He got a peremptory order in reply, to listen to no communications on the subject, that this was a matter settled because it was a concession made to the friendship of England. It was not Russia that apparently acted; it was England—or rather the English minister. England and Russia were at that time on the most intimate terms; but England spares no endeavour with Russia for her to join. By standing out she made the world believe that it was hostile to her. It was put forward in the Queen's speech as an unparalleled victory *over Russia*. It was paraded in all the journals of Europe as a most marvellous stroke of policy, and as the most fatal defeat to Russia

that had ever occurred. This treaty, in which all Europe combines, has just this effect: it leaves Russia, who had not joined, free from every charge which it voluntarily imposes on the subjects of every other state. Those Blue Books to which I have referred consist of answers given by merchants and officials on the spot—answers given to the bewildered government which asks the meaning of its act. I will give one of the answers. Here is the testimony of Colonel Rose. [Mr. U. here read an extract.] Therefore the adoption of this treaty by the other powers is evidence that it was Russia's wish they should do so. Russia is not original; she does not design things. The new plan has only arisen from the necessity of the circumstances I have detailed. Had my measure been adopted she would have been extinguished. She remained outside so long as that posture was requisite. Then she turns round without noise and tumult—signs a parallel treaty with Turkey, so that Europe should not feel the irritating effects of the privileges Russia enjoyed in consequence of its triumph over her. I cannot conclude the answer to such a question as this, without inviting you to consider the intellectual materials of which Europe is composed—of the texture of which you can judge by drawing the threads of a part.

Qu.—Has not Turkey the power to destroy this treaty?

Ans.—Of course she has the power at any time to do so. The treaty does not impose on her the necessity of exacting this duty. But from the reply I have given you, you will see that there is Russia—the man; the rest is a world of fools. The Turkish government was under the impression that it had to execute this treaty to the letter. These new imposts on trade are unlawful. The Turks have withdrawn from the farms which are so left in the hands of that miserable body of miscreants called Christians—Greeks and Armenians—to whom £500,000 yearly go under the treaty, and they know how to corrupt therewith the government. In May last I received a communication from those who are striving against this evil in Constantinople, stating that they had great hopes of having this twelve per cent. abrogated. They have great terror for the English embassy. They have no fear of the Russian. Of course this was one of the reasons for Russia's crossing the Pruth.

Qu.—Would it not be an object for this Society to send an envoy to Turkey in the person of yourself, to suggest the abolition of this treaty?

Ans.—If I were to answer that question it would be travelling a little beyond the limits prescribed to inquiries of this kind; but, if you like, I will say what is suggested?

Qu.—What plan would you suggest to rid Turkey of the duty on corn? Would it not be advisable to send an envoy to Turkey for that purpose, as soon as we are in a position to do so?

Ans.—I believe that there is nothing that is not in the power of this Association. It depends entirely on the character and capacity of the men who form it. I believe that the case is so grave, and the necessity so great; the means of influencing men's minds which it may become possessed of so varied and powerful—the facilities of action, when once it has formed for itself that purpose, so universal—that it may change, not merely the policy of the English Government, but the character of the British nation. If you observe institutions which have power and value, you will never be able to trace their origin, because such institutions have arisen out of some necessity, have so come into being, and been consecrated by use. We are in a condition, where our institutions, such as they are, are far beyond the reach of our repairing. We are in a case where danger is presented to us as a motive. It is a circumstance in which the nation may be re-made, if it finds men equal to the task. If you possess yourselves of the sources of that danger, you will find in that know-

ledge the means of counteracting it. The difficulty in this land—I know from my own experience—is to obtain adjudication—and no other. It has been well said by the first writer of our times, that "the first object of our institutions is to obtain adjudication in each case." I have found—by the accident of knowing what is done in our times—that adjudication is not to be obtained, either in the institutions or dispositions of the people. Knowing of public crimes, I have gone to one man, and he would not heed it; and to another, and he could not act; one has not the power, and another has not the inclination; and so the case is always dropped for want of the means of adjudication. For the first time I am examined on these facts, and, therefore, I recognize the existence of a tribunal. You may consider this tribunal of no value, because it has no constituted authority. I reckon its value by that of the matters it undertakes to examine. No doubt a direct appeal to Turkey would be an easy means of attempting to abrogate a particular fact, but what is involved in the whole transaction is nothing less than the crime of treason, which the people of this country do not seem to understand. That meaning is what you understand of a house where there is poison in the kitchen—of a firm where there is a forger at the desk—of a fortress where a traitor watches on the tower, or guards the gate. This is the nature of the crime involved in the act here before you. Treason cannot exist in any state till its character is perverted. It is perverted by judicial blindness, it can be restored only by judicial sight. This investigation to-night is the first indication of a glimmer of light; and if you pursue it to the end it will be heard of hereafter: if not, it will pass away like so many other beginnings. I hope you may have emissaries to send to Constantinople and other places, and to do good at home as well as abroad.

Qu.—Do I understand that the fact of sending an embassy to Constantinople, to advise the Porte to abolish the duty, would be looked at in this country in the light of treason?

Ans.—You mean to ask whether the Government would consider it as a breach of the law? I should say—most decidedly not. Whoever has the knowledge of Lord Palmerston's guilt is gifted with impunity. There is no man who has charged him with guilt, who—choosing to accept it—has not received place and office. As to prosecution, I have tried every means to get it, but in vain! The Turkish Association formed in London, took my letter to the Circassians and published it, appending to it the names of three of their own members, that they might bring into evidence the Government's inability to prosecute where that prosecution would be putting themselves on trial for treason.

Qu.—By the Secretary.—You said at one of the meetings last week, that England had no commercial knowledge. In what sense did you use the term?

Ans.—The merchants of this country may understand over-reaching one another in a matter of individual trade; but Russia understands over-reaching them in a matter of general regulation.

Mr. Wake.—She carries the scheme a little higher?

Ans.—You have individual knowledge of business; but you have no comprehension either of commercial rights or of commercial policy. Commerce is only one branch of many that constitute the elements of diplomacy: therefore, commerce cannot be understood or practised by itself. For a nation to advance its ends by commercial means, that nation must be in possession of all talents, and knowledge. Russia is in the possession of that knowledge and those talents, and she uses them against you. You cannot have better evidence of this, than that this treaty was accepted with joy by the merchants of Constantinople; and in twelve months every man who put his name to the laudatory address had gone through the Gazette. For my part, I never saw an English merchant

who knew anything of trade. When I began working in this matter not one town possessed a single treaty of commerce. I would give one instance. At a dinner party in Glasgow, I spoke of the intense interest with which Russia regarded the troubles in Sicily. I was asked by one, what Russia could have to do with Naples? I said if a politician asked me that question, I could understand it, but I could not understand a merchant asking it. He said I dont know what a merchant has to do with Russia. I said, a merchant should know that the quarrel between England and Naples puts 1¼ millions sterling into Russia's pocket every year; because the merchant, knowing whence oil and tallow come, knows that the restriction upon the oil tends to increase the price of, and demand for tallow. Russia, by commerce, will achieve her ends. She has already, without any commercial resources, made herself a commercial nation—because her trade is not the result of her natural resources, but of her capacity for management.

Mr. Wake.—I understand, the merchant only knows commerce by the process of profits that he individually gains—but that, to understand it in its broader sense, it should be taken as of what benefit to the country?

Ans.—In connection with the operation of tariffs.

Qu.—Have these facts been communicated to the heads of the Anti-Corn Law League? Do they know that it was through England that the treaty of 12 per cent. was imposed on Turkey?

Ans.—I have laboured to the utmost of my ability to bring this subject before every one of these gentlemen. I told you what Mr. Cobden knew of the grain trade in Turkey.

The Chairman.—Have you taken any steps to bring this matter before the other members of the Government, or any other administration—or before parliament, or the nation?

Ans.—I have brought it before other members of this Government; I have had correspondence with the Board of Trade, especially when Mr. Gladston was in office. I have with Lord Aberdeen, who rejected all information on the subject. I wrote to Sir Robert Peel on his coming into office in 1841, and begged him to send a person to me, for my door was open—that he might report whether there were grounds or not. This he specifically refused. I have applied for judgment before the Privy Council, as I have a right to do, as a servant of the Crown making a charge against another servant. I then attempted Parliament; they would not come to a conclusion, but allowed the matter to drop. I have tried individually member by member. But there is not one man having courage to come forward and state what he knows. The question is one of crime; and there is not a man in England who will charge a crime. But I tell you as a fact, there is not a man of any station at all, or who considers himself to hold a station, who is not a coward!

Qu.—Will you affirm these statements by oath before a magistrate?

Ans.—What I have detailed resolves itself into two branches;—judgment *of* facts, and testimony *to* facts. With regard to the first, my judgment rests on reasons. In respect to the second, whatever I have stated is of my own knowledge; I have stated it to you, as every word must be, on my honour, and I am also ready to confirm it with my oath.

By the Secretary.—What is the general inference you draw from the facts detailed to night?

Ans.—That this country is thoroughly rotten.

MR. URQUHART'S EXAMINATION RESUMED.

By the Chairman.—On reconsidering your evidence of last Friday, have you to add anything?

Ans.—Yes: on three points. The first is, with reference to the question put to me as to the motive and purpose in preventing the free exportation of grain from Turkey. I have to add to what I then stated, that at the present moment when the influence of England is supreme at Constantinople; when the political assistance given to Turkey is given upon conditions—namely, those of internal reforms, if it were the object of the English Government, to have corn cheap, it would require from the Turkish Government the abrogation of the 12 or 25 per cent. duty, which, I before stated, is in direct contradiction to the religious laws and political constitution of the Turkish empire. It has been often already remarked that that high duty was not protested or acted against by England when England was known to be supreme in the councils of Turkey. But the value of that abstinence appears to be manifoldly increased when we are suffering from famine.

Mr. Crawshay.—Does the export duty apply to Egypt?

Ans.—That question was answered in detail at your last sitting. It was made to apply to Egypt by the framers of the treaty, but the Pasha would not submit to it, and that point comes singularly to illustrate what I have now said, showing that the Pasha of Egypt was able to resist its imposition. It was very easy for England to cause it to be removed, supposing she had no hand in urging its imposition.

The second point I wished to mention has reference to the Danube. In addition to the obstructions placed by the interference of Russia, submitted to, confirmed, and enforced by England, there is a totally distinct series of facts in the treaty negociated with Austria, about the same time as that negociated with Turkey. That treaty is of as great importance to the understanding of the subject as the Turkish treaty itself. If, therefore, it be the pleasure of the Sub-Committee, I will endeavour to condense that case. The Austrian treaty was a plan of the Austrian Government, just as the Turkish treaty was a plan of the Turkish Government—that is, it was suggested by an Englishman at Vienna. Sir Frederic Lamb (Lord Beauvale, brother to Lord Melbourne) adopted it; and through Lord Melbourne it was pressed on Lord Palmerston, just as the treaty of commerce was by the late king. The object of that treaty was to combine England, Austria, and Turkey in a common act to insure the navigation of the Danube. It was the forging of a common shield, and placing it against the interference of Russia—converting from that hour every local aggression into a flagrant political offence. It was laboriously thrust upon the attention of the Foreign Office just as the Turkish was, it was accepted, and then it was betrayed in exactly the same fashion. The practical object of the treaty was this, that there should be a relaxation of the navigation laws in England, so as to admit reciprocally the vessels of Austria and Turkey with Turkish or Austrian produce into British harbours, as if with cargoes of their respective countries: that is to say, that a Turkish vessel could bring Austrian goods into England as if she were an Austrian vessel: and that an Austrian vessel should bring Turkish goods into England as if she were a Turkish vessel. It was altogether a novel and ingenious device, and, as is evident, it was happily calculated to hit one point, the freeing of the navigation of the Danube, giving common rights to those three powers. The treaty was not confided to the hands of the gentleman who was to carry it to Milan, where the Emperor then was, but sent afterwards in a week's time, and when it arrived it was altered. It was altered by the exclusion of Turkey, and by dropping the negociation with Turkey, which

was to be part of the negociation with Austria; and the pretence for dropping the negociation with Turkey was, that a direct treaty with Turkey had been signed. I may further mention that the Austrian government offered to place the negociation of the treaty on its part in the hands of the British Commissioner or agent; so that England would have stood at Constantinople as having to negociate for Austria. When the treaty arrived in this fashion at Milan in June, I think, of 1838, or it might be later, Prince Metternich expressed himself with the extremest bitterness and sarcasm, and said something to the effect that he supposed the English minister was anxious that Austria should treat with Russia. The consequence was, that Austria did treat with Russia for the navigation of the Danube, by which Austria admits only such merchandize as Russia *permits* to enter the Black Sea! This fact, or series of facts, you will see, has an essential connexion with those stated the other evening, as showing the purpose of the English government throughout, and at every step to sacrifice the Danube—to withdraw it from Turkey, and to withdraw it from Austria, and place it in the hands of Russia. I should leave the matter incomplete if I did not tell you the results of this treaty. So soon as it was signed, the merchants in the Danube shipped cargoes of grain. When they arrived, they were immediately seized and confiscated. The first case was that of the "Vallaco," which was seized at Gloucester, for contravention of the navigation laws. Neither by order in council, nor by a measure in the House, did the Government proceed to enable their treaty to take effect. The vessel was released under a small fine, and no more shipments took place. Ten months afterwards, Mr. Herries, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer, brings the subject before the House in the form of a vote of censure on the Government, and it is only in the face of that vote of censure that the Government move. A bill is passed by the opposition to legalize the treaty. The questions put in the House between the signing of the treaty and the seizing of the "Vallaco," present, perhaps, as wonderful an exhibition of human imbecility as this world —old and dotard as it is—has ever seen. The questioners were—Lord Aberdeen and Sir Robert Peel. It cannot be talked of in the ordinary terms of courtesy and civility.

The third point I wish to add, and the last, is this—I was asked whether the secret of the frustration of the treaty with Turkey was not the aristocratic interest in opposition to the low price of corn. I answered first, that I knew it had no connection with that notion; and that I knew what the object was—a Russian object. Secondly, that the aristocratic power had no existence in this country. I illustrated this by facts. Thirdly, that at the time this transaction took place, grain could not be imported free into England. I would now confirm these statements by two facts; the one, that it was the aristocratic and landed interest that forced the government into the relaxation of the navigation laws in reference to the Danube; the second, the treaty with France. I am the more pleased to refer to this matter in the presence of Mr. Attwood, who knows something personally about it. The treaty with France would have largely benefited the landed aristocracy of this country both by an increase of the prospective value given to their property, and by a decrease of the charges on those articles which they chiefly consume. It was frustrated by the act of the same minister. As the treaty with France is most important in this inquiry, if it be agreeable to the Committee I will give a succinct statement of that which occurred. That treaty was forced upon the Foreign Office like the others. It was forced upon the Government and frustrated in secret. It was undertaken to remove restrictions which pressed on the one side on the raw material and the produce of France, particularly its wines; and on the other hampered the trade

of manufactured articles from England. The matter was taken up with zeal by Mr. Labouchere, who was at the time President of the Board of Trade. He cast his eye on a chief officer of the Board of Trade for its negociation—Mr. Porter had been intimately acquainted with the whole of these matters with regard to Austria, Turkey, and others which I have not detailed to you. When Mr. Labouchere offered him the appointment, he said there was only one condition on which he would accept it, and that was, that it was not to be considered in any way connected with the Foreign Office, and that he should not be under the necessity of speaking to, seeing, or having written communications with Lord Palmerston. When Mr. Labouchere expressed some surprise at the extravagant nature of the proposal, he replied that he had his reasons for it; and Mr. Labouchere refrained from inquiring what they were. Mr. Porter went further. He recorded this opinion in the office and left it there—to the effect that he did so from motives of precaution, because he felt certain if Lord Palmerston had any hand in the matter he would cause it to fail. Mr. Porter went to Paris. The objections on both sides were removed, and arrangements according to the original stipulations were in fact completed. The pen, so to say, was dipped in ink to sign the treaty, when a note from Lord Palmerston reached the hands of M. Thiers. This statement, as nearly all those I have made, has been made in the House of Commons. I will read the statement which Mr. Anstey made, Mr. Porter being then alive. [Mr. U. then read an extract.] You will be anxious to hear Lord Palmerston's answer. *Not a single syllable.* It was calculated that the effect of that treaty, had it not been frustrated, would have been to have increased the exports of England by ten millions sterling a year.

APPENDIX.

LETTER FROM MR. URQUHART TO A TURKISH PACHA.

Pera, Nov. 24, 1850.

I regret exceedingly that I did not see you again, and that you should have left without my even knowing whether you had spoken to the Sultan upon our affairs. But, according to what Reschid Pacha has said to me, you have not done so, or, at least, the Sultan has not communicated it to him.

Since your departure, we have made great progress. The Usburjis are to be abolished; little now remains to arrive at the essential point, the collection of the taxes by the municipalities. I have had the opportunity of waging fierce war against the tariff (the English commercial treaty), and have made use of your opinion thereon; we have arrived at a proposition that will perhaps astonish you. It is to unite, and place the whole under your Government. There will be first saving to the treasury, then saving in the charges to the people; you will have this vast field on which to carry out your maxims, and also ——— Pacha and ——— Pacha will be got rid of. There is, however, a hitch.

You are so great a loss here for me, that you must mitigate the regret your departure has caused me, by still giving me your help. Write energetically upon the tariff, in regard to its action upon your own Pachalic. You can call for its abolition upon two grounds that cannot be gainsayed.

1. That the treaty gives the additional duties in lieu of the monopolies and interior duties, which there never did exist.

2. The promise of the Sultan, that imposts should be diminished.

Yesterday evening, one of the merchants appointed to revise the tariff communicated to me two apparently trivial circumstances. In taking the price of grain upon which to calculate the tariff, the *dearest* spot in the empire was chosen —Constantinople; in taking the measure, the *smallest* was chosen—the kilo of Constantinople! The Turks had allowed the word kilo to pass in the tariff without specification, which in certain provinces would have lowered the duty to the extent of one quarter. Afterwards it was proposed to them to specify, "Kilo of Constantinople." Both propositions were made by the *English Commissioners*.

Believe me, we have got to triumph over England as well as over Russia, before we can take off the prohibitive duty; that is to say, we have to triumph over *diplomatic power*, and all that is required to vanquish it is cotton for Reschid Pacha's ears. You believe that it is through fear that the Russians do what they like with us (the English): *I* say that it is the trust of the Turks in the English that enables the Russians to do with you what they like.

Servia at this hour only pays 3 per cent. customs' duty. The province itself farms the customs, but does not execute the treaty. That is what you also may do.

After going over with Reschid Pacha the subjects which we discussed the night I passed with you, he said to me that he had fixed on the Prince of Samos to examine with me the treaty in detail. This morning has been consequently so employed.

He always came back upon the *difficult* position in which the Porte was placed. At length I replied as follows, requesting him to report my words to the Grand Vizier.

The position of Reschid Pacha is difficult, only because he will make difficulties for himself. The tariff, under the English commercial treaty, will assuredly bring the dismemberment of the Empire. How should it not bring pains upon the minister? From these troubles I propose to deliver him by making the cause of them to disappear, and you answer me, "he has troubles."

But, after all, nothing could be more satisfactory than the result. I am to occupy myself now in drawing up memoirs upon each item. Notwithstanding, however, these impressions of an immense success, not less unexpected because it has been the object of long attempts and continuous efforts, I cannot believe in its reality, or at least, in its realisation. Take this, then, but as a dream, and await my next letter as the awakening. Thus, my dear Pacha, I say adieu to you for the present, and wishing you the most brilliant success,

I remain, &c., &c., &c.

P.S.—Speaking of the tariff, Vogorides used these remarkable words—"We must profit by our freedom, we are no longer in the Egyptian times." This had reference to the means employed by Lord Palmerston to make the treaty be accepted as the condition of the assistance of England against Mehemet Ali. At present they think of ceasing to levy the 12 per cent. duty. They are astonished to learn that a treaty which *allows* them to lay a certain duty does not *oblige* them to do so.

You know that two or three months ago, the Porte sent to the Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia the order to impose the 12 per cent. duty upon exports, which, up to the present, they have resisted. Well, I asked Vogorides, whether it was not the English ambassador who had demanded this new victim. He became much embarrassed, and beating about the bush, said that it was the Dutch minister! When I laughed, he replied—"I assure you that Sir Stratford Canning finds this a very impolitic measure, and that he would approve of the Wallachians if they refused to submit." I replied—"It is not of Sir S. Canning that I spoke but of the ambassador of England." He remained silent. Austria, in the interes

of the neighbouring provinces, has hitherto resisted all the attempts of England, and kept her treaty of 3 per cent. I knew, however, that she had lately yielded, and proposed to make the concessions by means of "*a separate treaty with the provinces.*"

I asked him for information upon this matter: he listened with ill-humour and shame, and declared that the Porte would not accept the project. I must add that this plan dates from some months back, and I have just written a few lines to the Grand Vizier, to say that the first step is to withdraw the order.

Otherwise, the news from Wallachia cannot be more satisfactory. The Porte has replied to the note of Titoff against Achmet Effendi by a letter approving of his conduct. It was drawn up by Ali Pacha. Tonad Effendi was then heard, who proposed a P.S. "Notwithstanding you are requested to conform, &c."

I have presented a possible case to Reschid Pacha, one in which you might agree to a proposal for withdrawing the troops simultaneously, though made (by Russia) only to get rid of Achmet Effendi, taking the opportunity to procure a political organization before withdrawing the Turkish army. This is a great and essential matter. I have the satisfaction to tell you that it is possible that he may appreciate and appropriate the proposition.

EXTRACT FROM MR. URQUHART'S JOURNAL IN "THE LEBANON."

The following extract is the conclusion of Mr. Urquhart's journal in "The Lebanon":—

Beyruth, May 2nd.

I had been asked, last night, if I would attend a meeting of the chief merchants of the different tribes, to report to them what I had been saying to several by themselves, respecting their trade. I consented to do so. To-day, I was sent for about 3 p.m. I was conducted up a great many flights of stairs, to a sort of barn, which had been fitted all round with rich sofas for the occasion, and a goodly array of nargillés and pipes. Soldiers were posted at the door to give, I suppose, formality to the assembly. I found a large party assembled round the room, the Mussulmans occupying the upper part, the Rayahs the sides. They wished me to plunge at once in *medias res*, and I had some difficulty in making them apprehend that I had nothing to say; that they had invited me, and I had come, and unless they had some question to put to me, I must go away again; I was then asked if I thought it possible that the Porte would relax the heavy duties, and if so, what steps they could take to promote that object? Before, however, we got into the subject, a preliminary question was raised: they said they had long suffered from this new tax, but had never remonstrated against it, conceiving that, being settled with foreign powers, their Government had no power to grant them relief. This I soon disposed of by citing the instances in which the Porte had already relaxed these duties, viz., at Aleppo for manufactured silks, reduced to 7 per cent.; at Constantinople for carpets, on which the duty is wholly remitted; in Roumelia, on Valonea, where it has been reduced 25 per cent. Also, that the treaty gave to Turkey the faculty of exacting 12 per cent. on foreign trade, instead of 3; but Turkey was not on that account forced to take this larger sum, and finally, that the 12 per cent. of the treaty was for goods exported to Europe, whilst that sum had been imposed on all their internal traffics. These reasons were admitted as conclusive, and they signalized several monstrosities such as this. Foreign sugar imported at Beyruth pays three per cent.; passing into the interior it pays two per cent. more. The people have the habit of crushing it, and ramming it into bottles. Oh, says the customer, it has changed its nature; it is now a native manufacture, and must pay twelve per cent. So cloth, by being made into clothes, changes its nature, and becomes native manufacture. The wearer is stopped at the gate and charged twelve per

cent. for what he wears on his back; so leather, when made into shoes, iron when made into nails, &c.

The following are the heads of my answers to their questions:—You may apply to the Porte for this change, on two grounds. 1st. The general interests of the country. 2ndly. The peculiar rights of Syria. You can make out in regard to the first the most triumphant case ever submitted to a Government; then put that aside, and supposing the treaty to be as beneficial as it is injurious, you can make out for Syria an irrefragable case for exemption from its operations.

In regard to the first point I showed, first, That to exact more than five per cent. was contrary to the fundamental and religious laws of the empire. 2nd, That it was an imitation of those fiscal regulations of Europe which were the origin of its present convulsions—but that it was a mistaken imitation—in Europe we tax importation, but leave exportation free. That the treaty destroys, by the distinction, at once the sale of raw produce, and the manufacture of native goods. 3rd, That the Turkish Government draws its revenue from the land, of which this treaty destroys the value. That the Government, receiving its taxes in kind, prohibited the sale, by this *tax on its own property*. I illustrated these positions by what had occurred in Roumelia, in 1846. The price of grain was there about 45 piastres the kilo. The duty carries it above 50, which brings it just over the price, with charges, at Odessa. In that year the prices rose to 80 and 100, so that the 12 per cent. was virtually overpassed. Immediately the grain poured on all the ports. From the walls of Varna might be seen double strings of waggons along the plain to the very horizon, night and day, week after week, month after month, uninterrupted; the one coming full, the other departing empty. In ten months about 2,000 vessels were laden, 20,000,000 of kilos exported, and above £10,000,000 introduced into the country.

It was at once admitted by all, that, with the tranquillity at present enjoyed, and especially under the operation of the new firman, granting its full possession to the occupiers of land, and reducing the charges—if it were not for the 12 per cent.—thousands of vessels would be lading with grain on its coasts, and that the trade with oil, sesame, and all other products, would greatly increase—Beyruth, in ten years, they said, would rival Marseilles.

A difficulty then arose as to whether the Porte would sacrifice, for the moment, its revenue. I was able to answer that one of the first persons in the country was ready to take the customs at the actual rate, if the Government would grant them for five years, and reduce the rates to 5 per cent.

2. I now come to the second point, the right of Syria to exclusion from the operation of the treaty, be it good or bad. This I placed on two grounds. The first, that the treaty stipulated the additional nine per cent. as an equivalent for monopolies and internal duties. It was, in fact, a bargain—something was exchanged for something else, and the one thing was not given without the equivalent—here there was no equivalent. In Syria there were no internal duties, and no monopolies, and consequently there was no claim for the additional nine per cent. The English merchants had already urged this right, and even the English Government, which had imposed the treaty, did not pretend that the claim was groundless; it merely answered—"monopolies may be imposed some day." The second, and conclusive ground is, that when Syria was restored to the Porte, the Sultan engaged himself to reduce the taxes one-third; and consequently the Miri and the Firdeh had been so reduced. The twelve per cent. ought equally to have been reduced, had it existed, but it was not then in operation. The customs duties were not reduced, only because they were so trivial. That on silk amounting but to 20 paras the oke (or less than one farthing the pound), immediately afterwards the new duties were introduced, laying on silk, instead of 20 paras, 14 piastres and 16 paras, or increasing the duty 60-fold. Tobacco, in like manner, was charged 50, 100, and even up to 1,000 per cent. The firman of the Sultan was, therefore, an absolute bar to the introduction of the tariff for Syria, and gave to that province a special right to appeal against a right which no other province could claim; so that the Porte, in granting to them this concession, was not bound to grant it to

the rest of the empire—though it was clear that the like favour would be granted to the whole, if they succeeded in making the Porte understand the evil inflicted on the people and on the treasury: these two points, and especially the last, was a new light to them: they now passed to expressions of sanguine confidence. Before the evil was felt, the idea of struggling against it did not exist, conceiving it to be irremediable. It now seemed to appear to them that the thing was done, and I had to apprehend their confidence as much as before I did their despondency. I had, therefore, to tell them that not a single individual connected with the Turkish Government had the remotest idea on the subject: they had got the idea that they had overreached England by getting twelve instead of three per cent., and, in a word, that it had cost me four months' labour with Emin Effendi, before getting him to see the matter in this light, as he had himself told one of them the night before. They now asked what measures they ought to take. I explained to them that it was an evil imported from Europe, and they must adopt the means which we had invented to combat the like—that they, being the heads of the various communities, should now appoint a committee of three to draw up their petition; then have another meeting like the present to consider it; then call a meeting of the whole community under the Pines or elsewhere; then send round the petition in separate sheets for signature; then despatch envoys to Damascus, Aleppo, and the principal towns, to do the same; and, finally, send up a deputation to Constantinople, the bearers of the united appeal of the whole of Syria. The plan was adopted by acclamation, and I withdrew amid benedictions.

It being known that I was to sail by the French steamer in two days, some of them came afterwards to represent that they could not venture on beginning unless I promised to stay for the following packet; and, considering that I might labour for ten years in England without being able to effect the tenth part of the benefit for the trade of England that this change would bring, I consented to remain the ten days required; the more so that the measures taking in the Lebanon were actually paralysed by the knowledge of my departure, and might be ultimately frustrated if not brought into shape before I left.

During this conversation, there was an incidental but interesting allusion to the Megelis:—One of them quoted these bodies as an instance of the disposition of the Porte to do everything beneficial for the people. I accepted the instance as regards intention, but rejected it as regards effect. These bodies, in evincing the good intentions, showed the incapacity of the Porte; for mixing them up in the administration of the country, they were a cloak to abuse, not a check upon it. The opinion was re-echoed by all; nor did two members of the body who were present dissent. I told them that a meeting such as this was worth a thousand Megelis. Independently of the object for which they were assembled, and that they were now taking the first step towards affording to the Porte what it sought and required for the Government of the country, and that was the help of the people.

On arriving in the country I perceived three prevailing evils—the farming of the public lands, the "System of the Lebanon," and the prohibitory duties. These evils were themselves consequences of the mutual misjudgment and distrust of people and Government. I now close these remarks, after having to announce a measure of the Porte which puts an end to the first, and a movement commenced among the people with the probable consequence of removing the other two. Henceforth I trust that foreign intrigue, if not banished from the land, will be mitigated. I feel the irresistible satisfaction that attends the successful issue of a course adopted with care, pursued undeviatingly and through difficulties, and finally crowned with success; for whether or not the last two points will be obtained at once, at least this is obtained—that the people of this country entertain altered sentiments towards a sovereign who has shown himself not slow to respond to kindness; and last, though not least, it is something to labour for a people who do not reply by contempt and calumny.

(The Russian consul was absent; two days after he returned. The place was locked up, and the Pacha, who had hitherto been acting with Mr. Urquhart, turned round, and pursued with vengeance all those concerned.)

Russia, if not Everywhere, Nowhere.

A CORRESPONDENCE.

QUESTION.

THERE is no one readier to give you credit for the new element you have introduced into the philosophy of political ratiocination than myself. My objection is only to the ratio and proportion which you attribute to it. Judging this to be in excess, I condemn you in the very interest of your own discovery. Admitting, then, that there enters into the sum of action a peculiar and distinct influence, not hitherto appreciated, it evidently can constitute but one out of many, and must be subject to peculiar laws and have action only on particular and restricted fields. But if this action be generalised—if, indeed, it be not strictly confined to and limited within its own field, the effect on the public judgment must be, as I take it to have been, to withdraw all value from the proposition, and to surround it with an atmosphere of exaggeration. In a word, it has been concluded that your warnings are useless because you see Russia everywhere. I am only giving expression to the conclusion to which the public has already come. I and every one would see Russia somewhere, if you would be content with the modesty of such an assent. I will be more explicit. If you tell me that Russia is at the bottom of the Candian affair I can believe you; for my sense of human probabilities is not shocked, nor my

perception of political profit overstrained. But when you tell me that Russia made the Prusso-Austrian War, why then I am inclined to believe, *te teste*, that she had nothing to do with the Cretan Insurrection.

REPLY.

I might tell you, and with truth, that the subject of these remarks is one of business, and not of speculation, and that you have either to master it or to let it alone. I might further tell you that the proposition you put in my mouth is not mine, and that, consequently, all you say respecting it falls in the water. Again, I might rectify your proposition by putting in its place what I do say, and which is only what DEMOSTHENES said to your compeers of old, "PHILIP triumphs by your indifference." I have rendered it, "There would be no danger, no "suffering, for England and the world, were you to give to the "most important of your affairs the same care that you bestow "on the most insignificant."

But I leave all this to come down to the line you have selected.

Russia, you say, is one element in the movement of public affairs. That means that there is, in active operation, an interest in opposition to the interests of England, in matters not exclusively affecting England, so that not only England but the world also is injured, in so far as that influence is not successfully combated. Your implication seems to be that it *is* combated: for otherwise you would at once recognise, with me, the vital and supreme necessity of evoking some means of protection. Now I put it to you distinctly and categorically, does there exist in the Government of England a perception of this danger, to any, the most limited, amount? Is there a plan in operation by which to frustrate such designs? You cannot, you will not, answer me in the affirmative. You know that you could not make the modified admission you now make to me, in conversation with your colleagues or those of the opposite faction. You *could not do it*. You would lose consideration; you would be laughed at. It is not that all chance of the Foreign Office would be gone, but all office whatever. You know that on every, the smallest, occasion where a course has to be taken, you and every one else are in doubt and trouble.

But what is the end of this Russian influence which you admit to exist? Is it not, by your own showing, conquest? An insurrection in Candia, nurtured by her, means conquest, and that conquest directed against an Empire at once European and Asiatic—a conquest, which, in the opinion of a competent judge

(NAPOLEON) included all Europe in its consequences. This is the element to which you oppose nothing, and are content that nothing should be opposed, because of its exclusive and limited field of action.

But if there be an action of this sort in progress, one by its very nature simultaneously operating on all the Governments, and doing so through the total absence of countervailing action, two inferences are clear; the first, that it must go on progressively from year to year accumulating its results; the second, that it will draw within its sphere and into its vortex the whole of the affairs of each particular country, and so interweave them the one with the other, that at a certain point the whole must be inextricable. This appears to me to be the inevitable conclusion of any dispassionate observer, who, without special knowledge, and merely looking on the matter, must conclude on general grounds that Russia is active and that the other Powers are passive; that Russia is everywhere, if anywhere, and that unless she be everywhere she can be nowhere.

Now the illustration you offer you have not turned to account in your sense; for, properly used, it shows that Russia is nowhere. You should have said, "The Cretan Insurrection is sup-"pressed, therefore the desires of Russia are impotent. The "Prusso-Austrian War proves that she weighs nothing in the coun-"cils of Europe, for Prussia has usurped the Duchies of the Bal-"tic, her claims on which have been her dearest object in the West "for a century and a half. Prussia has set up a Pretender in "the Principalities of the Danube, and so cut her off from all her "dreams of Oriental conquest. The Italian Kingdom is established, "so that her principles of legitimacy are put down in Europe, and "the German War has been made in defiance of the obligation to "settle their differences by Mediation and a Congress, thus giving "the final blow to that artful scheme of diplomatic policy by "which her designs against Europe (in the opinion of Lord "LIVERPOOL) were to be gratified."

This is the line I should have taken had I been in your place, and desirous of excusing the passive condition of my country in face of foreign dangers, the existence of which I could not deny, instead of contenting myself with saying, as you have done, "You "cannot make out that Russia gained anything by the German "War."

Diplomatic Review, February, 1867.

THE

MILITARY STRENG

OF

TURKEY.

FROM MSS. ENTITLED

"THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE UNDER AB
MEDJID,"

WRITTEN IN 1852.

BY

DAVID URQUHART.

LONDON:
EFFINGHAM WILSON, ROYAL EXCHANGE

1869.

INTRODUCTION.

ON THE DELUSION OF THE POWER OF RUSSIA.*

POWER is relative. The assumption of Russia's power is relatively to that of Turkey. It is assumed that Russia has more power to attack her neighbour than Turkey has to defend herself.

This Russian power is, then, vaguely transferred to Europe and Asia, and she is looked at as terrible to the world. Yet no one pretends that she is stronger than Europe or than Asia. What is felt is that Russia being more powerful than Turkey, and subjugating her, will acquire in Constantinople an aggressive power sufficient to endanger the East and the West.

It is this sequence which has established the maxim on which all the Governments of Europe have uniformly acted since the fatal year 1827: that Turkey must be "constrained to make concessions to diminish "the amount of future sacrifices," in other words, they "seek to disarm Turkey in the interest of her defence.

The combination directed under this inspiration has disturbed the internal state of Turkey, and tends to realise the very danger the apprehension of which has given rise to it. The danger has no existence save in the false belief and in the erroneous inference. Turkey is not weaker than Russia, and but for the interference

* From the "Diplomatic Review," September, 1867.

of Europe it would be Russia, not Turkey, that would at this moment not only be heard of as in danger, but that really would be so.

Not one of the European Governments has ever set itself to examine the case. Each man cast accidentally into office in each of them, has contented himself with accepting from his predecessor both maxim and practice. There never has appeared a serious and methodical inquiry into the relative military power of the two Empires. Yet such inquiry is the very first step to be taken in order that any correct judgment should be formed in respect either to whether the world is in danger, or as to the means of averting it.

Such an investigation does, however, exist. It was undertaken long ago. It was prepared for publication in 1852, in view of the coming war; but its publication was superseded by the immediate occupations imposed on the author by the war itself. It is contained in a MS. work on the "Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdul Medjid, by Mr. Urquhart. The chapters on the "Army," and the "Frontier Provinces," have been placed at our disposal, and are now printed without the alteration of a word.

The war of 1853, thus anticipated in 1852, confirms, in every respect, the anticipation of the author. Russia did enter the Principalities without a Declaration of War; England did prevent the Turks from sending a force to oppose her. It was thus that she was able to remain there unmolested for three months, and to transfer the conflict from the Pruth to the Danube.

The MS. is also printed without addition, because it is equally applicable at the present moment. Two great changes are indeed in progress, but they have not as yet been effected; the one is the construction of railroads across the Steppe; the other is the construction and preparation of a virtually Russian Army Administration and Commissariat on the Danube under the name of an "Independent Roumania."

To the Editor of THE DIPLOMATIC REVIEW.

September 20, 1867.

SIR,—I have been no less surprised than delighted to see in your columns the first of a series of chapters on "The Military Strength of Turkey."

I read that MS. in 1853, and by means of it I was prepared for what to the public appeared the incredible results of every conflict between the Russians and the Turks, as also for the political consequences that ensued, in the direct teeth of the military operations.

With a more than ordinary experience of the East, and as a military man, I do not shrink from saying that it is to this unprofessional observer that I am indebted for the understanding of this, the most grave of the problems, perhaps, ever presented for solution.

We, who protest against the subserviency of the Cabinets of Europe to Russia, would have no right to speak, and could have no claim to be heard, were it true, as the world believes, that Russia is relatively strong and Turkey relatively weak. But if it is exactly the reverse, then are our words the only true ones.

Could Russia, by her own means, achieve her ends, then, to use her own words on one occasion, "Europe would only have heard of the event when too late."

The case submitted in these chapters, is the elaborate, the comprehensive, and the irrefragable evidence of the military superiority of Turkey over Russia. It is thus the vindication of Russia from the folly of which she otherwise would be guilty.

It has been to me a subject of never-failing regret, that this work has lain for so many years idle, in the dark; and yet it now appears to me that it may have been providentially reserved. Had it been said, in 1853, that is, before the war, that the Turkish regular troops would "always beat in the field twice the number of Russians," all military men would have set down the writer as a person utterly incompetent to entertain or to express any opinion upon military matters.

It is very different now. The campaigns of 1853-4 have justified that prevision, and now amongst military men the question of a comparison to be instituted between the relative merits of the two systems and qualifications of the two people does present itself, and constantly presents itself.

Had the work appeared during Lord PALMERSTON'S life, it would have fallen utterly dead with regard to any convictions that might have resulted from it, as affecting the conduct of Great Britain in the East.

There is a third and last consideration, which is, perhaps, not the least important. The Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople has just published a work containing the exposition of the whole course of those fatal negotiations which, beginning in 1821 out of Russia's insurrectionary operations in Greece, have involved the Governments

of Europe in an inextricable chaos. This authoritative work must produce an effect, and this effect must principally result in this question—what is the relative material strength of the two Empires? To this question the four volumes of Baron PROKESCH, though himself a military man, give no reply. While, therefore, the work of M. PROKESCH gives a value to that of Mr. URQUHART which otherwise it would not possess, so also does the work of Mr. URQUHART afford to that of M. PROKESCH a confirmation which it absolutely requires.

There is a singular coincidence between these two works; they both appear in 1867; they were both prepared for the press in 1853. The delay, in the one case, arose from the war itself, which left to the author not a moment of rest. The delay, in the other, arose from the intrigues of Russia at Vienna, by means of which the printed sheets were, up to the beginning of this year, consigned to darkness in the cellars of the Police Office at Vienna.

I cannot close this letter without pointing out that, while Mr. URQUHART is considered, in England, as a man standing alone, the case is exactly the reverse. The Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople, the former English Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord PONSONBY, and the former Envoy in Persia, Sir JOHN MACNEIL, agree with Mr. URQUHART in the essential points of difference between him and the nation. I might extend the catalogue, not only amongst the dead, but the living.

In 1853, a lawyer, who had happened to be frequently present at the conversations of those who were struggling to avert the war of 1854, having been asked his opinion on the political crisis, replied, "I find that all those who have a right to speak are of one mind, "but, unfortunately, the British nation is of another."

S. E. ROLLAND.

Military Strength of Turkey.

FRONTIER PROVINCES.

CHAPTER I.

THE STEPPES.

THE first consideration in a European war is the army; the second is the structure of the country; and, last of all, come the dispositions of the populations. In the present case, this order has to be reversed. The first matter is the dispositions of the people; next come the physical difficulties; and, last of all, as regards the defensive forces, the army itself.

From the Scythian invasion of DARIUS, down to the march of DIEBITCH across the Balkan, every event bears testimony to the importance of the geographical features of the scene of the coming contest between the Ottoman and the Russian Empires.

Notwithstanding the decline of Ottoman power, the Turkish frontiers extend to the north and west, nearly to the point which they attained under SULEYMAN THE GREAT.

Notwithstanding the enormous accession to the power of Russia by the incorporation of Poland, of the Cossack communities, the khanships of Cazan, Astrakhan, and the Crimea, the Czars have only been able to reach the Pruth; the field of future contest consequently remains the same as that upon which the first defeats of PETER were incurred, and the first victories of Munich and Suvaroff achieved.

The area included in that theatre is gigantic, embracing both sides of the Euxine, and ranging from east and west twelve hundred miles. The varieties of its nature are not less remark-

able than the rapidity of its changes with the seasons. An army encamped in swamps may, in a week or a fortnight, be exposed to perish from drought, and two armies encamped in sight of each other may be, the one in the enjoyment of healthful breezes, the other afflicted with pestilential miasma. A knowledge of local circumstances, and an appreciation of times and seasons, thus rise superior to all considerations of discipline and of strategy.

After the war of 1812, a French military writer of authority says:—

"Moldavia and Wallachia are no longer for the Turks any-
" thing more than a domain of ostentation. They can no longer
" defend them.

"The only means of preventing or retarding their fall is to
" withdraw behind the Danube, sacrificing a portion of their
" territory to preserve the rest."

"The repose of Europe," he adds, "requires this arrangement
" for its security, which is, in consequence, compromised by the
" ineffectual efforts of Turkey to retain a dominion which is
" escaping from its hands."*

I shall endeavour to establish that the defence of Turkey and the peace of Europe depend on their retention, that they are no "domain of ostentation," and that by withdrawing behind the Danube the Turks would inevitably sacrifice those other domains, which they are held securely to possess. Russia's Cabinet has revealed in its policy of more than a century that it firmly holds the same opinion. I will even go further, and assert that the defence of Turkey lies beyond the Danubian provinces, and in the very dominions of Russia herself. The acquisition of Bessarabia, a fertile, well-wooded, well-watered, mountainous, and healthy region, does, indeed, furnish her an important station on the borders of the Pruth. The resources of that district are, however, slender in proportion to the efforts to be made; and to reach that advanced station she has to cross a vast extent of wild and depopulated country, which exhausts her resources and decimates her armies before they can even gain sight of the territory of their foes.

This band, chiefly composed of acquisitions made at the expense of the Cossacks and the Khans of the Crimea since 1735, covers a surface of 150,000 square miles, with an average breadth of 250. It stretches from Galicia away eastward to the Ural, and is known under the name of Steppe.

* Beaujour's "Voyages Militaires," vol. ii. p. 552. A Government organ recently made use of this passage in insinuating the necessity of abandoning these provinces to Russia.

The Western or Polish portion is known as the Ukraine*—a term signifying, march or frontier; in consequence of its having been, for centuries, the scene of border wars between the Poles, the Muscovites, the Tartars, and the Turks. It is destitute of mountains and even of hills, though it is not absolutely flat; there are no forests, and no trees, so that it is destitute of fuel; there are no wells, and no streams, so that it is destitute of water, save where the rivers from the interior pass. During the long winter, it is covered with a sheet of snow; in summer, it is a burnt-up waste, so that, with a short interval, it is destitute of provender and forage. From all these causes, it is bare of population; it is consequently destitute of all resource whatever by which an army in its passage could be supplied, or assistance afforded to its movements. There is no shelter where it rests, no roads where it passes, no bridges or causeways, and no stones to make them: everything must be transported. Russian armies, unlike all other invading forces, are vast and unwieldy masses, so that the difficulties presented to the movement of such an army, in its own territory, are infinitely greater than those to be encountered by enemies invading it.

In winter the traveller, wrapped in furs and gliding on a sledge, easily traverses the steppes; but at that season they are impassable for armies, and it lasts the third of the year. In March the thaw commences; and for six weeks the communications are then interrupted even between the cities and the neighbouring farms, the lowlands being flooded, and the ice insecure, so that neither can the sledge, the carriage, nor the boat be used. As the ice and snow disappear, under a tropical sun, vegetation springs up, but the stagnant waters soon give forth poisonous exhalations; the excessive sultriness joined to the sudden change exhausts animal strength, and exposes the body to the fatal effects of those vapours. Intermittent and typhoid fevers break out, which are generally fatal for inhabitants of the northern districts.†

* Speaking of the Steppes of the Ukraine, Hell says: "There are, here and there, a few depressions where the grass retains its verdure during a part of the year, and some stunted trees spread their meagre branches over a less unkindly soil than that of the Steppes; but these are unusual circumstances, and one must often travel hundreds of miles to find a single shrub."—P. 38.

† A recent traveller thus describes the Steppes in the summer season.—"The reflected glare of the sun, the absence of any breath of wind, made this day's journey one of the most oppressive we encountered. It took us four hours to get over nine versts (less than six English miles). Though I wore a thick veil and blue spectacles, my eyelids were so swollen that I could hardly open them. Nothing can be more saddening to the imagination than the lifeless aspect and uniform hues of these endless plains. One is surprised to meet in them from time to time some miserable Cossack villages, and cannot tell how the inhabitants can exist amidst such desolation. This sad sterility is the work of man rather than of nature. The present system

There is, however, a bright interval of from six weeks to two months, after which the land begins to lose its verdure, and in a short time assumes the aspect of the deserts of Arabia.

The spring is therefore the moment favourable for passage, but it is difficult for Russia to profit by it. Coming from the north, she has to advance in an opposite ratio to the season, and even in so far as she is able to profit by the favourable moment, her troops will then arrive upon the Danube only to be exposed at that season to still more deleterious influences of climate than in the Steppes themselves. In fact, every movement which involves the crossing of the Steppes places her between two horns of a dilemma—snow and ague.

Yet in former times this country was the field of great military expeditions, carried on by populations wholly destitute of the science and resources of a great empire; and it may be suspected that the difficulties I have described are overstated, and the picture overdrawn. But we have to take into account the difference of circumstances, both as regards the nature of the forces engaged, and the change which the country has undergone.

Then armies were composed of cavalry; unretarded by the slow movements of infantry, unencumbered with artillery or baggage, they could easily sweep in four days across a region through which a modern Russian army has to toil for a month. The suddenness of their approach, the expanse of their radiation, deprived the inhabitants of the means of escape or the time for concealment. The supplementary horses augmented their speed, facilitated the transport of provision, or themselves supplied, in case of necessity, food. On the east of the Caspian, the Tartars can supply themselves in deserts which to the Russians have proved utterly impracticable.

The Russians do not understand the horse: their cavalry is drawn entirely from Malo-Russia: the very Cossack organisation, which has been of such great moment in the wars of Europe as well as of Asia, has rather been employed of necessity than cultivated by system: the efforts of the Government have all tended to impair its strength, and have ended by alienating its affections. The change in the country has been depopulation. It is the policy of a weaker State to interpose wastes between itself and a more powerful neighbour. This service Russia is in her own territory performing for Turkey: it results from permanent causes over which the Government has no control. A more saddening contrast it would be difficult to find between the Steppes of the Don, the Volga, the Black Sea, and the Caspian,

of government of the Cossacks is an insuperable bar to agricultural improvement, and, so long as it exists, the land must remain uncultivated."—Hill's Travels in the Steppes, p. 155.

under the Golden Horde and under NICHOLAS. Then they were covered with forests, with flocks and herds, habitations and men. Russia has driven out the people where she has conquered the land. There have been sudden flights, gradual migrations, and systematic decay.

In one day (January 5, 1771) Russia lost half a million of subjects!

Fifty thousand Cossacks have silently passed into Turkey; they are daily passing to the Circassians. The inhabitants of the Crimea have dwindled to one-tenth. Astrakhan, that flourishing capital of the Moguls, with its magnificent position, counts throughout its territory but eleven agriculturists and thirty nomades to the square mile.

In the eastern districts of Poland, nearly half a million of peasants have, by the consequences of confiscation, been added to the number of Imperial serfs or to the military colonies, and the culture of wheat has been prohibited by ukase.

Since the events of Galicia, the Government has arrived at fomenting dissensions between the serfs and the nobles, the immediate effect of which is the discouragement of agriculture, so that analogous causes are in operation along the whole of this region from the East to the West.

A test of the progress of depopulation is to be found in the disappearance of timber, marked by the sinking of the streams. Formerly it was customary to shoot the falls of the Dnieper, which is no longer practicable. The German colonists of Sarepta had established, fifty years ago, saw and other mills on the Sarpa, and these have been abandoned through want of water.

The German colonists settled below the falls of the Dnieper can no longer use the river in its lower course for the transport of their produce to the sea, but have to send it by land to Azof.

In Russia proper, the population and culture are rapidly extending, and no doubt the Russian Government has believed that the substitution of a Russian for a Tartar population would be followed by similar effects in the South; but an agricultural people is not fitted to turn the Steppes to account; a nomade people can alone do so.* Besides, with these Russians, serfage, conscription, and military colonies have been introduced. No restraint is further opposed to the systematic corruption of the administration, against which *tribes* might rise up, before which a disunited people must succumb.

* "Here, as everywhere, the Russian population, in taking the place of the Tartars, have destroyed the agricultural population of the country."—*Steppes of the Caspian*, page 182.

But besides the horse, there was another animal the peculiar property of the Tartar, which, if not of equal importance for warlike operations, was far more so for rendering prosperous the Steppes. VOLNEY concludes his eloquent description of the camel with these words: "Without it the peninsula of Arabia "would be untenable by man." In like manner might the inhabitant of the North describe it as equally adapted to resist the severities of winter, and to gather its economic subsistence from beneath the snow. How essential is it not, then, for a country which passes from the extreme points of northern to those of southern latitude, and unites the rigours of Siberia to those of Arabia Deserta. I shall now endeavour to describe what the animal is, which the Russians have exterminated.

A camel can carry seven hundred pounds weight, at the rate of twenty-five miles a day; he gives no trouble for his management, one man sufficing to look after a dozen. He requires no shoeing, currying, or stabling; he is content with a little muddy water, and finds his food as he journeys along, by means of his long neck, in the shrubs and thorns which these countries generally afford, and which no other animal will touch. Anything that is green suffices for him, be it horny, nitrous, or saline. If no food is to be found, even of such a description, he does without it. One foodless bivouac thus passed, you come to a second; and again the camel passes the heat of the day and anguish of the night without meal or drink. Again the third day you try him, and still his patience holds, and still his life and his still undiminished power to prosecute his journey. This may go on for a week; one week may become two; it will be the third before his willing spirit and enduring flesh at length give in.

The only cost for these animals is at their birth, and the necessary attendance during their long adolescence; for this they make up by their long service. A camel will wear the pack-saddle for half a century. In case of necessity, they are slaughtered for food, the hump and the flat foot being great delicacies. Like the cow, they yield milk; like the sheep, wool; and while excelling the ox in laborious patience, they outstrip in speed the horse.*

The Tartar is no less remarkable for his aptitude to use the camel than the horse; and, in fact, extensive regions of Tartary would otherwise be untenantable and impassable. The Russian, if he neglects the horse, extinguishes the camel. Wherever the

* Huc states (vol. i. p. 206) that the camels carrying the Chinese messengers across Tartary are expected to travel eighty miles per diem. Abbas Pasha ran for a bet one of his best camels against time. It performed one hundred and seventeen miles between sunrise and sunset; it did not, however survive.

agricultural Russian peasant has taken the place of the Tartar nomade, the camel has disappeared; and thus countries formerly flourishing have been converted into a desert. The Russian Government has at times appreciated the value of the animal, but not to propagate and preserve it. In 1796, it collected from the Crimea, at a high price,* all that could be found, amounting to a thousand, which were sacrificed in the Persian War. The passage of the Balkan, in 1829, was owing, in a great measure, to the forethought of Marshal DIEBITCH, who had a great number brought from the banks of the Volga.

But the camel presented an element for the operations of war itself, no less than for the transport of stores and the sustenance of population. No sooner had NAPOLEON set foot in Egypt and beheld that animal, than he incorporated it in his warlike system. He instituted a Dromedary Corps, each carrying two men, to dismount and fight on foot, and able to accomplish distances of twenty-five and thirty leagues without stopping. Such was precisely the fashion in which the Arabs appeared in the army of XERXES.

Thus a Government, which, in its intercourse with Europe, displays so wonderful an aptitude for profiting by occasions, appears in its internal management distinguished by an equal incapacity to utilise resources. It is not even that it does not combine and create, but it disperses and destroys; and this disposition of the mind has to be taken into account in estimating the obstacles, the result of its past improvidence, which are opposed to the achievement of its future progress.

In reference to transport across the Steppes, there remains one matter still to be dealt with. The rivers of Russia flow through its rich and fertile provinces southwards; it may therefore be supposed that by this means the transport of provisions and stores may be easily effected. But this is not the case. The Dnieper is out of the question, the navigation being, as above stated, interrupted even below the cataracts. There remains but the Don, which, at about 250 miles from Azof, communicates, by a land portage of thirty-five miles, with the Volga at Tzaritzin, and to which point there is water communication from the centre of the provinces of Muscovy Proper. In the spring, transport is thus readily effected down to the Black Sea; but the stores only then arrive at Azof, and are exposed to all the incidents of a difficult voyage, in time of war, to the coast of Roumely. The river transport occupies two months, and can only commence with the breaking up of the ice ten degrees to the northward of the field of operations. These rivers are there-

* Varying from 22*l.* 10*s.* to 88*l.* 15*s.*

fore unavailable except for supplies at the end of the campaign, if, indeed, preparations have not commenced at the beginning of the previous year. It therefore follows that the whole of this immense transport will have to be effected by oxen waggons across the Steppes, the force to be so supplied being no less than a couple of hundred thousand men. This will account for the statement of POZZO DI BORGO in reference to the War of 1828, that Russia had been employed for two years in preparation for it, and that it was necessary, to bring about a favourable termination of it, that she should call up the whole of her resources.*

The difficulties on that occasion were greater than on former ones, in consequence of the depopulation to which I have adverted. These difficulties are still greater at present than they were in 1828.

The Steppes may therefore be considered as a breakwater placed in advance of the Ottoman Empire on the west, as the Caucasus on the east.

* "It was the Russian Empire, *after two years of observation and preparation*, which put itself in motion against the Turkish Empire, *reduced to the Mussulman population of Europe*. . . . The patriotism, the position, and the resources of the Empire are equal to all. Let them be evoked, let them be exerted with order and capacity, and the policy of Europe will cease to offer problems for our solution. . . . This campaign has become indispensable, in my opinion, because the first has not produced its effect. We will undertake it, then, with the chances that it offers to us; *and these chances will be less dangerous in proportion as our efforts will be great and terrible*. . . . Here, M. le Comte, you have the tribute of my zeal, and my feeble conceptions upon the grave questions which occupy the Imperial Cabinet. In examining them, I have not disguised the difficulties which we have still to overcome; but I have also sought out the means we possess of triumphing over them. The events of the past campaign, far from discouraging us, will have given us the experience which we had not. If unforeseen obstacles have existed, the Emperor knows them to surmount them; and I see, in the very necessity in which we are placed of conquering, a principle of activity and energy which will preserve to the Empire and its glorious Chief, in the sphere which is their own, that supremacy from which it belongs to no human power to make them descend."—*Count Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nesselrode*, Nov. 28, 1828.

CHAPTER II.

THE PROVINCES OF THE DANUBE.

MOLDAVIA stretches from the junction of the Pruth and the Danube two hundred and fifty miles north-west to the limits of Galicia. It is defended along its whole length by the Pruth; it is defended by the Sereth, both of which present a rapid course and high defensive banks; parallel to both runs the lofty chain of the Carpathians, with Transylvania close in the rear. It was on this field that the Poles experienced those defeats which ended by placing Podolia for a time under the sway of the Ottomans, and detached from Poland the Cossacks of the Ukraine. It was here that were dissipated the illusions of PETER respecting the approaching fall of the Ottoman Empire, and where he himself only escaped the fate of CHARLES XII. by the cunning of a woman and the corruption of a Vizier. On both of these signal occasions the Turks had ceased to retain that military power and character which had made them formidable; nor were they commanded by Generals of distinction. Their superiority over the Poles and the Russians is attributable to local advantages, whether as regards defencibleness of position or facilities of supply. From that time Russia applied herself to obtain at Constantinople a modification of their connexion with the Porte of the highest importance, to which I shall subsequently refer.

The Poles and the Russians experienced, at that time, obstacles not only at the entrance into Moldavia; others not less formidable defended Wallachia.

The Carpathians bound Moldavia to the south and west, narrowing, at their southern extremity, the plain in the line of Foxani where it joins Wallachia, to some thirty or forty miles.

To the eastward the Danube and its various estuaries and marshes bar the passage, so that the entrance of an invading army must be across this opening, where the defenders can rally themselves, and which the assailants can reach only with considerable loss. If there met, they are at a distance from their resources, whilst their antagonists have Wallachia in their rear, and can obtain from it unlimited supplies.

The season for this operation must be the spring; the one army approaching from the south and deriving thence its supplies, and the other from the north: the former are, so to say, constantly under the weather, and the latter have always the wind aft. The one moving before the other anticipates the unhealthy season; the other marches into it.

We are putting the case of a war in which Turkey defends the Provinces, and that by means of a regular army, in numbers sufficient to cope with the Russians in the field. In that case, the Turks, if driven from the line of Foxani, would not retreat to the Danube, but maintain themselves in Wallachia. For I assume that they would not expose themselves to the chances of a great pitched battle; they would retire slowly with undiminished strength, devastating the country behind them, and driving before them the populations and herds towards the strong mountain positions of the West. The Russians would then be delayed until the warm summer weather set in; they would find no subsistence, no means of transport. It would be impossible for them to advance upon the Danube, leaving the Turks in the rear, and, therefore the campaign would consist in a wholly novel operation, that of attack upon the dispersed Turkish bodies among the Carpathians, aided by the population, who, if for no other reason, would fight to prevent their country from continuing to be the field of war.

We must, therefore, take the case of the Russian force in the middle of on oval basin, surrounded on the one side by mountains and on the other by the Danube; with the Turks in force in the mountains on one side, and on the other along the Danube.

As presented on the map, nothing can appear more easy than the passage of these Provinces. You perceive an immense alluvial basin, the largest in Europe, except Hungary, traversed by a great river, and numerous streams, and which has passed into a proverb for its fertility. The march of a disciplined army cannot here be supposed to be attended with inconvenience or dangers. How different the reality!

Surrounded on the north-west by lofty mountains, and exposed to the north-east, the winters are peculiarly long and severe. With the interval of a spring, lovely but short, summer

sets in with an intensity which rivals that of winter; there is no protection against the inclemencies of either; the mud and wicker huts of the Troglodyte and miserable peasantry afford no lodging for troops, and are speedily broken down or filled up. There is not a road of any kind; there are no bridges or causeways; the soil is aluminous and friable, cracking, parched, and dusty in the summer, thick mire and mud in the winter; no pasturage is to be found in the one season, when the flocks and herds are driven to the mountains, and in winter military operations are impracticable. In the lowlands the forests are exhausted, and in the highlands they serve for the reteat of the flying population.*

An army entering suddenly in spring during the fine season, and without any measures being taken either for defence or for the removal of the stores and means of transport, will fare comparatively well, and once having crossed the country, established its etapes and got the administration into its hands, it can link its lines of communication and obtain, by agreement or force, abundant supplies. Then it can move with facility throughout the province, as we have seen the Russians do in 1849, when they sent fifty thousand men across both provinces to enter Hungary at its southern point, whilst despatching other bodies against Transylvania, and maintaining a reserve of sixty thousand men; the provinces furnishing the means of transport and subsistence for nearly one hundred thousand men, just as if they had been integral portions of the Empire. But the case is widely different if they are obstructed in their passage and delayed on their march.

The sluggish course and sinuous windings of the Danube show that its level is low and scarcely raised above that of the Euxine, which, being without tides, allows no facility for the discharge of the waters. The warmth of the spring and early summer causes the snow to melt with rapidity, and at this season a great quantity of rain falls, and in a peculiar manner, raining consecutively at fixed periods of the day. The numerous rivers and streams from the Carpathians rise rapidly and carrying down

* "A winter campaign in this country, though it is in the same latitude as the middle of Italy, is not so easy as may be supposed by those who know it not. Although the cold is rarely of long duration, it alternates with thaw and heavy rains, and while it lasts it surpasses that of northern climates. This may be attributable to the two lofty chains of mountains which enclose the valley of the Danube to the north and south. The villages are chiefly in devastated places noways convenient for quarters, march, or cantonments; the valley and the lowlands, either covered with snow or inundated, render the roads impracticable from the moment that it does not freeze. Men and horses are exposed to perish by hunger, finding no subsistence, and it being impossible to transport on the backs of beasts of burden more than what suffices for small corps or for expeditions of short duration."—*Valentini, Traité sur la Guerre contre les Turcs*, p. 48.

enormous quantities of water, inundate the country in their passage, and swell the volume of the main stream by which the central parts of Europe are drained. At the same period the northerly winds which have depressed the level of the Euxine cease, the southerly winds set in, reversing, when they have prevailed for some time, the current of the Bosphorus, which then runs upward to the Black Sea. The level of the latter is raised, whilst the Danube and all its confluents are overcharged; hence those sudden inundations by which the lowlands along its course are submerged. The water runs off, forming lakes and marshes, the communications are cut off; troops, baggage, and artillery flounder in the mire, convoys are stopped, provisions destroyed, material lost, and delay occasioned. In countries where art and industry have exercised their hand, ordinary incidents of this description would be rendered innocuous; and with causeways, sluices, dykes, and bridges, the country might be kept passable, and rendered wholesome. Here no such contrivance, however simple, is employed; and the face of nature with the exception of the mere furrow, lies to-day as the Deluge left it.

The great extent of stagnant water, and the exposed surface where it has retired, leaving behind slime and vegetable matter, under the increasing heat of summer soon generate miasmata, and the ague appears.

It is well known how inefficient is the Russian Commissariat; its hospital service is still worse. Add to this the filth of a Russian army, and it will be easily understood that these Provinces, wearing on the map so inviting an aspect, offer in reality to an invading force, that force being Russian, little more than a grave. Thus, in the last war, when unopposed, and having entered at the most propitious season (the end of March), and having all things prepared for their rapid passage, by their own avowal fifty thousand deaths occurred in the hospital out of a force of one hundred and fifty thousand men. What would have been the position of this army had the passage of the Pruth and Sereth been disputed, the means of transport removed, and the supplies destroyed? *Unless in possession of the Provinces before war is declared, the Russians cannot attack Turkey.*

A scarcely less important consideration is the disposition of the inhabitants. The aspect of that portion of the country which has been the field of war is so pitiable that the numbers of both Principalities was formerly not reckoned at above 500,000. The Russian census in 1830, which is probably below the truth, brought it up, to the astonishment of every one, to 4,100,000. This mass of men, however abject, must, if they act for or against either party, materially influence a contest

carried on on their soil. They are assumed to be favourable to Russia, but the fact is they have never been enabled—I may say allowed—to make head against her. I have traversed both provinces in all directions, and, judging from what I have seen, as well as from events, I have no hesitation in saying, not that they love the Turks, but that they hate the Russians. This truth, of the highest importance in judging of the actual balance of power and for the future independence of Europe, is put beyond question by the enthusiastic welcome recently given to the troops of the SULTAN.*

The Porte ceasing to suspect them, and anticipating hostilities by the advance of a respectable force to defend her frontiers at the Pruth, the population of the two provinces would immediately create a subsidiary army. The idea of stemming the torrent, the hope of preventing their country from becoming the theatre of a destructive warfare and a prolonged occupation, would soon rally 50,000 muscular and rugged peasants on the frontier, who otherwise would, with the remainder of their countrymen, have resigned themselves, as beasts of burden, to the invading army. A consequence of their engaging actively in the contest would be the systematic withholding of supplies, the removal or destruction of grain, villages, and means of transport. The population would retire on the approach of the Russians, and be soon out of their reach on the forest-clad sides of the Carpathians, and, once guerilla bodies formed by the natives, a Russian army would find itself in face of a wholly new enemy and dangers, and in the same position as that of DARIUS when attacking the Scythians of old.

While the central region presents so many obstacles to an invader, there is nothing which he can positively attack or hold; there are no gorges, no positions of strength, no fortresses, and no cities of importance. Bucharest, like Jassy, is a large village, wholly exposed. If he moves to the south, he will be pressed upon from the north; if he turns to the north, he will be ravaged from the rear. From the one side the enemy will descend from the mountains; from the other they will cross the Danube; in either case his retreat is cut off. The invading force can nowhere be collected in large masses, and, if it break itself up, will be sacrificed in detail. The defence being carried

* Referring to the year 1848. The higher classes, however corrupt or ambitious, share in the feelings of the people, as the following incident will show. The Russian Government was desirous of employing the same means in the Principalities, to obtain a footing, as she had done in Georgia—by intermarriages of her officers with the daughters of the principal persons. There was but one instance of a family willing to ally itself with a Russian. The Turkish Commissioner, in the autumn of 1850, paid a visit to Yassy, and was received with the greatest enthusiasm. The Russian Commander-in-Chief repaired thither to balance his popularity. No one paid him the compliment of a visit. "On aurait dit qu'il eut la peste," said a Moldavian Boyard.

to the Carpathians, the Russians will be placed upon a soil wholly uncongenial. They are accustomed to the plain, and their value is restricted, especially against the Turks, to the use of the bayonet. For mountain warfare, the musket for taking aim is the arm, and that is what the Russian does not understand —that is the point of superiority of the Turk. When, in 1789, the Austrian Government, on account of suspicions awakened by the conduct of SUWAROFF, determined to remove them from Italy, and to send the army to operate with the other Russian army in Switzerland: the reason given was that they would find there a climate more congenial to their own. As THIERS justly remarks, a mountain region is the theatre least of all adapted for Russian troops, for there what is wanted is "practised tirailleurs."

In the rear of the Carpathians lie Transylvania and Hungary. There is the most warlike people of Europe—a people hating the Russians, and united by ties of blood and sympathy with the Turks. It is impossible that they should remain neutral in such a conflict. A movement in Hungary would be followed by one in Italy and in Germany. It is certain that if the Turks defend themselves in the Provinces Austria, must be separated from Russia, and will throw her weight into the scale to prevent such a contingency (that is, that the Turks defending themselves on the Pruth, Austria is of necessity with them and against Russia, by the double reason of the certainty of their triumph, and the internal dangers by which she would be menaced if she were against); *the contrary reasons will operate upon her if the Turks withdraw behind the Danube.*

But even before Turkey possessed a regular army Russia was unable to attack her until she had appropriated the resources of these Provinces. In 1806 she entered them before she had declared war; in 1821 she was prevented from making war because Austria prepared to resist her peaceable entrance; in 1828 she entered simultaneously with the declaration of war at St. Petersburg, and when, Turkey being taken by surprise, she was assured that they would not be defended. In 1848 she again entered without war by a pretended unauthorised movement of her generals, and was obliged to quit without being able to make it. *She is now preparing to repeat the same attempt.*

By an article in the *Réglement Organique*, it is provided that each household shall hold in depôt twenty kilos of Indian corn, which is calculated to be equivalent to the subsistence of an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men for two campaigns.

It does not require that a Turkish army should defend the Provinces to render it impossible for Russia to invade Turkey

proper: it suffices that a Turkish army should retreat before and across them. The whole question, then, consists in making Wallachia the theatre of war, and not the basis of Russia's operations.

I shall presently show that Turkey is no longer assailable on the east of the Euxine.* It is on this theatre, therefore, that any war between the two Empires is to be carried on. It is in every respect a desirable one for Turkey and an unfavourable one for Russia. It is close to Turkey and at a distance from Russia; the one has to send her troops across long distances and inhospitable tracks, the other can convey them, without loss, by water and by steam. Were the field of contest on the east, the Powers of Europe would know and care little respecting the event; Poland instead of a consciousness of common interest with Turkey, would be drained of her arm-bearing men to fill the Russians' ranks; Austria would not be tempted to regain her independence, or Hungary her institutions.

The justification of what I have said respecting the dispositions of the population will be found in the historical sketch of the Principalities. I must now proceed to consider the further progress of the war, on the assumption that the Turks have been beaten, and that the Russians have pressed on to the Danube.

* A *bonâ fide* war is here understood; not a war in which the operations are decided by Allies "in understanding with the enemy" (words of the then Secretary of War. Note, 1867.

CHAPTER III

THE DANUBE AND THE BALKAN.

THE Danube, no doubt, is but a river; and all rivers can be crossed: and the Balkan is a chain not to be compared to the Alps or the Apennines, which have failed to stop the passage of invaders. But the fact is that both the Danube and the Balkan have arrested invaders, although they were possessed of science, and their antagonists neither of science nor subordination. We have now to consider the aids which they can afford for a defence under circumstances wholly novel—that is, by troops disciplined, subordinate, and in considerable numbers.

The Danube is a moat in face of a continuous bastion. This feature is peculiar to it, and can be estimated only by local knowledge. I may therefore be permitted to enter into some details which have been suggested by the country itself, and have not, in as far as I am aware, been treated of in works on this subject.

After breaking through the mountains of Transylvania at Orshova, the Danube must originally have run a straight course through the hollow between the Balkan and the Carpathians either to the gap opposite Kustandji, or to the north of the chain of low hills which skirt the Euxine. But as this hollow was filled up by the alluvium brought down by itself and from the Carpathians, the streams and drainage of which are considerably greater than those of the Balkan, the river has been pushed down to the south until it reached the rise of the ground on the edges of the Balkan range, which it has scarped into a parapet. This is exactly what has happened in the upper plain of Hungary, where the drainage of the Northern Carpathians has

shoved, as it were, the river to the extreme verge of the plain, which seems to run like a ditch under the Servian hills.

By this means the river forms a crescent, the horns of which are presented to the invading force, confining the operations, rendering collateral ones difficult, and entailing the paralysis of a considerable force by the necessity of observation on the flanks.

The second point, though more striking, is not more important. The process of the formation of the plain shows that the left branch of the river is low, and that the right is high and precipitous. This is an undeviating character from the neighbourhood of Widdin down the whole way to the marshes at the mouth.

On the Turkish side you stand upon an elevated plateau; you everywhere look down upon the opposite plain; you command it as far as eye can reach; you perceive every movement.

The common peasant is ever on the alert, and knows exactly where the enemy is, and, consequently, acquires the instinct of stratagy. This disposition has materially affected these contests.

From the plain on the left bank nothing can be observed of the movements of the enemy, unless he chooses to show himself. If he is acting upon the offensive, he can conceal his movements; if on the defensive, his presence will everywhere be suspected.

The soil is generally argillaceous, from the schist and aluminous rocks which lie upon the north of the Balkan; whilst soft and greasy, it is very tenacious. No one has visited Constantinople without being struck with the stone-like tenacity of the earth, which overhangs the stream as if it were rock. Of a similar character is the soil which forms the right bank of the Danube. The consequence is that the bank presents an obstacle of the most serious description, being neither earth that you can walk upon, nor rocks that you can lay hold of.

It is needless to say that the Danube is a wide and magnificent stream—what then must be its importance when flanked in such a manner? When first it enters the plain it is rapid in its course, and in the early part of the year, during which the military operations would be carried on, or which at least, if not profited by, must render a campaign abortive, its bed is full, and a considerable portion of the left bank inundated. For the passage of the army, boats have to be constructed, or brought up the river. If constructed, it is upon the unsheltered beach, and in sight of the enemy, with timber to be brought from a great distance, and from places not in the occupation of the invading army. If

the vessels are to be brought to any given spot, they have to be towed up the stream, two or three hundred miles, and have to pass under the guns of two or three Turkish fortresses.

If pontoons are used, the great breadth of the stream and the inundation of the left bank render the operation so difficult, that the Russians in their late wars have only attempted it at one point, and that after the stream had withdrawn within its bed. If partial expeditions are attempted, the enemy has long prior notice of the preparations; and the boats while constructing remain exposed. In fact, the Russians cannot advance through the centre of the crescent until they have been allowed to cross the Danube at its northern point, and so occupy the plain of the Dobroja and the small ports along the course of the river, which can only be the result of sheer neglect.

There is another no less important contrast between the two banks—the one is healthy, and the other unhealthy; and this distinction extends down the whole course. On the right bank there is everywhere wood for fuel and for works; on the left, none. On the right hand there is everywhere abundance of streams; on the left, so soon as the river is quitted, an army is in danger of perishing from drought. "So soon," says General "VALENTINI, "as the wet season is concluded, the soil is as if fire "passed over it; there does not grow a blade of grass; consider- "able streams are entirely dried up;" thence he shows the necessity for an army, if it is to finish a successful campaign, to be in possession of all the important points before the hot weather sets in.

Thus, although it may be supposable in a diplomatist, it is scarcely conceivable how a military man should have urged as a precaution and security the abandonment of these defences. A more magnificent glacis for the protection of an empire could not be devised: it would be insanity to abandon it were the Balkan a Caucasus. I shall presently show that it is no Caucasus, and that the security of Turkey is in the depths of the Danube, not in the heights of the Balkan. There was, however, a colour for the suggestion in the last three wars, each of which the Russians commenced by occupying the Provinces. It was thereupon concluded that to all intents and purposes they were already Russian, and that their nominal connexion with the Porte was only imposed by the jealousy of the other Powers. Hence it was inferred that Russia could not be restrained from their occupation, and that Turkey could be saved only by sparing herself exhausting and useless efforts for their retention. This explains not only the suggestions of Monsieur BEAUJOUR, but possibly also the policy of England in 1806 and 1812, and, indeed, on every other occasion. This, indeed, is the reasoning of the friends

of Turkey at all times. The rule is to urge her by prompt concession to diminish the amount of ultimate sacrifice; they will always strip her of her armour in the interest of her defence.

The possession of these provinces by Turkey did not exhaust her in peace—did not involve her in war—nor in such wars compromised her defence. She did not require, as would an European Government, a large standing army to keep down the people. She had there no troops at all. The Russians did not make war on her on account of these Provinces. Their object was Constantinople; and so long as she held her ground in Wallachia and Moldavia was the war kept at a distance. If at the peace she reverted into possession of them, it was because Russia was not so strong as was believed. If Russia could have held them, most assuredly would her frontiers have been carried by the Treaty of Adrianople, if not by former treaties, up to the Danube.

Russia found in the Provinces not a population devoted to her, but a country that was open to her; not States that invoked her sovereignty, but plains that fed her troops. She entered peaceably because the Turks were diplomatically overreached, and found, when established, the resources prepared, which her own country could not supply. By them she carried on the war.

Now then we come to the question, Why did Turkey not defend these Provinces? This is the point on which the whole matter turns, and the difficulties disappear from the moment it is taken up.

After the defeat on the Pruth, in 1711, Peter the Great perceived the total insufficiency of his Empire to assault Turkey in this direction.*

At that time Bessarabia still belonged to Moldavia. At the two extremities of that province were placed the great fortresses of Kotzim and Bender, and the Russian force had therefore no resting-place after crossing the Steppes; it was met at once by the Turkish frontier and provinces. He therefore applied himself to detaching the Principalities from the Porte, persisted at all hazards in refusing to surrender CANTEMIR, by whose treachery he had been invited and deceived, and sent Prince MENSCHIKOFF to Constantinople to prepare the way for his future designs, entrusting to him for that end 200,000 ducats, fully equivalent at the time to half a million sterling. From that

* He and his army escaped through the dexterity of his wife. So great was the service she then rendered, that by it was justified her nomination to the succession after Peter's death. In that act he describes the imminence of the danger, and states respectively the Russian and Turkish forces at 20,000 and 200,000 men.

period Russia has undeviatingly applied her means of influence and corruption at Constantinople, her intelligences in the Provinces, and her successes in war to one object, which is the semi-independence of the Provinces, interpreted by their non-occupation by a Turkish force. She was aided in this matter by the reaction against her own intrigues; for the Porte, distrusting, after the defection of CANTEMIR, the native princes, replaced them by strangers to the Provinces, and subjects of her own, on whose fidelity she believed she could rely, and over whom she imagined that she possessed entire control. These were *Fanariots*. Thus was the entire administration placed in the hands of Russian emissaries by a measure designed to exclude her influence, and a burden of the most intolerable oppression laid upon the people by a policy designed to attach them to the Porte.

Although it had now been established by treaty that no Turkish forces should occupy the Provinces, still she retained the fortresses, and her troops had the right of passage to Kotzim, on the extreme west, and Bender, on the extreme east. In case of an invasion, these fortresses arrested Russia, and gave time for the advance of the Turkish armies from behind the Danube: for the inviolability of the Provinces by Turkish troops, depending upon the stipulations of a Treaty, ceased the moment that war was declared. But as Russia, not Turkey, waged those wars, the Turks were kept in ignorance and suspense to the last moment; war was known only by the passage of the troops.

The full benefit of this position was not obtained until 1812, when, at the moment that Turkey might have regained all the territory she had lost, a Treaty was concluded under the mediation of England, and by the treachery of a Fanariot by which the half of Moldavia lying between the Dniester and the Pruth, *containing the fortresses of Kotzim and Bender*, was surrendered to her. Now she was relieved from frontier fortresses, now the Provinces were wholly freed from the presence of Turks, she obtained a rich, a fertile, and healthy region where she could accumulate her force, and her stores, and with it that important line of the Pruth, second only to the Danube. A fraction of Moldavia was however, a small gift on the part of England, seeing that she had six years before gone to war with France, or resumed hostilities, to endow her with both Provinces, and that soon after she had attempted, with the same object, to bombard Constantinople.*

* The attempt indeed failed, but after the difficulties had been overcome. Had Sir Sidney Smith been in command, instead of Admiral Duckworth, the policy of England would have been successfully accomplished, and Russia would have been long ago established at Constantinople and mistress of the Dardanelles. The Admiral and the Ambassador both shrank from the execution of the order. The latter spoke of the "evil policy" of the case.

The advantages thus secured were on the point of being profited by in 1821. She had then assembled a powerful army on the Pruth; she had prepared an insurrection throughout the whole of European Turkey; the signal was given by the passage of IPSILANTI, in his general's uniform, with a body of Greeks, to raise the standard of Christian revolt. There was no Turkish force to oppose to them, and they were, in fact, destroyed by the Christian peasantry. Russia, who is always reany with an offer of troops to put down the insurrection she has caused, volunteered to send an army to restore order. On the refusal of the Porte, who sent its own troops, Russia withdrew herAmbassador from Constantinople, and would have assumed the act as the grounds of war had it not been for the menacing attitude of Austria and the unexpected declaration of the people in favour of the Porte. On this occasion England again took the side of Russia, and made herself at Constantinople her mouthpiece in the absence of her own Ambassador.*

When, in 1828, the Pruth was crossed, there were, of course, no Turkish troops in the Provinces, and, with the exception of the three or four fortresses retained on the left bank, there was no opposition made to her after she had entered them.†

In 1848 she entered without war at all, putting forward the plea of an Insurrection which she herself had openly fomented, just as in 1821 she had offered to the Porte to send her own troops to put down the Insurrection which had proceded from her territory. When she had entered, she thence proceeded, after wintering there, to attack Hungary (her troops invaded Transylvania in February); and the next year she was on the point of playing the same game in Turkey itself.

But in 1828 she stood, and, consequently, in the next occupation she will stand, on entering, on a wholly different footing from 1828. Then she had not the command of the Danube. At the peace that followed that war, she got the Delta of the

* In the "Précis of the exposure of the differences that arose in 1821 between the Government of His Imperial Majesty and the Porte, presented to the Emperor Nicholas on his ascending the throne by the Russian Ministry," it is stated that conditions were agreed to at the Congress of Verona which Turkey was to fulfil before Russia should re-establish relations with her; and that "the negotiations to be opened to this end were confided to Lord Strangford." This was at the end of 1822. (Protocols of Verona are dated 9th November, 1822.) Speaking of Austria during the next year (1823), the Russian "Précis" says: "Austria concealed no longer the succours which she assured to the Turks." ("L'Autriche ne cachait plus les secours qu'elle assurait aux Turcs.") The document here referred to was first published in 1853, a year after the composition of this work.

† An expedition of 3000 or 4000 men sent across from Rustchuk is not worth mentioning.

Danube; she has since blocked up the entrance. At the peace she pertinaciously insisted upon the evacuation and razure of the few forts still remaining to the Turks on the left bank opposite Bulgaria. Occupying peaceably the country in the autumn and during the winter, she can bring up gunboats and construct pontoons, as she did in 1849. We have seen of what vital importance to the defence of Turkey is the Danube; now to the possession of its northern entrance, acquired in 1812, she has added, since 1829, the absolute command for all warlike operations at the mouths of that river.

She stands in another respect upon new ground. In 1828, the European Powers, who, in fact, enabled her to enter, still ostensibly murmured at her entrance, whilst Austria was resolutely hostile. In 1848, her entrance was concerted with Austria, and defended in the British Parliament by the English Minister, who gave two reasons, both of which were of course false, and moreover contradictory—the first, that it was an unauthorised movement of the Russian general; the second, that it was concerted with the Porte.

It may appear surprising that the Porte should have suffered under any circumstances the exclusion of her own troops from her own territory; a territory of necessity the theatre of every war. It must be esteemed an infatuation without parallel: yet the Turks only concurred in opinion with the statesmen and military men of Europe. They were made to believe that the population detested them, and was wholly devoted to Russia; and they consequently ceded the point of the presence of their troops in time of peace, not unwillingly, believing that the force so situated would be compromised; never doubting that in time of war they would be in the field ready to meet their antagonists; for they had no notion of war except as arising out of causes, and therefore giving notice of its advent. The illusion is now dispelled, but the effects remain. The matter, however, has to be considered not only in reference to Russia and Turkey, but also with reference to the Provinces themselves. They no doubt hailed as a boon the being relieved from the insubordinate and disorderly forces of a former time. Here two circumstances have altered; they would now be too glad to have a Turkish army stationed amongst them. But whether the Turkish army paid or did not pay for their provisions, whether it was orderly or disorderly, the real question was, whether their country should or should not become the seat of war. The exclusion of the Turkish forces made it so, and also made the wars themselves; for with one of the present Turkish armies on the Pruth there could be no question of invasion. At all events, unless a Turkish force defends their frontier, it is their duty to

defend it themselves, and for this they are quite ready. Their chiefs have accepted with joy the proposal to form a distinct Ordu, with 30,000 men on foot, and twice that number in reserve; which, with the Turkish army in their rear to support them, would enable them efficiently to perform their duty to Turkey and their duty to themselves. Without the height of the Caucasus or the chivalry of the Circassians, these Provinces would thus become a barrier against Russia on the west of the Euxine, as inexpugnable as that which opposes her on the east.*

It may be suggested that the armies of these populations is open to the same objections which I have urged to the enrolling of Christians in the Nizam. But it is not here a question of embodying them in the regular army; it is that of furnishing a permanent and auxiliary force with its own constitution and under its own officers. If by the Capitulations the Provinces are to be free from the Turkish troops, they are also bound thereby to furnish their contingent to the SULTAN. Of their fidelity under these circumstances there can be no question, the only difficulty might lie in their will. When I first offered the suggestion to the Porte, it was received with astonishment, and incredulity. The question was not, "Can we trust them?" but "*Will they serve?*" Their assent having been obtained, the plan was accepted: the future inviolability of the frontiers would thus have been assured by means of this Wallachian Ordu behind the Pruth, with 25,000 Turks in the Dobroja. This was the substance my plan for the defence of Turkey; not a mere paper speculation, but a practical arrangement, debated and concluded severally with each of the parties concerned.†

Behind the Danube rises the Balkan, a strong and defensible region, but neither continuous as an inaccessible chain, nor impracticable for artillery. The chain to the westward, where it is high and defensible, would be left to the right by an invader, who, passing the Danube at Silistria, would take the route straight by Shumla and the Little Balkan to Adrianople. This is the direct line for the capital, and runs parallel to the coast, so that it could receive reinforcements and supplies. Here no remarkable physical obstacles oppose its progress; and the distance to the plain of Adrianople is but two hundred miles. The real obstacles consist in the pure Turkish population inhabiting

* Circassia has not fallen before the arms of Russia, but before the Treaty of Paris.

"Circassia has ceased to exist as a Nation in consequence of the conduct of Lord Clarendon at that Conference" (Paris).—Mr. Disraeli, June 4, 1866.

To this charge no reply was even attempted. *Note*, 1867.

† See "Memoir to the Sultan Abdul Medjid," *Free Press* Serials, No. 11. Acting thereon, the Porte demanded and obtained the withdrawal of the Russian army of occupation in 1850. See also "Denmark and the Duchies," 1852.

the district of Shumla in a radius of thirty miles, and that established at Silistria, Rustchuk, and Varna, the attack of which places constituted the principal operations of the last wars. The country is fertile, well wooded, with abundant streams of water, and well peopled, so that here the war can sustain itself. It will be found necessary to operate on the flanks, and the Balkan can be crossed, and the upper valley of the Maritza occupied. The inhabitants are Bulgarians, originally Turks from the Volga, but professing the same religion* and speaking nearly the same language as the Russians; they are unwarlike, and may be rendered favourable to the invaders; at all events, they would make no resistance. On the left flank the sea runs parallel to the line of march at the distance of about fifty miles, and approaches to within ten. Here, granting the superiority at sea, strong posts may be occupied, troops disembarked, and diversions made. The facility of an advance will depend upon the strength of the Turkish army left in Shumla, which again would depend upon the army which the invaders are able to leave to observe it, and on the success of their operations on the two flanks.

Such being the field, it will at once be evident that it is capable of opposing a most formidable resistance to a force which has had to fight its way from the Pruth across the Principalities. That it has done so we must assume for argument's sake only; but then, in what plight will that army be to meet the untouched and concentrated resources of the Ottoman Empire? The result will then depend, as the chances of all battles, on reciprocal mistakes.

Let us grant that Russia brings her whole available resources, undiminished, right up to the Balkan, even then Turkey can oppose to her half as many more of troops, double their value.

The attacking force has always the advantage, except when deserts interpose. In the case, however, of a fair stand-up fight, the probability is that the command of the sea will decide the contest. The Capital, which is the heart of Turkey, is exposed; and what is of not less importance, the communications and coast of the Empire are equally exposed to a Russian squadron sent round from the Baltic.

Russia, however, will run no risks; she will only act when she has made the chances sure. There will never be allowed a fair field for the trial of the merits of the Nizam. Russia will repeat the game she has so often played, and with such success; her foot will be placed where its print has been left. She is limited in method no less than in time and season, and the blow,

* It has always to be borne in mind that Russia has suppressed the Oriental rite, and substituted for it her official Church, with the Emperor the object of "worship."

when it falls, will be as unexpected as each one has been that has preceded it. She will enter Adrianople, when she does enter it, as she entered the Bosphorus; she will be the generous protector, not the grasping foe; she will enter the Principalities to 'protect Turkey from a Moldo-Wallachian Nationality, as in 1848, or from the ambitious designs of France, as in 1806, or on some other equally available pretext. When there, she will repeat against Turkey what she practised against Hungary in 1849. Settled in the Principalities, she takes Germany in flank, and already commands the West as well as the East.

It is not, I again repeat, a Christian Insurrection which can shake the Porte, or draw down a Russian intervention; that catastrophe will only come from a Mussulman schism. It is the innovations of Constantinople that are now Russia's sole hope. This is a military question, no less than a political and a moral one. If the Turkish Government has ceased to be Turks, how shall Turkey exist?

I conclude this review with the very consideration with which the Russian historian of the last two wars commences:—

"*In general the Turks are not imitators, and there, perhaps, lies*
"*their greatest political wisdom. Their common expression is,* 'WE
"'ARE OURSELVES.' *A Sovereign of genius, far from seeking to in-*
"*troduce amongst them European methods, would certainly culti-*
"*vate the seeds of the peculiar qualities that evidently exist in the*
"*men of this nation. Then, but only then, might they again become*
"*dangerous, if not for all Europe, at least for their neighbours.*"

CHAPTER IV.

THE BOSPHORUS AND THE DARDANELLES.

I CANNOT resign these Straits to a mere incidental reference nor trust to the spontaneous conclusions suggested by the map.

It was the Byzantines of old who devised the Trident as an emblem of dominion. It was by the Chersonese that PHILIP prepared the subjugation of Greece.

The Restorer of the Roman Empire preferred to its Capital a new seat on this then desert coast. All this time savage tribes alone occupied the Euxine. The Ottomans came at last, and placed a padlock on the Straits, above and below, and, thus secured, built up their vast dominion, the limits of which realised the dream of ORKAN, who saw the Tigris and Euphrates, the Nile and the Danube, obeying the signet of that ring, typified "as a diamond between two emeralds, and two sapphires, the chief stone in the ring of Empire."

This capital, between two continents and two seas, required a peculiar setting—artillery. By means of that invention, Constantinople, an emporium and a capital, became also an arsenal and a fortress.

A Sultan might sit in the Admiral's kiosk on the Golden Horn, and reviewing his caravels, ponder in his mind, whether their thunder should be despatched against a Khan of the Crimea, a Shah of Persia, an Ameer of Syria, a Soldan of Egypt, a Grand Master of Rhodes, a King of Spain, or a Pope of Rome. Seated, like Eolus, on the mountains of the wind, by a gesture he could direct the storm of war to the north, to the south, to the east, and to the west; the nations stood in suspense, and from the pillars of Hercules to the ramparts of

Iskander, the princes and people trembled when his hand was raised.

It is related of an envoy of Persia that, in endeavouring to fathom the designs of the Conqueror of Constantinople, he bribed one of his attendants to note if, as he sat upon his terrace, he particularly directed his countenance *to one point of the heavens.* The same Sultan, being questioned by a Vizier as to the destination of a fleet then preparing, replied, "If a hair of "my beard was in my secret I should pluck it out."

The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus had given to this tribe—so insignificant as to numbers—everything within their reach; they became masters of the Euxine to its furthest bounds, and of the whole of the Levant; then they paused; their care henceforward was to guard themselves; maritime aggression was possible only from the south, and there they provided against danger by guns and batteries prepared in the infancy of art, which have anticipated its latest discovery, and fill with admiration its most scientific professors. But on the north, that is to say, at the Bosphorus, no such care was needed; so that in that quarter — the quarter from which the Turks had themselves grasped the ring of Empire—the casket was left unguarded.

Another power arose in the North; by gradual expansion it reached the Euxine; it, too, commenced forging the tools by which that casket was to be forced; the world was alarmed; it was more than once forced to break the tools and to destroy the moulds.* But the world became accustomed to such practices, and those who had been most indignant at the projected burglary became the most serviceable in its execution.† Russia now got a maritime footing in the Euxine, and from that moment, in the words of the great minister of Russia, "Peace in Europe became "an empty name."

This position is one upon which the mind dwells. It is a fountain of thought, and not a subject, and the more it is pondered upon the more difficult is it to write about; if, indeed, all is not said in the words of NAPOLEON, "Constantinople is "the World." To have the mind incessantly bent upon it is to acquire an element of political power scarcely less in effect, and higher in character, than the force derived from its actual possession. It thus creates and constitutes the two Eastern Empires, whose conflict ultimately must shake the whole fabric of Europe—the one by possessing it, the other by pondering upon it.

It is curious that it is Russia herself who has called the attention of Europe to her designs thereon. She did so even at the

* Treaty obligations of Russia to maintain no ships of war upon the Sea of Azof.
† Story of Otchakoff.

time when PITT projected her total exclusion from the Black Sea. She was, indeed, at the time secure, by English treachery, of thwarting him, and was sufficiently acquainted with Western Statesmen to know that he would prefer the surrender of principle to the abandonment of office.* In the despatches of that period, which I have had an opportunity of perusing, and may be able one day to publish *in extenso*, I find the following communication from Mr. LYNDESAY, the British Secretary of Embassy at St. Petersburg in the year 1791:

"HASSAN PASHA's plan was to put the fleet on a respectable "footing, and then to endeavour to reconquer the Crimea, the "Liman, and the Sea of Asoph, for he did not think that the "recovery of the Crimea alone was sufficient to secure Constan- "tinople. He began by reducing Egypt; but in his absence the "Porte declared war, and overset all his projects. From what "has been above said it is, then, evident that the Russians may, "whenever they please, become masters of Constantinople. They "are not, perhaps, sufficiently apprised of its weakness (!), but "this cannot long be concealed from them, and its fall is, pro- "bably, not far distant; because the Turks themselves have not "the means of retarding it, and because the interference of any "European Power is, at least, very precarious, since the event "might happen before they could even have heard of the prepa- "ration of an armament at Sebastopol."

No one can doubt that these suggestions were furnished—of course indirectly—by the Russian Government itself. This the uninformed will be unable to reconcile with her designs. It is, however, Russia's method. She wants your aid, and is able to

* 'Leopold (of Austria) having concluded peace with the Turks at Sistowa, Catherine, thus left alone to carry on the war with that Power, might unquestionably have been compelled to restore all her recent conquests, particularly Ockzakow. The Cabinets of St. James's, the Hague, and of Berlin, acting in concert whilst they were sustained by Leopold, could have dictated to the Russian Empress. Frederic William already threatened to march an army of 100,000 men against Riga, and every preparation was made for attacking the Livonian frontier *when the British Ministry receded.* These events took place during the spring of 1791. In embracing a line of policy calculated to set limits to Catherine's conquests on the shores of the Euxine, Pitt acted in my opinion with equal wisdom and justice. But, unfortunately, he could not impress the House of Commons with a conviction that interests so remote, as well as so little understood, were of sufficient importance to run the risk of a war for their support. Fox, availing himself of these circumstances, inveighed with such effect against the ministerial plans, and was supported on every division by such numbers, that it became evident Pitt must either abandon his measures and his allies, or be finally left in a minority. *In order to keep Catherine firm to her determination of not relinquishing Ockzakow, Fox did not hesitate to send a friend and relative to St. Petersburg as his agent. Mr. Adair demonstrated to the Empress that if she remained inflexible, the House of Commons would either force Pitt to yield, or would drive him from the helm.* Thus encouraged, Catherine refused to make any sacrifices of territory, or to restore Ockzakow. *The English Minister, after a long conflict between political principle and power, at length resolved to consult his own preservation by renouncing his alliances.*"—*Wraxall's Memoirs.*

obtain it only through your fears and animosities. Intrinsic evidence is furnished by the two creations in the Black Sea, the one of which is too great, the other too little. Sebastopol and its batteries could aid no expeditionary force, and achieve no descent on Constantinople; yet on them have been expended vast sums of money; whilst the fleet was so starved that, in the course of a quarter of a century, it has received no addition, and is so weak in numbers, fragile in materials, and worthless in crews, that even after Navarino, and in Turkey's moment of extremest helplessness, it was incapable of any enterprise against its coasts. Nay, even at that moment, the Turkish flag held the sea, and in the only action that was fought a Russian frigate was captured. To those who entertain the opinions prevalent in Europe, this may be incredible, but it is so. Either Russia has been negligent of her resources to an inconceivable degree, or we must be wholly in error in the bases of our judgments. Russia has expended upon her Marine just what was judicious.

It sufficed to operate along the coast of Roumeli, in connexion with a large invading army; had it been of ten times the strength it could not singly have availed anything beyond this, without a contest on land; or, even with such a contest. There were no insurrectionary elements in Turkey which it could reach; and I have already shown why, from local circumstances, her vessels on the Caspian, as on the Black Sea, have availed her nothing in her wars with Persia and Turkey.

Had she augmented that force, she would have prompted the Turks to do the like; and a powerful Turkish navy could have found revolutionary element to work upon in her territory. It would have, moreover, excited the serious apprehensions of a descent on Constantinople, and produced an unsubduable irritation amongst the Turks fatal to her ulterior plans. It is by Protection that Russia conquers. It was as a Protector she came into Poland, into the Crimea, and into Georgia; and for that end it is internal revolution that is required, not external blows. *Her last war with Turkey has been fought.* In it she utterly failed. From its date has recommenced the wonderful reorganisation of that Empire, which is now unassailable to her arms. It is through Europe that she will now fall upon it—through its opinions, its intrigues, its interference, and the weight of its masses; then, indeed, the squadron of Sebastopol may again suffice to transfer to the Bosphorus a protecting or a liberating force to back the SULTAN against a rival, an insurrection, or a European invasion.

Russia no doubt uses at Constantinople, as she does at London and at Paris, the *undefended state of the Bosphorus* as an inarticulate threat, always within the lips of her representatives.

That has not prevented Turkey from restoring her navy, and constructing an army. What is the value of a menace which is answered, not by open retort, but by effectual means of prevention? I can tell a very different story. I know, from experience, the value of the *articulation* of that threat; and from that experience I say that, had the Bosphorus been fortified, the Russian flag might be now floating on the Dardanelles. I therefore conclude that Turkey is no more exposed to danger from the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea than she is from her armies; but that, on the contrary, Russia is exposed to those dangers, from the naval as well as the military force of Turkey.* It is that fear which is emphatically assumed by POZZO DI BORGO as having prompted the war of 1828, though, in vain, to meet them. Turkey is in no danger, save from a British Embassy; and that same Embassy is Russia's sole protection. I cannot place the case otherwise than I have already done. "Unless you rectify your course, by the detection and punish-"ment of the guilty, your very physical means will be of no "avail, if ever you require to use them. You may sink the "Baltic and Black Sea fleets, dismantle Cronstadt, and capture "Sebastopol, and you will only serve her."†

Besides, by the new application of galvanic batteries to sunken mines, the Bosphorus can be hermetically sealed against any attack, without expense or noise. If that did not suffice, a few PAIXHAN'S guns would do the business of a squadron, if Russia were ever so mad as to attempt the bombardment of Constantinople.

That her purpose has been to create a false alarm, and a misjudging fear, as proved by the erection of these batteries, is further proved by the selection of the points. Russia's outlet, whether for soldiers or for provisions, is not in the Crimea,‡ but to the east or west of it. It is into the Sea of Azoff that falls the Don, traversing the centre of Muscovy Proper; and Odessa is her great port of shipment, through which her commerce passes, and at which her soldiers have been embarked. *Odessa is not fortified.* She therefore anticipates no retaliation. We have assumed against ourselves the doctrine of these being closed waters; when Turkey asks our protection against Russia, we pretext, for our refusal, our interest in the integrity of Turkey.

The first stipulation was in 1809, when an attempt had been made by England to bombard Constantinople, without even a declaration of war. The object was to force Turkey to sur-

* Lord Ponsonby. † Speech at Glasgow, 1840.

‡ "When (speaking of Sinope) a *Russian fleet, for the first time*, returned to Sebastopol laden with the spoils of *victory*."—*Times*, October, 1854.

render Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia. The stipulation at the peace (1809) was tantamount to a promise not to attack her again through the Straits.

In 1829, the British frigate *La Blonde* sailed into the Black Sea, by permission of the Porte; the captain—the present Sir EDWARD LYONS—was reprimanded, and permanent instructions were transmitted to Constantinople to prevent, *at the instigation of the Russian Ambassador in London*, such "irregularities" for the future.

In 1833, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was extorted on our instigating the Pasha of EGYPT to revolt, and on our inviting Russia to send an expedition to Constantinople to oppose him. The secret Article was for the exclusion of foreign vessels in time of war. England and France sent a naval demonstration in consequence, not against Russia, but against Turkey. The two Governments declared that they would act as if the Treaty had not been signed; but, after alarming the Porte, they retired.

In 1836, the Porte applied privately to England for the passage of some men-of-war. The English Minister refused, alleging it would be a violation of Turkish independence.

In 1839, Marshal SOULT proposed to force the Dardanelles in the event of a Russian descent. The English Minister refused, and betrayed the communication to the Russian Envoy, M. KISSELEFF.

In 1840, England accepted a Treaty sent from St. Petersburg, stipulating the occupation of the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora, and Constantinople itself, by a Russian naval and military force, which Treaty produced a rupture with France, and all but involved the two countries in war.

In 1841, within eight days of the expiration of the above Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, was signed by England and France that of the Dardanelles, for the exclusion of themselves in time of peace; and this Treaty was called "for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire," and was the reconciliation between England and France.

In 1849, England violated her own Treaty of 1841, by sending her squadron into the Dardanelles. The act was explained by "stress of weather," which was false. The object given out, was to back the Porte in its refusal to deliver up the Hungarian refugees, which again was false: the effect was to put England in the wrong, and to paralyse the action of the Turkish Government.

This series of diplomatic instruments confirms the conclusions to which geography would lead us. It also shows us that the Western and Maritime Powers are moved by fears, or designs, of which Constantinople and its two protecting Straits are the

points. It is impossible to resist the conclusion, in reviewing them, that England has been acting perfidiously towards Turkey.* She commences by forcing the Straits, she attempts the bombardment of Constantinople, she professes to hold the Dardanelles, and this avowedly against France, not Russia. The same scheme may be traced throughout, France being in turn cajoled and offended, Turkey uniformly betrayed.

France is moved at once by fears of Russia and fears of England. She dreads collusion between them. Even at the moment of the most cordial friendship, Marshal SOULT gave utterance to that suspicion,† and, upon the word, England joined Russia, and came to a rupture with France.

Now these fears and designs have their origin solely in the supposed tottering condition of the Ottoman Empire and the supposed power of descent upon its capital attributed to Russia, two ideas, than which nothing can be more preposterous. Allured by the magnificence of the spoils, they supposed the danger, not to take the means to prevent, but to devise schemes to profit by it. In this frame of mind it is self-evident, as there is but one Constantinople, that Russia possesses in these mutual and fictitious jealousies the means of involving them in war, and will thus make, not the possession, but the thought the instrument of her conquest of Europe, as well as of Turkey.

The word now is, "Who shall possess Constantinople?" There is a common struggle of the three Embassies for influence there. France has her pretext in the Holy Places. England is counteracting the designs of France on the one side, and Russia on the other. Each of the three is busy in saving Constantinople from the other two. The spot is accessible by sea to all three, and Russia will encourage her rivals in that prostration of the Ottoman Sovereignty which will give her the opportunity of stepping in as its Protector. But let Europe be warned. When a Minister, at a Council Board of Paris or of London, can assume to dispose of Constantinople, reckon thereafter on no possible tranquillity. He has from that moment value to the amount of at least one hundred millions sterling under his hand, which he must hide, may dispose of, but cannot possess.

It requires the prospect of gain and the hope of impunity for an individual murder; less would not be requisite for a system swayed by no temporary passion. A descent on Constantinople would, however, be not a murder, but an attempt alone, with the certainty of failure and punishment. Russia seeks to win Constantinople, not to destroy it. Her power consists in the

* Lord Ponsonby's Memoir.

† Lord Palmerston parait s'accomoder très-facilement d'une occupation Russe de Constantinople.—Marshal Soult, 1839.

menace, not in the execution. Constantinople is as secure against a Russian bombardment as if the Atlantic rolled between and the Andes closed the Channel. Bombardment! That is dwindling to the calibre of England. The capitals she wishes to secure, England bombards.

The Governments of Russia and Turkey stand in mutual dread of each other; that of the one is based on reason, that of the other springs from ignorance. The reasoning fear prompts to incessant action; the unreasoning fear bewilders and benumbs. Concealing her own alarms, Russia plays upon the terrors of her antagonist. But what is to be said of the representative of a *friendly State* who constantly refers to the unprotected Bosphorus, never with a view to its fortification, but only to extort from Turkey some suicidal concession?

It must not be forgotten that this wonderful geographical configuration is repeated in the North; that there Russia is advancing simultaneously as in the South; that she will thus gripe Europe at the two extremities, whilst within those Straits lie the countries which supply the materials for war and food; so that when she has possessed them she will stand in the position of the garrison of a citadel in the centre of an exposed town, which it can at pleasure sweep with grape or starve. Further, the closing of the Euxine lays prostrate every resistance throughout Central Asia.* Her progress towards India, whether in the shape of assailant or protector, or of both combined, becomes henceforward a matter of her own convenience and of time.

I was once asked by the leading statesman of France the reason for having said that England would never go to war with Russia. I answered, because that was a question neither military nor naval, but geographical. "Ah!" he exclaimed, "I under-"stand you. You mean the Dardanelles." Addressing the Chambers on the Eastern Question, he said, "Gentlemen, I "must give you a lecture on geography." He graphically sketched the Continents which there converge, the seas which there unite; traced out the vast scaffolding of the earth composing the system of which this point is the centre; the warlike populations of the Eastern world dependent upon it for political freedom; the mighty nations of civilised Europe dependent upon it for industry and food; the barbarian of the north pressing upon it to launch himself therefrom upon the ocean; the Ottoman Empire holding by it and protecting Christianity, freedom, and civilisation. He showed that the agitations of Europe were like those of the market-places of Athens, where an intellectual people was occupied in disputations while PHILIP was thundering at the gates. The Dardanelles were the gates

* Witness already Circassia.

at which the Barbarian now stood, and Europe's fate depended on meeting him there and being there before him. He addressed but Frenchmen; I address Englishmen. Words are vain to races "used-up with political ideas;"* unless you have a fallacy to present no one will listen; and unless you rouse a passion no one will act.

Then I speak from bitter experience. I have learned how dangerous it is to propose an end, and how useless it is to slaughter a fallacy. And yet it is imperative on me to speak. If I succeed in convincing this universal nation of the necessity of resisting Russia, I know that in so doing I shall only be preparing for the ruin of Turkey, for thereupon you would set about acting, and you know not how to act. My object is not this. It is to persuade you that it is of absolute necessity to reconstruct the system by means of which you carry on your public business; for as it is, no man can be an hour in the Foreign Office without, consciously or unconsciously, being engaged in the service of the Emperor of RUSSIA, and that service is always the most effectual, when it assumes the appearance of opposition —deadly (as in the case of Afghanistan) when it assumes the mask of war.

When I said that war was impossible between England and Russia because it was a geographical question, my meaning was this, that your resolution to strike, if ever honestly arrived at, would render blows needless; that Russia's resolution to strike will come only after there was no possibility of resistance. So long as the Dardanelles are open, your first hostile measure must be to send a squadron through them, and Russia is brought at once to her knees;† but when the Dardanelles are occupied, you can no longer strike her, for they cannot be occupied till Turkey has lost the desire of her own independence.

I therefore hold it of vital importance to the very existence of the British Empire, that Russia should not get the Dardanelles. There is but one way of preventing her from getting the Dardanelles, and that is, ceasing to believe that Turkey wants your aid. Be assured of this, that you cannot separate Constantinople and the Empire. You cannot say, "Let the "Empire go, and we will get the Dardanelles. You cannot rescue Constantinople from Russia, though you may ruin Turkey by playing that fine game. I know I speak in vain. I know that those who rule you have nothing to learn; and as for you, who are ruled, it matters not what you think. These words

* Words of Napoleon.

† The reader will understand that this refers to the consequences of a war in earnest, when the trade of Russia would have been sacrificed, Odessa occupied, Bessarabia recaptured, Poland, Georgia, and the Crimea delivered, and all those effectual measures taken which it was in the power of England to take.—1867.

are set down for the benefit of those who, if they understood, might save — the Queen of ENGLAND and the Turkish Government: the first has but to know the truth, the second but to distrust England.

These are, however, speculative and prospective matters. I wish to close with a real matter. It is Constantinople that menaces Russia, not Sebastopol that menaces Turkey. It is Russia that is at the mercy of the Ottoman Empire, not the Ottoman Empire at hers.

In herself, Russia is invulnerable to any of the great States of Europe. An attack on her by Prussia is too preposterous even to be dreamt of. It is Prussia who is exposed to her assault. The same thing may be said of Austria. The Empire of the CÆSAR lies at her mercy. Her armies have already appeared on the Danube as Protectors. As to France, with all her power, what can she do against Russia?* If she were again to move 500,000 men, she would require first to pass over the body of Germany. As to attacking her by the Black Sea, that would be impossible, unless Turkey were also at war with her; but then the operation would be superfluous. England—where can she attack her? She is not going to take from her Poland, her own gift! Failing that, what can she do? She may level Cronstadt, and occupy St. Petersburg. The EMPEROR will retire, and his troops may retire six miles, and that is all. In the Black Sea, as in the case of France, she can only appear in a Turkish war, where she is not wanted. Finally, let us take the case of a Confederacy, a European Confederacy against Russia. You might as well speak of a Greek Confederacy against PHILIP. A terrible day for Europe would be a Confederacy against Russia. The smallest of States may overthrow her, that has a mind equal to the task; if not, the more the Confederates, the greater the danger. Now let us take Turkey. The mere fact of war paralyses one half the Russian Empire, and convulses the whole. This is a new feature. The cause of it did not exist previously to the late war. It lies in the development of the agricultural population of Southern Russia, during the last half century. It is avowed by Russia herself, and that openly. Here are the very terms she uses in her Declaration of War of 1828:—

"The Bosphorus is closed. Our commerce is annihilated. "The ruin of the Russian towns that owe their existence to this "commerce becomes imminent, and the meridional provinces of "the States of the EMPEROR lose the only outlet for their produce, "the only maritime communication which can, in facilitating

* "Russia" said Pozzo di Borgo, "has nothing to fear from the Union of France and England, for the naval power of France would add nothing to the efficiency of that of England."

"exchange, cause labour to fructify and bear industry and "riches."*

These were the words of NICHOLAS; but already had ALEXANDER called Constantinople "The key of his house." That key, is the property of the SULTAN, and not of the CZAR, and, therefore, he offered to NAPOLEON half of Europe, in order to get it, and therefore too did NAPOLEON refuse. He knew that the Ottoman Empire was not to be shared, and that either it must stand or Europe fall.

The Western nations, however, did believe that Turkey was exposed to great danger from the Russian fleet, and their course, so far, was clear—either to obtain the entrance of men-of-war, or the placing of the fortifications of the Bosphorus on such a footing as would render any attempt upon the capital impracticable. They did not, however, follow either course,† and so far justified the judgments respecting them which I have attributed to Russia.

When Russia created a navy in the Black Sea, the other Governments had to require admission, not only to balance her power, but for all those reasons for which they have vessels-of-war afloat upon the ocean. So long as the Euxine was an exclusive possession of Turkey no one had anything to say to it; there were no questions of peace or war affecting it; any insult to which our flag might there be exposed could be avenged on Smyrna or Alexandria; we had no right, no need, no object to enter for. But the matter was wholly altered when another State arose upon its banks: when the Russian power came down upon its shores; when her advancing frontiers spread around its limits, and her conquering armies were transported across its waters; when our trade entering there was carried on with populations no longer subject to Turkey; when it was exposed to the violence of power, to the accidents of piracy, to the chances of war, and the despotism of blockades; to the questionable authority of quarantines. But it so happened that, although periodically alarmed to the last degree at the designs of Russia, and frequently injured by her acts, we have never taken that simple course of sending up our men-of-war.

This, however, was a matter with which Russia had nothing in the world to do. It was a question for Turkey, and for Turkey alone, whether or not we should pass through her

* Accordingly in the Crimean War the Bosphorus was not closed, and the only spot in the Black Sea at which a blockade was established was the mouth of the Danube! If any one still doubts this, let him read Admiral Slade's "History of the Crimean War."—Note 1867.

† Lamartine selected General Aupick as Ambassador in 1848, with a view of assisting the Turks in fortifying the Bosphorus. He never uttered a word on the real object of his mission.

Straits. Now, by the very reason that it was essential for Russia that we should not enter, was it essential for Turkey that we should. I do not mean navies to occupy and coerce, but vessels to observe. But on that matter we would hold no intercourse with Turkey, except to scorn and repress her appeals. If Russia has maintained the exclusion, it is by England's doing, not her own. It is to this very circumstance that Turkey owes the creation of her army.

The Bosphorus, after making Russia the menacing State she has become, has rescued Turkey from the dying state in which she was.

MILITARY OPERATIONS.

CHAPTER V.

CAMPAIGN OF 1828.

THE problem contained in the three previous chapters will be admitted by all to involve the future fate of Turkey, and some will be ready to extend the application to Europe itself; it is one, therefore, which merits the most careful scrutiny, and as the best test which can be applied to it is the practical trial which it has undergone, I shall now proceed to pass in review the events of the late war.

To enter upon such a matter seems adventuring on the domain of fable; but though the figures are strange, the facts are not uncertain. The authorities of which we are in possession are indeed *ex parte*,* but on that account all the more favourable for my purpose. The Russian statements may be liable to the perversions incident to a contest, but they are free from the fallacies incident to reasoning ignorance. It is from the Russians alone that we have to expect anything like a just appreciation of the Turks; their intentional misrepresentation comes nearer the truth than European panegyric.

* "The Turkish and Russian Armies," by Colonel F. Irvanitchew: Ilmenau.
"Account of the Russo-Turkish Campaigns, 1828-9," by F. A. Witzleben: Magdeburg, 1829-31.
"The Russo-Turkish Campaign in European Turkey," by Major Moltke: Berlin, 1845.
"Treaty of the War against the Turks," by General Valentini; French Translation of Blesson: Berlin, 1830.
"Secret Dispatch, reviewing the Position of the Governments of Europe with reference to the Russo-Turkish Campaign," by Pozzo di Borgo, June 1829, Portfolio: London, 1836.

The war was declared at St. Petersburg on the 7th of May: on the same day all was prepared for crossing the Pruth, which was speedily effected by two *corps d'armée*—the 6th and the 7th. The first of these, under General ROTH, marched in haste to occupy Bucharest, which they did without seeing a Turk; the second, under the Grand-Duke MICHAEL, sat down before Ibrail to besiege that place.

The passage of the Pruth being thus readily effected, and the country opened to Bucharest, there appeared no difficulty in attaining and crossing the Danube, and arriving at once at the heart of the Turkish strength, before any troops were assembled, or any preparations made to receive them; for the Russians were already at Bucharest, before the Turks, at Constantinople, knew that they were at war; besides, in the convulsed state of the Empire, it appeared that anything might be attempted with impunity. Colonel CHESNEY thus describes the opening operations* :—

"On the 7th and 8th of May, 1828, the 16th, 17th, 18th, "and 19th divisions of infantry, with six regiments of Cossacks "and the Hulans of the Bug, composing the 6th and 7th corps, "passed the Pruth, on bridges which had been previously pre- "pared, leaving the third corps for the moment on the other side "of the river."

It will, therefore, appear inexplicable that the third *corps d'armée* should not have advanced by the same route and pressed on to reap a harvest that only required to be gathered, and that, instead of making use of the facilities for crossing the Pruth, it should have involved itself in the marshes on the left bank of the Danube, at the extremity of Bessarabia, there to consume an entire month in works to reach the river, and to be followed by a hazardous operation in crossing. Still more extraordinary must it appear that the Emperor, accompanying the army of invasion, should have attached himself to this corps, and exposed himself to these annoyances and danger; but the fact is, that the issue of the campaign entirely depended upon this movement, so thoroughly understood by the Russian Generals, not in this war only, but also in that of 1810, and yet that the reasons for it should be passed over in entire silence by all the writers on the subject.

I beg the reader to open the map, and to study the ground. I do not think that it will require military knowledge or experience for him at once to detect the secret. He will see a strip of land, exclusive of the marshy delta of the Danube,

* Extracted from his unpublished Memoir to appear in the continuation of "The Expedition of the Euphrates." Since published separately, see "Russo-Turkish Campaigns," by Colonel Chesney.

running up between that river and the Euxine from the neighbourhood of Silistria to the very frontier of Russia, being about 120 miles in length and about 40 in breadth. The shading of the map will show him that this promontory is neither level like the plain beyond the Danube on the west, nor marshy like the delta on the north-east. The colouring will show him that it is not included administratively in Wallachia, but that it belongs to Turkey Proper. He will perceive in it no less than five forts stationed on the Danube, two of these commanding the passage to the Sulina branch, and another fort on the Kustendji, commanding the only anchorage along the whole line between Odessa and Varna. The peculiar configuration at its narrowest part, where the Danube suddenly turns away to the north, instead of continuing what would appear to be its natural course straight on to Kustendji, and the projection of a long lake half across the isthmus, and the words TRAJAN'S WALL traced on the same line, combine to declare the military character of the position. So that I say that any one who will reflect upon the matter for himself must at once perceive that the DOBROJA is the field of defence of the Ottoman Empire, and that its occupation must be the first object of an invading army; that not to defend it is to sacrifice half the war, and to occupy it without a contest is to win the campaign. It is necessary, however, to enter into some details which the map will not afford.

The Dobroja, strictly speaking, is no man's land; it has nt native population, having been for many centuries exposed to the incursions of neighbouring States, and especially to the devastations of the Cossacks. The people scattered over ie amount to not more than 15 to the square mile, and is composed of a medley of tribes not amalgamated, but living distinct. There are Tartars, remnants of the army of TIMOUR; there are Arabs, Cossacks, Bulgarians, and shepherds who come to pasture there from Moldavia and from Austria. The land is fertile, the winter not severe, the summer tempered by breezes, and the country well wooded. It is on two sides protected by the Danube, and with steep and generally inaboardable banks. On the north and east it is protected by the marshes of the Danube and an unapproachable sea-coast: yet it has the advantage of communication with Constantinople by the harbour of Kustendji. On the fourth side it is shut in by the Lake of Carasou, and a chain of heights where TRAJAN established the line of defence against the barbarian tribes of the Ister, the value of which is illustrated in the late wars by the advantage which Russia has taken of its neglect by the Turks.

The Roman Empire, under TRAJAN, had to be defended on

the Danube against a people occupying Wallachia. The Ottoman Empire has to defend itself against an enemy coming from beyond the Pruth, and has to protect Wallachia; the line of Carasou, essential in the first case, is only the rear of this entrenchment as applied to the last.

The process by which Russia has opened to herself the Ottoman Empire has been the establishment of the quasi-independence of the Principalities, from whence she has been allowed to deduce their non-occupation by a Turkish force; and this has become a Treaty stipulation. If Turkey is apprehensive of war, she does not dare to send forward an army to her frontier, because that would be a declaration of war, which she wishes to avoid. Russia, therefore, when she intends to make the war enters and possesses them before the Turks are aware that they are at war; hence the importance of the Dobroja as not being a portion of Wallachia, and yet extending to the Danube; consequently, the Turks may establish themselves in advance of Wallachia, and in face of Bessarabia, and command, by their guns, the Danube, below the Pruth, below Galatz and Ibrail, and therefore entirely intercepting the whole communications by that river. This district is made to the hands of the Porte; it is contrived, so to say, with a wonderful ingenuity to frustrate alike the diplomatic art and the military endeavours of its antagonist. It requires but to establish here Cossack colonies, or a Turkish population, or both, to render it one immense Shumla placed on the very frontiers of Russia, and sealing those of Turkey against all invasion. It was to this district, at all events, that, in case of war, her armies had to be advanced; there was no diplomatic impediment to their being so, and nothing but the most deplorable blunders* could have prevented that step.

But if the Russians had advanced by the line of the Pruth, then most certainly would the Turkish armies have been pushed into the Dobroja. In that case it would have been impossible to bring up the Russian flotilla, which has, with great difficulty, to be tracked by horses along the beach; and without that flotilla none of the fortresses of the Danube could have been captured, nor its passage effected. The siege of Ibrail, always so difficult and costly an operation at the beginning of a war, would have been rendered far more so; and, with the Turks established at this point, and Widdin at the other, Wallachia must become the theatre of war. Even if they advanced into the centre of the Crescent, their rear and their communications would have been exposed to constant enterprises, and the enemy would have been within reach of that narrow plain of Jocham, extending

* General Valentini, in speaking of these operations, says, "It is always the contest of a seeing man with a blind one."

from the north-west angle of the Danube to the eastern point of the Carpathians, by which alone, in case of a reverse, their retreat would have to be effected.

For these reasons it was of absolute necessity to commence the campaign by occupying the Dobroja, from which also the further advantage is to be obtained of maintaining the Turks in total ignorance of the use to which they might turn it.

Except the small garrisons in the six neglected forts of which I have spoken, and which were composed of Albanians and old Janissaries, and therefore disaffected, there were no Turkish troops in the Dobroja; yet the army destined for its occupation amounted to 30,000 men, a large proportion of which were cavalry,* the want of which was extremely felt by the rest of the army. I quote the operation as detailed in the Russian reports:—

"The chief of the staff of the Emperor, Count DIEBITCH, "flew to the Pruth, to prepare for the passage of the 3rd corps. "Difficulties were encountered which, on reflection, ought "not to occasion surprise. *The banks of the Danube, from "Silistria to its mouth, proved to be impracticable,* with the ex- "ception of some points, in consequence of the inundations of "the season. The escarpment on the Turkish side comes up to "the water from Tultsja to Isaktschi, but close to the last place "it is possible to obtain a footing. On this side, starting from "the village of Satunovo, a causeway of four versts (6000 "paces) was indispensable to reach the river: it had to be "carried through a low valley, and required *four weeks for its "construction:* it was far from being terminated when the "Emperor arrived, on the 18th of May.† It was desirable "that such preparatory works should be completed at this or "other convenient stations on the Bessarabian side of the "Danube before the opening of the campaign. If these pre- "parations were postponed to *avoid any indication of opening the "campaign,* it is one of those faults with which policy often "afflicts war. When the causeway was almost completed, on "the 7th of June, and when the 3rd corps was about to effect "its passage, the enemy assumed an advantageous position on "the opposite bank. Its aspect was, indeed, imposing; but it "could be positively ascertained that it manœuvred to conceal "a weakness which, under the circumstances, was inevitable.

"The passage of the Danube, under the eyes of the musketry "and the grape of the enemy, was, however, one of the most

* Two regiments of Cossacks, the 3rd division of Huzzars, the 1st division of Dragoons, and the 2nd division of Chasseurs, the last two forming the 4th corps of cavalry.

† Showing that the works had commenced three weeks before the declaration of war at St. Petersburg.

" difficult of enterprises, and was executed with the greatest " talent by General ROUDSEWITSCH, under the especial direc- " tion of the Emperor. The expectation proved vain of being " able to transport the troops by means of merchant vessels; " but the zeal of the Hetman of the Zaporogne Cossacks " supplied the deficiency. Crossing with 200 of his men, he " was enabled by degrees, with small boats, to transport " 15,000 Russians.* The fire of a battery placed upon the " opposite causeway, and above all the attack of the brave " Russian flotilla, soon extinguished that of the Turkish batte- " ries on the right bank. Scarcely had General Prince GORTS- " CHAKOFF appeared at the head of four battalions on the other " side of the river than its defenders took to flight. Isaktschi " surrendered a few minutes afterwards, the commandant giving " no other reason than this, that it was contrary to all propriety " that he should resist an Emperor of RUSSIA—a courtesy which " he paid for with his head on reaching Shumla."

These corps once landed had no marches to encounter, no loss, or sufferings fron climate, provisions were amply supplied by the Cossacks from Bessarabia, and there was no enemy to meet them in the field. They consequently radiated off to Matschin, Hirsowa, Tultoja, Kustendji, to the Wall of TRAJAN and Chernavoda. To the neglect of the apparently important operations in Wallachia, this was the scene to which the Emperor transported himself; it was not till after the surrender of Ibrail that he was able (on the 10th of July) to advance from TRAJAN'S Wall upon Bazajik, where he was within a day's march of Varna, and two of Shumla, the vital positions of the Turks, the last of which, twenty days after the Russians had crossed the Pruth, was without defenders, and the former of which might have been carried by a *coup de main*, had the Russians appeared a week earlier.

Ibrail is in the form of a crescent, and stands on a plateau of from 60 to 80 feet above the water, touching the river at the southern extremity, and receding from it towards the northern. A detached fort on the low ground enfilades the beach between the escarpment and the river, and joins to the river the northern extremity of the Crescent. The Danube here divides into several branches. Matschin, on the Dobroja, is on another branch. The distance between the two places by water is five miles, and the communications were maintained by a Turkish flotilla of thirty-two gunboats which commanded the river. The

* These Cossacks had fled from Russia into Turkey, where 50,000 of them are domiciled, and are devoted to the Sultan. The Hetman in question was seduced by a large sum of money. The statement in the text shows to what extent Russia has been indebted to this active treachery.

rampart on the land side is 30 feet high, with nine strong bastions surrounded by a ditch. There are no advanced works, save the glacis of a narrow covered way. The strength of the place consisted in the Turkish population of 30,000 souls, out of which the Russians reckoned that 10,000 were found capable of bearing arms.

The Russians arrived on the 11th of May; the trenches were opened on the 25th, batteries having also been established lower down the river, to enfilade the branch passing by Matschin, and in which was stationed the Turkish flotilla. On the same night this flotilla was attacked by the Russians, and one-half the number having been lost or destroyed, it retired up the stream by Matschin, to rejoin the main flotilla which, through the negligence we meet with at every turn, had not been sent to the scene of action. The Russians now commanding the river, the works were advanced, and battery added to battery, both of mortars and heavy guns, the attack being directed against the southern angle, till the 13th of June, when, the third parallel being carried up close to the wall, mining commenced. There being in the garrison no professional defenders, the Turks could not be expected to employ art, and still less so as the operations were carried on during the night in consequence of the great heat of the day. Their fire, however, both of guns, mortars, and a long rampart musket which they used with great effect, considerably annoyed the besiegers, and cost them some thousand men. They made great fires upon the rampart to watch the enemy, and almost nightly sorties. The mining operations of which they had no experience greatly terrified them, and they expected to be all blown into the air. Not understanding the means of detecting these works, their attempts to countermine proved ineffectual, and the Russian preparations being effected on the 15th of June, the explosion took place, and the troops rushed to the assault before the breach was properly cleared. The inhabitants rushed also to crown the breach, and after a long and desperate struggle the Russians retired, leaving by their own account in the trenches 3000 men, and amongst them two general officers. That the defenders of Ibrail on this memorable day included children of tender age is proved by an incident mentioned by VALENTINI. The assailants had carried away with them a boy twelve years old. His brother, aged ten, had been killed in the breach. Being asked if he was not sorry for his brother, he answered, "Why should I be so? did he not die "in the breach!" "But," continues the narrator, "this boy must "have learned these notions in some European school." Yet with strange inconsistency in accounting for such a defence by the spontaneous movement of the inhabitants, he says, "It is

"the result of a warlike instinct, and a well-calculated personal "interest, which will be obtained only in Christendom when we "arrive at complete civilisation. With us the first bomb shakes "institutions which can have security only in a military spirit "and a love of country."

On the day following, another mine was sprung, and more effectually, on which the Pasha offered to surrender on condition of marching out with arms and baggage, and retiring freely to Silistria. These terms were granted.

The Turks could not possibly have held Ibrail much longer Already had the Russian army marched on on both sides of the Danube. The commander, like the garrison, had nobly done its duty. He surrendered when, in European warfare, further defence would have been impossible, as he had maintained his fortress under circumstances which, in European warfare, would have rendered defence impossible. He further obtained terms most honourable and useful, for, by prolonging the contest, he would not have been able to transfer the inhabitants of Ibrail to Silistria to become hereafter its heroic defenders. Yet when he arrived at Shumla he was put to death, assenting himself to the Spartan decree of the Grand Vizier, "You have done well; but "you ought not to have survived the fall of Ibrail."

The character revealed in the defence of this city explains the campaign and its results. Substitute for the word "Turk" "Roman," and the matter would be plain. Are not the acts which we have recorded worthy of Rome? Does its history afford better examples of soldiers or citizens, of sternness or valour? This population was a trading community; twenty years had passed since it had seen war. It was domiciled in a foreign land; it had relied upon its native impulses alone. Let any one consider what a trading community of Europe would have done, if so abandoned, in the face of 150,000 veterans? The small fortresses of the Dobroja obtained the same honourable terms. One of them only was made prisoner; the others retired to prolong their country's defence, even though one of them, from the internal schism then agitating the state, forced their commander to capitulate. How the Russians with an open breach, and closing in the city upon all sides, allowed the garrison—a garrison so formidable and animated with such a spirit, and now filled with vengeance—to retire to garrison the next fortress is conceivable only by the respect which they inspired. In fact, as it has been well said, "the dangers of a siege com- "mence with the Turks only after, according to the rules of "European war, further defence is impracticable." Besides time, even calculated by hours, was to them of the greatest importance, as already before the walls of Ibrail had it been per-

ceived that the troops were not in sufficient numbers, and orders were expedited to send forward from the interior of the Empire all that could possibly be spared. But why were the Russians so anxious to get possession of Ibrail? The way was open on both sides; it contained but its inhabitants, and though they might defend its walls, they were not going to attack the Russians in the rear. Let them answer the question themselves!

"Of all the places possessed by the Turks on the left bank, "Ibrail was the principal. It was necessary to have it to be "master of the navigation of the river, *so as to get possession of* "*the other important ports and secure that of the invaded countries.*" It was the Danube that was captured at Ibrail!

The 7th corps being now free, it advanced, as did the 6th from Bucharest, to cross the river in the direct line of operations, that is between Silistria and Rustchuk, where a portion of the 3rd corps was expected by this time to have established a lodgment on the right bank to prepare a passage. General Roth had early been detached with a strong body to prepare on the Dombowitza (a river which passes by Bucharest, and falls into the Danube nearly halfway between Rustchuk and Silistria) the pontoons and materials requisite for throwing a bridge across at Tourtukni. This operation was not found so easy as was expected, in consequence of the occupation of Giurziova by the Turks, and their flotilla which, at that time, gave them the command of the river. This division had, therefore, to turn back to cross at Hirshova, and by the aid of vessels sent up from Ibrail, so that the 2nd corps now entered by the Dobroja and joined the main army under the Emperor.

The general quarters had already been established at TRAJAN'S Rampart, and "already had commenced to be felt the danger of "the weakness of means;" and it was necessary to wait for the fall of the fortresses in the rear. The experience of preceding campaigns proved that the Turks would oppose in Bulgaria a pertinacious resistance, whether in the fortified places or in broken ground adapted to their order of defence, and where numbers might easily paralyse art and tactics. It was not, then, until the 7th corps had joined from Ibrail that an advance could be made, which took place on the 10th of July, when the army moved forward in two divisions, by two routes, on Bazarjih, escorting, at the same time, the garrisons of the places that had fallen, to become in turn the defenders of Varna and Silistria. Bazarjih was found evacuated, and was at once occupied by the avant posts. The Turks immediately returned and drove them out; a Russian reinforcement came up, and again they were driven back. A division of infantry (hitherto cavalry alone had been engaged) came up to receive their comrades; the Turkish

cavalry threw themselves on the guns in the intervals of the squares, and finally were repulsed. The Russian army was obliged to halt several days at Bazarjih, awaiting reinforcements. Here, for the first time, was the Emperor gratified with the sight of the new uniform of the NIZAM; and it is worth while to record the impression which it made upon its adversaries:—

"We have observed, for the first time, a remarkable order in "the movement of the Turkish cavalry; they closed up and de- "ployed, scattered and rallied again; and it was easy to per- "ceive that they were no longer directed by warlike impulses, "but by the will of their chiefs."

The flotilla was now making its way up the Danube, and Anapa, the northern frontier of Circassia, having fallen, the troops engaged in that siege, instead of being sent forward to join PASKIEWITCH, in Asia, were sent across the Black Sea and landed in the neighbourhood of Varna. Thus strengthened on the two flanks, the main army advanced on Koslondji, between Silistria and Varna, on a line with both, thirty miles from the one, and fifty from the other. This place the Turks had also evacuated. They were, however, reported to be "in posi- "tion at a few versts distant from the route of Yeni Bazar. "A reconnaissance of two squadrons found there 8000 cavalry "(?) and five guns, and was this time better mauled even than "at Bazarjih. The Lieutenant-General, hastening to the sup- "port of his flying squadrons, was instantly enveloped, and "quickly reconducted (*ramené*)* several versts. The Turks "must have had difficulty in comprehending how the immense "resources of Russia could only furnish a division of huzzars "for the avant-guard of his army. On the other hand, after "all their disagreeable experiences, the confidence of this ex- "cellent division diminished only in proportion to the strength "of its horses. . . . It would be unjust to reproach the officers, "who acted only," &c.

A junction being now effected with the army of General RUDIGER, it advanced on Yeni Bazar, and then on Pravodi, equally evacuated by the Turks; and, while it marched on Shumla, the troops destined for the siege of Silistria and Varna radiated in these directions. General Count SOUCHTELN, advancing up to the walls of the latter place, was saluted by a vigorous sortie, which caused the Russians to retire, "after a "bloody engagement, leaving behind 300 men." At the same time a reinforcement of several thousand men entered by the Bourgas route, so that the Russian General thought fit to retire and entrench himself at a respectable distance.

* Courteous military term for flight.

On the 20th of July, the Emperor advanced on the famous bulwark of the Ottoman Empire—Shumla. I may be pardoned if I say a few words in this place. It is, perhaps, the most historic of strategic points and of fortresses, and yet resembles in nothing other fortified places. When I first entered it, some years after this war, it was of a misty morning. Dismounting at the post-house, I inquired how far it was to Shumla, which I was all anxiety to behold. I had seen no walls; I had passed no gorges, crossed no heights; in fact, it is an open place, formed by hills abrupt and wooded, but not high or steep, in the form of a horse-shoe, looking to the east, with a radius of a couple of miles. It is an admirable position for an entrenched camp, but is nothing more; and in the hands of no other people would it be heard of to-day, as it never was heard of before they possessed it.

Here intersect the roads longitudinally and transversely, crossing from Varna to Upper Bulgaria, from the Danube to the plain of Adrianople and the Capital; consequently it unites at once the best ground for an entrenched camp, and a most admirable position for a camp to entrench itself in, whether opposing an enemy, operating in Bulgaria, or watching an army proposing to cross the Balkan.

The Russians advanced with the 3rd and 7th corps, strengthened by detachments amounting to no less than 60,000 men, with above a hundred guns. The Turks were only engaged in their field defences before the place, which was not closed. They reckoned them at 40,000 men. Although the Russians drove in on both sides bodies that came out to meet them, they were overawed by the imposing effect of the place and its defenders, and, consequently, divided in counsels as to the course of future operations. A similar effect seems to have been produced upon the Turks, judging, at least, by the statement of Colonel CHESNEY, who was at the place at the time. From his manuscript report I quote the following numbers and dates of the arrival of the troops, and account of the first operations:—

On May 17th the first troops arrived to occupy it.

	Cavalry.	Infantry.
May 17th, CARRAGE NEMEN . .		800
„ 22nd, OSMAN PASHA . . .	2,000	
„ 27th, HUSSEIN PASHA . . .	8,000	8,000
„ „ HALIL PASHA . . .		11,000
June 2nd, HEMIM PASHA (Delhis)	3,000	
„ 30th IZAAD PASHA . . .		8,000
„ „ „ „ (Albanians)		4,000
	13,000	31,800

Amongst them the Regulars amounted to 8000 horse and 20,000 Infantry, including Artillery; and a portion of them were those which we have seen at Bazarjih and Kolousji. Colonel CHESNEY continues:—

"HUSSEIN PASHA immediately commenced to throw up a "chain of bastioned field-works in advance of the old line, "which he accomplished in forty days. The entrenchments "took the shape of a grand front of a fortification, with its "flanks resting on the crests of the mountains, and each ending "in a fort. There are eighteen bastions running across the "valley (2½ miles wide); they are all mined; and in advance "there is a double chain of *detached* redoubts, one at 300 and "the other at 500 yards from the main line. These works are "enclosed in the rear, and occupy some ground which would "otherwise be advantageous to the enemy.

"Count WITTGENSTEIN, with 24,000, arrived just as the "new works were finished by HUSSEIN PASHA. He was met, "for the first time, in the open field by the Turks, about three "leagues from Shumla. He repulsed them, with the loss of "2000 men, and drove them into the fortress, so panic-"struck that they abandoned the redoubts outside, and he might "possibly have entered with them. The Russians commenced "throwing up works immediately, and on the 22nd of July the "Emperor NICHOLAS arrived with 18,000 men."

It is singular that the Russians take no credit for this loss inflicted on the Turks, and that they were not aware of their panic. It must have been, however, of short duration, for the Russians were obliged to abandon the design of closely investing them, were unable to prevent the entrance of convoys and reinforcements or to arrest the advance of the new field-works. Here was observed a phenomenon in military tactics, that of two armies carrying on siege operations against each other; so that sorties were made by the besieging force, and zigzags pushed by the besieged. Under such circumstances the expectations of a triumphant campaign vanished; all attack upon Shumla was out of the question — a close investment of it impossible; it could not be reduced by famine, as the large extent of works mutually defended and attacked exposed the army to the effects of discouragement and of loss with no possibility of success. Inquieted at the same time in its rear, and in a bare country destitute of fodder, and where, in a night attack, a Russian redoubt was carried and a general officer (Wrede) slain, it became evident that the Turks were beginning to contemplate the possibility of more daring and effectual enterprises.

"The position of the Russian troops before Shumla was "beginning to become very critical, and so much the more as

" they were daily exhausted in efforts to maintain a development " out of all proportion with their disposable forces. Above all " forage was wanting, by which the horses were ruined; and with " their strength the confidence of the riders diminished, who had " no desire to deliver up their heads to the agile Spahis.* Here " it was evident that the numerical weakness of the Russian " cavalry deprived it of the means of subsistence; had it been " in greater force, and, above all, had there been enough of Cos- " sacks, forage could have been obtained from a greater distance, " and the service of the avant-posts effected with less fatigue. " That happened which will scarcely be credible, that the whole " cavalry of the army was on service daily at the avant-posts, or " as foragers, and was almost entirely destroyed in this service. " The infantry was exhausted and deprived of rest by the inse- " curity of the avant-posts, and cavalry could not be reckoned " on for action."

Shumla was not the only place besieged. "General ROTH, " from the middle of the month of July, had drawn a blockade " around Silistria; but the weakness of his troops (40,000 men!) " prevented him from closing sufficiently to cut off the commu- " nications with Rustchuk (by the river), from which it drew its " subsistence." Nothing of importance occurred before that place during the campaign, except, indeed, an attempt made by the troops, on their retreat to Wallachia, to get possession of it, which failed.

Varna was now the chief object. The opportunity of the co-operation of the fleet, the facility afforded of transporting by the fleet the guns, shot, and siege material, the importance of the place, as joining the land operations with the sea, and the exclu- sion of the Turks from this *tête de pont* on the Euxine, presented sufficient inducements to render it a chief point of the original plan, especially as the fortifications were not calculated to resist a regular siege.

In the hopelessness of making any impression on Shumla, " the siege of Varna became the principal operation of the " campaign," as it was expected that the troops set free might still be employed against Shumla. Therefore the Emperor, on the 3rd of August, went to superintend in person that siege. However, " not finding the necessary preparations sufficiently " advanced, and as it was necessary to await the arrival of the " Guards, his Majesty, to avoid passing several weeks in inaction, " went to Odessa; thus at no point was there force sufficient to " act with vigour."

The Emperor returned at the beginning of September with

* "In the month of August from 100 to 150 horses died per day, and in the charge of a regiment of huzzars sixteen horses fell dead from weakness."

the reinforcements, and the operations commenced to become serious. Prince MENSCHIKOFF, being severely wounded, was replaced in the command by Count WORONZOF, and the Emperor's camp-general was established beyond the Devna to intercept the communications from the south, as it had not been found practicable to invest it on that side. The weakening of the Russian force before Shumla enabled the Turks, in the middle of September, to send out bodies for the support of Silistria and Varna; 14,000 approached the latter place. Marshal WITTGENSTEIN, by means of the reserve at Pravodi, Yenibazar and Rasgrad, operated so as to intercept the diversion, though not without difficulty and loss.

The contest was carried on before Varna with fierceness on both sides: several redoubts had been carried, and the lines had been much advanced, when OMER VRIONI, with 20,000 men, advancing to the relief of the place, debouched between Kamtchick and Varna. The Adjutant-General GOLOVIN had taken post on Kurtep. OMER VRIONI menaced the ford which ensured his retreat on Varna; but, on the other hand, the detachment was supported by the fleet. OMER VRIONI commanded a body of irregulars against which, not being held in much respect, a reconnaissance was detached, composed of one regiment of 1500 men, two squadrons of chasseurs, and two pieces of light artillery. The result was "stupefaction on both sides." The half of the body only returned, leaving the general wounded and a prisoner. It was now found necessary to reinforce GOLOVIN, General BISTRON taking the command, and Marshal WITTGENSTEIN received orders to advance all his disposable troops on the same point. These were placed under Prince EUGENE, with orders to rally Prince MADATOFF and all the reinforcements that could be spared from Varna; General DIEBITCH was also advancing, and General SIMANSKI. Thus then the whole of the disposable forces were concentrated around this irregular corps of Bashi Bozuks, with Russia's best generals and their Emperor at their head. It was the opportunity most of all desired of meeting the Turks in the open field, and it presented the further incitement that "the attack, if repulsed, must neces-
"sarily compromise in its consequences the fate of the army."

OMER VRIONI had established an entrenched camp according to the old Roman practice of the Turks (he indeed formed three) on the strong position of Kurtep; and the Russians, to their surprise, discovered by its dimensions that it was destined for an army, consequently that the movement of OMER VRIONI was preparatory to a great strategic operation to change the nature of the campaign.

Opinions were divided, but the case was desperate: the order

of the Emperor for the attack was in these terms:—"The grace "of God and the courage of the troops inspire hope which the "knowledge of the circumstances and of the ground cannot pos- "sibly promise; but His Majesty can in no case doubt of the "obedience and the zeal of the troops." Another appeal was made to their chivalry in these terms: "His Majesty has destined "to a heroic action a handful of brave men. The God of "armies will be with them."

The operations which ensued between 8000 Turks and 20,000 Russians are too confused to be detailed, consisting of partial actions, attacks of redoubts and entrenchments, and *mêlées* in he forests. There seems to have been as little strategic combination on the one side as the other, and equal bravery. The advantages of discipline were, of course, all on the side of the Russians; the Turks had that of position, but not that of numbers; and it is wholly inexplicable how, in broken ground, and especially in forests, cavalry should have beaten infantry; in fact, the Russians remark that, from the agility of their horses, the Turkish irregular cavalry, in broken ground, are equal to *tirailleurs*. The devotion of the Russian officers was unparalleled; two general officers perished in leading charges; General SIMANSKI himself was killed, Prince EUGENE wounded. In one grave were interred the chief of the brigade, the chief of the regiment, two chiefs of battalion, and two chiefs of companies. The principal attack ceased only to prevent the total destruction of the troops by closing the combat. The Russians acknowledge a loss of 2000 men.

"Varna, the object of these bloody combats, was at the time "on the point of yielding; two breaches were open, and preparations making for the assault; it is therefore inexplicable how "OMER VRIONI, after the failure of the Russian attack upon his "lines, should have remained eleven days in position to witness, "with his own eyes, the fall of the place he had been sent to "relieve."

The first period of the siege, dating from the 14th of July, commenced with the taking of a distant position in the north by SOUCHTELN, with four battalions and four squadrons, supported by a reserve of four battalions and five squadrons. We have seen how he was unable to prevent the Capitan Pasha from entering from the south with a reinforcement of 5000 men, partly regulars; and at this moment he was ordered to Kousloudji to protect the rear of the grand army marching on Shumla, and could only leave his reserve to watch the place. It was only at the end of July that the Third Brigade of the 7th Corps, after the capture of Anapa, arrived before the place, on board the fleet, under the orders of Prince MENSCHIKOFF. The siege was

regularly commenced under his orders. Reinforced by a detachment, on the 3rd of August the Turkish posts in that direction were driven in; the besiegers then amounted to from 12,000 to 14,000 men.

On the 9th of August, a line of redoubts was established to the south, from the sea to the Lake Devna; the day before, the Russian vessels had destroyed the Turkish flotilla of sixteen vessels. Ships were also transported to the Devna, so as to assure the establishment of a detachment on the road to Constantinople. On the 19th, the fleet took up its position at the distance of 2000 paces, and cannonaded the town. The Turks replied the next day by a sortie, in which Prince MENSCHIKOFF was wounded; on the 29th, the works were advanced 240 paces from the place. At this time General WORONZOF took the command. On the 7th of September, the detachment of the guards, under the Grand Duke MICHAEL, arrived, carrying the attacking force to 18,000 men; next day the Emperor joined the army, and established his general quarters on board the Admiral's vessel. A sortie of the Turks, on the 13th, on both banks of the Devna, being repulsed, they were driven in from every point they had occupied beyond the ramparts, and henceforward restricted themselves to guarding against an assault by a measure well worthy of imitation, namely, the establishment of a large body of Albanians in the ditch, it being easy to shelter such troops from the enemy's fire, and they being always ready to attack upon occasion, and advantageously placed for a sortie, should it be advisable. The first mine was sprung on the 14th, under the sea-bastion, and appeared to have completed the breach commenced by the shot. The fire continued, without interruption, from the 15th to the 17th; a new battery of eight 24's effected a new breach by the 22nd. The Albanians in the ditch alone opposed an assault, and, to drive them out of their position by enfilading the ditch, the right lunette of the enemy was carried during the 26th.

At this period the division of OMER VRIONI arrived and the Capitan Pasha, desiring to support him, made a sortie with a large portion of the garrison, and then the Albanians were withdrawn. Two new mines were sprung, widening both the breaches already made, and in the night of the 6th several companies, of their own movement, scrambled over the ruins, without meeting opposition, and entered the place; they were, however, driven back with the loss of 400 men.

In this state of the siege, says the Russian report, OMER VRIONI remaining inactive, the greater part of the garrison determined to capitulate; and so on the 10th of October, notwithstanding the opposition of the Capitan Pasha, YUSUFF PASHA, commander of the place, marched straight to the

Russian camp, and surrendered himself as a prisoner with 7000 men. The brave Capitan Pasha nevertheless maintained himself with 300 men, and the Emperor, respecting misfortune and conduct so honourable, granted to him and his new Spartans a free retreat. YUSUFF PASHA, judging differently from other Turkish chiefs, had no regret to pass the Danube as prisoner.

This statement but slightly veils the fact that Varna had been doubly surrendered by treachery, first, through the mysterious inaction of OMER VRIONI, and, secondly, by the formal act of YUSUFF PASHA. The conduct of the first may be explained on other grounds; that of the second is explicable on none. YUSUFF PASHA is a solitary instance amongst the Turks. In Europe his crime might be extenuated by his being imposed upon through a fabricated order for his decapitation. The Turks have another code of morals. OMER VRIONI, on witnessing the surrender of Varna, hastened to retreat. The Russians were not in strength to intercept him; but, soon changing his mind, he attempted to regain position on the bank of the Kamtjik, which he had abandoned. In this design he was, however, defeated with loss. The Russians now commenced the retreat from all points except Varna and Pravodi. But they were everywhere incommoded; a small Russian body was annihilated in Bazarjik, and General RUDSCWITJ, in command of the 3rd corps, vigorously pressed during his retreat, had to abandon his baggage. So at the end of October ended the campaign, the Russians having lost the whole of their cavalry and *matériel*.

It is impossible here not to contrast these operations with those of 1810.

General KAMINSKI had but 100,000 men; he lost 7000 before Ibrail in a single repulsed attack; they had not then adopted mines, to which, in 1828, they owed the capture of Ibrail and Varna; yet the main army passed the Danube by the middle of May. Rutschuk, Silistria, Nicopolis, Sistova, were all carried; the latter was an important town, now utterly ruined. The campaign commenced thus early was expended, so to say, upon Rustchuk alone, which in 1828 was not touched; before Silistria even they failed. In 1828 Russia had doubled the force; her attention was concentrated upon this war alone, and her preparations had long been making. The Turks were in complete disorganisation, and distracted by many fears; such forces as they had were occupied by those alarms. They had to guard against an invasion from Greece, an invasion in Asia Minor, an insurrection at the capital, and, as they believed, an impending war with England and France. In 1810, it was

Russia that was so circumstanced, and she had for nearly fifteen years been engaged in war in Europe.

Whatever our conclusions regarding the nature of the new Turkish force, it is impossible not to ask the question, whether in the interval the military resources of the Russian Empire had not deteriorated. Her panegyrist does not attempt to deny that this is the conclusion which suggests itself. "It would "appear," says he, "that the chiefs and all those employed in "the army were then (in 1810) more familiar, by a war of "several years, with the best manner of equipping themselves, "and with making their arrangements in a desert and arid "country, than could be generals whose experience was derived, "although against the greatest generals, from cultivated countries "(WHAT, WOURGHZOF, ROTH, MENSCHIKOFF, and GEISMAR). "Besides, the army of KAMINSKI was better furnished with "Cossacks; the horses and the harness less elegant, and vigo- "rous in appearance, were better adapted to the country, and "so the artillery and the cavalry were able to last to the end of "the season. There were then no complaints of the want of "subsistence or the loss of horses; and other arrangements of "that kind, which our recent experience will no doubt induce "us to revert to, will not escape military men."

If this fact stood alone, it would still be of the greatest significance; but the Hungarian war comes to confirm it. It has been the remark of more than one veteran general, that the Russians there appeared to have degenerated from that reputation which they had acquired in the great European war.

The deterioration as here indicated points more particularly to the condition of the cavalry, the Cossacks, and the commissariat; but we do not find the Russian infantry distinguishing themselves as might have been expected in the field; occasions invaluable were lost. The affair of Kurtepe can bear no comparison with that of Battin (in 1810); and the pompous demonstration against Shumla sinks into signifigance as contrasted with the operations of KAMINSKI, who made a vigorous attack on that place, and even carried one of the heights.

The effect of this conclusion is attempted to be veiled under a purposed moderation, the object of the campaign being stated to be, not to break the power of Turkey, but to obtain a peace. The publication of the Russian secret dispatches does not permit such a question to be entertained; the object of the war as there explained, was to break the new Turkish military organisation before it had time to establish itself; there can be, therefore, no question that Russia exerted herself to the utmost, nor would we find reiterated at every point, and from every

quarter, complaints of the insufficiency of troops, unless her purposes had been stretched beyond her means.

The honour of the defence is willingly attributed by the Russian writers to the new Turkish discipline. That there should be exaggeration in this respect is quite natural, both from the surprise occasioned by their bearing and conduct, and from the *esprit de métier* of military men; but the sketch which I have given of the campaign will show that this position is untenable. There were no regulars at Ibrail, which occupied one-third of the army during one-half the campaign, nor on the Dobroja, which occupied one-third during the same period; none at Widdin, from which point Wallachia was menaced in such a manner as to require a strong body of observation. The defence of Silistria was not by regulars, nor was that of Shumla, although there was there a considerable body of them. Varna, upon which the whole campaign turned, was again the defence of a place according to the old Turkish plan, and the force under OMER VRIONI were irregulars. Except therefore in minor operations, the Nizam had no opportunities of distinguishing themselves, and, indeed, they would have been sacrificed if they had, for the superior command was in the hands of the old Pashas, not merely uninstructed in the art of war, but distrustful and jealous of the new system. The Russians had, therefore, to contend only with their old antagonists, local obstructions, inhabitants of the fortresses, well armed Bashi Bozuks and Delhis on their horses, and hardy Albanians on foot, yet without being able to make on them anything like the impression that with half the resources was made in 1810.

General VALENTINI after a glowing encomium on the Nizam, which he compares to the French in the first wars of the Revolution, admits that for all practical purposes the conditions of warfare remain on their former footing, adding that the changes introduced by Sultan MAHMOUD had been less important in the introduction of discipline amongst the troops than by the establishment of subordination in the chiefs.

Europe, meanwhile, believed the forces of Russia overwhelming, and the fabric of the Ottoman Empire tottering to its fall. They expected to behold a triumphant march of the Emperor from the Pruth to Constantinople; they were perplexed by the results to the point of incredulity. "Every man," says Colonel CHESNEY, "was astounded, from the Duke downwards."

The Russian force engaged is variously stated. WITZLEBEN thus gives the detail of the main army under Count WITTGENSTEIN:—

Infantry	76,000
Cavalry	14,000
Artillery	5,000
Total . .	95,000

Colonel IWANITSCHEW says that, "In the course of 1827, "throughout the Empire, four recruits had been ordered in every "thousand, Jews included; and the military colonels were required "to bring up their numbers to the full war complement. The "first army which crossed the Pruth in May consisted of 130,000 "men; the Asiatic army, which marched simultaneously, of "68,000. A squadron of the Black Sea was allotted to support the "movements of each army, and another sent round from the "Baltic to co-operate according to occasion; that of the Black Sea "consisted of ten sail of the line and six frigates; that of the "Mediterranean, of three sail of the line and three frigates."* He states the army led by the Emperor, which advanced in July from the Rampart of Trajan on Bazarjik, to have consisted of 54 battalions (900 men), 48 squadrons, six regiments of Cossacks, and more than 250 pieces of artillery: General ROTH had 40,000 men.

According to the Turkish accounts there crossed from the Pruth and the Lower Danube, and were transported from Odessa and Anapa, from first to last, during the campaign, 216,000 men. Now, as POZZO DI BORGO admits that the whole resources of the Empire had been evoked during two years of preparation; as no inquietude then prevailed on the side of Poland; as the eastern frontiers, even to Siberia, had been left degarnished, that so early in the campaign as the siege of Ibrail "it was felt that more troops were required," that consequently two additional corps were advanced from the interior, and the guards marched from St. Petersburg; 200,000 men will appear not an excessive number, but rather the reverse. It is natural that the Russian writers should seek to diminish the number of to forces employed in a campaign which was so disappointing their hopes, and so disgraceful to their arms; but still the most reliable of these authorities brings up the number engaged to pretty nearly the statement of the Turkish Government. We may therefore assume that nearly 200,000 men were employed in European Turkey, and also that that amount is the utmost which Russia can collect on this frontier. This is precisely the number which General VALENTINI, in his original work on the war of 1809-10-11, sets down as requisite for passing the Balkan, attacking Constantinople, and driving the Turks into Asia, and it

* "Turkish and Russian Armies," p. 139.

exceeds by nearly double the troops at the disposal of General KAMINSKI, in that campaign when he carried all the strong places on the Danube, nearly took Shumla, beat several powerful armies in the field, and sent detachments to Upper Bulgaria, during which operations his Cossacks crossed the Balkan,* and all this without having the co-operation of a fleet, either to aid him in the Black Sea or to paralyse the Turks in the south.

Now, let us see the forces which the Porte was able to oppose to this formidable armament—not after "two years of preparation," but without the preparation of a single hour. When the *war had actually begun*, the SULTAN, according to IWANITCHEW, *called for* the following contingents:—

	Men.
Asia Minor	45,050
Roumeli	52,000
Total not paid by the State	97,050
Troops paid by the State:—	
Grenadiers, with muskets	10,000
Zaims and Spahis	10,000
Mousouhurs, or new troops	40,000
Border artillerymen	20,000
Total	80,000
	177,050
Disposition of these troops:—	
For the security of the capital	15,000
For the fortresses of Asia and Roumeli (Dardanelles)	17,000
Defence of Asia and Erzeroum	30,000
„ „ Gallipoli	7,550
To oppose the Greeks	10,000
Defence of the Bosphorus	15,000
„ „ the Danubian fortresses	25,500
To Silistria	15,000
To Adrianople	10,000
The Commander-in-Chief, HUSSEIN PASHA, and KAZIR PASHA had of *élite* troops under their personal command	32,000
Total	177,050

* "Clouds of Cossacks passed the Balkan, and advanced up to the suburbs of Burgos."—*Walsh's Constantinople*, p. 111.

The SULTAN was said to have organised, in the European manner:—

Massuris—regular infantry	40,000
Spahis—cavalry	10,000
Gunners—bombadiers and sappers . .	20,000
Garrison—gunners for the defence of the fortresses on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles	10,000
Total . . .	80,000

But these corps were certainly never completed.*

MOLTKE counts the total of regulars, including artillery and cavalry employed, on the Danube at 50,000; 25,000 at the other fortresses, and 25,000 at Shumla. The Turkish Government calculates 32,000 in all as the troops of the State employed in the campaign—a number which seems to be borne out by the other reports. The contingents from the provinces called for so late did not arrive, and the diversion in Asia prevented the Asiatic troops from quitting their homes. We may, therefore, to these 32,000 regulars, or rather conscripts, add 20,000 irregular horse, 30,000 to 40,000 irregular infantry, and the Turkish inhabitants of Shumla and its district, and the fortresses; so that to oppose the Russian force of 200,000 the Turks had but 100,000 men, less than a third of which only was disciplined, and acted under subordination. In point of artillery the disadvantage was still greater.

They were further placed in the embarrassing predicament of acting upon two systems; all confidence in the old one was ruined by the introduction of the new; but the authority of the new one was not established, and the regulars were not merely raw conscripts, but beardless youths, and those who had instructed them did not lead them. The foremost men would not enter the Nizam, and the Government could not trust them with arms.

A defensive army ought to be numerically much stronger than an attacking one, as it has to guard all the points that may be endangered. Here we have the very reverse; and of this defensive army, the whole of that occupying the line west of Silistria to Widdin, including Rustchuk, and amounting, according to one of the reports, to 30,000 men, was never engaged.

The chief result of the campaign was to establish the credit of the new troops. It was not that as a corps it had distinguished itself, but as a system; the prejudices against it were broken; the impression it made upon the Russians, reacted upon

* Turkish and Russian Armies, pp. 163-5.

the Turks; the youth of its members invested it with a character of heroism; it had gained practice and self-confidence, while the irregulars, at the close of the campaign, had disbanded in a manner that resembled a flight; it had pursued the Russian veterans and driven them across the border. It had suffered comparatively little, both from the nature of the operations before Shumla, where it was chiefly engaged, and from the abundance and excellence of its provisions and stores; for to this point, in spite of its embarrassments, the Turkish Government had sedulously attended.

During the war recruitment had been actually pushed, so that there was every prospect of opening the new campaign under very different and much more favourable auspices. The Turkish Government was relieved from its alarms with respect to the European Powers, to Greece, and the inhabitants of Constantinople. It could send forward the regulars, which it had before retained for these objects, together with the new levies; and the contingents, from the provinces, which had been called up too late in the foregoing season, could now be early in spring in the theatre of war. But the treasury was exhausted. The revenue at that period little exceeded four millions; the fleet had been destroyed; civil war had not ceased to rage for seven years, and the Porte found itself in the inability of giving the bonus on enlistment to the Bashi Bozuks, or Delhis, with which otherwise it might have covered its frontier, or of paying the sums demanded beforehand by the Albanians, including large arrears. The provinces were so exhausted that it was impossible to force them to raise these troops from the moneys of the provincial treasuries. In fact, 1,500,000*l.* was requisite, but was not forthcoming; and zeal could not, in this case, supply its place, on account of the bloody internal feuds, *e. g.*, Janissaries, Derebeys, Greece, Servia, &c.

But the worst feature was the disorder of the administration, which prevented the adoption of the most imperative and the easiest measures: it was imperative to retake Varna, which might have been done during the winter; it was easy to destroy the works of the Russians at Silistria, which they found on their return in the condition in which they had left them. The greatest neglect of all was that of not forming a flotilla to regain the command of the Danube.

The Russians, on the other hand, were in a scarcely less agreeable predicament. The effort had been great, both as regarded expenditure and men; the cavalry had been annihilated,* their means of transport nearly exhausted, the hospitals filled,

* Moltke states their loss at 80,000 men.

and the surviving troops discouraged. But they had the advantage of a general of superior ability in the highest command; they also had the resources of Wallachia and Moldavia, from which they drew subsistence, and cattle amounting in value to no less than five millions sterling;* above all, they had the Danube.

* Turkey, at the end of the war, was made to pay a contribution of 13,000,000 of ducats, or nearly 6,000,000*l.*, no deduction being made on account of the Provinces.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1829.

THE Turks at the opening of the Campaign had reinforced the garrisons of Widdin, Nicopolis, and Rustchuk. There was no army in the field, and but 10,000 men at Shumla. The new Grand Vizier, REDCHID MEHEMET PASHA, entered that place with a few on the 21st of March, and from that time reinforcements continued coming in. The Russians were more active. On the 26th of January, General GEISMAR got possession of two points on the left bank: the one, the *tête de pont* of Nicopolis, and the other near it; in consequence of which, on the 18th of February the Turkish flotilla of thirty boats was surprised and captured. A few days before, the Black Sea fleet had made a descent on Siziboli, at the southern extremity of the bay of Bourgas, by which means the Turkish army at Shumla might itself be compromised. On the 24th of February DIEBITCH reached Jassy, and the main body of the Russians put themselves in march; floating bridges had been prepared at Hirshova, near Silistria, by which the 2nd and 3rd Corps crossed in the beginning of May. The general quarters were again established on the 8th of that month, at the rampart of Trajan. On the 17th of May Silistria was invested. Little Bulgaria,—the real theatre of war—was in the hands of the Russians, by the possession of Varna, Siziboli, and Pravodi, which latter place they had fortified. All the local difficulties of the first Campaign were overcome, and they were in the centre of the Ottoman Empire in the full season of health and forage. But they were now met in this region by a Turkish army of force in the field. The Grand Vizier in the middle of May had marched from Shumla with 40,000 men, partly regular, partly irregular. The Russians, engaged in no sieges except the

investment of Silistria (being already in possession of the principal points), could oppose to them nearly double that number. It was the part of the Turks to protract the war, and to stand upon the defensive. There lay their strength, whether as to tactics, whether as to country and climate; and, besides, they were destitute of the strategic faculties necessary for taking the offensive. The course adopted by the Grand Vizier can only be described as insanity. It could have been no other, had DIEBITCH planned it for him.

The attack, however, was unexpected; and the Russians, being at the moment unprepared and dispersed, suffered on one point severely; they rallied, and by the act of concentration the Turks were repulsed with considerable loss, and ultimately retired. The principal affair occurred at Eski Arnautlar, where the generals on both sides were wounded; the Nizam, under a general of their own, HALIB, greatly distinguished themselves.

The object of the movement was to take Pravodi from the Russians, whilst at the very moment these were besieging Silistria, and the Turks were as incapable of besieging a place, as they were pre-eminent in defending one. Had that army been devoted to the protection of Silistria, that place would not have fallen, nor would its repulse have opened the way to the Balkan. This rash movement compromised the whole war. The same General, by an almost similar rashness, subsequently sacrificed the last resources of his master against IBRAHIM PASHA at Konieh.

At Silistria, the Russians found ready to their hand the works of the previous year. The place is commanded on the south, and it had no longer now the river open to it. The Russian flotilla now occupied a position above the town, as it had the year before, below. Batteries were established on the opposite bank and on the islands, which took in reverse the defences of the place. It was thus blockaded and besieged at once in the closest manner, and every front enfiladed. The third parallel hugged the works in front, and the miners were busy below. No less than eleven mines were sprung along the counterscarp and the rampart, which opened such vast breaches, that the enemy's crowning batteries looked into the town, and prevented the besiegers from lining the interior works. But still the Russians did not dare to storm, and continued advancing step by step, trusting to the effects of famine and disunion.

"The garrison of Silistria has covered itself with glory in "awaiting this last extremity. By small but continual sorties "it sought to arrest the progress of the sappers, and to maintain "its communications along the Danube to Rustchuk. It opposed "the subterranean attack even within its own counterscarp, but

"that which above all proves the talent and the obstinacy of "this garrison was the grand retrenchment made during the "siege behind the attacked front, and admirably linked to works "beyond it.

"We cannot pass in silence the great sortie of the night of "the 3rd of June to repair the fault they had committed in "suffering the development during a single night of the third "parallel. Creeping on while yet dark, on the rising of the "moon they threw themselves in several columns into the third "parallel, and turning, or passing it, reached the second. But "as the Russians had received notice of the sortie, the trenches "were full, with reserves carefully concealed, to fall upon and "intercept them; the combat, therefore, degenerated into a "melée of musketry, and the Turks only regained the place "after a severe loss.

"Silistria had resisted for six weeks, and sustained the open "trenches for twenty-seven days, which surpasses all expecta- "tion, in a place without exterior works, against a vigorous and "well-directed attack. The Russians, expecting an earlier suc- "cess, had not left out of their plan that of also taking Rust- "chuk."

The General-in-Chief superintended the operations at Silistria, and from that point combined the passage of the Balkan. The first step was the establishment of an entrenched camp at Kaorgu; on an elevated position, at nearly an equal distance from Shumla, Pravodi, and Varna, and in a straight line with Silistria to the north. This camp was occupied by a flying body almost exclusively composed of light cavalry, whose business it was to be constantly in motion in all directions, striking any assemblage that might take place of the inhabitants, and accustoming them to these repeated movements in all directions. The Grand Vizier was engaged in his siege of Pravodi, to which he had been suffered to return, and where he employed 40,000 men, the entire dependence of the Ottoman Empire, for any operations in the field. DIEBITCH, for his intended movement, had to pass between Pravodi and Shumla: he had to bring up his troops from Silistria, and to collect those stationed within range of Varna: he had, therefore, to conceal these complicated operations from the knowledge of the Grand Vizier, and, in fact, from the whole of the Turkish forces opposed to them.

He conjectured DIEBITCH to be equally intent on his siege of Silistria, which place he had on his side abandoned to him. But the latter having broken the communications of the Turks by his flying camp, while he established his own, and having taken all credit from reported movements of his troops, suddenly, on the notice of his arrangements being completed, and also that

Pravodi was in danger (the intelligence was carried to him in twelve hours by one Circassian horse, the distance being 100 miles), he suddenly quits Silistria with 20,000 men. The flying corps of Kaorgu became a vanguard, and joined on the way by General ROTH, on the 10th his camp was placed at Madara, so as to cut off the retreat of the Grand Vizier to Shumla.

The latter began to be alarmed at the presence in that direction of Russian corps, but was far from suspecting that he had to deal with their main force and their Commander-in-Chief, and commenced his retreat on two lines, not even taking the most direct one. Marching during the night, on the morning of the 11th, he had reached the wooded plateau of Kouleftja, where, though in a good position, he was enveloped in one extensive ambuscade, immensely superior in numbers: the body accompanying the Grand Vizier, though composed of his best troops, could not have exceeded 15,000 men. On this a hunt, rather than a battle, began, and terrible execution was done by the Russian artillery on the Turks, who had nothing to oppose to it, and which was planted to catch them, like sportsmen's fowling-pieces at a battue. The conduct of the Turks bears out the simile. During the previous night they had almost crushed a brigade of cavalry and taken from it four guns; and in the morning two squares were cut down in one of their charges by the irregular horse. The result, however, of the day was a perfect dispersion, and the Grand Vizier escaped with only a few attendants to Shumla. The irregulars thought only of making their way to their homes, and even the Nizam threw away their muskets. It is difficult to say whether, in the operations of which this action is the result, the palm is borne away by the Russian General for his ability, or the Turkish General for his infatuation. Silistria had not fallen; Rustchuk had not even been attacked; Varna is never heard of, and Shumla scarcely seen; yet the campaign is now decided and the Ottoman Empire prostrate. All because the Nizam has been so much increased in strength, and improved in character, as to be adventured in the field, and, being so adventured, is not trusted to its own officers.

"It was impossible for DIEBITCH in the first moments to have "apprehended the immense results of this brilliant victory; it "required several days for him to convince himself that no "obstacle remained to the passage of the Balkan. Shumla "without an army had lost its importance, yet it could not be "attacked since the inhabitants alone sufficed for its defence; "and a column had been instantly pushed on Eski Stambul to "prevent the remnants of the army (a large portion of which "had not been even engaged) from entering the place. But to

" cross the Balkan, it required that Silistria should have fallen, " for otherwise, even in case of success, a peace could not have " been dictated. So soon as it had fallen (30th of June), the " troops gradually rejoined. The Grand Vizier was closely " invested, so as to lead him to believe that the efforts of the " Russians were now to be made against Shumla; the detach- " ments from the south were made to come in by day, while con- " stantly detachments for the north were being sent off by " night, he being, in the mean time, amused with offers of " peace, which he rejected with disdain."

In the mean time the passage of the Kamjik was forced on the 17th and 18th of July, and on the 24th the left wing was in possession of Bourgas, and the right was marching by the mountains on Aidos. The Grand Vizier learned the movement only on the 21st, when the heights of the Balkan were already crowned, and thus was the passage effected behind a screen of Cossacks.

" But had the remote satraps of Turkey acted with the least " concert, a combined defence might have averted the catas- " trophe which menaced the Empire, and staved the storm at " the last moment. It is, above all, to the Pashas of Widdin " and of Scutari that it belonged to make a powerful diversion " in Wallachia and succour Silistria. But the first displayed " weakness, the second ill will."

The second, however, did appear with an overwhelming force, but only after peace was concluded. He appeared not in Wallachia or at Silistri, but at a more important point—on the banks of the Maritza. Never was there assembled a finer irregular army than the 25,000 men he commanded; but this chief, though bearing the name of Pasha, was, in reality, a Dere Bey. He knew that he himself must be the victim of the new organisation if it triumphed, and he was, moreover, deceived by the Russians, and his readiness to recommence the war after the SULTAN had given in, and when, but for the authority of the latter, he would have exterminated the Russians, arose from his discovery of the deception practised upon him. My amiable friend, since then has resisted the SULTAN on his own account; he has been beaten, and owes to his master's clemency a more secure authority than that which he had received from his forefathers. At all events, in a future war the troops of his Martial Pashalic would be led by a General, and not by an independent Baron.

The Russians, on arriving at Adrianople, had but 8000 men fit to mount guard, when they were saved by the Treaty of Adrianople, forced upon the Porte by the representatives of England and France. The English squadron was at the Dar-

danelles, and the Admiral, Sir PULTENEY MALCOLM, threatened of his own movement to bring it up; and so it happened that England and France *saved the Russians*, and gave to Russia the Treaty of Adrianople.

The contest has been described as a fight "between a blind man and a seeing one;" but, indeed, the analogy between the two parties does not come so close. The one was in a delirium, and the blows it dealt were the spasms of convulsion, rather than the misdirection of aim. The final and dramatic adventure may be compared to a man scaling the back of a whale, on the calculation that the monster is in torpor or in sleep.

It is, perhaps, a fortunate circumstance for Turkey that such was the event, for a shock, not less powerful, was requisite to break her torpor. It is, however, curious that the Russians, while teaching this lesson, were profiting in their turn, copying the Turks in the art of war, and picking up from them practices which they themselves were abandoning. On the second passage of the Danube, the Russian cavalry appeared with Turkish lances, and some of the regiments with Turkish scimitars; and during the winter, to prepare for the contemplated passage of the Balkan, DIEBITCH had sent to the Kalmuks on the steppes of the Caspian for a supply of those despised camels, by the destruction of which Russia has rendered desolate the steppes of the Euxine.

The reader may have in two quarters of an hour run through these pages; the subject has occupied the writer for many and anxious hours. It has carried him thousands of miles, and exposed him to privation and toil; he may therefore be suffered, though not professional, to offer an opinion respecting the practical inferences to be drawn from those two most important campaigns. It is this: Turkey wants no disciplined troops for her defence. People the Dobrója, ply the adze, work the pick-axe and shovel along the Danube, give shelter and walls to that race of warriors which she possesses in hundreds of thousands, and which no other nation has so much as thought of, and these trenches will become the tomb of every invading army.

There are two branches in which the Turks are pre-eminent: populations defending as garrisons their walls, and irregular horse. With the latter in sufficient numbers, and with chiefs under subordination, no invading army could make its way. This cavalry is almost as good on broken ground as infantry, and when it is in sufficient numbers it can dispense with infantry; it then acquires a wholly different character—that character, in a word, which made the Tartars, masters of the world. This body does still subsist in Turkey. It has not been used, or in so

trifling a degree as scarcely to be observed; but it is not destroyed. The Pashalic of Aleppo could alone furnish 40,000. It costs nothing in peace, and can be obtained in war for not more than the charge of the current expenses of the troopers. In Europe soldiers have to be made; in the East they are found. There is the risk of losing an innate spirit in the accidents that may break a fictitious discipline. It is next to insanity to endanger by any speculation, the warlike ignorance which gave to Turkey the results of 1828.

I am not debating the relative merits of the Nizam and the ancient system, but I wish to see neither destroyed by an improper mixture with the other. It was the misfortune of Turkey that the two systems were antagonistic. She may be soon called on again, when, if unsuccessful, the war will not terminate like that of 1829. It is imperative, therefore, on her to husband all her resources and to call forth all her energies. She will make a fatal mistake if she considers that for the defence of Bulgaria she must rely upon the Nizam. If she assumes the contrary as the basis, then she may superadd the powers of the Nizam. Let the plans be combined, but let not the bodies be confounded, or the systems mixed up together. Let each have free scope for its peculiar characters, and pride in its respective merits. Let it not forget the example of Kurtepe in 1828, and Koulefcha in 1829.

But if the Nizam is not wanted for the defence of Bulgaria, it is requisite for that of the Principalities. There it would be impolitic as well as dangerous to adventure Bashi Buzuks, Delhis, and Albanians, and therefore does the existence of this body place in the hands of the Porte the effectual means of carrying its defence from the Danube to the Pruth, and in keeping the war at a distance, render it impossible for Russia, whatever successes she obtains, to make an impression on the Empire. Whilst by carrying the war to that point, a combination between Russia and Austria is rendered impossible, and Austria, in fact, is restored to independence. The occupation of the Principalities affects Austria exactly as it affects Russia: from the Principalities Russia threatens at once two empires: the Principalities free, they menace her very existence. In a word, the safety of Europe requires a Turkish army (or its equivalent) in the Principalities in time of peace.

PART II.—THE ARMY.

CHAPTER I.

ORIGINAL INSTITUTION.

Anxious spirits incessantly warn Europe against Russian art; time was, she was warned against Turkish arms. The travellers and statesmen of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries contrast with that of Europe the gallant bearing, the spirit and ardour, the discipline and sobriety of the Ottoman army which furnished the model, while the terror which the Empire inspired supplied the impulse for the creation of those armaments, which from the means of external defence have degenerated into a source of internal danger.

Our first knowledge of the Turks is as hordes devastating Europe. "The Turks encamped in Europe" was considered the felicitous expression of a profound truth, and the anticipation of an inevitable destiny; but the Ottomans stand in relation to the parent stock of Huns* as the present English Government to the ancient Goths. Its establishment in Europe was methodical, its advance rapid but progressive; it built there, and is again repairing.

Against no people who have attained to dominion can be less advanced the charge of ambition. Greatness was forced upon them by those at whose expense it was to be achieved. The Greeks have only themselves to blame if, like the Seljouks, they did not continue to the end to possess faithful allies in these terrible Ottomans.† The Ottomans knew only at the point of

* De Guignes selects that name for that of the whole race.

† "This good harmony between two Princes, natural enemies, arose from this, that the Sultan had extended the circle of his possessions less by encroachments on the Byzantine territory than on that of the Princes of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Wallachia, and of some Greek Commanders, who, profiting by the weakness of the Empire, had declared themselves independent."—Von Hammer, p. 252. French Ed.

the lance the Tartar hordes which devastated Europe and Asia. They advanced into the centre of Asia Minor to meet TIMOUR and his myriads, and at least diverted, by the shock, the avalanche from the Bosphorus. At Angora there was a Sultan defending, and a Sultan assailing the West: of the 120,000 men brought by BAYAZID against the 800,000 of TIMOUR, the only portion faithful to their colours were the contingents of the Christian tributaries of the Sultan of Adrianople. Against this invasion the Emperors of Constantinople raised not a hand; it followed that the line of Ottoman must ascend their throne.

The Mogul conquests present us always with the ideas of ferocity and numbers; the Ottomans were destitute of numbers, and could not exhibit the character of ferocity. Their achievements are, therefore, owing to other qualities—system and order. In tracing their development, I shall avoid generalisation and restrict myself to details, which would be dull, heavy, and uninteresting were we treating of most other people; but which in this case are relieved by the strangeness of the features, the greatness of the results, and the variableness of the events. The military branch includes the whole State. The Army was the estates of the kingdom. The Army had its Courts of Law, and its operations on the field have never been abandoned to the caprice of a Court or a Cabinet. In tracing, then, the progress of the Administration, which constituted the strength and furnished the conquests of the Empire, we follow also that of its ideas and polity.

The Ottomans placed between Christians in Europe and Mussulmans in Asia were prevented, by animosity of race from incorporating the one, by antipathies of religion from assimilating the other. Yet, to draw from both a military and political force that should be imbued with the spirit of the dominant race; to entrust the sword of Islam to Christian hands, and yet preserve the Mussulman supremacy; were the only conditions upon which this tribe could emerge from its insignificance. This was effected by the Janissary organisation.

The first modest step was the investiture of ERTOGRUL, chief of a tribe of 400 tents, in the Emirship of Eski Sheher, by ALAHEDDIN, Sultan of the Seljouks, in whose territory his tribe had long pastured its flocks. This occurred in consequence of a victory over a horde of Tartars. His success is attributed to a body of light horse, the name of which is one "which, for "two centuries and a half, was the terror of Germany and of "Hungary"—Akinji."

OSMAN, the second prince of this dynasty, who was the

* Von Hammer, vol. i. p. 59.

founder of its greatness, achieved his small but remarkable successes by the valour of his tribe, and by the aid of the Akinji. His son, URKHAN, first instituted (1320) a regular infantry. They were called *Piadè* and *Yaya*—the first the old Persian word for a foot soldier, the second Turkish, with the same signification—names which indicate a departure from local ideas and tribe habits. These were, like the troops of the Egyptians, Arabs, Jews, and Mongols, organised by tens, by hundreds, and by thousands, and the names of their officers have remained to this day. They were permanently on foot, and regularly paid. This, however, was but a first essay—a prelude to that great discovery in the art of war, which recalled and rivalled the Roman legion and the Macedonian phalanx.

It does not appear that any discipline was established, or manual exercise introduced. Permanency and "*disponibilité*" were the stages then reached, but insubordination soon displayed itself; the SULTAN took frequent counsel with his brother ALLAEDDIN, who refused the share he offered him of his flocks to become the peaceful pastor of his people, and with TCKENDERELI, the founder of a family of Vizeers, like the Barmecides or the Kiupruli. In the Council of these remarkable men was worked out a new plan, the honour of which is principally due to the last, who lived to see his small community, without incurring a single defeat,* transformed by means of it to an empire.

The corps was not of a uniform character, but composed of three orders, distributed as follows:—

Yenitcheri, 62 Buluks (squadrons).

Segbans, 33 Oda (chambers).

Yayas, 100 Djemaat (companies).

The first alone consisted of the new levies; the second were the hunting household of the SULTAN; the third an incorporation of the Yayas. Each company had four grades of officers, whose titles were taken from the household establishment, as Chief Soupmaker (Captain), Chief Cook (Lieutenant), &c. The Chief of the Segbans (Huntsmen) commanded the whole. The staff was composed of four officers, whose titles were derived from the chase. The *Yaya Beys*—of whom there were fourteen —were distinguished by a *bounkhak*, or horsetail. A legal officer was attached to each company to regulate its relations with the local authorities, or with other corps. Their name was placed first in the firmans addressed to the body. Promotion followed one undeviating course, until the office of Aga was instituted by

* The destruction of a Turkish force in Bulgaria was a surprise *in time of peace* —not a defeat in war.

SELIM II. No Sultan before him had interfered in its internal organisation. That it possessed, and was intended to possess, a large share of independence is unquestionable. It is a solitary instance of a military institution so constituted by a Sovereign. It was, in fact, a Parliament, or rather the old Tartar Curultai. Securities for a people's liberties in the shape of checks have always had their root in ancient custom, and have been antecedent to legislation. The Ottomans present an example of the reverse. No Sovereign of modern Europe has had so many checks imposed upon him by his people as the early Sovereigns of the Ottomans imposed upon themselves.

We have been accustomed to see in the institution of the Janissaries a forced abduction and apostasy of Christian children. The facts I have cited dispose in a great measure of these objections; but still the sixty-two Buluks, which properly constituted the Janissary corps, might be justly obnoxious to the charge. These, however, were originally composed of prisoners as their life was held forfeit, their enrolment might be considered rather a grace than an oppression. Nothing appears to show that the profession of Islam was a condition of service:* to a comparatively recent period Christians were enrolled, and under circumstances which will not admit of the supposition of informality.†

The body was recruited from the tribute children, restricted to a thousand a year, and taken from the Bosnians, the Greeks (of Morea), the Bulgarians, and the Armenians. This is doubtless an infraction of the institutions of MAHOMET, which impose on the Rayas the poll-tax in lieu of military service. It would appear, however, that the districts whence they were taken were not at the time incorporated in the Empire. These children might become Mussulmans, but there was no constraint.‡

* The Chiefs of the Buluks wore red boots, the others yellow: this being the distinction between the two creeds. The first must have been Christian. The Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia were invested with the Janissary *caouk* and heron plume, which, consequently, could not have been regarded as a religious distinction. The Sultan was enrolled as a common Janissary, and it is singular that the body which he selected was the one that distinguished Christian, so that the intention must have been to put down religious animosities.

† D'Ohsson mentions the case of an Armenian patriarch, who, having learned that he was to be arrested, enrolled himself in an orta of Janissaries over night. Next day the officers found the patriarchat in possession of the orta, assembled to protect their comrade against the Sultan's order. The sleeve of Hadji Bechtash did not designate the Christian Primate, and he could wear at pleasure the mitre and the caouk—head dresses, which in fact closely resembled each other.

‡ "It was rarely that force had to be employed; the parents solicited as a favour the admission of their sons into the corps. The levies took place once every two or three years. The recruits received their education in the ortas of the Adjemi Oglans, where they were instructed in the Mussulman religion. . . . However, the young Christians were not constrained to change their faith: to this the maxims of the Government were opposed no less than the precepts of the Coran."—Tableau de l'Empire Ottoman, tom. vii. page 327.

The Spahis, a body neither less celebrated nor less important than the Janissaries, equally sprang from the Yayas. The SULTAN had the right of settling conquered lands, but this settlement once made was irrevocable. By it was fixed the rate of tribute paid in kind, and the feudal plan was immediately followed in all the conquered countries.

These lands were divided into four classes—

Khass Houmayoum;

Khass Vuzera;

Khass Umura;

Khass Arpalik.

The first constituted the demesne and revenue of the SULTAN, and was in the nature of petty sergeanty; the second and third were in the nature of grand sergeanty, the appanage of the high officers of state, whether general functionaries or local governors; the fourth, literally "barley money," was distributed into lesser portions, and supported the Spahis.

The fiefs were divided into two classes—the Timars or Knights, with less than 20,000 *aspers** revenue; Zaims or Barons, with more than that, since they had to furnish one Spahi, termed Djebelu or Cuirassier, for every 3000 aspers or *kilich* (sword). There were Zaims, who were followed by 30. They could redeem themselves from service at the rate of 50 piastres per man. This body amounted under SOLEYMAN to 200,000.† The Pashas had to furnish, for their fiefs, Djebelus at the rate of one for every 5000 aspers; and at this rate their contingent would have amounted to 250,000. Thus the fiefs of the Empire supported nearly 450,000 cavalry.

When called out they were under the orders of the Beglerbeys of the Province or Sandjak (flag). They were recruited from sons of Spahis (the parentage being duly testified) and were consequently termed Teskerelees, or "certificated;" whilst those in the gift of the Pashas, and who were appointed under them, were known as Teskeresiz, or "without certificate." A supplementary allowance was given from the Treasury for every enemy slain in battle—fourteen entitled to a Ziamet.‡ They were only required to follow the standard of the SULTAN himself. This Order, while emanating from a line of martial Princes, was above all things calculated to maintain in the chief of the State those soldierlike qualities the signet of which has been so peculiarly stamped on the race of OSMAN. When the

* This word is supposed to be derived from the *ασπρον* of the Greeks, as applied to white money or silver; but we find it in the oldest Oriental writers, as, for instance, in the Dabistan, where it is a measure of years. It seems to be most likely to have meant a "horseman's pay," from *asp*, a horse in Persian,

† D'Ohsson, vol. vii. page 375.

‡ Origin of the practice of presenting heads.

SULTAN no longer took the field, the Turkish chivalry lost its vigour, and, it is remarked by a writer of the sixteenth century, that the Spahis were then so degraded that they did not dare to inquire if the SULTAN did, or did not, march in person.

The idea of this feudal organisation is attributed to ALLA EDDIN, who proposed thereby to simplify the administration, and to give the army an interest "in preserving as well as in conquering." It is not, however, uncommon for the discovery to be made, of things as old as the hills. The feudal system must have been the original system of all conquest, for it is the most perfect and most simple ever devised. It is in the nature of a clear-sighted and upright people, and requires no precedents or antecedents; such a people will be always found, under similar circumstances, doing the same thing. Of course that which is simple will never be hit upon by a people used up in speculation; nor can one which implies great reliance on the fidelity of subordinates be dreamt of when that character is wanting; the system, if introduced, would be, in that case, as bad as in the other it is the reverse.

We find, however, not merely coincidences in early times, but the use of terms which immediately connect the institution of ALLAEDDIN with early Tartar usage. Spahi is the name they have left in India (Sepoy); *Mansoub*, the Turkish designation of "charge" or "office," is the name in Tartary for fief; and under the old Mahabadian dynasty of India, "Timari" was the title of an officer appointed in each district for "the protection of the helpless"*—a designation which might well be given to the Timariots of Turkey, who were enjoined and empowered to be the protectors of the peasantry attached to the fiefs.

In most countries the acquisition of a horse is the first sign of the improved condition of the man. This is particularly the case with Turks. The feudatories, as their circumstances improved, mounted themselves and their followers; and thus the Piade became cavalry. To this period must be referred the formation of the Turkish breed of horses to which so much of their superiority was owing,† and which they could not have brought with them, being originally so small a tribe.

* Dabistan, vol. i. p. 175.

† THE SADDLE THAT DOES NOT GALL AND THE TWO MEALS A DAY.

A military friend thus writes:—"The Turks before the introduction of European discipline rode well, and had a good breed of little spirited horses. A wretched system of riding was introduced by their instructors, and a breed of horses comparatively spiritless and worthless.

"The English and French cavalry (since the campaign of Africa) is every day riding shorter, or returning to the method which the Turks have abandoned. Of his equestrian qualities, the Turk now only retains his fondness for the horse, his care in tending him, and a habit (the relic of the pastime of throwing the jereed) of charging with great rapidity."

These feudatories dwelt throughout the country with their vassals. The distinction of creed, which established in this case a line of demarcation as to military service, prevented the inhabitants from mingling with the vassals, and, consequently, the amalgamation between the conquerors and the conquered which followed the feudal establishments in Europe. But it possessed this advantage, that the land was never seized on by the feudal chiefs. The Spahilic remained in Turkey as distinctly a tax, or impost, as the tithe does in England, and no more would a Timariot have pretended to the proprietorship of his Arpalik than the Rector in England to that of his parish. The Beneficium, or Feud, retained in Turkey to the close of the system the character which it possessed at the beginning, and, while it never usurped the land from the occupiers, it never denied its obligation of service to the State. This is, in fact, the secret of the elasticity of Turkey. That "cheap defence of nations" was to it not, indeed, cheap, but it has proved lasting; and the re sumption of the feudal tithe by the Government after the phases of vigour, power, corruption, and decay had been passed through, is an event without a parallel. The administration is thus replaced in all its primitive simplicity, and it only requires ideas to be equally free to have a society in a condition such as it was when it emerged from the Desert.

The Agab, a new class of infantry, arose to replace the Yayas, a sort of Cossacks on foot, as the Akinji were Cossacks on horseback—without the pay of the Janissaries, or the fiefs of the Spahis. Their name (literally *expeditus*) became scarcely less terrible than that of Spahis, Janissaries, or Akinji. The four bodies (the number *four* is peculiarly affected by the Mussulmans) complete the original of this military organisation; unpaid and irregular cavalry and infantry, and regular and paid cavalry and infantry; of these four bodies, one only was paid out of the Treasury.

As the system developed itself, and the Empire expanded, various additions were made, and modifications took place. The principal are:—The formation of a body guard drafted from the regular bodies; the institution of provincial troops; and the addition of various corps required by changes in the instruments of war, or for the conducting of siege operations.

The household troops were first instituted by ORKHAN, and were composed of four Buluks, or companies of cavalry. They were imitated from the corps created by the Kalif OMAR, for the guard of the Sandjak Sheriff, and had the same title, *Bulukiat Harbiyah*. They were raised by recruitment—at least such is the inference from the names, *Onloafaji*, or "receiving pay;" and *Gourba*, "stranger." They were each divided into

sol and *sagh*, or right and left. Their number was at first only 2400.

The guard, however, was soon increased by four odas of Janissaries (named *Solak*), by feudal cavalry (Spahis) and *Selikdars* (esquires), and at a later period by *Bostangis*, enrolled in the Janissaries, and *Salastors*, who, like the Immortals, were bound by oath never to fly, and were employed on the western frontier. The six bodies of cavalry had, like the corps of the Chinese, peculiar flags. The Spahis, like the Janissaries, red; the Selikdars, yellow; the Buluks were green and white, green and red and white and red. The feudal cavalry received a supplementary pay; being permanent, they were distinguished from the other by the name of *Odjak* (fireplace), and were carried, the Spahis to 10,000, the Selikdars to 8000. This body became of great political importance, and in the feuds of the capital constituted the balance between the two factions of Janissaries and Spahis.

The provincial troops were termed *Ayalet*, *Asheri*, and *Yerli Neferat*. The first were those levied for war at the expense of the province, though probably receiving only on enlistment an equipment: the second was a local defensive militia. The provincial levies are mentioned as *Levend-Segban* (corrupted into Leymen). These must have been the Huntsmen of the Pashas, for they are distinct from the Segban Janissaries, and bore such inveterate hatred to them that the provinces were repeatedly convulsed by their feuds. There are other provincial troops, such as *Sarigis*, Yellow-caps, *Yuruks* and *Janbazan* (*Enfants-Perdus*). The government levied in the provinces in time of war other bodies, termed *Miri Asheri*, or, "troops paid from the Treasury."*

The command of these troops was thus distributed. The Janissaries were under their own officers. The Spahis under the Beglerbeys, named by the SULTAN. The command of the Akinjis was hereditary in the house of MICHAELOGLU, which had early joined the Ottomans, and claimed to descend from the Byzantine Emperors. When the civil administration under Pashas was organised, they were generally also Beglerbeys, and they consequently brought into the field the provincial contingents, together with their Segban and the Dyebelus, which they had to furnish for their fiefs. Thus commenced the inordinate power of the Pashas.

A TURKISH tribe is military in all its movements, habits, and equipments. No uniform was therefore requisite; indeed, our

* *Dal Kelelgi*, naked sabres.
Serden Guetchdijis, who have surrendered their heads.
Gunulus, volunteers (rabble).

first uniform in Europe was the adoption of their ordinary dress.* Still there are evident traces of the plan of giving a distinct costume, at least to the regular army, and uniform colours to particular corps. Thus the white felt cap in URKAN'S time distinguished the whole military service. The Janissaries adopted a peculiar dress. Various Odas had particular costumes.† The corps had, as in our army, colours corresponding with their uniforms. The idea of uniformity in dress was not peculiar to the Ottomans. At the review of his troops before entering Asia Minor, TIMOUR is mentioned as commending greatly the contingents from Samarkand, because each body was uniformly dressed.‡ The distinction which we associate with the colour of a flag, was formerly in the East observed in the dress of the person.

The Ottomans have ever aimed at dignity and splendour; and careful as they were to distinguish by dress every class of the people and their subjects, the army must have been in both respects peculiarly the field for the exhibition of this national taste. Their costumes, as preserved down to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, have exercised the pencil and graver of TITIAN; but the most perfect record of the Turkish uniforms is to be found in the first *Illustrated News*, published weekly at Vienna during the second siege, each number of which contained a characteristic woodcut of a Turkish soldier or officer, and an account of the corps to which he belonged.

I have said that the first uniforms were devised at Samarcand. From the Highlands of Tartary, where the warlike spirit would naturally first have arisen, other branches of service seem to have derived their origin.

The ancient Greeks attributed to the Turks (Medes) the first distribution of the army into separate corps. In the account transmitted by the Dabistan of the Mahabadian dynasty, mention is made of regular discipline and of an established order of battle. "They were drawn up in right, centre, and left columns,"§ and this has been the basis of the military organisation which through all vicissitudes has descended to our times. The organisation by threes, which pervades every portion of our service, is clearly derived from a people whose strength was cavalry;‖ for the horse being in length three times his front width, three horses presented the same front when wheeled to a

* Travellers in Turkistan have been struck by the close resemblance of bodies of horse to troops of hussars. We still, in the language of Europe, preserve the Turkish names of parts of the uniform, thus, calbek, dolman, &c.

† The Peiks wore the uniform of the Byzantine guards, green velvet, with gilt helmet and black plume. Harbadjis, red. Tufenkjis (sharpshooters), green.

‡ Shirrifiddin, chap. 44, V. Hammer, v. ii. p. 83.

§ Dabistan, vol. i. page 178. ‖ The French move by fours.

flank. This, then, formed the molecule, and according to it the whole body was moved. As this could hold neither for chariots nor for infantry, and as the ancients did not use cavalry in line, their tradition of the derivation of discipline and distribution from the Turks is amply borne out. It is true that another order prevailed amongst the successors of ALEXANDER, derived from the Indians, whose system was based upon the elephant; such may be found to-day in our order for artillery. The progression rose by multiplication, as one, two, four, eight, sixteen, thirty-two, and sixty-four, which was the phalanx complete, corresponding with the sixty-four squares of the chess-board, that image of war falsely attributed to the Trojan contest, wherein no elephants were used.

I now come to that most interesting subject — Turkish Artillery. The great arm of antiquity after the sabre was the bow and arrow, to which the term "artillery" was applied. Taschend, the ancient city of Tokaristan, was called the "Mother of the Bow;" and from the general name of Tokara, whence has come Turkistan and Turk, has probably been derived τοξα. In the old Coman language, "sageth" means arms generally, whence *sagitta*. The helmet and buckler of the Greeks are connected both in fact and name with the same country.*

Familiarised with the use of projectiles in war, it is to be expected that they would soon adopt gunpowder, the knowledge of which is now admitted to have been very ancient amongst the Chinese. But it is a question whether the Chinese did not derive it from them. Such is the opinion of the principal writers among the Jesuits.† This is to be inferred from the general course of inventions, which the Chinese appear to have almost universally derived from Tartary. When ROMULUS was marking out the limits of his new city, gunpowder was already known, and two thousand years before the birth of SCHWARTZ pieces of ordnance had been cast in China.‡ The Moors used guns in Spain in the beginning of 1200, if not in 1100. The distance between the employment of this instrument in the defence of a city to its use on board a vessel, or on a battle-field, is still as great as that which geographically separated the first casters of guns from the places where they are at present so much employed.

The claims of the Chinese having now been generally admitted, it is supposed that ordnance reached Europe through the

* These points will be illustrated in the early history of the Turkish race, originally intended to precede this volume.

† Gaubil and Visdelou.

‡ M. Paroucy: Report to the Academy of Sciences. 1850

Moors of Spain, or the Venetians.* Neither, however, had any connexion with China. It is unaccountable that it should not have been perceived that the Turks, who conquered the northern portion of China, in the early part of the thirteenth century, were established all round the Black Sea, with the exception of a strip between Varna and the Bosphorus. It is now doubted whether, indeed, the Black Prince did use guns at the battle of Cressy, but there is no doubt that MURAD I. had before then employed them at the battle of Cossovo; on both sides they were used, the Turks having already instructed the populations with whom they were at war.

Employing artillery in the field it was easy (reversing the process in Europe) to apply it to fortresses; the peculiar nature of the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles invited to its use. To the batteries placed above Constantinople is attributed the fall of that city, the supplies from the Black Sea being cut off. At a subsequent period, and after the Venetians had penetrated into the Sea of Marmora, they equally fortified the Dardanelles. The enormous calibre of the guns placed there still astonish the traveller, and their effect has been proved on our line-of-battle ships, on the only occasion on which the passage has been attempted.

In the campaign that followed the capture of Constantinople they had three hundred guns. Their siege-train was equally remarkable for weight of metal and number of guns. At the siege of Scutari they cast into the place shot of fourteen hundred weight. At that of Neuhæusel, in Hungary, on the first day, seven hundred shot were gathered by the besieged of not less than three palms in diameter. The largeness of calibre was not the only point on which they anticipated modern invention.† They employed red-hot shot at the siege of Vienna. The howitzer seems also to have been an invention of theirs, and also its successive improvements, and even down to the time of SELIM III. they ran ahead of Europe in invention. One species, adopted by the Russians under the name of "Unicorn,"‡ gave

* "A Venetian paterera of wrought-iron in the repository of Woolwich, which is one of the earliest specimens extant (two and a half inches bore, two feet five inches length), it is *loaded at the breech* by a movable chamber seven and a half inches long secured by a wedge. As this piece is similar to the old Chinese guns, which are supposed to have been adapted to the embrasure of the great wall in the third century before Christ, it has been presumed that the Venetians derived it from their early intercourse with the Celestial Empire through the Black Sea."—Chesney's Fire-arms, p. 49.

† "The Musée de l'Artillerie at Paris, contains, however, a Turkish culverine, which seems to have been one of the earliest light guns that were made in Europe. The tube of this piece is formed of several sections, which are firmly joined to each other by nuts and screws, and it *loads at the breech* by means of a movable chamber."—Chesney's Fire-arms, p. 56.

‡ "European Powers appear to have made the mistake of adopting the short in

rise to the Paixhan gun for red-hot shot and horizontal shells, which is about to produce such a revolution in naval warfare.

Scientific men in Europe anticipate one further change—the substitution in ordnance of steel for cast iron. The Turks have again anticipated us, by sending to the Exhibition of 1851 a nine-pounder of damasked steel. They also sent three muskets of ingenious contrivance, loading at the breech.*

With this instinct for warlike instruments, and as the first introducers of artillery into European warfare, their corps of artillery must have occupied an important place in their armies. The same instinct extended to fortifications. Administrative disorder has prevented the application, and, therefore, seeing the dilapidation of their walls, and the neglect of all sorts of works which has prevailed for a couple of centuries or more, those statements must appear extraordinary and incredible, but they rest on indubitable authority. They first used flanking walls and mined glacis. They first made regular approaches, and devised the system of zig-zags and parallels. The latter were distinctly planned at the siege of Zegedetty, under SOLEYMAN; and the former are mentioned at that of Candia, though of a peculiar fashion, and overlying each other as the scales of a fish. They also first introduced mining, and even before the use of gunpowder reduced cities by *burning* down the curtains of the wall.†

The various corps introduced by these adaptations consisted of *Topjis* (artillery men, from *Top*, a "gun"), *Djebedjis* (armourerst—he Djibellu were "wearers of cuirasses"), *Douloumjis* (miners), *Coumbarajis*, *Martoloses*, *Top-Arabajis*, *Woinaks*, &c. (bombardiers, sappers, train and waggon men). So important was this branch, that of four bodies enumerated as receiving a largesse on the opening of the Polish war of 1672.

preference to the long howitzers, with the exception of the Turks, from whom General Osmolski, of the Polish army, captured one of the longer and more efficient weapons in 1745. It is understood that Romanowicz, a Hungarian General, used one of these pieces about 1765; and during the struggle previous to the partition of Poland in 1772, the Russians took some howitzer-guns, which they adopted under the name of unicorns. A Turkish piece, in the Repository at Woolwich, nearly corresponding with our twenty-four pounder howitzers, bears the date of 1805, when many others were cast by order of Sultan Selim.

"A battery of unicorns was taken from the Russians by the French after it had done good service at the battle of Smolensko. Napoleon, on seeing the captured guns next morning, is said to have exclaimed, 'Ce sont ces diables là, qui nous ont attrapés de si loin hier.' An improved instrument of this kind was the consequence of their attracting Napoleon's attention; and the celebrated Paixhans' gun, which now takes a prominent place both by land and sea, subsequently appeared. On one of these, and that of almost the smallest calibre, has been based the new system of field artillery by Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, according to which a twelve-pounder howitzer-gun is hereafter to serve for every purpose in the field."—Chesney's Fire-arms, p. 319.

* It must be borne in mind that this was written in 1852, not 1868.

† The process is described in the Memoirs of Timour.

two of them are the Djebedjis and Topjis, the other two are the Janissaries and Spahis.

In appreciating their military organisation, it is not to be overlooked that the Ottomans suddenly created for themselves a marine. The Romans did so likewise, but they, ages before, had navigated the Mediterranean from Egypt to the Pillars of HERCULES. The Turks up to that moment knew nothing of the sea; yet their vessels were the models of those built in France in the time of LOUIS XIV., which we have been so glad to capture and to copy. They recently had the finest line-of-battle ship, frigate and corvette, afloat.

The Spahis and Selikdars of the guard received a pay besides their fiefs. There were enrolled Spahis (*Spahis Oglan*) and Janissaries (*Adjam Oglan*)—the first without fiefs, the second without pay; also, associated Janissaries without pay (*Yoldash*); retired Janissaries received fiefs. Other feudatories, *Ghedecks*, were engaged in the civil service of the Porte, but were bound to serve on being called out. The *Mosseleman* were a special and small body of cavalry with fiefs. There were other cavalry corps which seem to have been raised by different Sultans. *Beshlees* (hussars) *Djebellus*, like the Mamelukes, bought slaves; *Serdenghetchdis* (forlorn hope). The Segban, like the old dragoons, served on foot, or on horseback.

The whole may be thus divided:—

1. Permanent troops (Janissaries, hired Cavalry, and Regimented Spahis of the guard, artillery, &c.).
2. Feudal troops.
3. Provincial troops (Ayalet Askeri).

If we take the end of the sixteenth century, we may reckon the troops at—

Permanent:	
Janissaries	50,000
Spahis, say	250,000
Artillery, Armourers, &c.	50,000
Guards, besides those drafted from Janissaries and Spahis	
War Levies:	
Akinji	40,000
Ayab*	100,000
Ayalet Askeri (cavalry)	40,000
Miri Askeri (infantry)	100,000

Of these, the Janissaries, Artillery, and the Guards were alone a charge on the Treasury.†

* These, at the second siege of Vienna, were calculated to vary from 80,000 to 150,000.

† A statistical Memoir, presented to the Sultan in 1652 (see Von Hammer, vol. x.

Here we find combined permanent and disciplined infantry and cavalry with irregular foot and horse; a feudal establishment with provincial armaments, and forces conjointly raised as tribute, by conscription, by enlistment, and by estates. By the economy of the arrangement the SULTAN could bring these enormous armies into the field simultaneously in the heart of Europe and Asia.

One constant order of battle was observed—that adopted by MURAD I. at Iconium, in 1386, against the Karaman Emirs. The Provincial troops of Asia formed the right wing; those of Europe the left. The centre was composed of regular bodies of cavalry and infantry, the Janissaries forming the front line: the six Buluks were either in the centre of the centre, or formed the reserve. In Europe, the European contingents occupied the right wing.

The value of the military system of the Ottomans can be appreciated only by what it has accomplished. The tribe of OGRUL numbered but 400 tents; for a whole generation it dwelt peacefully in its Bithynian pastures. Its place on earth was so humble that it had, with presents of cheese and butter, lambs and wool, to bespeak the protection of the commander of a Greek fort for its heavy movables, whilst it shifted for the summer, to its mountain feeding-ground. Another generation elapses, and the Janissary sword with its twofold edge is menacing Europe and Asia. The name, then ungiven, of OSMAN has become terrible to every neighbour, and marvellous throughout the globe.

The tribe commenced its career of conquest through a quarrel with the Greek commander, and surprised his fort. It then repulsed a Tartar tribe, and its Emir was consequently invested by the Seldjouk SULTAN with the government of a town. It then proceeds to war with its petty neighbours in Asia, crosses to Europe, makes war on all its tribes from the Danube nearly to the Adriatic. Folding back on Asia, it overthrows the descendants of GENGIS KHAN, subjugates successfully the nine States which had sprung up on the ruins of the Seljuks, which these Tartars

p. 159), sets the Janissaries down at 55,000. The Spahis were entered only at 29,000, which refers to those receiving additional pay. The whole account of numbers, revenue, and expenditure is incomprehensible, in consequence, I imagine, of the distinction not being made between the revenue which entered the Treasury, and that which went directly to the support of fiefs.

In a treatise of Hadji Khalfa, proposing a new financial organisation, the total amount of soldiers paid by the State, in the time of Suleyman, is set down at 41,000; the expenditure for them at 122 millions of aspers. They increased gradually, until, under Mustapha, they amounted to 100,000, and were reduced at the end of the reign of Murad IV. to 59,000, at an expense of 253 millions of aspers. The enormous disproportion between these figures and the armies in the field, prove that the mass of the army was supported from other sources, viz. those I have mentioned in the text.

had overthrown. It then beats the armies of the Byzantine Empire wherever they appear as foes; humbles the Bulgarians, Serbians, Albanians, and reduces the Emperor of the East to the condition of a vassal. It has at once to combat polished States in their decline, and nomade people in their rudeness and vigour; it has for foes, strangers whose tongue and manners are unknown to it, whose religion is hostile, and compatriots of the same tongue, habits, and belief. It has to deal with disciplined armies, with experienced generals, with mountain defences, roving populations, deserts, and fortresses; it has seas and rivers to cross, multitudes and distance to overcome, and is equal to every fortune.

Yet here no CONFUCIUS or MAHOMET proclaimed a creed, no LYCURGUS instituted laws, no ALFRED or CYRUS restored freedom to an oppressed people, no ROMULUS collected refugees within an asylum, no CLIVE or ALEXANDER led forth an army of high discipline against nations destitute of its terrible energies, no PIZARRO or ALBUKERQUE brought to bear unknown instruments of destruction. It had no Tartar horse; no ATTILA or ALARIC conducted innumerable hordes to devastate the earth. Whence, then, this expansive power? Its military order and political discipline. All other things it had in common with its neighbours. These alone, were peculiar to itself.

But the system was not twofold. In one bond were united tactics and jurisprudence. The statesman who planned the Janissary body was himself Grand Judge of the Army. The SULTAN, who instituted them, pretended to no "Prerogative of war and peace." The lawfulness of war was provided for together with the means of conquest.* The institutes of MAHOMET are common to all Mussulmans, but no other Mussulman power has provided to the same extent in this respect for their execution, nor consequently enjoyed to the same degree the benefits of their wise provisions. In this the Ottomans resembled the Romans no less than in their organisation, and no more could Sultan or people, than Consul or people, engage the State in a war at their own caprice. Thus both empires combined the elements of strength with the secret of longevity, by associating discipline with law: and so it was that in both cases a small community expanded into a vast empire.

A century and a quarter elapsed between the institution of the Yayas to the conquest of Constantinople, and by that time, independently of achievements against the Greeks, its Janissaries, and Azeb, Akinjis, and Spahis† had made their valour and dis-

* This subject treated in the chapter, "Political Character of Islam." This chapter has since been printed in the "East and the West," by the Hon. H. Stanley, who has added valuable notes to it.—ED. D. R.

† Paolo Giovio thus describes the employment and action of these various troops:

cipline felt by all surrounding nations in Europe, Asia, and Africa. The Serbians, Bosnians, and Hungarians received a signal overthrow on the Morizza in 1363; the Turkish princes of Asia Minor at Iconium in 1386. Three years later was fought the first great battle of Kossovo in Serbia, where the Sclavonian confederacy was broken. Some years later the great array of the Chivalry of the West, under SIGISMUND, was mown down at Nicopolis. Six years later, the Sultan surnamed "Lightning" met the hordes of Timour at Angura, and the catastrophe, for which the Tartar was more indebted to the vain-gloriousness of his antagonist than to the numerical superiority of his own forces, did not prevent the recovery of the consistency of the Empire ten years later on the field of Chamourli. Thirty years later, for the first time they were defeated by Hungarians at Vasag, but their superiority was immediately reasserted in the memorable field of Varna (1444), and again at the second battle of Kossovo (1448), when the armies of Hungary, Transylvania, Bosnia, and Serbia were destroyed, and the feudal aristocracy of the latter swept root and branch from the earth. Five years later Constantinople fell. From this period it occupied three quarters of a century to extend their Empire northward to the Dnieper, westward into the centre of Hungary, southward through Syria and Egypt to Nubia, through Asia Minor or Mesopotamia, till it reached from the Tigris to the Adriatic, from the cataracts of the Tanais to those of the Nile. In the various battles fortune seems scarcely to have wavered, for in all this course of time they experienced but two reverses.

For a century and a half their power did not advance, but the tide stood full. They gained two great battles. The hardly fought and scarcely lost battle of St. Gothards, in 1664, marked the period of their greatness. Still was it followed by a Treaty which placed in their hands the bulwark of Hungary, while eight years later they were in possession of Podolia, and had disposed of the Ukraine.

The first heavy blow was the Treaty of Kainardgi, by which the Crimea was detached, and the large tract from the mouth of the Donetz to the Bug was ceded to Russia—a territory not indeed an integral portion of the Empire, but of which the value consisted in keeping Russia back from the Black Sea. Eight years later a corresponding tract to the east of the sea of Azof was incorporated with Russia. In 1792 (Treaty of Jassy) the limits of Russia were further advanced from the Bug to the

—" First come the Akinji, or Tartars, and sweep on till they find resistance. Then come the Azeb, upon whom the enemy may fight themselves weary, and when it is a fortress that is attacked they fill up the ditches with their bodies, in order to let the Janissaries pass on to the assault."

Dneister. In 1812 (Treaty of Bucharest) they advanced to the Pruth.

On the Austrian side, were lost by the Treaties of Carlovitz and Passarovitz, Transylvania and the thirteen counties of Hungary, and finally the strip of Moldavia known as the Bukovina. All these, however, were outlying portions of the Empire, and either tributary or protected States. The Ottoman State as it existed under SULEYMAN has suffered no diminution to the north or west; but at the period of the extinction of the Janissaries, or rather after the disastrous war that followed, Turkey was shattered. Its provinces stood each by itself. A reconquest of the Empire to the Nizam had to be undertaken, as if the Empire had to be refounded.

But the disorganisation evinced in the series of defeats which, commenced at St. Gothard, had affected for two generations the whole institutions. Its balance had been maintained not by chambers and estates, but by the urban and territorial militia, three bodies of distinct character. Instead of the sons of the Spahis succeeding their fathers, the fiefs were set up to sale by the women of the Seraglio, and the public posts were monopolised by their creatures and common mountebanks. The lowest rabble of Constantinople was incorporated in the Ordus. The discipline of both bodies was consequently relaxed, and the doors of parasites were besieged by expectants, dependants, and adventurers, whilst the high officers of State, losing legitimate power, sustained themselves by the factions which they formed amongst the rival corps of these corrupted soldiers. The life and office of the SULTAN and his ministers were determined by barrack cabals and street conspiracies. The Buluks were infected by the disorder of the corps from which they were drawn, and there remained no longer any curb save that furnished by their mutual jealousies. One of the worst effects of this disorder was that the Spahis used their influence at the capital and their power in the provinces to extort the offices of farmers of revenue, whilst the multiplied charges fell upon the Empire with such terrible effect that whole provinces were devastated. The increase of exactions entailed decrease of revenue, and to supply the deficiency of the treasury recourse was had to deterioration of the coin. In the last four years of the sixteenth century, specie fell one-half in intrinsic value,* and thence those violent

* Up to 1584, the *oke* (two pounds and three-quarters) of silver was coined into five hundred aspers. It was in a couple of years coined into more than one thousand. By connivance between a Jew banker and the Beglerbey of Roumely, a new coinage for the payment of the troops was nearly as much deteriorated. This was the occasion of the first insurrection against the Sultan. The Beglerbey lost his head; the garrisons of Pesth, Ofen and Tabreez revolted and killed their pashas. In four years there were three revolts of Janissaries, each followed by the destruction of a Grand Vizier. They soon after took to slaughtering Sultans.

convulsions which deluged the capital with blood incessantly threatened the ruin of the Empire.

Against the Janissaries were rallied at this time the SULTAN, the Spahis, the Ulema, the body of the Guilds, and, to a great degree, the provincial troops. In 1622, the plan for their destruction was first formed. ABBAZA PASHA was the originator, and the young Sultan OSMAN readily entered into it, and paid for his presumption with his life. The Spahis, fearing a similar fate, made common cause with the Janissaries. Sentence of extermination was actually pronounced upon them also, but in vain, by MURAD IV. These bodies were sufficiently disunited to destroy all order in the Government, and all discipline in the army, but sufficiently allied to resent all attempts upon either. It was only after they had brought the Empire to the very brink of ruin that they severally fell—the one by a struggle so desperate that it entirely perished, the other by a suppression so easy that the event has passed by wholly unnoticed.

Thus the work accomplished by Sultan MAHMOUD in 1826, had been planned two centuries before. So also had the Nizam Jedid, readopted by SELIM, been proclaimed by AHMET KIUPRELI. The word Nizam is now equivalent in Turkey, and indeed throughout Europe, to "troops." It means, however, "new order," and was originally given to regulations for relieving the Christians of the empire from illegal taxes, and the tyranny of the Spahis and Janissaries who collected them.

With the exception of the Canon of SULEYMAN, it may be said to be the only general administrative regulation of importance since the days of URKAN. The name was well chosen, the measure happily executed: the author lives in the grateful memories of the coreligionaries he raised to greatness, and the fellow-citizens he redeemed from misery. The purpose of that measure was to curb the licence of the soldiery by abolishing revenue farms and indirect imposts. But the scheme of SELIM III. was the imposing of these very grievances to raise a mercenary army! He had imbibed European notions of finance and government.

Economy is the only legitimate resource of a Turkish sovereign. He can neither impose taxes, nor incur debt, nor demand benevolences, nor dispose of titles. When SELIM was planning his new troops, he, in this respect, also appealed to his European advisers. They saw in Turkey no *Octroi* and no *Droits reunis:* neither doubted they the despotic authority of the SULTAN, nor the superior advantage of that mode of taxation. They dreamt not of resistance on the part of a people who had neither Parliament nor Press, and could not even suspect in the mind of an illiterate nation so much as predilections on financial matters.

Consequently the ordinance was issued for levying the taxes which were to supply the funds for the new troops, and the SULTAN was so infatuated as to give the same name to the new imposts that were to exasperate the people, and to the new corps that were to supplant the Janissaries.

The reasoning which had satisfied the monarch was not equally successful with the people. They looked upon these taxes as usurpations, and resisted them as an attack upon their customs and religion. The hatred for the new taxes was transferred to the new troops. By this proceeding the Janissaries became defenders of the national rights, and the SULTAN, whose purposes and character have won for him the applause of Europe, held to have fallen the victim of fanaticism and turbulence, did fall a victim to his own guilt and folly. This was the first exercise of "European influence," and the first result of "the march of intellect."

MAHMOUD, though his disciple, was constrained to adopt a different course. He at once attacked the Janissaries and destroyed them even without the aid of military force.* His success was owing to his not mixing up a question of odious excise with one of public order. He simply appealed to the people against an obnoxious body, and they decided in his favour.

The Janissaries were an oligarchy — military, not administrative; they squandered the military resources of the Empire —but interfered not with its political administration; they drained the treasure—but, as farmers of revenue, they did not multiply modes for replenishing it; they were an aristocracy, not of producers, to create and maintain privileges for certain interests—but of consumers, whose interests were inseparably bound with freedom of markets and exchange, and lowness of price; they were representatives of a dominant class, which, confident in its supremacy, stickled for no prerogatives that interfered with the internal customs and institutions of the realm — not a conclave of churchmen. Though they might individually despise or maltreat a Ghiaour, they meddled not with the creeds or church governments of other persuasions, nor suffered them to be meddled with.

We must distinguish in this body the Janissary from Turkish principles.

The first are: violence, corruption, and prostration of military strength; exhaustion of the treasury; resistance to all, and therefore to beneficial changes.

The second are: non-intervention in the collection of the revenue, unrestricted, unburthened freedom of markets and

* The small body of artillery does not deserve to be considered as such.

exchange, impossibility of illegal taxation on the part of the SULTAN, inviolability of local customs, appropriation of charitable and other funds, succession of property, decision of voluntarily-elected judges, of church administration in spiritual matters, and in several important civil functions immediately vested in the elected dignitaries of the various persuasions.

These principles have been the *Dä boni* of Turkey, preserved in the midst of the most convulsed and troubled times.

SELIM, falsely termed a Turkish reformer, arbitrarily imposed new taxes. These taxes, too, were of the most obnoxious kind, for they rendered exchange difficult, and raised prices; they rallied interests and opinions on the side of the Janissaries, and he fell a victim to his apostasy by imitating Europe.

Not more a Turk, but less an European, MAHMOUD did not commence his imitation of SELIM until after the abolishment of that which was Janissary. Then only was he emboldened to attack that which really was Turkish.

However, the ground was now free for that reconstruction which has proved to be the most important at once and most incomprehensible of modern events. It was so free, not only because the old militia had disappeared, swept away by a blow, but also because the financial embarrassment had likewise disappeared. The re-creation of an army to be equal to those of the great States of Europe could be contemplated by no one on an entire Revenue, not amounting to one-half or one-third of what these States expended on military purposes alone. Yet the attempt had to be made if the Empire was to be preserved. The navy was restored so far as, after the destruction of Navarino, to hold the sea against that of Russia,* and an army in all its branches, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, equal to any in Europe, was created. It was, in numerical force, sufficient to defy the assault of its two military neighbours, should they combine to attack it. This has been effected without imposing a new tax. The revenue of 4,000,000*l.* has, indeed, gone on increasing through increment of productiveness, but the resources from which the new organisation has been fed, have chiefly consisted in the appropriation to that end of feudal dues; in fact, those very resources of the ancient Gothic Governments of Europe which in the West have been usurped by classes.

We will now, therefore, have to consider the design and execution solely from a military point of view.

* In the only action hazarded by the Russians they lost a frigate.

NOTE.

The Movement by Threes.

The Author has received the subjoined observations from a cavalry officer:—

"I was much pleased to see, in the History of the Turkish Army—an army peculiarly noted for the excellence of its cavalry—that the *movement by threes* was the basis of its organisation. I am sorry to say, at the same time, that this most natural movement for bodies of horse (so natural that, on emergency, a body of ordinarily trained men will, when ordered, wheel by threes without telling off) is now, as in Continental armies, done away with in the English army. It was said, at the time, of the Board of Cavalry Officers—composed equally of Light and Heavy Dragoons—that a proposition made by the Light Dragoons for doing away with fixed pivots was accepted, and that, in consequence, a proposition from the other section for doing away with the movement by threes was also accepted. In fact, of late years, the rage for change that pervades everything has been introduced into the drill of the army; so that almost yearly the drill-book is fundamentally altered.

"In European armies, cavalry is divided into heavy, medium, and light; the difference, in Continental armies, between the extremes being that the heavy cavalry are large men and horses, and the light small men and horses, the medium being lancers and carbineers. But all these corps are in effect heavy cavalry, as, from the necessary want of training of the men, they are very inefficient for outpost duties, and, from the same reason, can only keep pace with the infantry and commissariat. Russia and England are exceptions to this, the former having a real light cavalry in the Cossacks, each man of whom owns his own horse, and has from infancy been used to riding and the care of horses. In India England also possesses a light cavalry in the Irregular Native Horse, where also each man is a horseman, and owns his horse, and has to provide both for his horse and himself; so that for such corps, during a campaign, all the detail of the commissariat is arranged by the men, the wholesale part being alone to be provided by the chiefs, viz., that the bazar that follows each corps shall have the means of providing for itself.

"In confirmation of the excellence of this arrangement, Napoleon, at St. Helena, described such an organisation as his beau ideal of what an army should be."

CHAPTER II.

NEW ORGANISATION.

THE Janissaries are extirpated; the Spahis make surrender; the Guards had long before disappeared. The provincial organisation of the Pashas is thoroughly broken; the hereditary chieftains (Derebeys) are put down; and this work is accomplished by invasion, insurrection, disorganisation, and revolt, no less than by the prompt energy of the SULTAN. The heavens indeed are black, and thunderclouds impend, but still the ground is cleared and the whole work of conception and organisation has to be commenced anew. SELIM'S scheme had extended to nothing beyond the enrolling of mercenaries and the disciplining of some regiments so raised, according to the European fashion. There was no leading character, or comprehensive plan, and MAHMOUD was as little embarrassed or aided by the Nizam of his cousin as by the regulations and constitutions of KIUPRULY and SULEYMAN. The new design was not at once conceived. It was worked out slowly, and while it was in progress the Turks kept their own counsel, and in its maturity it has taken by surprise, those best acquainted with the country.

The Legion is one of the truly excellent institutions which are found, not framed: it reappears at the interval of thirty centuries. The same plan has been devised by a nation who had never heard of a Latian and scarcely of a Roman people. It was a complete army, composed of infantry, heavy and light auxiliaries, and cavalry; it belonged to its district, and was the forum encamped: and to this day throughout Europe it furnishes the peculiar designation (*municipality*) of civil as distinguished from political or military organisation. Service in it was reckoned tribute. The Legion gave to Rome her simplicity and vigour, and built up her fortunes.

The new Turkish system is composed of camps, called "ordu,"

(whence *horde*). Such was the name given by JENGHIS KHAN to his armies, in which was included the whole polity of the Mongols.* Each camp has its complement of horse and artillery; belongs to its district, which is told off into circles corresponding to the subdivision of the camp. The conscripts serve for five years. The recruits who replace the *emerite* find in their new comrades their relations and neighbours, so that no tie is severed, and the army remains rooted to the soil. They receive pay, but still the service is a tribute, and it falls on the Mussulmans alone. These Ordus are each 30,000 strong, precisely the same as those organised by JENGHIS KHAN on the Amour for the conquest of the world.

The new military distribution of the Empire has been made, to the exclusion, however, of the Danubian provinces, Serbia, Bosnia, Egypt, the coast of Barbary, and the Islands. The remainder has been divided into six circles, each furnishing one Ordu of 25,000 in time of peace, and 30,000 on the war establishment. They are thus composed :—

Infantry, 6 Alaï of 3300	19,800
Cavalry, 4 Alaï of 1000	4,000
Artillery (64 guns†), 1 Alaï of 1800 . . .	1,800
Giving for the six camps	25,600
Infantry	118,800
Cavalry	24,000
Artillery (384 guns)	10,800
	153,600

War establishment, 180,000.

As service is a religious duty imposed on the Mussulman, the question never arose of the liability to conscription; all are liable, but exceptions are made in favour of a sole male in the family, an only son of a widow, and a student. The first conscription fell upon those between the ages of twenty and twenty-five. They are now, progressively after eighteen, subjected to the ballot. The ballot papers for so many recruits as are wanted are inscribed with the words, "I am a soldier." Those who draw them pass over to the recruiting officer. The first conscrip-

* There were seven "ordus" of the Huns of 30,000 each, whence Transylvania is called Siebenburg, from the castle which each had there for the protection of their women and flocks.

† The original phalanx of elephants as copied by the successors of Alexander from the Indians (see Oliver). The subdivisions of the elephant-phalanx was 32, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1. The half phalanx is the number which most frequently recurs in battles; 64 is the number of the squares of the chess-board.

tions were a sort of press-gang, the soldiers seizing all they could lay their hands on, and the people taking to the mountains or the desert.

A most methodical arrangement is now introduced. Maps on a large scale exhibit the groups of villages, and the circles coloured according to the regiment, company, or corporal's guard they furnish.* The numbers are marked on them, the distances given in hours, and the references in figures to the registers. These are entered in volumes of thick vellum three feet by eighteen inches, where every house in every village is marked: the father, below him the sons, and (if any) their sons. There is space left for the genealogical tree in each of the lines for succeeding generations. Each fifth year a new entry will be made, so that the Government will have a dictionary of the names and ages of the members of every family. They will also serve as records, available as evidence in courts of law for determining the succession of property.

Each camp is commanded by a general (Muchir), two lieutenant-generals (Ferik), three infantry brigadiers (Liva), one of whom commands the reserve, two cavalry, and one artillery. The pay and rations of the different grades are as follows:—

Rank and File	Monthly Pay. Piastres. 20	Number of Rations. 1
On Bashi	30	1
Chaush	40	1
Mulazim	170	1
Yuzbashi	270	2
Colashasi	600	4
Bimbashi	1,125	8
Caimacam	1,350	12
Miralai	1,800	16
Miriliva.	7,500	32
Ferik	16,000 (equal to 160*l.*)	64
Mushir	75,000	228
Seraskier	100,000	

Below the Bimbashi the officers have clothing served to them, and all ranks receive badges of distinction. The seven higher are set in brilliants. These are the substitutes for finery in dress, and a great economy. They may receive their rations in money.

The daily ration amounts for the month to 10 lb. 5 oz. of rice, 1 lb. 5 oz. of butter, 16 lb. 10 oz. of meat, salt and onions 1 lb. 9 oz. each, oil, candles, and soap 6 oz. each, and bread 63½ lb.

* These maps are constructed on the Chinese plan: the south is the top.

The ration comes to two piastres (4d.) a day. At English prices it would cost from 8d. to 9d. The pay is under 2d. per diem, and if laid out in coffee, sugar, tobacco, tumbek, sweetmeats, fruit, and the bath, would require from 1s. 5d. to 1s. 6d. in England. The Turkish soldier is thus considerably better off than the English soldier.* Coffee, pipes, and nargilles are as freely used and offered in the barracks as in a gentleman's establishment. The private soldiers appear to give as frequent alms as other classes of the community.

One of the greatest disorders in the old times was the want of a commissariat. This caused the exhaustion and devastation of the provinces through which the troops marched, and often occasioned the loss of armies, or their dispersion at critical moments. It was, therefore, to be expected that it would be the first to be remedied as unquestionably it was the easiest, and presented, alas! the temptations to which European Governments are most exposed. Any officer of experience consulted beforehand would have suggested this as the first reform. The Turks, however, have not introduced a commissariat; the Treasury furnishes the money for the specified quantities, at the market price, and the troops have committees, composed of all grades, to superintend their mess, as is practised amongst us by the officers. The officers receive their rations in money. It remains to be seen how the system will work in war, but I have no doubt as to its success. It will require, however, in certain circumstances that the Government shall provide for there being stores within reach. In the mean time it gives to the army a civil physiognomy and business habits; it prevents peculation, contents the men, relieves the Government from an additional branch of administration, and prevents the soldier from becoming the mere machine he is in our armies.†

If the Commissariat appears to be neglected, it is not so in the Hospital service; no care, or expense, has been spared in this department. It has not been completed, but the scale on which it has been carried into effect in the capital and some of the chief cities exceeds anything to be seen in Europe. The most salubrious sites and picturesque exposures have been selected for the hospitals. Physicians of fair acquirements have been

* "The lot of the Turkish soldier is a very happy one. They are better fed than any other troops in Europe, having an abundance of provisions of excellent quality, and partaking of meat once and of soup twice a day. Their magazines are fitted with stores, and the regiments have large reserves. The pay of each soldier is twenty piastres a month, the whole of which he receives, as there is a prohibition against withholding from him any part of that sum. In short, everything has been effected that could promote the welfare of the soldier."—Marshal Marmont's Travels, p. 61.

† Admiral Slade has observed, in one of his works, that the *kiatib*, clerk of the regiment, does the work of the commissariat.—Note, 1868.

obtained—all the allowances are on the most liberal scale, and these institutions are models of cleanliness.

No punishment can be inflicted except by the decision of a Council. In penal cases, the Court Martial does not try and condemn, it merely investigates the facts, and transmits them to a higher court, where a member of the Ulema presides to see that the soldier is not withdrawn from the legal jurisdiction of the country. Military Councils are attached to every command, great or small. They must be consulted by the commanding officer. Nevertheless, the sole responsibility rests with him.

The comfort and sense of honour of the soldier have thus been the special care of the framers of the new system; not, however, as the result of any theory, but because it is in the habits and the ideas of the people. The army is composed of the privileged, or, at least, honoured class, who are all equal, and the lowest of which may attain to the highest grade in the Army or the State. They are not enlisted from a class bordering on destitution, humbled in circumstances, disrated in opinion, and excluded by their relative uncultured state from attaining to pre-eminence; nor are they raised by conscription, and the unlucky only chosen; but they serve as a duty, imposed by their being the dominant class. In both respects they are of a wholly different grade from the troops of Europe. Arms is their special career. They have been, before enlistment, distinguished from their fellow-citizens by wearing them, and hence the regulations, pay, and provisions are but analogous to the *locus standi* of the corps.

Each battalion has an Imam—*Tabour Imamy*—a most valuable class of officers, who wear a sword and the same uniform as the other officers. His functions are chiefly those of a schoolmaster: he teaches the soldiers reading and writing, and theology to the officers and soldiers.

It may here be the place to speak of this religious instruction, in so far as it bears on military duties. This is a point which cannot consistently be passed over, difficult as it may be to render it intelligible, and painful as it may be even to mention it in the presence of those who are expected to be the readers of this work.

I have advisedly used the term "Theology." The reason is this: the instruction received by all Mussulmans, and therefore by those who compose the army, has, first of all, reference to the very highest obligations laid down in the "Word of GOD." The difficulty of explanation consists in this: that, amongst those to whom the explanation is offered, the Word of GOD (as the Commandments of men) has ceased to be of any value in regard to the taking of human life in an aggregate manner. The soldier,

amongst Christians, is held to no higher duty than that of obedience; so that it is not only improper, but even inconceivable, that a soldier should exert his private judgment in such a case, or be in possession of rules according to which such judgment has to be given. Yet such is the condition of the Mussulman soldier. He is forbidden by his religion to take life without cause, and the rules are laid down for him by which the cause shall be determined.

It has already been stated that in the origin of the Turkish military institutions the insurrectionary faculty was consecrated as a check on the violence of Sultans, and that discipline and justice were reconciled by the withdrawal from the political and military authorities of the power of declaring war.

These provisions would be realised only in so far as the people were brought up to revere their religion.

This has been practicable by the judicial character in which alone its expounders appear before the nation. Their status being that, not of a Hierarchy, but of a Supreme Court, intervening as such only on the occasion of an external war or of an internal rebellion.

The creation of a new and salaried military force opened a new experience. It remained to be seen whether this powerful and armed body should become an instrument in the hands of the Political Government to enable it to override the law in making war abroad, and to suppress internal liberty by being available to crush domestic insurrection.

Such has been the consequence of standing armies in Europe, and analogy would point to a similar result in Turkey. There has, however, to be taken into account in Europe something more than the enrolment of armies. Simultaneously with this change came another, unobserved, it is true, but of the highest importance, and which consisted in the ceasing by the churches of Christendom to teach men that there was crime or sin in any act ordered by a Government. In some nations they were even taught that men perpetrating such crimes were virtuous and meritorious.*

No such attempt has, as yet, at least, been made in Turkey; and every soldier knows that without the *Fetva* for declaring war he cannot draw the sword; and if he does so he will not only be, by the belief of his church, vowed to eternal perdition, but that also he will be refused, by its ministers, as in the case of suicides in Europe, burial in consecrated ground. Whilst every penalty is accumulated to deter from unlawful war, so is every inducement held out to incite to just war. The supreme dignity

* The Russian military oath is to "extend the frontiers."

of *martyr* is conferred on those who fall in that kind of war, which canonically receives the title of *gazy*, or "religious war," namely one undertaken "for the *defence* of religion"—in other words, a war in which the Mussulmans have been attacked because of their faith. This branch of the subject, however important it might be for our instruction, has small practical bearing on the danger which the new military organisation might bring on the Ottoman Empire. The real danger consists in the facility of using the army to suppress internal revolt—in other words, the encouragement it might afford to the SULTAN and his Ministers to attempt to impose taxes beyond the "lawful" ones; to infringe either religious laws or administrative customs; to change the succession of the crown; to interfere with the authority of judicatories; or, finally, to put down the real safeguard of the State, the supreme authority of the Law as represented in the Ulema.

In regard to insurrection, the same course has been taken as in regard to war; that is, to define its character, and to bring in the teaching and authority of religion to repress it when groundless, and to support it when just.

Thus no speculative grounds are to be assigned for an insurrection any more than for a war; in the one as in the other a case can arise only from *acts*. So also the proceedings must be directed and confined to the repression and *punishment* of such acts. The procedure is identical with our method in Europe in respect to differences arising between individuals. It can be so, because for them public affairs are as simple, and therefore as easily apprehended, as for us private business.

The Mussulman, therefore, who would raise the standard of revolt for speculative change would be treated as a madman. He who did so as resisting a wrong would still incur the penalties of excommunication, unless justified by the *Fetva*. But when, on the grounds of a wrong, the *Fetva* is issued, he who falls fighting in such a cause against Kaliff, SULTAN, or any *constituted* authority whatever, receives the title of *Shahīd*—second only to that of martyr: his corpse requires no ablution, and he is buried in the clothes in which he fell.

So long, therefore, as the Turks retain reverence for their religion, obey its injunctions, and preserve the independence of their Fecial college, the new standing army will neither become a danger to their neighbours nor to themselves.

That politeness which gives equality and steadiness to Eastern society, establishes subordination without the necessity of severity or punishment; and the European officer, who is astonished and disgusted at the habits of familiarity which he observes between

the highest and the lowest grades,* and the terms of endearment which the general will bestow on the private, is merely ignorant of the military elements which the disciples of Islam possess.

The soldier has no *class grievance*. There may be, notwithstanding these checks, tyrannical officers, and in some cases (especially in the 5th Ordu), a prolongation of the legitimate term of service. With these exceptions, I have found no complaint, and, as regards the administration, but one abuse, the drawing more pay than the number of men; but this does not affect the private. The costume is, indeed, a subject of heart-burning, but that is not peculiar to the soldier, and (unhappily) this aversion is wearing away. The opposition, which in each province manifested itself at first, had reference not to the service, but to the uniform. There is no aversion to the conscription, such as is experienced in Europe, and it repeatedly happens that soldiers will not accept their discharge.

To provide against the danger of the breaking up of these bodies, and sacrificing their spirit and constitution, it has been laid down that they shall not leave their province in detachments, and that there shall be no separate command of less than 10,000 men.

After the term of five years' service in the Nizam, the soldier enters the Redif (Reserve), in which he serves for seven years more—standing to his Ordu exactly as when in barracks, save that he is at home. In this lies the difference with the Prussian Landwehr, where the regiment has no connexion with the province. They assemble a month in the year at their ordinary places of rendezvous for drill and exercise, and receive during that time pay and rations as the Line. There is thus a Redif Ordu ready to supply the place of the Nizam Ordu, whenever called on foreign service, or there is a second Ordu ready to march. The number of disciplined men is thus yearly augmenting, and the present number is 212,000. When the system is completed it will give—

Nizam	180,000
Redif (say)	300,000
	480,000

Of the six camps, four only have been completed. Those of Arabistan and Hedjaz are but in process of organisation. The following table will show the distribution:—

* "The captain brushes the major's boots, and the major fills the colonel's pipe."—Wm. Hamilton's "Asia Minor."

1st Ordu, Kilass.ssa or Guards.
(Western border of Asia Minor.)

Infantry.—1st Regt., Ismid; 2nd, Broussa; 3rd, Smyrna: 4th, Aïdyn; 5th, Kutayieh; 6th, Sparta.

Cavalry.—1st, Isnik; 2nd, Tyra; 3rd, Karahissar; 4th, Sparta. Artillery, from all the province.

2nd Ordu, Deri-Seadat—Capital.
(Adjoining districts of Europe and Asia.)

Infantry.—1st Regt., Adrianople; 2nd, Shumla; 3rd, Boli: 4th, Angora; 5th, Konia; 6th, Kaisarieh.

Cavalry.—1st Regt., Babadagh; 2nd, Yuzgad; 3rd, Angora: 4th, Konia. Artillery, Tchorum.

3rd Ordu, Rumeli.

Infantry.—1st Regt., Monastir; 2nd, Tirhala; 3rd, Selanik: 4th, Uskup; 5th, Sophia; 6th, Wydin.

Cavalry.—1st Regt., Jannina; 2nd, Prezrin: 3rd, Sophia: 4th (Not formed). Artillery, Monastir.

4th Ordu, Anadolis.

Infantry.—1st Regt, Sivas; 2nd, Tocat; 3rd, Kharput: 4th, Erzerum; 5th, Kars: 6th, Diarbekir.

Cavalry.—1st Regt., Tocat; 2nd, Van; 3rd, Mardyn; 4th (not yet formed). Artillery, Kharput.

5th Ordu, Arabistan (Syria.)
(Redif not formed.)

Infantry.—1st Regt., Sham (Damascus); 2nd, Balbek; 3rd, Acre; 4th, Sidon; 5th, Beyrut; 6th, Haleb.

Cavalry.—1st Regt., Havran; 2nd, Tripoli; 3rd, Deirulkamar; 4th, Hama. Artillery, Latake.

6th Ordu, Irak (Mesopotamia and Cerobia.)
(Rediff not formed.)

Infantry.—1st Regt., Baghdad; 2nd, Sulymanieh; 3rd, Kerkuk; 4th, Mossul; 5th, Jidda and Mecca; 6th, Mokha and Massu.*

Cavalry.—1st Regt., Baghdad and Bassora; 2nd, Mossul; 3rd, Deriè and Nejd; 4th, Jidda. Artillery, in all the provinces.

The effective force is estimated at 120,000.

The portions of the Empire not included have separate establishments, which are partially disciplined, and there are other bodies which more or less contribute to the public defence. These are:—

* ? Masowah. This was garrisoned from Jiddah, now from Egypt.—Note 1868.

Egypt	20,000
Serbia	6,000
Bosnia and Upper Albania, say . . .	40,000
Wallachia and Moldavia	6,000
Tripoli and the islands	20,000
Gunners (local bodies) at the Dardanelles, &c.	20,000
Police corps, mounted and on foot . . .	30,000
	142,000
On board the fleet and in the arsenal . .	34,000
	176,000

We thus have a grand total of 650,000 men, of which 150,000 only are a permanent charge on the Treasury. But in case of war in which the populations took an interest, Wallachia, Moldavia, Serbia,* and Bosnia might contribute 150,000 men beyond the numbers here set down.

The original institution of the Ottoman armies has been a subject of admiration, but how much more extraordinary is their reconstruction. They were instituted in the midst of victory, they are reconstructed amidst disaster and defeat. Then there were conquered lands to distribute—then there was a Treasury overflowing by the enlargement of the State and the simplicity and economy of the early Sultans; now the resources are at once cut off and anticipated.

As I have adduced the conquests of the one period in proof of the excellence of the system, so must I enumerate the difficulties of the other to vindicate the greatness of the achievement.

The Janissaries were destroyed in the midst of a civil war—the Greek Insurrection. The Powers of Europe immediately after annihilated the Turkish fleet.

The Porte believed herself at war with England and France as well as Russia, when the latter seized the moment to pour in her armies. Yet already is a force (few and raw indeed) ready to take the field. They are nearly annihilated. A peace is signed imposing a war contribution equal to a year's revenue; her Danubian provinces are occupied, and thus in 1830 she has to recommence the military organisation. Next year breaks out insurrection in Albania, followed by that of Kurdistan, and immediately afterwards by that of Egypt. The Nizam is again annihilated at Kutayah. Egypt and Syria are wrested from the Porte. The Russians enter the Bosphorus. The Treaty of Hunkiar Skellessy is imposed. On this the Porte again recom-

* In 1843, when war threatened, Serbia offered 80,000 volunteers.

mences on a large scale, plans the incorporation of the provinces in the Nizam, institutes the reserves, and sends young men to Europe preparatory to the formation of officers.

In the four years that followed, the Russian indemnity is paid off, the provinces freed from Russian occupation, the fleet restored, and a body of 100,000 men disciplined. Then again broke out an Egyptian revolt—the Turkish armies are again annihilated, the fleet carried off, and at the same moment the SULTAN, whose energy had offered the only hope of restoration, dies—a young and weakly prince ascends the tottering throne. Again Europe gives Turkey up.

From that period Turkey has enjoyed twelve years of repose; but this repose is a result of her success. The rapid concentration and good countenance of the Nizam alone prevented a rupture with Russia in 1844 and with Russia and Austria in 1847, and again with both those Empires in 1849. It has also served to introduce order in the provinces. Thus was Albania reincorporated in 1831, Kurdistan and Serbia a few years later, Syria in 1840. Tripoli acknowledged once more the supremacy of the SULTAN. Egypt has again lapsed to the SULTAN. In 1851 the Danubian provinces were freed from Russian troops, and Bosnia, the sole remaining province unsubdued, became an integral portion of the Nizam system.

In such measures Finance is a primary consideration. The revenue in the time of SELIM III. did not exceed 4,000,000*l.*, of which about a quarter was absorbed by the Janissaries. From 1806, commenced an almost ceaseless state of war and insurrection, reducing the provinces furnishing revenue to one half, and exhausting the remainder. Russia occupied the Principalities; England forced the Dardanelles and attacked Egypt; the long Serbian war commenced; Baghdad and Albania soon after, under DAOUD and ALI PASHAS, raised the standard of revolt. Then followed the Greek war, and the other events already enumerated. At how much shall we rate the permanent defalcation of revenue during this long course of misfortune?—at what the war expenses and indemnities?—how much for the Russian war closed in 1812?—how much for the Serbian and Greek wars?—what the pecuniary sacrifice at Navarino?—what for the expenses of the war closed in 1829, with its indemnity?—what for the two Egyptian campaigns? Between 1806 and 1840 not less than 20,000,000*l.* have been so expended, with a revenue curtailed at least one-third. Yet we have Turkey with an army equal to that of its most flourishing period, the best paid in Europe, and without the imposition of a new tax.* To the

* The new customs' duties, introduced by the English Treaty, are a deception practised on them, and a loss to the Treasury.

army and navy nearly 3,000,000*l.* is at present allotted, and the revenue now (1852) amounts to 8,000,000*l.*

But it will be objected, "Here number is of little or no avail. What is the quality of these troops? Fewer would suffice, if good, and so many will not, if worthless. That they are of inferior quality is to be inferred from the defeats which they have invariably met with, not from the Russians only, but from Egyptians." I am inclined to believe that in the average of events discipline will be found to beat character, and the character most essential is aptitude for discipline. The Russians are certainly not to be put as men on a level with Poles or Turks; yet they acquired an immediate ascendancy over both from the moment that they were disciplined. The Egyptian fellah, by the same process, easily mastered the Turks. The question simply is, whether the beating which the Turks have received has borne this fruit.

The temper of a people is tried by blows; disasters strengthen if they do not break down. The Russians owe their discipline to the Swedes, who thrashed them into order, and their endurance to the Tartars, who trampled them into stubbornness. They have taught both lessons to the Turks,* but what a difference between the two processes—the trial of the one was at best a scorching sun, that of the other a fiery furnace.

When the organisation was first attempted, the belief was universal that the Turks had utterly degenerated—that the decay apparent in the institutions had its root in the character of the people. It was disbelieved that they ever had any merits; their triumphs were referred to numbers and ferocity; or if they did possess some martial virtues, these belonged to the hardened life of nomades, or the reckless impulse of a predestinarian belief. At all events, now, every such quality had disappeared, and their name had passed into a byword for sloth, turbulence, ignorance, and cruelty.

I recal, in writing these words, the impressions under which I first visited that country, and it was not without a struggle that I yielded to the convictions of my senses. After experience more varied, extensive, and intimate than has, I believe, fallen to the lot of any other European, I have formed an estimate the reverse of my preconceptions. I do not know, and I cannot imagine, a finer raw material for a soldier than the Turk. He is no longer, indeed, the roving Tartar, but he has not lost the martial instincts of his original condition. What can be desired more than a warlike spirit with a religious temper, a cleanly person, a hospitable character, a polite demeanour, deference for

* As since confirmed on the Danube in 1853-4. Note, 1868.

letters, respect for justice, and a sense of national dignity, united to courage, a love of arms and horses, and experience in the use?

By his temperance in diet, and his abstinence from fermented liquors, as also by cleanliness, the Turk is healthy. He is small and sinewy. He is brave by temperament. He is proud of himself but respectful to others, particularly his chiefs. He is formed from childhood to those habits of deference which we endeavour to create by discipline. He is not liable to the seduction of speculative opinions. He is incapable of desertion to a foe. He is indifferent to odds, and to be conquered must be "hacked in pieces."* He has the ploughman's hardihood of frame, the cynic's contempt of death, the savage's endurance of privation, the gentleman's sensitiveness to honour.

I am glad to be able to give the opinion of General Bem:

"Vigour, courage, confidence, and subordination distinguish "the Turkish soldier. Pride of race, abstinence from fermented "liquors, and a sense of religious duty give courage and ensure "discipline. Gravity and *etiquette* prevail in a Turkish barrack. "Ten thousand Turkish are worth 15,000 or 20,000 Austrian "or Russian infantry."

A military man writes to me:—

"The infantry is only deficient in field officers: but "non-commissioned officers may perfectly well perform all the "duties of captains and of subalterns of infantry, as seen "in the British footguards. The real use of commissioned "officers is to raise discipline by raising the officer to a higher "caste, to make a nursery of field officers by the devoting "of educated men to the drudgery of the profession, and in "some armies to insure their leading, and being followed "by a sense of superiority in the officer, and of inferiority in "the men. But for reasons peculiar to them discipline is attain- "able in a higher degree among the Turks by means which "would prove inadequate with a Christian, or western population. "Every soldier in his character of Mahommedan and Ottoman "has as much pride of position and race as it is possible to im- "part to him. Between the Moslem private and the Moslem "Seraskier, the difference is merely rank not social station. In "European Turkey every Mahommedan is what a Basque noble "was in Spain, or a Roman citizen throughout the Empire. It "is not true that any discouragement prevails in the ranks of

* "L'espèce de soldats est excellente. Le turc a les qualités qu'exige le métier de la guerre. Il réunit la force à l'agilité, l'ardeur à la souplesse; il est intelligent, endurci à la fatigue, et porté à la frugalité jusqu'à se contenter d'un peu de riz ou de graine: il dort au bivouac comme dans son lit; il se defend individuellement avec energie: il faut, pour le vaincre, le hacher.—*Beaujour, Voyage Militaire, T.* II., *p.* 372.

" the Nizam. The soldiers are anxious to fight, at least, against " the Russians, ignorant of the disasters of their country and full " of faith in the result."

" Europeans are ready to undervalue the Turkish troops on " account of the loose slovenly appearance of their necks and " feet. This, not from negligence, but from the frequency of " ablutions, and the habit of sitting without shoes. This habit " is to a certain degree detrimental to their walking, and the " want of sufficient exercise, and high feeding occasion some " distress to the men on long marches, in changing garrison, or " in the first few days of a campaign. But after a short time " the stamina resulting from their good living tells, their feet " uninjured by heavy or tight shoeing become fitted for the " work, and they get into excellent condition just when Prussian, " Austrian or Russian troops would be falling off."

The old Russian generals, says General VALENTINI, were reminded by these Turkish recruits of the French under DESAIX. These are his words, from which I will not take the edge by translation :—

" Tels que les Français d'alors combattèrent leurs adversaires " sans connaissance, et sans exercise, tels nous avons vu aujourd- " 'hui les Osmanlis faire leur premiers essais, sous les mêmes " auspices. Des coups dècisifs étoufferont toujours des forces " naissantes, qui par une guerre lente et méthodique se seraient " elevées à une puissance formidable."*

The concluding sentence shows forth the purposes of Russia in that war, and reveals a maxim which has guided her policy since that day. Decisive blows not having sufficed for the intended purpose she has abstained from rendering to the Turks that service which the Lacedæmonians did to the Beotians, and which she herself has to the Circassians.

A still more important witness, however, is Count POZZO DI BORGO, who thus writes in a secret despatch to Count NESSELRODE, in June 1829, and he conveys the conclusions of a general officer as well as of a distinguished diplomatist.

" The experience we have just made must now reunite all " opinions in favour of the resolution which has been taken. " The Emperor has put the Turkish system to the proof, and " His Majesty has found it to possess a commencement of phy- " sical and moral organisation which it hitherto had not. If the " SULTAN has been enabled to offer us a more determined and

* *Guerre contre Les Turcs*, p. 229. Colonel Chesney who followed the operations of the war, passing and repassing to the one and the other army, bears his testimony to " the bravery and obedience of the youthful soldier of the Nizam." His account of the war, which will be a valuable contribution to the History of Turkey and Russia, will appear in the Third Volume of his work on the Euphrates.

" regular resistance whilst he had scarcely assembled toge
" the elements of his new plan of reform and ameliorations. h
" formidable should we have found him had he had time to g
" it more solidity and to render that barrier impenetrable wh
" we find so much difficulty in surmounting, though art h
" hitherto done so little to assist nature."

If we have ascertained that Russia dreaded the "nasc
" force" of the Ottoman Empire, and "the moral and physi
" energy" of the new system, we have gone as far in respect
evidence and authority as possible; and I have shown, I thin
in the subject itself, in results up to the present time achiev
viz., the tranquillity of thirteen years, and in the opinion
other qualified judges, strong confirmatory grounds of her o
nion. The failure of the attempt made in 1828 to crush t
system only justifies the step. Let it not be forgotten that the w
was undertaken, in the words of Prince LIEVEN, to "Diminish th
DANGERS of the future." I shall now proceed to the grave con
derations involved in the numerical strength to be given to t
Nizam, and the question of the enrolment of the Christians.

CHAPTER III.

NUMERICAL STRENGTH; ENROLMENT OF CHRISTIANS; CHANGE IN COSTUME, SALUTE, AND CLEANLINESS.

MONTESQUIEU predicted that the means adopted for their safety would, sooner or later, bring to the ground every Government of Europe.

That warning has availed them nothing; may it not be equally unfruitful with the Turks! This passage I translated for and laid before Sultan MAHMOUD, in 1834, together with the well-known opinion of NAPOLEON to the same effect, and his project for a general disarmament. At that time the plan of the Redif was definitively adopted. The point was to fix upon a force sufficient for the defence of the Empire, but not oppressive for the Treasury, nor alarming for the liberties of the people; and so to organise it that it should retain its provincial character, and furnish, in case of necessity, a large supply of disciplined men. The Porte had the singular good fortune of being able, in this respect, to exercise a judgment. Everywhere else the army has come in the course of time, and the numbers have been determined as much by events abroad, and by the opinions of strangers, as by the circumstances or the will of the people themselves. Turkey required no troops for her internal tranquillity. She had to look merely to defence, and that case was limited to one foe, who could reach her only by one road. The force required had, therefore, to be calculated on that which her antagonist could bring against her at one time on that point.

Russia has on paper a very large number of men, and her effective army may be 800,000. We have seen her thrice engaged, in the south and west, in a war on which all her energies were concentrated. Once with Poland, once with Hungary, once with Turkey herself. We could not desire more

ample means of estimating her relative weight of power and he facility of moving armies. The circumstances are too w known, however, to require more than reference; and as she i undergoing no change, we may take the force brought again Turkey in 1828, "after two years of preparation," as the fu amount of that which she will be enabled to employ in a futur invasion. I have entered, in describing the "Frontier Pr- "vinces," into the local circumstances that impede her progre in every movement she makes to the south,* where climate h her enemy, where bogs, marshes, and inundations entomb he armies.

We may, therefore, assume that against Turkey she ca bring no more than 200,000 into play; but if she had myriad at her disposal they would be of no avail, for the greater the number the greater would be the loss. This number is far to large. Her armies by their size lose agility, are vulnerable and perishable. Besides having to act in neutral territories, nothing turns the scale more than mere mass by the oppression which they create, and the animosity they engender. The smaller the army, so it suffice, the cheaper it is; the less exposed to reverses, the easier to move, the fewer the contingencies, and the less the loss between recruitment and the battle field. Europe herself, England excepted, has set but a bad example, and has lamentably degenerated since the days of MARLBOROUGH and FREDERICK THE GREAT, whose armies were small, the perfection of their mechanism enabling them to employ the "extended order." Such has been the case in all conquests. The Romans sent 30,000 men against MITHRIDATES, JENGHIS KHAN sent 30,000 men to conquer China, ALEXANDER led the same number into Persia, the Goths into Spain, WILLIAM into England, and WELLINGTON commanded no more British troops at Waterloo.

The British army remains the only specimen at present of the *corps d'elite*. This is perhaps attributable not so much to military conclusions as to political causes. Parliament does not vote a rate of conscription, but supplies the money, leaving it to "the de- "partment" to find the men on whom economy must be practised, by care of their health, and attention to their food and clothing. Consequently, we have seen the full number of the men recruited for a regiment, brought into the field: and our armies, rarely attaining 50,000, were always successful against those of NAPOLEON, which were the produce of conscriptions of half a million at a time, not individually inferior, and commanded by the best officers and generals in the world.

* It has been stated on good authority that a Russian regiment marching from St. Petersburgh to the Caucasus has lost more men than an English regiment through the whole war of the Peninsula.

On the Continent the conscription and the budget are voted severally: the first is decided by general statistics: local circumstances fix the Revenue; pride takes charge of the numbers, the commissariat is left to prudence. The conscripts are fed and cared for in an inverse ratio to their amount. When called into action the difference appears, and quality must be made up for by numbers, deficiency in compactness and rapidity is supplied by "profound order," to the simultaneous sacrifice of the resources of the State and the efficiency of the army.

If this be a general mistake and fallacy, to what extent must it not affect Russia? Her raw material, except as regards endurance and obedience, unpromising. She entertains for it the greatest contempt, and sacrifices men with the utmost recklessness. The soldier is in every respect considered and used as a beast of burden, or rather as material to move a ramrod or to fill a ditch. The numbers are a source of profit to the chiefs of all the departments, and the Emperor is powerless to change the system. He cannot reduce his armies, nor therefore improve them.

It is for Turkey, then, to profit in this respect at once by her freedom of action and her high standard of soldiers. She has commenced with respecting them, paying and feeding them well. Her danger is the being led astray by the Russian practices, and the opinions of continental Europe, and this is my inducement for entering into a matter otherwise foreign to my subject. The army is to the State what the sword is to the soldier. Let her copy in this respect her own scimetar. The material for the one is equal to that of the other. Let it be equally light and ready. The "short sword" of Rome conquered the world, but it was wielded by small armies.

A marginal note to ALISON'S History of 1812 is to this effect:—"The difficulties of the Danubian Provinces supported "the Ottoman Empire." If so, even when those provinces were abandoned to the enemy, what defence does Turkey require beyond protecting them? In the campaign of 1828, had she sent forward her raw recruits to defend the Pruth and the Sereth, never would the Russians have advanced to the Danube, and that body of recruits would have amply sufficed for her defence. It is impossible, indeed, to separate the military from the political defence, and if the political defence is abandoned, what can armies avail? and what avail, again, are armies if she neglects her fortresses? With a couple of camps 30,000 strong, and her fortresses placed in a respectable condition, her protection would be as sure as if the Caucasus or the Himalayah filled up the gap between the Carpathians and the Euxine.

This conclusion does not spring from an under estimate of the

Russians, but from knowledge of the character of the Turk. We have seen the Russians accomplishing wonders against the French. Their stolid nature fits them for the shock of disciplined men, but, excepting the Cossacks and Malo-Russians, they are not a match for light and expert irregular troops; nor are they fitted for siege operations. The points in which the Turks are strong are precisely those in which the Russians are weak.

No one who has not witnessed it can form any idea of the desperate character of these sieges. The Turks lie as close as cowards, and die like lions. The child, the octogenarian, shares the common frenzy. They care little for batteries and defences. When the breach is practicable, then do they prepare for their stand; then do their assailants tremble for the result; each house, each wall, each partition, is a new entrenchment, and tens of thousands will perish in single combat, from house to house, before the place is taken. The Turkish Government, has then to look to its fortifications. The first thing is to strengthen them, and to induce the settlement in them and around them of a pure Turkish population. It may create a new system, but it ought not to sacrifice an old and inestimable security.

The Europeans at Constantinople believe, or affect to believe, that the numbers drafted for the army will exhaust the Turkish population, and so prostrate the Mussulmans' supremacy; consequently, the Power principally interested in the fate of Turkey, England, has urged on the Porte the adoption of a more judicious system. That system, however, is not the reduction of numbers, but the supply of men from another source—in a word, *the enrolment of the Christians*. This plan is presented to the Turks as relieving them from undue pressure; to the Christians as establishing for them political equality! It proceeds from a high source, no less than the Government of Great Britain, and is indirectly urged forward by all the influence at the command of Russia. In fact, the proposal offered as an expedient for recruiting the army is the subversion of the institutions of the land. The plan urged to defend the Empire against Russia will fill it with convulsion and revolt.

The Rayas, by the Code of ISLAM, are exempt from military service. They are so by compact, for on this condition the subjection of each province severally took place. For this exemption they paid the Poll tax. This is equally a fundamental institution. There resides in the State no legislative body with power to alter either law. To do so would be a revolution, and if one is changed both must be so. You therefore simultaneously strike at the laws, religion, military organisation, and finances.

But do the Mussulmans desire this relief? Do the Rayas seek this privilege? I cannot argue the question. I will only say

that the Mussulmans would rise to resent the attempt on their supremacy, the Christians to resist this infraction of their privileges. The most odious of all charges is the "blood tax." Who ever heard of appeasing the discontent of an overburdened people by imposing upon them forced conscription? Unwarlike they may be, but not to the point of quiet acquiescence in a wrong which in its consequences would destroy them as distinct races and faiths.

If the Mussulmans cannot support a weight which is the condition of their privileges, let them sink. If they needlessly increase its pressure, let them be advised. I neither desire to see the Christians absorbed into the Mussulmans by an enrolment of children, nor an arming of the Christian population (if it were possible) called forth to aid a Russian invasion.

The Christian provinces, which possess distinct administration, in which no Mussulmans dwell, and where the general law of the Empire does not run, are not only not excused from service, but *are bound to furnish their contingents.* They are placed under their own officers, and serve according to the conditions of their union with the Porte. Thus it is that Christians appear, and have always appeared, in the Ottoman armies. Wholly different is the proposal to enrol them in the Mussulman corps of each province. There they would be isolated, mixed with the Mussulmans, and, subject to Mussulman officers, they would, following the example of the Janissaries, soon become Mussulmans. It does flatter the vanity of a Bulgarian, Boyard, or an Armenian Seraff to hear of a "Bulgarian" or "Armenian" regiment. If there be deeper views when the enrolment of the Christian provincials is spoken of, it is the dismemberment of the province that is meant. The English Embassy is angry because this is not done; but it should begin by offering to the Turks 400,000 men, the one-half to keep down the insurgent populations, the other to meet the Russians invited to support at once the dearest interests of their Christian co-religionaries and the sovereignty of their Mussulman Allies.

But so far from believing that the actual measure is likely to injure, or extinguish, the Turkish population, or supremacy, I anticipate a contrary effect. The exhaustion of races does not come by accident and misfortune: natural causes alone bring their decay. Torpor was the disease of Turkey. There could be no better remedy than a course of discipline which does not dissever the army from the people, or generate an *esprit de corps.* Instead of exhausting their numbers, impairing their social position, or diminishing their prospects, it will dispel the sluggishness which was creeping over them, and the despondency which was invading their minds. It will ultimately promote private

enterprise and industry by tempering the springs of public spirit.

But the conclusions of the European diplomatists have been based on false data. I have before me a report prepared for a European Government, from which the following is an extract:—

"In European Turkey the army is entirely drawn from the "Mahommedan, and chiefly from the Ottoman population, which "only numbers 700,000. Supposing we place at 500,000 the "other Mahommedans, and we will have more than one con- "script out of every five adult males."

The names of the corps have given rise to this mistake. The guard of the SULTAN and the "camp" of the capital appear as if raised in Europe; whereas the first is exclusively raised in Asia and one-half of the second; so that, instead of 75,000 men being raised from one million, 37,000 are raised from 3,500,000. In Asia, the Mussulman population cannot be rated under fifteen millions, which will bring its contingent of 112,000 men to one soldier in 125 souls. There certainly remains a heavy pressure upon those in Europe, which it would be very desirable to see equalised. This may easily be effected by including Bosnia in the Rumely Ordu, or by giving a labour substitute to each family from which a conscript is taken. The Bulgarians and other Rayas, if disinclined to fight, are willing to labour; and may be obtained at the rate of the soldier: the family he assists would also supply food. The balance would thus be restored at a charge of some 80,000*l.* a year, which might be advantageously economised on the exorbitant pay of the superior grades of officers.

Instead, however, of thinking of lightening the burden where it is heaviest, the Turks are now only dreaming of increasing its pressure where it is lightest. Their mind runs to the augmentation of the army. The Bosnian recruits are superadded to the establishment, and it has been seriously proposed to enrol in the Redif all the young men eligible for the conscription, amounting to two millions. This sudden impulse is partly to be attributed to the reaction which has followed past depression,* and partly to the effect of the union of Austria with Russia, an event which has naturally filled them with alarm, but which, justly estimated, ought rather to be a ground of security. They are

* "The efficiency of that force (Rédif) has been fully demonstrated of late, when an army of 62,000 men was assembled in the space of six weeks, on the occasion of the interruption of amicable relations with Russia and Austria on account of the Hungarian refugees. In another month, 200,000 men of the Rédif might have been collected at Constantinople had they been required; and it furnished matter for astonishment to the many foreigners in that capital to behold a thoroughly drilled and disciplined army thus extemporised in a camp, to which a number of mere peasants in appearance had been seen flocking from their villages."—SKENE. *Three Eras of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 70.

exposed at present to no danger which is not diplomatic, and whatever tends to sever ties with the diplomatists of Europe, tends to their security.

It was RIZA PASHA who, although the leader of the reactionary party, had fallen into the idea of enrolling the Christians. He had commenced with embodying the workmen of the Arsenal, and had them reviewed before the SULTAN. Fortunately he fell from power, and was succeeded by that statesman whose name is peculiarly associated with the entrance of Turkey into the system of Europe, RESHID PASHA. From him the completion of this measure was confidently expected, and the more so as his great support was the English Ambassador. The expectation has, however, been hitherto disappointed. RESHID PASHA has carefully avoided saying, or doing, anything. It may be inferred that, belonging himself to a portion of the Empire inhabited by Greeks (the Morea), he was not, like his predecessor, deceived by specious fallacies, but prudent enough to keep his own counsel.

A new danger has arisen for Russia out of the Nizam, and that is—*desertion*. The Russian armies, whether in Europe, or in Turkey, have not hitherto evinced any such disposition, because, in the first case, the soldier was in a strange land amongst nations which he despised, and with whom he could hold no intercourse, and in the second, because the inducement to which I am about to refer did not exist. That inducement is the circumstances of the Turkish soldier in regard to pay, food, the treatment he receives, and the station he holds. The Russian soldier is, after all, a man, and it is impossible he should not contrast these with his miserable fare,* his eleemosynary pittance,† and his doglike treatment.

"The dogs of Constantinople are better provided than the "Russian troops." Such were the words of an Attaché to AHMET PASHA'S Embassy to St. Petersburg. At Bucharest, where the barracks adjoined, the two armies could study each other. The Turks, when they threw out the offal, used to say, "For the dogs and the Russians," and the Russians were daily seen contending on the dung-hills with the dogs. "They never "knew before," said a Turkish soldier, "whether wheaten bread "was black or white, or flesh meat sweet or bitter." The Russian regiments that have been recalled from the provinces, instead of returning to their ordinary stations, have been dispersed in small

* According to Captain Alexander, the food of the Russian soldier consists of black bread, salt, and a portion of spirits daily.

† The Turkish soldier receives monthly, and without deduction, the same pay as the Russian does in twelve months, with deductions.

bodies, and sent to be forgotten, or killed off at distant and dangerous posts.

It has been supposed that Russia dreaded to send her armies to the West lest they should be contaminated by the doctrines of France; but the steam of the Nizam kettles and the sight of the Pilaf is more alarming to her than all the phrases that ever were penned on the rights of man.

There is no obstacle to intercourse between the armies. One-half of the forces Russia would employ in a Southern campaign would be composed of troops whose sympathies would be Turkish, not Russian, or whose dialect would be understood by the Turks or their co-religionaries.

"Russia," said NAPOLEON, "will advance or fall to pieces: "and it is to be expected that she will advance, for the warlike "populations which compose her armies have tasted the luxuries "of a more genial climate, and sigh for their possession." The means of acquiring these were discipline, and the discipline which was enforced on the Russians was terrorism. Success, corruption, a faulty organisation, have relaxed the bonds to that degree that changes are made, not with a view to amelioration, but by the necessity of concession.* Each of the recent external struggles has had for its result a curtailment of the military service. It had been for life; it was then for twenty years. After the Polish war it was reduced to sixteen years. Since the Hungarian war it has been reduced to eight or ten. It is clear, therefore, that the Russian soldier has learned to be discontented with his condition, and that the Government defers not perhaps to his opinions, but to his feelings. But this is no improvement of the condition which is curtailed; far less will it bring diminution of the desire of change, or indifference to the seductions of better treatment; and so may the fruition of the good things of the South be sought for by other means than conquest.

No one, however, will question the first part of the proposition, and Russia, like all systems formed for aggrandisement, must go back if she does not go forward. She has not advanced in the last twenty-five years on either side of the Euxine.† Nor has she in the interval been accomplishing any great revolution, consolidating any progress made, or amending any existing in-

* The following observations of Napoleon have their political as well as their military bearing:—"Unlike the French and English, the subjects of the Russian Empire improve their condition by becoming soldiers. If I called on a Frenchman to quit his country, I required him to abandon his happiness. The Russian, on the contrary, is a slave while a peasant, but becomes free and respectable when a soldier."

† The English, French, and Sardinians gave to her Circassia. At the end of 1853 Turkey had beaten the Russians, and would have resumed the recent conquests of Russia but for her allies.—Note, 1868.

stitution. Neither the condition of the troops nor the efficiency of the service is improved, but the reverse.

That array of bayonets which dazzles the eyes of Europe itself threatens the Empire with its chief danger. The military system is a millstone, which will drag the head under water so soon as it ceases to be buoyed up by the prestige of diplomatic success, so soon as the people begin to suspect that their endurance is in vain, and that the world is not at this time to be subdued.*

In comparing the present with the ancient military organisation of Turkey, one contrast cannot fail to be observed—the absence in the new system of the light irregular horse. Yet this had remained the only serviceable body in the Turkish armies, and was particularly necessary against an enemy who had made use of similar troops; to them, indeed, that enemy was indebted for the terror her name inspired, and so great was their share in her successes, that the word "Cossack"† has come to be synonymous with "Russian." This oversight and error I am not able to explain; it, however, is more than counterbalanced by the course adopted by Russia towards this population, whose political importance had slumbered for nearly a century, but who had for the two previous centuries determined the fate of the surrounding kingdoms. They "secured Poland against the Russians, the "Tartars, and the Turks whilst the Poles retained their affection." When the Poles had lost that affection they brought first the Turks to Kamniecz, and then the Russians to Warsaw. They gave to Russia her victories over Poles, Tartars, and Turks when she had succeeded in securing their affection. Circumstances are altered, and they again emerge from the condition of a class of troops.

This vast mass of intervening military population, actually furnishing to Russia almost exclusively her cavalry and artillery, has to be taken into account under a new head in estimating the amount of force required by Turkey for *military* defence against Russia. The latter can no longer safely trust regiments composed of them in presence of a Turkish enemy in force. This consideration tells both ways. It is of the very last importance. It is fully appreciated by the Russian Cabinet.‡ It is unper-

* "Le Russe se paye de sa degradation actuelle par l'espoir de la domination future."—Custine.

† "As light cavalry they are unrivalled; they and their horses have marched one hundred miles in twenty-four hours without halting: with them in front, no Russian army can be liable to surprise; in charging, they spread out like a fan, uttering their 'hourra,' each man acting individually."—Sir W. Scott.

Napoleon compared them to the Bedouins advancing with confidence into unknown regions, and as formidable to the most powerful armies opposed to them.

‡ In the campaign on the Danube the Russian cavalry and light artillery had to be withdrawn three leagues to the rear. Fourteen men were shot at Bucharest in one day for attempted desertion.—Note, 1868.

ceived, with one or two exceptions, by the persons surrounding the SULTAN. It is a result of the reconstruction of the Turkish army and of the manner in which, as regards the well-being of the soldier, that reconstruction has been effected. The Nizam is the bulwark of Europe against a barbarian invasion from the North, or would be if the Porte were conscious of what it had achieved, and so closed the chapter of Diplomatic meddling.

There remain two incidents of the military organisation calculated to react injuriously and even fatally on the character of the people, which it is impossible for me to pass over, however insignificant or harmless they may appear to the Western reader. These are the *costume* and the *salutation*. The first is actually, the second prospectively, desecrated; the first by the substitution, the second by the superposition of another. The first has been, indeed, assailed with a purpose, the second compromised without so much as a thought. Both I hold to be fundamental for the Ottoman Empire. To have left them as they were would have cost nothing. What they have put or are about to put in their places has nothing to recommend it. The rancour of the late SULTAN against the Janissaries both explains and justifies the adoption of a costume different to theirs; it noways justifies that one which was then composed and which is both hideous and foreign. It is at least foreign in appearing to be so, though the like is to be nowhere found on earth. It has descended from SELIM III., and belongs to his bastard imitation of Europe.

The opportunities afforded me by the late SULTAN were not neglected to urge a return in this respect to the old ways; and these endeavours seemed at one time to be successful, so far at least as one body was concerned, the Imperial Guard. The argument that in this case prevailed was the example of the CZAR. It was at that time proposed that the Guard should be composed of contingents from every Province and Tribe, each wearing its own costume. By what direct influence this plan was overruled I know not, but I record it in the hope that it may be some day revived when the mania of copying will have passed away, and Turkish sense and self-respect will combine to turn their own resources to account.

Such an expectation is not destitute of historic grounds. Once before in their history, that is four centuries ago, a like mania of imitation developed itself, yet within two generations it subsided.

The change has already lost its strength of passion; its only support is fallacy. They cannot defend the Nizam costume on its own merits. When it is assailed, the only, but the invariable, answer is, "The old Turkish costume was cumbersome. A man "cannot manœuvre with ten pounds of cotton on his head, even "when not moistened with rain, or march with six yards of

"broadcloth in his trousers." *Turkish* dress! There was no Turkish dress to be seen at Constantinople at the time so referred to.

The dress which had become so cumbersome and extravagant was imitated, or rather caricatured, from the Arabs; the Arab dress itself is not unmilitary. The proper dress of the Turks was, in the last century, to be seen in the *armies of Europe*. But in a more general sense the Ottoman costume is the costume of the various populations of the Turkish Empire, the Albanian—the image, the prototype, perhaps, of that of Rome, the gorgeous raiment of the Guegue, the endless variety of Bosnian, Servian, Illyrian, Wallachian, Curd, Druze, Arab, Uzbek, Turcoman. In each case it is the object of their affections, and constitutes a part of their distinct existence, which Turkey has never conceived the design of trampling upon, and in which consists its security and strength. This is the great blemish of the military system. This has engendered one of the internal struggles in which the Government has for the last twenty-five years been engaged. This gives it its hideous aspect; this lowers the estimate of Turkish mind and character. The army is created, but it wants something to make it Turkish. It wants the horse tails, it wants the noble folds of the Romans, it wants the rich gallery of historical portraits of its subject States. It must cease to be clad like a scarecrow before it can feel or command respect.

As to the Salute, this is what has happened. In teaching the manual exercise the European instructors have, as a matter of course, taught the European Salute. They did not observe that the Turks were already in possession of at once the most perfect and the most ancient of forms of salutation. They did not consider that the military salute of Europe was an invention of modern times to supply the want of ceremonial in the people; a ceremonial of some sort having been discovered to be of absolute necessity in disciplining a body of men. Far less did they perceive that this military salute of theirs was as ungainly and coarse as that of the Turks was poetic and refined.

They indeed experienced resistance. Every feeling of the Turk revolted against abstaining to give the TEMENAS to his superiors. A compromise was, therefore, fallen upon; which was to give both salutations. Thus you will see a sentry first carry arms, and then, holding his firelock in the left hand, perform his Temenas with the right.

So far there is small disturbance; but as the double process is extremely cumbersome, the one will come to be substituted for the two, and then the Temenas will disappear.

General BEM, in dwelling on the "*Etiquette*" reigning among the Turkish soldiery as contributing so largely to their

soldier-like qualities, refers of course to the habits of the people from whom these soldiers are drawn. It is amongst them that this etiquette prevails. But in what does it consist? It consists in nothing that we practise or know; that we can understand in them, or apply in ourselves. It consists in or is rather summed up by the Temenas. This term is the expression of a code of etiquette which consists in the regulations for that act. In its essence it is the kissing of the hand of the superior by the inferior.* It is the salute of the Romans—at once "grave and sublime."

This will shock modern notions of which the great doctrine is "Equality." Yet this equality is in words only amongst us, for no two men brought in contact act on the word. The sense of equality is not to be found in Europe since disqualifications of caste exist. It does exist in Turkey since there are none. The porter, the slave, may become Sadrazem, the common soldier Seraskier. But as between man and man, the idea of equality does not, and cannot, present itself. Than this, no idea more monstrous, more false, or more degrading could be formed. To put it in practice would destroy all human respect. In one sense only equality would be introduced by it: that is, they would all become vulgar.

Amongst them no two human beings can be in presence of each other without the perception of such shades of distinction as to call forth the ceremonial of salutation. The difference of the intervening minutes of birth between two twins† places the one in mute observance before the other till permitted to sit down, just as much as it might be between the general and the common soldier. This etiquette it is which enables all classes

* I once had the opportunity of calling the attention of a poet to this politeness in action. It was the Improvisatore Regeldi. He sat motionless and absorbed for half an hour. In the afternoon of the same day, being on a pinnacle of the Bithynian Olympus, he stretched forth his arms, and chanted an Ode on the Temenas. I was unsuccessful in my endeavours afterwards to get him to put it down on paper, but from my own memory I recovered the two first stanzas, which were as follows:—

"Baccio le vostre care parole
E come accese nel grembo al sole
Le depongo con dolce affetto.
Nell intelletto.

"Questo è il sublime grave saluto,
Che il Romano popol caduto,
Quando regnò con forte orgoglio,
Dal Campidoglio."

† The identity in this respect of Turkish habits with those of Sparta may be learnt from that most instructive incident given by Herodotus respecting the means taken to discover the elder of two twins, by watching the mother to see which she washed first.

freely to mingle together, and which establishes that real equality of man which their society presents. It governs all the relations of political as of social life, because it is the mould in which the character of each is formed during early and unconscious childhood. It gives to the family its affections, to the State its wonderful indestructibility, and casts over the whole that grace of life in the politeness of intimacy which charmed the gentlemen of Europe of a former age, and proves inexplicable to the reasoners of the present.

It follows that with them, *Familiarity*, in our sense, has no existence. They cannot conceive the idea of disregarding ceremony any more on the grounds of frequency of intercourse than of that of propinquity of relationship. The term "family" implies with them the highest degree of deference, instead of, as with us, its total disregard.

In the army, it is a salute of some sort that will be substituted for the Temenas. Not so among the people, in the extension to them of the change. They will not present arms. They will be exposed to copying the civilian salute of Europe. But the civilian salute, taking off the hat and making a bow, is incompatible with their costume. Then they will be reduced to copying the process recently introduced, and now spreading through the nations of Europe and decomposing them socially as it leavens itself into the mass, of joining and moving hands and arms. This process is, however, not a salutation, but is introduced to dispense with salutation. The effect that may be produced amongst us can bear no proportion to that which would result from its being brought at once to bear on a people not prepared for it by a previous and long course of social disintegration.

Turkey is simultaneously exposed to the infection of false opinions, infidel notions, dirty habits, and vulgar manners; each will react on the other. A change such as this once effected in the army, it will unquestionably spread to the nation, and hurry it on in that melancholy course which the English designate "free and easy," and the French applaud as "manières san gêne," which is no manners at all.

It is necessary to mention cleanliness in connexion with politeness, as that word has no more an equivalent for us than the other. It is, like politeness, a religious observance; religious, in the sense of having been enjoined by all Religions. The standard of cleanliness would appear to have been the first instituted amongst men, and consists in a line drawn between the clean and the dirty, involving pollution in whatever has not been subjected to purification, and establishng rules for the

purification of the body, and for whatever comes in contact wi it. It is the observance of these rules that makes the Turki Barrack what it is, and the Turkish home what it is. The di tinction, incomprehensible to a European, becomes offensive him by the contrast to his own practice, so that it is one of t things which will be first attacked by "civilisation," "progress and "European Opinion."*

The army created to defend the frontier may thus becon the means of extinguishing the people, if through it incidental the habits of social intercourse should be subverted.

* The Turkish Government, having had the madness to attempt to imitate educational institutions of France, resistance has broken out upon this point. T Turks have submitted, it is said, in reference to the ablutions after meals; but th have refused to give them up as regards the impurities of nature. The character the Europeans employed is thus displayed. Who could perceive such practices, a to revere and copy them, but to hate and destroy them? From the moment that myself perceived the idea, I adopted the practice, and have never once intermitted and have established it amongst my household, family, and friends.—Note, 1868.

CHAPTER IV.

Its Future Use.

An army without means of transport is but a gun without a carriage. What a truck is to the one a road is to the other; yet Turkey has no road from the places where her armies must assemble to that where they are to be employed.

Constantinople is the point of intersection of all land and water communication throughout the Empire. It is the link between the continents and seas, and the key to both. It is the place of rendezvous and of refuge. Thence will be given the signal of every attack, there security will be sought after every disaster. There is the manufactory of weapons, the store of grain, the station of the navy, the depôt of artillery. It is the centre of administration, it is a fastness and a dockyard, an arsenal and an emporium, a fortress and a capital. It is at once the head and heart, the sword and buckler; and, as it is the lure which draws Russia on, so is it the source of the opposition that delays her progress. Can anything be more necessary than a military road thence to the Danube? In any other state you would require for military purposes fifty roads, but here *one*, and a short one, is sufficient.

"Surely," it will be objected, "Russia can attack in the east "as well as in the west. In the last war she sent her troops to "scale the mountains of Koordistan, when she poured them "across the Danube." This would be a reason for two roads, not an argument against the making of one; but I think I shall be able to show that the second is superfluous.

The map shows two internal seas east and west of the chain of the Caucasus, which seem made on purpose to enable Russia to reach beyond that barrier, and strike at the exposed vitals of the two eastern kingdoms, which have so long appeared to be

breaking under her pressure. Into these seas pour her rivers after traversing the vast regions where her armies are recruited and her grain is grown. No countervailing streams through Persia and Turkey carry downwards their resources so as to enable them to meet her in these basins—once closed lakes belonging to themselves. All seems calculated to render the Euxine and the Caspian the handmaids to her ambition, the carriers of the substantial implements of her conquests, and the dispensers of the blight of her menace over the south. She has either been incomprehensibly negligent of such advantages, or there are obstacles which have escaped our scrutiny.*

Her wars with Persia excited little interest. No one thought of the means she employed, or to what end, far less by what route, her forces went or came: no one doubted that these seas were made use of, or cared if they were not. In the last war (1828-9), however, Russia's movement in Asia did excite attention—perhaps astonishment. Occupying a position on the sources of the Euphrates, she was seen to menace at once Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, and might have descended to the sea of Syria, or the Persian Gulf. It was, with the exception of NAPOLEON's expedition to Egypt, a movement of more spring and purpose, vivacity and aim, than had been displayed in any military operation of our times, and recalled the great events of antiquity, enacted on the same theatre. The conclusion was that no serious obstacle did oppose her in the East; and the invasion of India ceased to be considered a chimera. Let us examine the circumstances.

The Persian war of 1827-8, was then just concluded, so that she had an army ready at hand, an army which the Persians had never opposed, and the transport of which had occupied the three previous years.† This transport *had been effected entirely by land.* Her troops and provisions were sent to the mountains of Armenia by a journey of months across the steppes of Astrachan, the gorges of the Caucasus, and the unhealthy plains of Georgia, and for the following reason:—

The bight of the eastern extremity of the Black Sea is flanked by two lofty ranges—the one a continuation of the Ararat, the other the Caucasus. Through this funnel the wind constantly draws east or west: and when it gets to the eastward, which it does nine months in the year, it blows right on shore; a vessel once embayed with a strong wind from the west or north (which in shore always draws to the east) has all round a lee shore without headland or protection of any sort; a current

* South of the Caucasus she has never been able to keep together for service more than 5000 men at a fortnight.

† The active preparations for war commenced in 1825, and from 1821, a rupture with Turkey was only postponed from season to season.

running between two and three knots (an eddy from the Bosphorus) sets at all times dead into the bight. With such craft, and such sailors as Russia has got, nothing can be more formidable; and casualties do not occur only because by standing orders her men-of-war are prohibited from approaching this coast in the winter months, on any pretence, and in summer can only proceed thither by special orders, and then under no pretext lie there beyond four-and-twenty hours Steam may render the coast approachable, but that advantage in war would be contingent on her possessing the supremacy by sea, which at present as regards steam force belongs to the Turks. Steam, however, will not overcome the difficulties of the coast.

The water is shoal; vessels must in the finest weather anchor three or four miles out; the beach is low, and beyond it marshes spread for miles into the interior; these are passable only here and there by narrow stone causeways upon which two persous only can pass. During the months that the sea leaves the coast approachable the fever renders the marshes impassable. The disembarkation of a single regiment would be a matter of great uncertainty and much delay, and before it could extricate itself from the marshes it would have two or three nights to bivouac where one night would leave a Russian regiment but a skeleton, if not a corpse.

Coming further west, a descent on Asia Minor is from other causes an operation too hazardous to attempt, and has never been attempted. She would meet on landing perhaps with no resistance if she approached in force, but with no support and no supplies; her troops would be dependent on the fleet, and the coast is near the Bosphorus. The Turkish fleet, even after Navarino, held the sea, though unable to operate against the Russians when concentrated at Varna. It is quite different on the Asiatic coast. All argument is, indeed, superseded by the fact that except in the transit from Odessa to the coast of Roumelia, the Black Sea has never served Russia for the transport of a man, a cartridge, or a biscuit. This obstacle she has carefully concealed, as nothing was more calculated to destroy the prestige of her arms.

She is little better off in the Caspian. The marshes and bogs that form its north-western side reappear in the south-west to which her convoys would have to be directed, and the ague is there a scarcely less formidable opponent than on the Euxine.

The obstacles, however, to the use of the Caspian in a Turkish war, are political rather than physical.

Russia never comes to a rupture with one State, except when assured that it will be helped by no other; her whole resources have been required against each, and she has been allowed to

bring them to bear separately. For instance, in the successive years 1826, 1827, 1828, 1829, 1830, and 1831, Persia, Turkey, and Poland were each in succession crushed,* and from the one to the other her whole forces were transferred by geographic stages. Indeed she used each in turn against the other. Thus Persia, abandoned by Turkey in 1826-7, was employed in 1828-9 against the Turks. Poles, to be extinguished in 1830-1 were employed against the Turks in 1828-9. The money from the Turkish subsidy was of use for the Polish war, the positions gained in Persia, for the Turkish. The experienced veteran bodies of the Caucasus were employed in each, the Circassians being too glad to be left alone.

In the present altered state of feeling, the transport of troops across the Caspian would agitate Persia and expose her to the risk of a Persian together with a Turkish war, just as PETER'S advance, when he built two vessels on the Caspian, would, but for the interposition of France, have brought a Turkish war on his hands. For these reasons neither of the two seas will serve her in the next war unless circumstances are altered: her attack if made in Asia must be conducted across the Caucasus, where she can no longer venture with the impunity she has hitherto enjoyed.†

Though pervious to the Russians only at two points, the Caucasus is to the Turks, with the disposition of the people in their favour, pervious throughout its whole line, and they would be invited thither and *beyond*. The council at Constantinople might not decide on an invasion of Russia, but with a BEM in command, orders would not be required nor contrary orders heeded. BEM is no more; but without Transylvania who would have heard of BEM? Nor in this respect would there be much difference if KOURSCHID PASHA or OMER PASHA, or half a dozen more who could be named, chanced to have an independent command of 10,000 men in that direction.

It was neither the Senate of Carthage, nor the Senate of Rome, that decided on the invasion of Italy, or of Africa, and where there are similar chances BARCAS and SCIPIOS may still be found. The readiest means of parrying a blow in Asia most assuredly would be a thrust home. Russia presents to an invading Turkish force no physical obstacles to vanquish, no passes to force, no fortresses to reduce. Neither would there be

* "But Russia, feeling that her position in Asia would be in the last degree critical, if the contest with Turkey should have commenced before that in which she had engaged with Persia should have terminated, was desirous of bringing to a conclusion the war with that country; and the success of her arms, in the autumn of 1827, enabled her to dictate terms to the Shah."—*Progress of Russia in the East*, p. 98.

† If the case is altered, it is owing to the presence of European troops, ships, and treaties in the treacherous war of the Crimea.—Note, 1868.

armies to oppose the invader, for the Russian force would be collected on the west, or shut up in Asia Minor. Down the sides of the Caucasus would pour the now united and aspiring mountaineers; the wild horsemen beyond the Caspian would break in upon the Eastern frontier. The Tartar tribes of the Crimea and of Astrachan would rise to a man; so would, in all likelihood, the religious dissidents. The Cossacks, and even the Malo Russians would be more disposed to profit by, than to oppose, the invasion. Russia would be girdled by a flame of insurrection, and the way would be open to Moscow. On the other hand, the Russian army would not, as on the last occasion, be unopposed in Asia Minor by a military force. It would no longer find allies in Dere Beys. It would have to move in small detachments, through broken and rugged ground, not with one chain of mountains to cross but a mass of mountains, extending before and around for hundreds of miles. It would look in vain for Greek religionaries, Slaav brothers; it would obtain no support from a fleet; it would draw no resources from the people, and would be contingent for support upon weekly convoys sent across the Steppes and the Caucasus, which, on our hypothesis, would be already occupied by the enemy, or in a state of insurrection.

Besides, Russia's inducement for such a movement has disappeared. The struggle of 1828-9 was, as every struggle must be, on the Danube. The Porte had but a small body of regulars, and relied chiefly upon levies from Asia. The appearance of the Russians on the Eastern frontier paralysed at once one half the Empire. With an enemy hovering on their rear, these tribes would not quit their homes and march a thousand miles to the westward. The movement on Erzerum was indeed decisive of the war, but only as checkmate may be given by a pawn. Now that the defence will be carried on by regular troops, the Porte would rejoice to see a Russian army blocked up in Kurdistan and Armenia, three months' march from the theatre of war.

Again, Russia has no army to spare for such a purpose. The echo of the first Turkish gun* would be answered from one end of Hungary to the other—perhaps from one end of Poland to the other; and so hazardous a game (and she must engage in it deliberately, or it will not be played) requires all her disposable forces in the west.

Thus against an invasion in Asia we have the removal of the inducements, the increased difficulties of the enterprise, the risk

* The gun here referred to was understood as being fired on the Pruth. Had the Turks not been held back by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the surmise of the text would now be history.—Note, 1868.

of a war with Persia, and of a counter invasion by the Turks. More, perhaps, than any one of these weighty objections is the increased range of her operations in Europe, and the augmentation there of her dangers and her cares. Russia can no longer venture on hazardous expeditions. These arguments are certainly good so far as to show that the importance of a road to the mountains of Armenia is as nothing compared with that of one to the plains of the Danube.

These questions arise only when England is on Russia's side; for if she were with Turkey, Russia would be powerless, and Turkey, conscious of a real support in England—not one prospective only, and then conditional—would never fail in courage to defend her own.

No diplomatic question was raised by the creation of the army, because no English Ambassador could venture directly to combat such a measure; and it was not of a nature to be frustrated by a counter project. It belongs to all immoral and selfish purposes to derive the energy and courage requisite for their execution, not from inherent courage, but from the weaknesses of those on whom they act. They fail when attention is directed to the disguises assumed or the arts employed. Hence the strange vacillations in the conduct of Russia, now daring, and now impotent. She is daring when she has secured the support of England, impotent when she has it not. Thus she suffers the organisation of an army, and frustrates the construction of a road.

By want of roads the Ottoman Empire, except within twenty or thirty leagues of a port, is unproductive for exportation. This has been incessantly pressed on the attention of the Turks.* Companies have proposed to undertake their construction, the Government has itself formed endless schemes. It has been proposed to employ the troops, as were those of ancient Rome, in making them. The troops are desirous to be so employed. But somehow the fatal influence is felt, reappearing at every point, occurring at every interval, and always thwarting every project of the kind. No one doubts whence it proceeds, but no one sees it, or at least is able to counteract it, on each particular occasion. Practically, indeed, there is a great obstacle. There cannot be roads without wheels, nor wheels without roads. A road cannot be kept up without traffic, and until the road is made no carriages can be constructed. The difficulty is to bring together roads and wheels in a country that has neither. The reason of this combination recently presented itself at an important point, in a practical fashion.

* So far back as 1834, the Sultan's promise was given to me for the construction of three great roads, one of which would have been to the Danube. A commencement was then made, but soon interrupted.

The merchants of Smyrna have their country houses near the bottom of the bay, and to it, for three miles, there is an incessant traffic of carriages, omnibuses, and carts. They proposed carrying the road right into the city, whence, as from a centre, roads would soon extend throughout the whole of Asia Minor. They offered to subscribe one half of the expense, if the Porte would supply the other. The Government received the communication in the most encouraging manner, but first required the approval of Sir STRATFORD CANNING, who answered the application made to him in these terms:—"I tell you frankly that "all my influence shall be exerted against it."* The explanation he offered was, that he was then urging on the Government the construction of a road of the greatest political importance, and would not have either money expended or attention directed to any other scheme. The same objection would have held equally in respect to the road to Shumla; but what other route was there of political importance? The scheme of the English Ambassador was a road from Trebizond to Erzerum!—that is to say, from the Black Sea to the interior of the Turkish provinces, or to the frontier of Persia, and from Persia (where Russia has got twice already) into Turkey and to the Black Sea.† But if the project failed, roadmaking received another blow. It has failed!

This is the way in which questions at Constantinople become diplomatic, and such are the results.

But the theatre of war could be reached by a far more rapid and easy way—a canal from the Black Sea to the Danube. Besides the military importance of this undertaking, trade and navigation would receive an impulse of which the consequences would ultimately be the depriving of Russia of all aggressive power. Well, this matter, too, became a diplomatic question.

In 1844, it was proposed by one foreign Power and opposed by another. It was not England but Austria who proposed it. Russia, by the payment of heavy bribes, succeeded in frustrating it. England did not support Austria, or counteract Russia. In 1851, the project was revived, but not by a foreign Power. Russia abstained from all interference, and took no heed of the matter; but England suggested a *counter project*—a railroad from Varna. It is needless to say that both plans were dropped.‡

* These words were addressed to myself, having been commissioned by the Smyrna merchants to negotiate the matter for them.

† The diplomacy of Pera was lost in wonder at the boldness and success of Sir Stratford Canning in carrying this measure, and in despatching the Minister of Commerce to superintend the execution. Kossuth, hearing of it, exclaimed, "The English Ambassador has become a Russian engineer!"

‡ Were even a parliamentary inquiry to be instituted into these transactions it is probable that no trace of these intrigues would be discovered in the records of the Foreign Office, and even if a Commission were sent out it could not compel the witnesses, nor, giving their testimony, would they allow it to be publicly used. So entirely is Europe in Russia's hands.

In moving troops from their remote provinces to the field of action both Empires have hitherto had to encounter like difficulties, which for both were so great that the operations of the war were subordinate matters. The introduction of steam has wholly reversed the balance.

Turkey is surrounded and bisected by the sea, every coast is indented with gulfs. By means of steamboats she passes from the condition the most unfavourable for the transport of troops to the enjoyment of facilities known (except by rail) to no other State in the world. Her forces are transported with rapidity and without loss. Her provinces are spared their passage: the difficulties of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus are vanquished; and the resources of the Empire may be suddenly concentrated on the Danube, before the forces of Russia could march, even if unopposed, to that river, from the Pruth. The menace of invasion which has so long hung over Constantinople is reversed, and the Russian soldiers would be paralysed in their advance by the fear of a Turkish descent. These advantages are of course contingent upon the supremacy at sea; but Russia could not derive from steam any aid in offensive operations until she had crossed the Balkan and reached Varna, which is equivalent to saying that after victory she would possess the means of conquest. Russia can compass no insurrectionary efforts by means of a maritime descent even if she had the means. The Porte, on the other hand, can by a maritime operation, insurrectionise the whole of southern Russia.*

Russia may, indeed, recover her ground by means of railways. This will be a work of time, and it is surprising that she should so long have delayed so important a measure. From St. Petersburg to Moscow a line has been opened. A company is actually forming for carrying a line from Kharkow to the Black Sea, and it is proposed then to connect that place with Moscow.† In a country so poor, and where transport is so cheap in the winter and so rapid, such an enterprise cannot be entered on for commercial objects. It is a warlike measure—not a defensive but an offensive one.

* See the despatch of Consul Yeames of Odessa, describing the consternation produced by the Turkish declaration of war in the autumn of 1853.—Note, 1868.

† "The Russian Government had resolved to carry into execution the project of establishing a railway from Kharkoff to Theodosia, and had accepted the proposition of a private company for that purpose, with a capital of fifty millions of silver roubles (118,750,000 francs), to which the Government had consented to guarantee an interest of 5 per cent. Kharkoff is a city of the Ukraine, situated 1030 kilometres S.E. of St. Petersburg, and Theodosia or Kaffa is a port on the Black Sea near the straits of Kertch. It is in contemplation, also, to establish a railway from Moscow to Kharkoff, so that a direct communication will be ultimately established between St. Petersburg and the Crimea, and the capital of Russia be thus able to communicate in a few days with the Black Sea and Odessa."—*Letter from St. Petersburg.*

Russia's force in the Black Sea is insignificant. There are but thirteen sail of the line, and half of these available only as transports with their lower deck guns landed. The crews are miserable. It is a pasteboard fleet. She has a considerable number of small steamers, but even in this respect she cannot cope with the Turks who have five or six first-class steam frigates. Turkey has at this moment but five line-of-battle ships really effective; but these vessels are magnificent. It is inexplicable that they also should have thus neglected the navy, whilst they are strengthening the army, unless it be by the advice of those zealous Allies who are watching over them.

Within the last few years considerable expenditure has been devoted to batteries and guns, but the object of this care has never been the Bosphorus but the *Dardanelles*. These augmentations have regularly followed the "demonstrations" of the English and French squadrons *for Turkey's protection*. Meanwhile a Russian fleet might anchor before the Sultan's palace, with its yardarms breaking his windows, without having lost a spar, or perhaps a man in running down the Bosphorus. But this danger is only apparent, and I am far from regretting that this source of alarm should have existed. No State can recover without anxiety. Russia would rather burn St. Petersburg than Constantinople. The Ottoman Empire she can conquer only by *protection*. Such has ever been her process. When she has brought about revolution or partition there, her thirteen line-of-battle ships will serve by saving, not destroying Constantinople.

The infantry colonies round the frontiers of Austria were instituted in a defensive spirit, but the cavalry colonies of Russia, which extend from the Ukraine to the Caspian, have been formed for conquest.

It may be objected, that in the provinces occupying the space between the Russian frontier and the Danube, there is no room, and behind that river they would be too remote; but there is the Plain of the Dobroja running up to the Russian territory between Wallachia and the Black Sea. A situation more admirable for colonisation and defence is not to be found. Here no diplomatic compacts exclude Turkish occupancy; here, bounded by the Euxine, ditched by the Danube, open to communication with Constantinople, might a vast camp be formed. A gigantic Shumla carried 300 miles to the north flanking the line of the Russian advance, and whence in four-and-twenty hours 50,000 men might be deployed to line the Sereth or the Pruth. The administration is in the hands of the Porte. The land is public property, it is scarcely occupied; some 15,000 families of Tartars (remnants of those of Jyngis Khan, who crossed from Asia before the Turks), Cossacks, Arabs, Wallachians, and Transylvanians, are thinly scattered over a region

equal in extent to Yorkshire, Cumberland, Westmoreland, and Northumberland. Scanty as they are, their condition is happy.* The country is undulating and free from the marshes of Wallachia, and swept by the breezes of the Euxine; it is exposed neither to the extreme rigour of the winter, nor to the excessive heat of the summer of the adjoining provinces.

The Cossacks settled throughout Turkey live by fishing. They might be organised as Chaykists (boatmen), and a flotilla thus formed would secure the supremacy of the Danube. It is impossible to conceive a settlement more attractive for them, or to imagine a combination of circumstances more calculated to fortify the northern frontier.

Great importance will accrue to the Dobroja from the canal, if ever dug. A commercial city will soon arise, which will be the centre of trade of Bulgaria, the Danubian Provinces, and Hungary. On this spot a Highland colony must give to the SULTAN Celtic claymores to intermingle with Cossack lances.†

I have remarked on a former occasion, that it was impossible to separate the military from the diplomatic defence of the Danubian Principalities; unless I make this point clear the rest will be of no practical use. That diplomatic defence consists in the prevention of an occupation by the Russian army of these Principalities preliminary to a war. This is a point on which has been concentrated the whole mind of Russia from the mission of the first Prince MENZIKOFF to Constantinople with 300,000 ducats to purchase for Moldavia that first instalment of so-called independent privileges which have ended by excluding a Turkish garrison from a Turkish frontier, so as to constitute the advance of an army for her own protection a breach of the peace. This anomalous and monstrous position has as completely failed to be observed by Europe, or, I may rather say, is as completely misconceived by Europe, as the stipulations regarding the passage of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus; and further in misconception and illusion it is impossible to go.

When, then, Russia is preparing to invade—she being always the aggressor—the Porte is always anxious to smooth down difficulties, and to avoid a collision; and its troops not being on the frontier, it avoids movements which war alone could justify—that is, moving them up. But as Russia can attack only at one season of the year, an expedient might be devised for assembling a camp at that particular moment, periodically every year, if not behind the Pruth, at least behind the Danube, whence, on an

* "I have seen no peasantry in any part of Europe, whose condition is so prosperous and whose taxes are so light." Joanesco's Plain of the Dobroja, Constantinople, 1851.

† Austria has begun to bring Highlanders to settle in Hungary, with the view of using them against Turkey, and interesting Europe in her quarrels.

emergency, they could advance as rapidly into the Provinces from the south as Russia from the north, and by the single movement cause to Russia the loss of one campaign.

The martial predecessors of the SULTAN were in the habit of transferring their Court, with great pomp, in the spring season, to Adrianople. This was the occasion for great festivities for the resumption or preservation of the nomade Turkish character. Hunting expeditions were at times undertaken, as under MAHMOUD IV., resembling the operations of a campaign. Why should not the SULTAN resume this habit of his forefathers, and unite to this tribe festivity the important purposes of a great military review? Each of the Ordus might send its contingent. A useful emulation would be developed in the different corps, proficiency would be acquired in the handling and movement of bodies, and the troops would be formed to the exercise of marching, involving the completeness of all the other parts of the service, and constituting, in fact, the great element of success in war. Unfortunately the Turks have not considered this all essential point of the *one available season for attacking them.* This is the discovery they have yet to make, to dissipate all their fears.

If such an arrangement is clearly of importance for the improvement of the condition of the army, of what security would it not be in a political point of view? A permanent protection would be obtained without making a display or giving offence.

Within five years the Porte has had twice to assemble armies of observation, and on both occasions by doing so has protected itself from an invasion; yet so delicate was the matter, and with such difficulty did they arrive at their decision, that on the first of these events a Ministry fell from office, and on the second the majority of the Government sided against it, and the SULTAN interposed and commanded it, by an Act of Authority.

The very abundance of the resources possessed by the Ottoman Empire which I have now enumerated may appear suspicious; yet this is the natural consequence of mismanagement. For a century and a half there has been unremitting activity opposed to persevering neglect. It has been directed to disguise as well as to destroy the advantages of its opponents—to simulate as well as to create resources for itself. Where values have been taken credit for, that never were possessed, and entered on the debit side, when they could not be abstracted, it is natural that, on sifting the accounts, we should find the alleged bankrupt solvent, and the nominal creditor a debtor alike to his victim and the law.

It was originally proposed that the SULTAN's guard, in imitation of the CZAR, should be furnished by the various tribes and

provinces, and should *preserve their own costume.* It is deeply to be regretted that this idea was not carried into execution. As four centuries ago, the mania of change seized the Turks, and yet subsided within two generations, so may again sense and dignity reappear in the calkap and dolman, or even in the turban and Benish. The rancour of the late SULTAN against the Janissaries explains, if it does not justify, this folly; now it is sustained only by fallacies.

When to this rectification of form it adds the solid advantages above stated—that is to say, a colonisation of the Dobroja, a military road to and strengthened fortress on the Danube, an irregular cavalry, and a spring review in the north of Thrace, then will the schemes of Russian ambition be indefinitely adjourned.

At the time of the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, in the States of Europe the feudal system was falling into decay, and regular armies had not come into use. It organised a feudal system which flourished in youthful vigour while that of Europe was in its decline. It combined therewith a standing army composed of every race over which its sway extended, or against which its arms had been turned, and so rapidly rose from the humblest station to the highest power. It fell into disorder as the standing armies and the tactics of Europe arose; as the disorganised military bodies had struck deep root into the political system, that branch was corrupted also, and correction or suppression became alike impossible to escape from this tyranny. The sovereign had recourse to undisciplined levies, which exhausted the treasury, and fatally affected every contest with foreign Powers, so that in tracing the events of this epoch of ebb one is filled with astonishment at the continuation of existence in an Empire which seemed to have accumulated on its own head every cause of dissolution.

This sum of disasters has not to be rated by ponderable quantities. It is not a state of things to be known by the name of a country as existing at a certain date. It is in part, of course, inherent and original, but it is also in part external and derivative. It is the case of a man who, benumbed with cold, is eaten by rats. In this operation we have played our part, for we have nurtured and sustained the Power who has profited by certain internal disorders to bring, extend, and perpetuate convulsions. Russia may be said to be England's creation, for without her aid and support Russia might have existed peaceably within her own natural sphere, but never would have swallowed up her neighbours, or disturbed or alarmed the universe.

On the other hand, we have never ceased under the guise of friendship to deal deadly and perfidious blows on Turkey; so

that the cumulative results of our fostering care of the disturber and our insidious betrayal of the disturbed, have to be taken into account in the estimate of the trials through which Turkey has passed, and we have to see in those disorders and malversations, not as we are inclined to do at present, the results of Turkish misrule and Mussulman fanaticism, but also of British incapacity and Christian perfidy. Were the British nation endowed with the moral or religious attributes of an upright people so as not to do wrong, or to suffer wrong to be done, and the spirit of liberty by which to restrain their rulers from interfering in the affairs of their neighbours, there would have been little to tell historically of Europe during the last three centuries; there would neither have been great loss, standing armies, fixed debt, loads of taxes, or permanent embassies. Causes which are general include the results which are particular; Turkey, for her share in that negative well being which would have resulted from England's enormous power as the first maritime State, had she possessed active virtues, would have been spared the loss of that "village on the sea of Azof" (which the last just and vigorous councils of the British Government, after resolving to prevent in the interest of their country and the world, abandoned before a parliamentary combination and a traitorous intrigue) out of which has come, if not all, the greater portion of her recent sufferings and perils.

The matter may be put in a shape more seizable by those who have not followed the events of history, noting at each step what would have happened if any one State had been just and wise—the only course by which the study of history can serve the purposes of instruction—by saying that the partition of Poland, to which the SULTAN alone among crowned heads did not consent, and against which he protested, has amongst its other consequences brought upon the Ottoman Empire those evil and fearful days out of which it has emerged, not by one, but by a succession of miracles.

A judicious reorganization of a domineering military force, under favourable circumstances and with the necessary pecuniary resources, would do honour to any administration. The old body had to be attacked and extirpated before the new one could have existence, while a powerful enemy was carrying its victorious arms from both extremities into the centre of the Empire. One Christian insurrection having shorn the Crescent of one horn and a Mussulman revolt of the other (Greece and Egypt), a third having shaken its power to the very heart, having twice had its new army swept away (at Koniah and Nejib), its fleet once annihilated by foreign Powers, once carried off by domestic treachery. From this series of calamities it emerges

with a military organisation equal in numbers to that which it could display in its days of power, without having imposed a new tax or contracted a debt. This is one of the most extraordinary resuscitations to be found in the history of the human race.

This reorganisation having been effected during a period of humiliation caused by a Christian enemy, aided by their Christian subjects, it was to be expected that it would be imbued with fanaticism; and Turkey might have escaped dissolution from insubordination only to sink under the animosity aroused by the insolence of a new military caste. Or it might have run to the other extreme. Observers reported as a matter of fact the decay of Islam; the question to them was solely what new shape it would assume. All were agreed that the faith of Mecca was falling to the ground; some thought the fragments might fit into a Christian edifice, others that it would be a hopeless incumbrance of the spiritual field in some atrophic guise of materialism. These speculations have not been borne out as regards the army; it has avoided intolerance without falling into infidelity. The men were not marched to church or chapel once a week; but daily at the hours of prayer they voluntarily assemble for its performance. It is the most observant of any army of the practices of its faith, and it is the most religious portion of the community. Officers negligent of observances when not under the soldiers' eyes, are careful of them when in their presence. The character and demeanour of the army as a body would be creditable to an individual. Not sharing in the belief that Islam was dying out, the rock I chiefly apprehended was fanaticism; with what surprise then did I hear it announced by an eminent diplomatist, that "discipline, by destroying fanaticism, had taken from Turkey her real strength"!

A momentary impulse on the battle-field may be obtained by lust or hate; but a State cannot be consolidated by failings and vices in the men of whom it is composed. No promise of permanency can be found in passion, no trust based upon animosity. What, then, the fatuity that would call animosity directed (as in European Turkey) against two-thirds of their fellow-subjects an element of power, and deplore its being replaced by discipline and order! But, did this animosity ever exist? It appeared in the evil times of Turkey, no doubt; it was the aberration that threatened its extinction. Who can read the Ottoman history without perceiving that it owes its existence to toleration? It is because toleration—religious and political—was the rule of their society that their Government did not fall into the snare of enforcing conformity. The Turk, when he has nothing to do,

contains his hands, his tongue, and his soul, and knows how to be still.

Such interest as Europe feels in Turkey is avowedly on account of Russia; our care for Turkey's endurance is our fear of Russia's approach. The proposition I have to establish, knowing it to be true, is this—that Turkey is in no danger save from her allies, and that Russia can make no impression on Turkey save through the schemes of the Powers of Europe to oppose her.

I here conclude with enumerating the suggestions which I have made in connexion with the new military organisation. The Restoration of the native costumes in the Army, which will be their preservation amongst the people. Sedulous preservation of social manners and etiquette. The colonisation of the Dobroja. The strengthening of the fortresses of the Danube. A military road from the Capital to Silistria. The constitution or preservation of an irregular Cavalry. A Spring Review in the North of Thrace. Then will the schemes of Russian ambition be indefinitely adjourned, and that principally, because it will then no longer be possible for the Porte to shut its eyes to its own strength.

I have now closed my case as regards the Army, and I think in so far I have substantiated the proposition with which I have commenced these volumes—that what the Turks have well done has been their own doing, and neither undertaken at the suggestion of nor accomplished by the aid of their allies.

THE END.

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THE SECRET OF RUSSIA

IN THE

CASPIAN & EUXINE:

THE

CIRCASSIAN WAR

AS AFFECTING THE

INSURRECTION IN POLAND.

GERMAN INTRODUCTION

TO THE

"VISIT OF THE CIRCASSIAN DEPUTIES TO ENGLAND."

"If we do not take care, Russia will obtain the Caucasus, and all the power that possession will give her over Turkey, Persia, &c."

Lord Ponsonby, Sept. 8, 1834.

LONDON:
ROBERT HARDWICKE, 192, PICCADILLY.

February, 1863. *Price One Shilling.*

Postscript.

February 1, 1861.

THESE pages had just been concluded, when there was placed in the writer's hands an inedited work entitled "*Twelve Years of Diplomacy in Europe:*" drawn up in 1842 by M. de BIELKE, late Minister of Denmark at Berlin and London.

M. de BIELKE places as foremost in the events of the world in recent times "The Discovery of Circassia," which he himself has discovered in official documents and private letters of British officials in London and Constantinople in 1834.

Nothing can exceed the joy and exultation, at this discovery as it appears by these letters of the Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord PONSONBY. He instantly applied himself to the formation of a scheme for the dismantling of Russia by restoring Poland, supporting Circassia, and reorganising the Ottoman Empire.

The Russian Government seems to have left no means untried to intimidate him: but in vain.

What is most surprising in this correspondence is, that the full bearings of the discovery burst at once on those engaged. There is not a point left to be supplied to-day; there is not a rectification to be made.

It is amazing that these materials should not have been turned to account either during the intense interest awakened by the sacrifice of the *Vixen*, and the debates thereon, or at any subsequent period. It may be, providentially, that these evidences have been thus reserved till the moment (Circassia having in the mean time held her own) when measures of a more practical nature are in progress than any that could have hitherto been contemplated.

It comes out that the views of Lord PONSONBY were eagerly adopted by persons in power in London with the exception of the Foreign Minister, who placed himself from the beginning as their reserved but resolute opponent.

The subjoined extracts will afford the means of judging of the value of this mass of documents when brought to light.

The extracts will be found, p. 95.

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VISIT

OF THE

CIRCASSIAN DEPUTIES TO ENGLA

CONSISTING OF THEIR

ADDRESSES TO THE QUEEN;

CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, &c.

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GERMAN INTRODUCTION

TO THE

"VISIT OF THE CIRCASSIAN DEPUTIES TO ENGLAND."

THE great contrast presented by modern Europe to mediæval Europe, consists in the organisation for defence and attack; consequently in the duration and effect of wars. The Feudal system was "an armed people." The Modern system is the antithesis to this. It is conscription. In other words, a disarmed people and an armed Cabinet.

Under the Feudal system the brunt of war fell directly on those engaged in it, and those were the powerful in the State. The nobles and the holders of noble fiefs bore at once the charges and endured the sufferings of the war. It was their interest that war should not be made without necessity, and when made that it should be concluded as speedily as possible. The obligation to service, except when the King himself was present on the field, was in fact limited to forty days. This population of soldiers being at the same time agriculturists, the domestic claims of their fields, in regard to sowing and harvest time, superseded all external considerations, whether of passion or of fame.

The new system, which grew out of the concentration of regal authority, followed by the wars of religion, followed again by the invention of permanent debt, and finally completed by the introduction of secresy in international affairs, has substituted taxation, minutely applied to the mass of uninfluential individuals, for the personal and pecuniary service of powerful ones. The mass of troops have become mercenaries and machines. The military branch is separated from the political. Both from the diplomatic. The connexion of cause and effect is lost. War in itself becomes

desirable for those who are engaged in it, as the capacity for resisting it is withdrawn from those who pay for it.

The result is that the military establishment, formerly borne by the rent of the land, and, therefore, without charge to the Exchequer, is now become a heavy charge upon the whole people; that debt has been imposed when taxes have not sufficed, so that every nation in Europe staggers beneath the weight of permanent obligations. Whilst war itself, which in the thousand years of the Feudal system had occurred but rarely, and had then but temporarily disturbed the general peace, has become, since the period of the accession of WILLIAM of NASSAU in England, as frequent in its occurrence, as vast and prolonged in its operation, as it has been enduring in its effects.

These reflections are suggested by the appearance, or, at least, the revelation, on the political field of Europe, of a new experience. There has been in England an appeal made to the QUEEN to obtain that commercial liberty of the Black Sea which appeared to have been obtained by the sacrifices of England and France, as the result, and the sole result, of the war waged by them against Russia in the Crimea in 1854. The correspondence elicited by this appeal is herewith presented to the German people as deserving of their most earnest consideration, affecting as it must in its results the future condition of Germany in common with the rest of Europe.

In the course of this correspondence, and from the circumstances that have given rise to it, truths come out of so startling a nature, that in presenting the case to the German Public, it is not the working out of the inferences which constitutes the labour; it is the establishing of the credibility of the facts. These consist in the vast expenditure of Russia upon a country which in itself can make no return for such expenditure: the design which she has formed and executed of suppressing all commercial intercourse between this free and independent people and the rest of the world; the not less daring design and incomparable success of suppressing all knowledge of the existence of such a people; the subserviency of all the Governments of Europe, and their connivance in stopping the trade of their subjects with the Circassians; and, finally, the indomitable resistance which this people has opposed to her overwhelming power, and her still more terrible faculty of disorganisation and corruption.

Here, to the philosophic mind, a most interesting field of inquiry is opened as to the two systems above referred to, which at the interval of years have been established in Europe. We have, on the one side, the Feudal system in all its rude purity, but destitute of all concentration. On the other, we have the purest

expression of the system of conscription; and that not in regard to an equivalent population, but of many populations, each larger than the Circassians, and brought to bear upon them systematically during generations.

In Europe, the making of war is severally contingent on the possession of many things:—

Firstly. Troops. These must be in sufficient numbers. Troops are the result of enlistment, as in England, or of conscription, as on the Continent, and of discipline.

Secondly. Generals: to be obtained only by prior instruction and experience, and the existence of constituted authority.

Thirdly. Ammunition and artillery.

Fourthly. Provisions, clothing, and commissariat.

Fifthly. Money, not only for the current expenses of the war, but also for the means that have to be prepared for it, and for the support of the general authority by which it is organised.

On this money, therefore, ultimately depends the possibility of making war, and that money can only be obtained by taxes, actual or prospective. It must be either collected at once from the people, or it must be obtained from money-lenders, in the expectation of being subsequently paid out of the taxes of the people.

This being the notion in Europe in respect to war, if that war is to consist of a campaign, or even of a battle, it will be at once perceived how Russia has been enabled to cover with a veil of impenetrable mystery the events in the Caucasus. For on the occurrence of so unexpected an accident as that a European should set his foot upon the shore of Circassia, and should persist afterward in narrating what he had seen, that statement would be received as a thing incredible, and therefore be set down as false. Such an explorer would naturally dwell upon the points which had struck him with the greatest admiration and surprise, precisely because they were in contradiction to all his previous conceptions. The effect upon the readers at a distance would, however, be the reverse of what had happened to himself. He was convinced by what he saw. They would be incredulous of what they read. He would say, "Here there is no Government, there is no Union, there are no taxes, there is not so much as money. There is no trade, there are no resources, there is no army, no commissariat. There is no enlistment as in England, no conscription as on the Continent. But the men go out and fight the Russians, and they keep on at this work. One man from a family goes out to fight, the other members of the family support him by their labour at home. When one man of a family falls, another takes his place, and so they go on from father to son, and from

brother to brother. They begin at fifteen; he who reaches to forty is an old man; those who attain to fifty are rare exceptions."

Spectator of such a scene the European would be filled with enthusiasm and admiration. His narrative, unless supported by irrefragable evidence, would be treated with derision. The self-love of every reader would be offended, for the picture would involve disagreeable comparisons; the explorer would be set down as a visionary, and it would be assumed that no war was carried on at all. Russia might have lines of posts to protect herself from the incursions of savage mountain tribes, but that was all. And faith would all the more readily be given to those statements which prevailed up to the year 1834, that the Circassians were so savage as to make slaves of those shipwrecked on their coasts, if even they did not devour them.

The narrator might then be supposed to complete his picture of the terrible array of military power brought to bear by the Russian Empire on these isolated men. He would point out the four hundred miles of coast on the east and the west, along which the maritime power of Russia was exerted against them in the shape of blockade, depriving them of resources and necessaries of life. He would point out the line of the Caucasus, extending 12 degrees, and running north-west and south-east, and so presenting on the south and the north a double line of frontier, and military operations of not less than 1400 miles, with a permanent force, for supplying the war, of 200,000 men, increased during the periods of activity by from 50,000 to 100,000 more. He would have to show that Circassia occupied and consumed continuously a quarter of the military resources of the Russian Empire; and he would probably bring into evidence the gravity of the circumstances by tabular views of the amount of troops employed by Russia in her Persian and Turkish wars, from which would appear the perfect insignificance of her operations against those Empires, and, indeed, as against Europe, compared with her operations against Circassia. He might take the year 1854, and show that the number of troops which passed the Pruth amounted to but 68,000 men, for a war to be carried on against Turkey, England, France, and Sardinia, which war ended in a request to the Russian Government to permit the allied forces to retire from the Crimea, by embarking from the harbour of Sebastopol,* which request was only granted

* "The Plenipotentiaries of Russia announce that they have received orders to declare, in reply to the request which had been made to them on the subject, that the port of Sebastopol will be opened to the vessels of the Allied Powers, in order to accelerate the embarkation of their troops and of their material."—*Protocol No. 22, of the Conference of Paris.*

on condition of the signing of that Treaty of Paris by which they declared themselves vanquished, accepted for themselves the terms of the original MENSCHIKOFF note, and adhered, by a Declaration, to Russia s Armed Neutrality of 1780, which was the sacrifice of England's Maritime Rights and power. In a war thus shameful and disastrous in its results, and which cost the Allies, exclusive of Turkey, two hundred millions sterling, and 100,000 men, Russia's Maritime Power, so terrible to the Circassians by means of a few cruisers, was not even exerted. Of her land forces, not above 100,000 men were engaged, so that the great Powers of the west were discomfited by the employment on one occasion of less than one half of the forces which are permanently engaged against the Circassians.

The Empire against which that war was waged, was thus described at the time by the Prince Consort of ENGLAND:—

"We are engaged with a mighty adversary, who uses against us all those wonderful powers which have sprung up under the generating influence of our liberty and our civilisation, and employs them with all the force of unity of purpose and action, impenetrable secresy, and uncontrolled despotic power."*

This Power, operating on behalf of an Empire of sixty millions against disorganised tribes, finds no campaign concluded by a surrender or a defeat, whilst its adversaries to-day are defending the same fields and using the cover of the same copses that their fathers defended and stood behind, sixty years ago.

Here, then, are the two systems of Europe brought into contemporaneous conflict, resulting in a permanent and normal condition of war, with continual defeats of the great military system, and continual triumphs of the loosest of feudal arrangements.

Although the mission of the Circassian Envoys to England may be said to be the first revelation of this state of things, seeing that it is the first time, except in the Prætorian Guards of the CZAR, that Circassians have been beheld by any of the populations of Europe, still announcement has been made at times, and especially in Germany, which may now be accepted retrospectively as evidence. The whole case was stated more than twenty years ago in the "Conversatzions Lexicon." As that statement has become historical by the continued existence of the Circassians, and credible by their personal presence in the West, it is now reproduced in illustration of the Diplomatic Correspondence which has taken place between the Circassian Envoys and the English Government.

Intelligence of the events in the Caucasus has also from time to time reached the public in the shape of news, glanced at, at the time indeed with some curiosity, but immediately cast aside and

* Speeches and addresses of the Prince Consort, page 156.

forgotten, as having no connexion with the movement of affairs and no influence on the destinies of Europe. But as it is essential now to establish the links of this evidence, and at the same time to demonstrate from it the vastness of those operations which Europe ignored, we will quote a few fragments from the principal German journals in the beginning of the year 1844:—

"Large reinforcements are being sent by the Russian Government to the army of the Caucasus. The effective force of Russia in that quarter will soon amount to 200,000 men."—*Silesian Gazette.*

"Odessa, February 2.—On the 25th of January there was a regular consecration of the troops, who on the same day were to proceed to the Caucasus; it was an imposing ceremony. Although it was notorious that the soldiers were in winter to make a march of 1600 versts, through very desolate districts, and with the certainty of meeting opponents, equally cunning and formidable, there did not seem to be the least depression of spirits; on the contrary, they appeared in excellent order. The Emperor is determined this year to put an end to a war so destructive, both to his soldiers and to his finances. The effectives of the Caucasian army are to be raised to 200,000 men; eight regiments of infantry and four regiments of cavalry, with their artillery, march from Bessarabia, and sixteen battalions from Moscow. The Emperor intends to superintend himself the military operations; at all events, he means this spring to be in those provinces."—*Allgemeine Zeitung.*

"Borders of Turkey, February 21.—It is said that the Emperor is determined to try the experiment, whether he cannot subdue this chain of mountains by a great combined effort, instead of leaving it to the pettiness of detail. Some believe that His Majesty himself will lead the operations, and for this purpose called around him all the officers who have been accustomed to this species of mountain war. The attacks will be simultaneous and combined, from the Kuban, from the Black Sea, and from Daghestan, as well as from the south side of Transcaucasia; and there is no doubt among the Russians that the expedition will be crowned with complete success. When the campaign is to be opened is not yet determined; it would seem, however, that the presence of the Emperor on the Kuban may occasion some delay, especially if there is any truth in the report that His Imperial Majesty intends to go to Germany. The Caucasians are likewise stated to be preparing for the conflict; and it is said that numerous agents from Circassia are busy in the Turkish dominions in the acquisition of the sinews of war."—*Allgemeine Zeitung.*

The two Deputies of the Shapsoug and the Abaseck have attended public meetings in several places in Great Britain, such as Edinburgh, Sheffield, Newcastle, Preston, Manchester, Macclesfield, &c. In each of these towns the local papers, describing the meeting, have spoken of it as enthusiastic and unanimous without parallel in their memory. In a Dundee paper the Deputies are thus described:—

"The Chiefs are two remarkable-looking men. Their imposing bearing, their romantic dress, their dark solemn eyes, and yet keen as the eyes of hawks, their eagle-like expression of countenance, and their natural dignity of mien, stamp them as very superior men, and help us to understand why it is that Russia's hordes have been rolled like waves, in endless succession, to the base of the Caucasian mountains, only to be broken and hurled back like the waves which assault a coast of crags. Raven-haired, black-bearded, broad-browed

with wide springing eyebrows of sooty black, and eyes which look like moons of jet, 'dark with excess of light,' on skies of pearl, and preserving in all their looks and movements that striking stateliness which our tragedians aim at but do not equal, these bronzed and armed children of the mountains tend to put us out of love with our own specimens of men, and suggest thoughts not complimentary to the types of manhood by which, in this country, they are surrounded. . . . Of the use of the most improved agricultural implements they displayed an intelligent appreciation; and on observing ploughing going on in an adjoining field, each in his turn went between the stilts and traced a capital furrow."*

The words which they have spoken on these occasions were of a nature to produce an effect analagous to that of their presence, although imperfectly given through an interpreter, and only in reply to questions.

The following are some specimens taken from the reports in the local papers.

At Sheffield:—

"In answer to a question of 'On what points are they attacked by Russia?' the Chiefs replied by another question—'On what points are we not attacked?' (Cheers.) The Russian army constantly operating against them numbered 150,000, with the whole force of the Empire as a reserve. They complained most of the blockade of their coasts, which prevented them buying arms in Europe or trading with other countries. In reply to a question as to the annual loss of life in the war, the Chiefs replied that, counting men, women, and children, their loss amounted to 25,000 a year. (Shame.)"†

At Leeds:—

"HADJI HASSAN EFFENDI addressed a few words, and said that this was the first time his countrymen had attempted to communicate with the outer world. Their presence signalised a real cry of distress, and they would not have left their country had it not been so. They would go back to their country with a belief that England would not forget them. The present fight with Russia was a question to them of life or death, and they hoped the people of England would not allow that Empire to obtain possession of Circassia. They hoped, if possible, to have help from the land side; but at any rate they hoped to be delivered upon the side of the sea, so that they might have free communication with the rest of the world."‡

After such secular and oral testimony as this, we can return with assurance to the statements collected a quarter of a century ago by the German writer, Professor WURM, in the Conversatzions-Lexicon, to which we refer the reader; specially directing his attention to the extracts from REINEGGS, employed by the Russian Government in Georgia at the end of the last century; to those from a Russian officer in the *Minerva* of 1828; to those of M. TAITBOUT DE MARIGNY, and Professor KOCH, of Vienna.

The long struggle between Russia and Poland, however inscrutable in the ingenuity of its method, is by no means so, as regards Russia, in its motive. There is no one who does not see

* *Dundee Advertiser*, October 24th,
† *Sheffield Independent*, October 16, 1862.
‡ *Leeds Mercury*, October 31, 1862.

what POZZO DI BORGO has so well expressed in his Memoir to the Emperor in 1814; that as by the breaking down of Poland Russia had emerged into political existence, so would she by the restoration of Poland be again cast back into nonentity. Poland subjugated, the Russian power might take such development as to endanger the rest of Europe. But it by no means follows of necessity that the measures taken by Russia against Poland were prompted by a foregone conclusion to that effect. There were the rancours of anterior struggle, the animosities of religion embittered by community of race and similarity of tongue. So that, however incredible it may be that Russia should have made use of the Powers of Europe to destroy Poland, still, as regards herself, the destruction of Poland was necessary, and called for every effort of dexterity abroad and sacrifice at home.

As regards Circassia, the case is wholly different and entirely enigmatic. No anterior struggle had existed; there was no intermixing of interest, no conflict of religion, no uncertainty of frontier. The line of demarcation was as distinct as that of land and sea. There were no dangers to apprehend, no acquisitions to effect. And yet Russia has expended, in hitherto fruitless attacks upon this people, the lives of more soldiers, and a larger sum of money, than she has expended, since the great European war, upon Poland, Turkey, and Persia, to which again may be added the expenditure in her late war with England and France, together. It was not gradually that she was engaged, and unconsciously that she became involved in this struggle. Nor has she faltered in the prosecution of this course. Every interval allowed her between particular efforts on distinct fields has been filled up by the prosecution of this military industry in the Caucasus. Lastly, though not least, no encouragement has been given to her perseverance by any such facilities as those which she has found everywhere else of exciting opinion against opinion, class against class, religion against religion, race against race. She has been unable here to manage conspiracies against Governments, and so, getting the command of Governments through conspiracies, to drive them into acts calculated to excite disloyalty and provoke insurrection.

The only solution of this enigma is, that she looks to the subjugation of Circassia, not for itself, but for ulterior objects.

The countries lying beyond are: first, the Ottoman Empire, with Constantinople; secondly, Persia, with the entrance to the Indian Ocean; thirdly, Hindostan itself. So that the sacrifices making for Circassia prove the purpose of acquiring all those countries which is nothing less than universal dominion.

But if these sacrifices are made with this end, it follows that Circassia stands in the way of her acquiring Constantinople or

the one hand, Calcutta on the other. The sequences of ideas here laid down may be logically established without being practically understood, for this reason: that the European, looking at the map and perceiving on the one side the Caspian, on the other the Black Sea, and knowing that from the first, namely the Caspian, the Persian flag is totally excluded, and that on the other, namely the Black Sea, the Turkish naval power is next to extinct, he would necessarily conclude that it is impossible that such efforts as have been above described could really be made by Russia against the Circassians. He would say to himself, "If Russia does entertain designs against Turkey and Persia, she has no necessity to break down the Circassians, for, especially now that steam is at her disposal, she can send down her forces by sea to the right and left of that barrier."

This inference would be correct if the data were true. The data here are exactly the reverse of the truth. The truth so concealed is the secret of Russia. The naval power, as regards the Black Sea, lies in the hands of Turkey, not Russia. On the Caspian the naval power of Russia is null.

All she has ever effected by the Black Sea is to provision the posts which she holds on the Circassian coast, which, being themselves isolated, count in no ways for ulterior operations. In 1838 the condition of these forts is thus described by the Russian Councellor of State, ECHWALD:—

"Soukoum-Kalé is likewise a ruin for the Russian garrison, of which a great number yearly die of scurvy, not being able to get fresh meat; they are destitute even of good flour and fresh provisions, and of wine and liquors. Provisions are in general wanting in the fortress, *because they cannot go the distance of a verst, without the protection of a gun, to get wood.* If not, they are attacked by the Abkasians, in overpowering numbers. They live, therefore, in a perpetual state of blockade, and are always on their defence."

On this coast, in 1836, Russia possessed six stations, namely, Anapa, Ghelengik, Gagra, Pitsounda, Bampor, and Soukoum-Kalé. The Circassians held but two: Pshad, a small creek, and Soujouksou, a bay. The balance of these is now reversed, Russia having lost all her stations except Anapa and Soukoum Kalé. Ghelengik, the most important of all, both by its bay and harbour and its fortress, being in the hands of the Circassians. The garrison of this place, when held by the Russians, was three thousand men.

Southward of the Circassian coast, that is, a little below Soukoum-Kalé, where Mingrelia commences, down to St. Nicholas, a distance of fifty miles, the country is flat, and in her possession. Between these two points is the embouchure of the Phasis and the station of Poti. From this sea-border a champagne country runs south-east to Salian and the embouchure of

the Kour, and to the frontier of Persia. Judging, then, by the map, nothing will appear easier than for Russia to transport by sea, almost in a direct line, her troops, ammunition, and provisions from Odessa, the centre of her power, to Poti, from whence they would be transferred, continuing exactly on the same line, right across the plain of Georgia up to the very field of war operations, whether carried on against Turkey, or against Persia.

Now, on the assumption that the map is to be our instructor, these enormous advantages thus afforded to Russia in a war against Turkey would be balanced by no countervailing circumstances. Turkey would be assumed to be destitute of the facilities of naval transport on that same sea, and she would be supposed to be placed under the necessity of despatching forces and subsistencies through the whole length of the difficult country of Asia Minor to meet the fresh, facile and abundant, contingents of Russia, who, moreover, would be held to occupy a position of internal menace by proximity to the disaffected and insurgent populations of Armenia and Kurdistan.

But the map which would have suggested these conclusions is not to be read without its key. That key, simple as it is, has never yet been furnished to Europe. It consists in this: *that the Eastern bight of the Black Sea is inaccessible.*

The connexion of the sea-board of the Caucasus with the commercial harbour on the western shore and the military construction on the northern, has first to be shown, otherwise the combination of things so dissimilar in nature to obtain a common result would never be suspected.

The construction of Sebastopol, now dating back ninety years, is the vastest conception that ever entered the mind of the Russian Cabinet. Its own consciousness of its act is expressed in the name given to it, which may be rendered "City of Veneration," or "City of Empire." Nevertheless, it remained wholly unknown until a very recent period. But the Russian Government went steadily on, raising batteries, placing guns, and accumulating stores.*

The grandeur of the design consisted in this—that Sebastopol was wholly useless to Russia as a centre of operations, and presented no possible point of impingement for an enemy. Russia's Emporium was Odessa. Here converged towards the South all

* "The stores accumulated there could only have been accumulated for *purposes of aggression*, and the manner in which Russia, without being enabled to bring a single man, or a single gun by sea, has relied solely on the defences of the place to *defend Sebastopol* for many months, shows the danger to which *Turkey is exposed*."—*Lord Clarendon, May* 25, 1855.

her lines of communication, so that the fortifications of Sebastopol were constructed to mask Odessa. The design was, therefore, this: that she should have a sham Arsenal by which to disguise her real centre of communications, which, at the same time, should be the one impregnable point on the whole line of her extended and vulnerable frontiers; that she should teach the nations of Europe to consider this as her vulnerable and sole vulnerable point, and on which, therefore, she should draw them as on a naked sword.

The scheme thus planned nearly a century ago, received its fulfilment at the close of the year 1854. A London journal was the instrument employed. The *Times* made the announcement that the Ottoman Empire was menaced *by Sebastopol.* It presented Sebastopol as something so vast, so incomprehensible, and so dangerous, that it, in fact, constituted Russia. This having been accepted by the nation, it became possible for the Governments to send their forces against Sebastopol. No official explanation has ever been given of the expedition to the Crimea, except that the Allies being in Turkey, there was nothing else to be done.*

It has further been stated, and without contradiction, and that under the authority of two members of the Cabinet, Mr. GLADSTONE and Mr. SYDNEY HERBERT, that at the Cabinet Council at which the decision was taken to attack Sebastopol, no reason whatever was assigned. The whole transaction was comprised in the simple words of the then Home Secretary, the present Premier, "Gentlemen, why should we not go to the Crimea?"

The grounds, therefore, upon which the Allied forces of England and France, sent to support Turkey after declaration of war against Russia, were prevented from carrying on any other operation against her whatever, by being sent to Sebastopol, are to be found in the columns of the *Times* newspaper.† The arguments

* "In considering the question of the expedition to the Crimea, the Government had to consider the alternative. England and France had sent an army into Turkey. If that army had been taken back to Constantinople for the winter, it would have been a great disappointment to the people of this country. *There only remained the expedition to the Crimea.*"—*Lord John Russell, Dec.* 12, 1854.

† After the lapse of nearly ten years—after the failure of every professed object of the war, the *Times* can venture to write as follows:—

"We pronounced for an expedition against Sebastopol with a decision which has earned for us a prominent place in Mr. KINGLAKE's Gallery of the World's enemies. Sebastopol was taken; its capture has done its work; Russia is at peace with mankind; she has moderated her ambition, and she is now deeply engaged in social improvements and reform. . . . Sebastopol remains a ruin and a desolation; the Eastern world is quiet; Turkey is menaced only from Greece, and endangered only by her own misrule. . . . We took the lead—so we are accused—in counselling the siege of

employed in that newspaper consist in statements. It asse
early as the 15th of June, 1854, that, "Sebastopol having
a place of first-rate strength and magnitude for all the pur
war . . . enabled the Russian army to carry on incessant
in the Caucasus, and to close the Circassian coast." Proce
show how, by means of it, Asia Minor was exposed, an
stantinople in danger, it concludes, "that the grand politi
military objects of the war cannot be attained so long as
opol is in existence." And that, "if that central position
Russian power in the south of the Empire were annihilat
whole fabric, which it has cost the Czar of RUSSIA a cen
raise, falls to the ground." Nor is this all. After statin
the Russian power would be destroyed by the capture of
opol, it goes on to say, that it is of absolute necessity for
that the aggressions of Russia should be stopped, and th
object can be accomplished "*by no other means*"!

The data offered in support of these conclusions consist
assertion that expeditions against her southern neighbour
been sent by Russia "*from Sebastopol.*" First amongst
quoted Circassia and the Caucasus. The vessels which a
ployed along that coast have indeed their station at Seba
But the operations in the Caucasus have nothing whatever
with Sebastopol. There have been two great wars, on
Persia and one with Turkey. With Persia, 1826-7;
Turkey, 1828-9. On these wars we have ample detail
various sources, together with the important and elaborat
of General VALENTINI. We are acquainted with every
ment of troops, with the source and direction of every c
and during these two wars, in the latter of which espe

Sebastopol. The place was taken, and the World is the wiser,
happier, and quieter for it."—*Times, Jan.* 24, 1863.

On the 10th December, the *Times* announced that Russia was
waggon loads of arms into the Danubian Principalities.

On the 11th, it mentioned that Russian merchandise was to ente
tsin at a rate two-thirds lower than the general tariff for European g

On the 13th, its leader contained these words:—"The great ev
Europe is the decline of Russian influence." This is said, too, at the
when the heir to the English Throne is about to have for his father
the Prince nominated by Russia, in her Warsaw Protocol, to the Th
Denmark. When the Treaty of May, 1852, was signed in Lond
which that Protocol was carried into effect, the Russian Ambassado
a formal reservation of the Rights (Pretensions) of his Imperial
This is no secret. The Note has been presented to Parliament.
Times can say, commenting on Lord RUSSELL's Schleswig-Holstein De
"He (Lord RUSSELL) tells us that a recognition of the independe
Schleswig-Holstein would save us from the risk of the Succession fa
the line represented by the Russian CZAR—*a risk against which sepa
vision was made by the Treaty of* 1852.

in the words of POZZO DI BORGO, "the whole resources of the Empire were evoked after a preparation of two years," not a single bag of biscuits was sent from Sebastopol Whilst the supplies are known to have been derived, as naturally they must have been derived, from Taganrog and Astrakan, for the Persian war, being directed through the passes of the Vladi Caucase and Derbend; and, for the Turkish war, from Odessa, crossing the sea to Varna, not, indeed, in Russian vessels, but by means of neutral English vessels taken up for that purpose.* The exploits of the Russian military marine during that war consisted in the loss of a frigate, captured by the Turks.

Although the Turks had the superiority at sea, when their larger vessels were brought out and into play, still it was but occasional cruises which they undertook, and as far as they were concerned, there would have been only a partial obstruction to the passing of small Russian craft to the coast of Georgia, and none whatever to neutral vessels chartered by the Russian Government for transmitting supplies, or transporting troops by that direct line from Odessa, which would have brought them at once without loss or cost on the theatre of war, both as regards Turkey and Persia. The physical formation and configuration of the country, however, rendered this impossible.

USELESSNESS TO RUSSIA OF THE BLACK SEA.

The ancient and traditional character of danger which hangs over the Black Sea has been, in modern times, denied. It is not that the improvement of navigation has dissipated groundless fears, but it is that there is danger on two of the coasts, and absence of danger on the two other coasts. The prevailing winds, in consequence of the direction of the mountain chains, are east and west. Consequently, both to the east and west there is presented the lee shore of a shelterless bay. But it is the eastern shore that is peculiarly so circumstanced by its more rapid curvature, and by its entire nakedness. It opens as a funnel, and a vessel there embayed with a westerly wind has no chance of beating off, no creek to run into, and no holding ground to trust to. The Russian vessels are forbidden to approach under any circumstances, except during the three summer months. And even in these, their stay must not on any consideration be prolonged beyond four-and-twenty hours.

Nor is this all. The vast discharge of waters from the Bug, the Dniester, the Dnieper, and the Danube, are all on the western side, and consequently a current is established downward to the Bosphorus. The overflow from the eastern lip of the aperture of the

* It was by means of these neutral English vessels taken up at Odessa, that the operation of crossing the Balkan became practicable.

Bosphorus drives along the northern shore of Asia Minor, and sweeping round the Georgian Bay returns northwards along the Circassian coast. So that a vessel embayed in a westerly gale is driven by this constant current (increased by such a wind) on the sandy beach of the Bight of Poti; and in the event of escape from such a fate, the iron-bound rocks of the Caucasus await it.

The shore of this bay is shoal. A vessel of any burden would have to anchor at least three miles from the coast. There is no tide to leave it dry, so that it may discharge its cargo into carts it is to wait there for lighters to come out to receive its cargo to discharge which, it would then have to seek the inner waters of the muddy Phasis. For this it would require that there were lighters, and the other conveniences of transport and trade, which are wanting.

As Colchis was in ancient times the passage of traffic between the East and the West, and a common centre for the populations of the world—for STRABO speaks of one hundred and three interpreters for tongues assembled at its Emporium—it is naturally to be inferred that the ways of the land and the sea were open and easy, and that that way was through the Bight of Poti and the plains of Georgia.* Yet, on closely considering the records, it appears that not even in ancient times was the shore under consideration used for the purposes of traffic. During the greatness of the kingdom of Pontus, largely indebted, no doubt, to its Bactrian and its Indian trade, the points of embarkation, and especially the celebrated Dioscurias, were on the Northern Circassian coast, now represented by Soukoum-Kaleh. These stations being doubtless occupied with the good-will of the natives, just as in recent times this same fort and Anapa were by the Turks. From Soukoum-Kaleh, the natives being friendly, an inland passage was open, through a healthy country lying between the asperity of the mountains and the miasmata of the marches.

After the fall of the independent and great States of Asia Minor, this traffic still continued under the Romans; but it was diverted from the Circassian coast without coming down to the Georgian coast. It found its issue to the sea, as descending from Erivan, through the analagous ports on the Turkish side; such as Batoum, Rizeh,† and Trebizonde.

Behind the sandy beach of this low coast, marshy lands extend for many miles, which are utterly impracticable. At rare intervals narrow causeways have been constructed across them

* Even the accurate Sir John MacNeill mentions the Phasis as the channel of communication between the East and the West.—*See Note at page 1 Progress of Russia in the East.*

† It is from this station that our European name for rice is derived.

just sufficient for two horsemen to pass. Supposing the dangers of the sea to be disregarded, and the difficulties of disembarkation to be overcome, and troops landed, or provisions deposited on the beach, even then would little progress have been made towards their being forwarded to their ultimate destination. For if the Devna, on the other side of the Black Sea, is called the "Valley of Death," this might be termed the "Home of Death." The encampment of the evening would become the hospital or the church-yard of the following morning. Neither could cattle or men be brought there to carry away the provisions, nor could the troops landed issue into the healthier country in sufficient time to effect their retreat. These circumstances being perfectly known no orders could be obeyed, issued with a view of sending detachments or provisions by this route.

The coast is closed by the sea in the winter months, by the malaria in the summer months. Thus it is that in no need, however great, has Russia been able to send supplies by this route. Thus it is that Sebastopol has never been of any active service to Russia; and it consequently follows that the statement that "that fortress is the central position of the Russian Power in the South of the Empire, upon which depends the fabric constructed by the Czars of Russia during a century"—the statement upon which the war of the Crimea was made—is a falsehood. A falsehood so destitute of any semblance of grounds, that it never could have emanated from any quarter whatever save from Russia herself.

There was indeed a semblance prepared by the *Times*, of supplies produced in the Crimea. It used these words on the 4th of October, 1854: "Its extensive and fertile plains provided copious and cheap supplies for the troops." These words were set down under no possible mistake. For it immediately adds, "*The absence of population and trade* left the peninsula as a sort of natural fortress." There was nothing that could be sent out of Sebastopol except that which was sent into the Crimea, and nothing was ever done by the Russian Government to bring anything into Sebastopol except for the subsistence of its garrison. On the contrary, all trade whatever was interdicted by Ukase.

It is further to be observed that this fortress, constructed with the view of defence, and therefore against a formidable attack, was, nevertheless, not constructed with a view to a real attack. In that case it would have been constructed for the defence of Odessa, and not on the barren cliffs of the Taurid Chersonese. The parallel circumstance of our invasion of the Crimea would be presented were England to accumulate vast piles of buildings and stores of provisions in Alderney, with the view of making France expend

all her military resources upon it, under the belief that it was the centre of English Power, that it was no use to assail England anywhere else, and that there was no choice between attacking Alderney and doing nothing. The English nation has believed for a century that Gibraltar was of the last importance as a means of defence, and has risked its very existence to retain it, while, in reality, it could never be of any possible use. A people that could so mislead itself as to the value of an acquisition of its own was easy to deceive as to the value of a foreign fortress. After all, this is but a step in a sequence. The fortification mania began with defending our naval stations. The fortifications of Alderney and Portland are now positively undertaken, upon the grounds that by constructing a fortress that defends nothing, a foreign Power will of necessity go there to expend its military resources, to ruin its army, and waste its time. Henceforward, then, the natural defence of England—her navy—is destroyed in order that a scheme of defence may be instituted, the counterpart of the theory of the invasion of the Crimea.*

This exposition in reference to Sebastopol is necessary to the understanding of the real barrier which is presented to Russia in the Caucasian Isthmus, for it is self-evident that these delusions would not have been practised upon Europe, nor would the expense which Russia has incurred for the support of Sebastopol, and the maintenance of a fleet, have been determined upon unless there were hitherto unsurmountable obstacles raised to her fighting her way down through the South, and establishing her dominion on the sources of the Tigris and the Euphrates. Moreover, whatever may be the connexions which she has established now, as for a long time past, through individuals, with the Governments of France and England, the results obtainable through these connexions would have failed her, had she not succeeded in concealing from Europe generally the dangers and the weakness of her position; and that by means of false notions disseminated with respect to every matter, geographical, religious, political, and military, affecting the countries, seas, and populations lying to the East of the Carpathian Mountains and to the South of her own territories.

* This very argument has been used by the *Times* in reference to Portland. "We, of all people in the world, who so toiled and suffered, lavishing blood and treasure under the walls of Sebastopol, should be the last to underrate the importance of a good fortification as a check to an invading army. The lesson, however, has not been forgotten apparently. Plymouth has been made secure, the mouth of the Thames is virtually impregnable; a tremendous chain of forts is fast encircling Gosport and Portsmouth; and surely, but slowly, as becomes its magnitude and tremendous strength, the Verne at Portland, the Gibraltar of the Channel, is rising into what is probably one of the strongest citadels in the world."—*Times, January* 1, 1863.

USELESSNESS OF THE CASPIAN.

The great maritime expedition fitted out by PETER at Astrachan against Persia, and the pertinacity with which Russia has insisted on the exclusion of Persian vessels from that sea, may lead to the inference that the Caspian, at least, is available for warlike purposes.*

It is commercial navigation which furnishes the sailors and vessels for war. Such trade existed in the time of PETER: not so now. The depopulation of the neighbouring countries and the diminution of the waters from the disappearance of the forests, the encroachments of the sands upon the Eastern Steppes, and the rapid shoaling of the waters of the Caspian Sea, have changed the country in value no less than in aspect. Every year some creek is no longer accessible, some district goes out of cultivation, some village becomes extinct, or some tribe decamps. The country may be said to be returning to a state of nature in its most intractable form.†

The navigation of the Caspian presents greater difficulties than that of any other sea; being shut in from the ocean, it loses the advantage of experience and dexterity in its sailors, and can receive no supply, either in regard to qualification or numbers. It has no tides; it has no islands, capes, or protected lea shores. It is exceedingly narrow in the direction of the prevailing winds, and a large portion of it is so shallow that vessels go aground even when out of sight of land. During a great portion of the year it is wholly unfit for navigation. The vessels are of the rudest construction and the worst materials, and those which may be called sea-going (skhoutes), in 1842, did not amount to eighty in number; half of these were rotting for want of employment. They are obliged to put to sea empty from Astrachan; twenty miles from shore they take in half their cargo, and it is not till they are out one hundred or one hundred and twenty miles that they can complete their loading. The navigation of the Volga itself is in like manner interrupted by the shoaling of its waters, and every year brings a change for the worse. The following statement is from a Russian official:—

"Moreover, we must not forget the difficulties of the climate; the fine season barely lasts four months in Russia. The roads are impassable for pedestrians in spring and autumn, and during the winter the cold is too severe, the days too short, the snow-storms often too prolonged, to allow of putting regiments on the march, not to say sending them to the Caucasus, across the uncultivated and desert plains that stretch between the Sea of Azof and the Caspian. The

* This expedition consisted of 442 vessels, and carried 25,000 men.

† At Sarepta they have been obliged to abandon the water-mills erected in 800.

route by sea is equally impracticable. No use can be made of the Caspian, on account of the arid and unproductive steppes that beset it in on the Russian side. Astrachan, the only town situated on that part of the coast, is obliged to fetch its provisions from a distance of two hundred leagues. The Black Sea, indeed, more favourably circumstanced, *but it only affords communication with the forts on the Circassian side*, and the mountaineers always wait to make their attack in the season of rough weather, during which navigation is usually suspended, and it is exceedingly difficult to reinforce and victual the garrisons. The tediousness and difficulty of conveying stores is the same by land. With the exception of the forts of Circassia; supplied directly from the ports of Odessa, Theodosia, and Kertch, all the garrisons of the Caucasus receive their supplies from the nearly central provinces of the Empire. Thus the materials destined for the army of the Terek and of Daghestan arrive first in Astrachan, after a voyage of more than two hundred leagues down the Volga, and then they are forwarded by sea for the most part to Koumskaia, on the mouth of the Koura, where they are taken up by the Turcomans, on their little ox-carts impressed for the service, and reach their final destination after fifteen or twenty days travelling. The mode of proceeding is still more tedious and expensive for the implements and *materiel* of war, which arrive from Siberia only once a year, during the spring floods of the Volga and the Dnieper. Such obstacles make it impossible to augment the forces employed on the Caucasus."*

The seas on the two sides of the Caucasus being thus unserviceable for aggressive purposes, the peninsula itself remains to be considered in respect to these operations.

THE CAUCASIAN ISTHMUS.

This isthmus is diagonally crossed by a chain of mountains of such fame for its altitude and asperity, as to belong to the mythology of all nations. It is equal to the Alps, but is continuous. Its value as a barrier will be understood by supposing the Alps ranged in a line flanked by two impassable seas, and so placed, dividing Europe as by a diaphragm. This chain on its western side is wholly impracticable. Near its centre there is a passage, the Vladi Caucase, or Vale of the Caucasus, a passage of extreme asperity and danger; and which, though continually used by Russia, has never once been passed by her by force. On the eastern side there is a narrow passage, known by the name of the defile of Derbend. These are her only means of communication with the south, and she reaches them only after having traversed from two to three hundred miles of treeless, waterless steppe. The mass of mountains throughout the whole range are inhabited by warlike tribes, either engaged in fighting against her, or in slumbering subjection; who at any moment, by the slightest concerted movement, could seal against her these two passages, and so hold at their mercy the Georgian army of occupation.

In speaking of the Circassians, the populations of the north-west are generally understood: the name in its more extended

* De Hell's Steppes of the Caspian Sea, p. 318.

application includes the Lesghians on the north-east: populations including between two and three millions, which are permanently under arms. Between these and adjoining the Vladi Caucase are the Kabardians, the Ossetinians, and Tchetchenses, &c., some of whom Russia has incorporated; the others, by their mutual jealousies and dissensions with the surrounding tribes, have afforded her up to this moment the faculty of passage through the Vladi Caucase.

But there still remain the Khanats of Karabagh and Daghestan (the latter being the local generic title for the whole, meaning Highlands) at present in subjection to Russia, although that subjection is scarcely more than nominal. These populations are no less warlike than the Circassians proper. By divisions and mutual jealousies, they have fallen into their present subjection. Their country, one of unrivalled fertility, without the asperity of Circassia proper, is of great strength for defence; the houses are of massive masonry, and horses abound. Russia has not succeeded in being able to withdraw from them their arms. They reckon themselves as equal in number to the Lesghes. They are Mohammedans. Were the jealousies allayed, a result now in process through the political pressure and religious intolerance of the Russian administration, their association with the free Circassians would extend the line of independent country from the mouth of the Kur, on the Caspian, to the borders of the Sea of Azof. To the west and south spread the rich and level lands of Georgia, occupied by a Christian population, numbering another million and a half. These are not warlike, it is true, and they have been hitherto divided from the Circassians by feuds, by religion, and by the effects of intrigue. The line of the ancient kingly race still live secluded under the protection of the Crescent, on the opposite mountains of Adjara. They have neither lost the memory of their past independence, nor have they sunk into apathetic subjection beneath their present rule.

The former sympathies of religion excited by conflict with the Mussulmans, and then centering in a Christian protector from the North, are being replaced by antipathies against that very deliverer, now become an oppressor; and whilst they no longer look with dread at descents from the mountains of Mussulman ravagers, they find themselves exposed to *religious* persecution from their Christian Ruler. The conflict between the new Faith and the old (the Starovirtze), which is actually shaking Russian society to its centre at home, finds its counterpart in the Caucasian Provinces. And as the Rashkolnicks of Russia look to the SULTAN as their religious protector, so also are the eyes of the Georgians turned to the same point alike religiously and politically; as are

those of the inhabitants of Daghestan, the Lesghes and the Circassians. In fact, it depends on the Porte to put forth its hand, not only to repossess its lost provinces of Asia, but to extend its limits to the Volga and the Kouban.

These circumstances, stated for the present moment, have to be retrospectively applied to the wars which Russia waged against Persia and Turkey in the years 1826 to 1829. It will be seen with what enormous difficulties she had to contend in those campaigns, and also with what facility, by the use of the arms against herself which she uses against others, the fabric of her Transcaucasian power might have been shattered.

Every movement across the Caucasus has been accomplished with extreme difficulty, and accompanied with extreme peril. But when she will have turned the Caucasus—when, by the success of continuous operations there, she has spread beyond the Isthmus—then only will have been realised the condition of things which Europe at present believes to exist. Her forces, then, will be conveyed across the sea, and independently of the Caucasus. This point will have been reached so soon as she will have got a footing on the healthy and mountainous portion of Asia Minor, where also there is a port of disembarkation. These may be received from Odessa, and expedited through Georgia troops and provisions for a Persian, as well as for a Turkish war. It is, in fact, at Batoun,* the name of which has not yet been pronounced in political geography, and not at Kelund or at Astrabad, that the first station will have been secured on the route to India.† It has to be observed that her present frontier approaches within nine miles of the caravan route, by means of which the transit merchandise from the West reaches Central Asia.

The obstacle which the block of mountains opposes to Russia

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* "Did we, too, not help you? Did we not keep in check 100,000 men? Is Russia not sore and weak by the many years she has been fighting us? If we did not prefer independence to slavery, would not 100,000 of our men be in her ranks? If we were not engaged in defending our country, would not the Russian frontiers be at Batoun."—*The Circassian Deputies on the Crimean War, Nov.* 5, 1862.

† "Two obstacles, indeed, there are, and only two, to this advance of Russia; these are: ENGLAND (!) AND THE MOUNTAIN RACES OF THE CAUCASUS. But for these impediments Russia would unquestionably be able by a great effort to advance her frontier to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf."—HAXTHAUSEN'S *Tribes of the Caucasus*, p. 38.

Beside this assertion of the Russian official, it is well to place the comment of the British diplomatist:—

"From the earliest times in which Russia has had a share in the politics of Europe, have her views in the East been promoted by the ignorance which made other Powers her dupes and the *instruments* of her aggression."—Sir J. MCNEILL'S *Progress of Russia*, p. 11.

consists neither in their heighth nor their extent, but in the warlike qualities of the populations who openly resist her, and in the insecure tenure by which she holds the populations which are nominally subject to her. But the exercise of the military virtues of this people, in this sense, is not to be held as a permanent condition of things. It is contingent solely upon human character, of all things on earth the most variable, and here exposed to the action of that Cabinet which alone has applied itself to metaphysical operations, and which has attained, as exhibited in Europe, to pre-eminent success in that pursuit.

We see in individual cases the whole character of a man changed by a word which has entered his ears, by a thought which has formed itself in his mind, by a secret purpose which has taken possession of his faculties. What is effected in the unit may be effected in the mass; and more easily in the mass than in the unit, the difference of conditions being observed. Then the effects become contagious.

The influence of the warlike dispositions of the Circassians, whether on Russia or the fate of Europe or of Asia, flows from an affection of their minds; it is neither reasoned upon nor expressed, but entertained. It is their sincerity which renders rare amongst them, instances of men not pursuing what they openly profess. These dispositions, in themselves most rare and most wonderful, are evidently capable of change, since throughout the remainder of the human race the mass of experience is the other way. That change may be effected by three processes, severally or conjointly. First, by the loss of the hope of independence; secondly, by the loss of integrity; thirdly, by the institution of a general government, so that the fate of a whole people may be placed at the mercy of the mistakes, the passions, the caprices, or the treason of a single man. These are nearly the words employed by Vattel, in accounting for the fall of Poland.*

CIRCASSIAN VIRTUE OF COURAGE.

Supposing that by any one of these processes the motive for those continuous individual and heroic efforts through which the mass of this resistance is presented to Russia were withdrawn, the result to be contemplated would not simply be the facility of secure passage to her forces. She has engendered amongst these populations an industry unknown elsewhere, and without which they can scarcely exist—the industry of War. The implements of the calling of men become the objects of their affections. To

* When a stranger in 1834 spoke to a Circassian of the necessity of a general government, he replied, "We should then be like Turkey; the whole people would fear Russia, whereas amongst us now there is no one child that fears her."

the Circassians, the affection for the bow, and the distinction of the coat of mail, is at least as strong as amongst other races the affection and respect for the sickle and the plough. There is in them the chivalry of warfare.* As to their arms, it is not pride they have in them, but love they entertain for them. The sense of individual superiority as regards their antagonists, carried to fanaticism, is yet pure of vain-gloriousness. The circumstances of that contest in which they are engaged, environ to them War, with a sense alike of majesty and sacredness. Courage is here virtue in its Roman sense; it is also charity, it is also faith, it is also martyrdom. In it consist the affections of home, the duties of neighbourhood, the respect of ancestry, the care for futurity; and coldly therewith has to be enumerated the sense conveyed in our words, "duty of citizenship."

Their warfare presents to them in their antagonists all that can be imagined most base and abject in man. A great European State, faithless, merciless, and piratical. The troops it employs, when of its own race, abject and cowardly mercenaries; those of other races which it sends against them are drawn from populations which have neither had the heart nor the hand to maintain or assert their own freedom, lending their arms to the Tyrant, by whom their own people has been laid low, against those whom he assails because they are brave and free. Thus has this virtue been nurtured at once by the duties of self-defence, and by the despicable nature of the enemies brought against them.

That virtue has become a habit. Being a habit, it will endure after the circumstances that have given rise to it will have ceased. It is the prominent habit of the race; it is its character. Change now the conditions. Let them cease to hope for independence. Let them cease from being under the necessity of a daily struggle for hearth and home. Let them be managed in secret by an Administration. Then that habit of virtue will pass into the passion for war. Lust of occupation and conquest will replace self-sacrifice and suffering. Russia will have at her disposal for the conquest of Paris and Calcutta the most warlike race on the face of the earth.

ORGANISATION OF POTEMKIN.

It might, perhaps, be inferred, after the admission of this view of the case, that Russia has failed to exhibit in the Caucasus that pre-eminent judgment which has elsewhere marked her course.

* Amongst them it is dishonourable to kill a man by point in quart! This surpasses the chivalry of the old Hindu legislator, who makes it merely dishonourable to take an enemy at a disadvantage.

and that she would have done better—finding them as she did the time of POTEMKIN, and, indeed, up to the year 1834, mer isolated tribes, not one of which cared for its neighbour, un indeed moved by jealousy or hatred—to have left them with such an amount of pressure as to produce in them a mutual und standing. By extensive culture of their evil passions, seduc them severally into her service, and opening to them, in her arm and through her wars elsewhere, a profitable field of conge enterprise, she might have converted these mountains int boundless nursery of inimitable troops.

It is very easy after the event to reason on the course have pursued, whilst that event lay still in the dark womb time. When the organisation of POTEMKIN was establish no human foresight could so much as have entertained the pectation that the expenditure, during eighty years, of a qua of the resources of the Russian Empire would have failed to m any sensible impression on disorganised tribes of mountaine and that, at the close of that period, Russia's tenure of Transcaucasian provinces should be less secure than at the h in which Georgia was first incorporated.

It has also to be taken into account that the Russian Cabine that time was judging and acting under the impression of PETE advance into Persia, and probably without a suspicion hav risen in its mind of the hydraulic alterations in the Caspian S by the sinking of its level, and the filling up of its estuaries. S less can it be supposed to have estimated the ultimate cor quences to itself of its successes against the Tartar, Kalmuc, Bourout populations, and the consequent extinction of the can and diminution of the breed of horses, by means of which Steppes were becoming depopulated.

At that time also even Russia herself shared in the delusion the proximate dissolution of the Turkish Empire—a delus which seems to have continued down to the period of the mission into her service of the remarkable man who has rectif her former misjudgments, and qualified her for the succes which she has attained in recent times.

Whoever has perused with care the despatches of POZZO BORGO, cannot have failed to remark that it is not a confiden servant discussing the application of maxims already laid do or merely dealing with the details of the execution of orders ceived from his Cabinet; but that it is the philosopher who is p sented, veiling arguments directed against prepossessions, un the semblance of observations made upon measures undertak There are two leading ideas presented by him. The one, the i possibility of Russia's maintaining ostensible possession of Const

tinople and European Turkey as against the Christian inhabi
alone, even if there were no Turks to fight against; the
the military power and spirit developed in Turkey, as a
sequence of the destruction of the Janissaries, and which
warningly compares with the martial spirit which had
developed in France by the first invasion of the Allies*
would be needless to have argued in this manner had thes
victions been shared by the Russian Cabinet, therefore we
assume that up to that time that Cabinet entertained a belief
the two contrary propositions. First, that the Christian inhab
tants of European Turkey would willingly submit to its
secondly, that the military power of the Turks was capable
being broken by its arms.

Carrying back these various impressions, latent in the minds
those forming the Russian Cabinet at the period of the organi
tion against the Circassians by POTEMKIN, and the parallel
struction of the port of Sebastopol, it must be evident that
acquisition of the block of the Caucasus by no means presen
itself as an object of fundamental policy. In the expectation
acquiring Astrabad in the East, in the expectation of secur
Constantinople, which closed all access to the Black Sea, wh
at the same time it conferred the command of the White S
(the sea of the Levant), making Russia mistress of the commu
cations of the East and the West, and the South and the Nor
the block of the Caucasus remained a mere geographic quanti
deprived from that moment of all political or military value, s
no Western enemy could then reach it, whilst she, possessing
faculty of expansion on the East and the West, could wholly d
regard its power of passive resistance.

These reasons will be sufficient to show how, in the forming
the first designs in regard to the Caucasus, the process of seducti
was not the one adopted. They do not, however, suffice to e
plain how the system of coercion was that which was adopte
In order fully to understand it we must revert to the real di
culties which then oppressed the Russian Cabinet, as we have de
in reference to the erroneous impressions which then it entertain

CONDITION OF SOUTHERN RUSSIA FROM 1760 TO 1780.

From the borders of Posen to the banks of the Emba, the d
tance, as the crow flies, amounts to three times the extreme leng
of Great Britain. It is equal to a line drawn across Aust
Piedmont, France, and Spain in their entire width. It is equ
to a line drawn from Stockholm to Madrid, or to one drawn fr

* Pozzo di Borgo, November 28, 1828.

Constantinople to Brest. The width of country on this line tween Muscovy Proper on the north, the Pruth, the Danube, Black Sea, and the Caucasus on the south, is not less on an aver than the distance between Rouen and Marseilles, between Mun and Paris, between Vienna and Dantzic: covering a surface eq to that of France, Spain, and Austria combined. Between years seventeen hundred and sixty and seventeen hundred eighty, during which was planned and matured the system agai the Caucasus,* the whole of this vast territory was occupied populations, many of them nomade, the Eastern portion of th horsemen, the whole of them armed, and constituting portion the Russian Empire. No Muscovite Proper inherited this te tory, with the exception of some towns and some colonies.

The administration of the Empire did not extend to it, nor the Russian Church. The connexion with the Russian Gove ment was established through submission of princes and of tril still retaining their own usages, and through the military orga sation, again dependent on tribe usages; through incorporati by Ukase, again on conditions, only at a subsequent period wh set aside; and, finally, on partitions, in like manner subject stipulations. The populations of this region amounted to betw thirty and forty millions, consisting of Poles, Malo-Russia Tartars, Cossacks, and Calmucks. The religions were the Ron Catholic, the Starovirtze or old Greek Church, the Mussulm and the Bhudistic.

During this period Russia was engaged in grave foreign w

The danger of such a position will be self-evident, as also anxieties pressing on the mind of the Council. It requires incidents to illustrate the reality of the one or the other; these are not wanting. In the year 1771, the Calmucks on Volga, by one estimate exceeding a million of souls, and by n placed at less than half a million, incapable of further endurar and hopeless of aid from the surrounding tribes, equally oppress lifted their tents and departed for China, after being in the f instance furiously assailed by the Cossacks, and afterwards by Kirghis.

Two years had not elapsed when a Cossack insurrection, orga nised on the banks of the Yaik by an adventurer of bravery a capacity, but intractable and savage, threatened the entire dis lution of the Empire, and was, after three years, finally tinguished only through his own misconduct.

There was not one of these tribes not ready at any hour for

* In 1776 the lines were drawn from the Black Sea to the Caucasus, cluding nearly thirty fortresses.

surrection; but insurrection on its own basis, and without the of concert with another. In each there were valiant and desp men, always ready as leaders of the rest. Siberia had n furnished those resources which it has in later times; and Si would have but very partially supplied the internal necessi the Empire. Of all things was it requisite to obtain a fo warfare, not within the State, so as to establish community o ing amongst the populations, not too remote, so as to involv with Foreign Powers. That field presented itself in the Cauc There the warlike dispositions of the internal populations co employed, and thither could they be sent to be killed with ourable forms. Even whilst enlisting their feelings on the s Russia, the more intractable and desperate of the religious d tants and the political malcontents could thus be disposed Whatever the consequences of the policy of violence against Caucasus, then begun, there can be no doubt that, at the it was not only a wise course, but so essential, that it ma safely said that without it that Empire, in its present proport could not be in existence.

THE DESIGNS OF RUSSIA BASED ON DESTRUCTION.

Here, again, preconceptions interfere with the understandi a system, which is purely abstract and scientific. There exi Europe no more the idea of war without object, than of exp ture without an end. Military occupations being in pro acquisition is as certainly predicated in reference to the agg as thirst would be of the man observed to be drinking w Not understanding war simply for war, the case arising, we to those who make it, either objects or passions to which the strangers; investing them with faculties which they do not po or charging them with follies with which they are not affl For the operation to be understood, the motive must equal understood, and the motive in this case is the very basis o Russian system. It is through it that she has effected her pro by it that she maintains her power. That basis is DESTRUCT

On the day and hour when the course of the Russian began to run, by the formation of the proposition in the of some Russian Grand-Duke, "I will conquer the world," maxim of destruction was accepted, as the means of accomp ment: there was no other. But destruction was not to be ap directly; for if Russia possessed the means in itself of destr others, conquest would have been the process. It is destructi one Race and State by another Race and State. It is destru of each State by itself. This is the object and end of all she undertakes, whether in movements of a militar

which she effects and induces; whether in her relationships of war with Foreign States, or of amity with them; whether in the negotiations into which she enters, or the Treaties with which she binds herself; whether in the outward manifestations of her power, or the secret communications of her Ambassadors. It pervades alike the ostensible evidences of her hostility, and the confidential marks of her regard.

A valuable illustration is furnished by the news of the day. A leader in the *Times* recites the earnest, friendly, and affectionate language of the Russian Minister to the Envoy of the United States at St. Petersburg, conveying that it is one of the chief objects of desire to the Russian Cabinet, to see the United States united, independent, and happy. He is believed. His words are reported. In consequence of this and similar words, both parts of the disrupted States look to Russia, and to Russia alone of the Powers of the world. Yet this rupture has been a most grievous calamity to England and France, whose interest it is that these grievances should be composed; whilst this calamity for them is profit for Russia. The calamity for them consists in the cessation to produce cotton and grain. The substitute for cotton being flax, and the substitute for American grain being Russian grain; it follows that if accident alone has produced the Civil war, accident has profited Russia more than all her own capacity. If she has at heart the composing of dissensions which will deprive her of the benefits of this accident, she will have given an example of self-denying and self-sacrificing philanthopy, the parallel to which is not to be found in the annals of mankind. The words of the Russian Minister, Prince GORTSCHAKOFF, were as follows:—

"The hope of reunion is growing less and less; the separation which I fear must come will be considered by Russia the greatest of all possible misfortunes; Russia alone has stood by you from the first, and will continue to stand by you. We are very, very anxious that any course should be pursued which will prevent the division which now seems inevitable."

The American Envoy, Mr. BAYARD TAYLOR, goes on to say:—

"At the close of the interview, he seized my hand, gave it a short pressure, and exclaimed, 'God bless you!' His manner convinced me that he desired his words to be reported."*

Here is an instance of the use of terms of cordiality and affection in furtherance of a purpose of unmistakable destruction applied on a gigantic scale, with no possible aim of occupation, but merely of financial advantage, carried on in the New World, without the moving of a single vessel or a single soldier, being utterly in-

* American State Papers quoted in the *Times*, Dec. 23, 1862.

scrutable both to the victims and the spectators of the design, and having as its result the reducing into complete dependence upon Russia of the whole of Europe for its imported corn, which will then have to be paid for at considerably advanced prices.

That, therefore, which above all things was necessary for Russia, in order that the Poles, Cossacks, and other tribes should be fused down, was a commensurate slaughter-house.

The results have justified the design. The Cossack population, since the final suppression of the rebellion of Poughatcheff, never again raised their heads. Transferred in large bodies to the banks of the Kouban and the Terek, they have ceased to be dangerous to the Empire, have submitted to the piecemeal deprivation of all their privileges, and have so far been incorporated into the military system, that the words "Cossack" and "Russian" have become in Europe interchangable terms. The Tartars have in like manner been decimated into innocuousness, the Malo-Russians, placed between the Cossacks and the Poles, have yielded to the levelling effect, and actually furnish the cavalry and artillery to the Russian armies.*

The first partition of Poland was effected in 1772, during the heat of the Cossack insurrection and during the war with Turkey, which closed by the first acquisitions made from that Empire in the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardgi. To what extent the continuous success of Russia against the Poles during the three subsequent generations of struggle, themselves alone far more than a match for Russia, is owing to the continuous abstraction of its population for the Caucasian war, and the expenditure there of the most resolute, capable, and indomitable spirits of that people, can only be ascertained from the military archives of Russia. But this will appear at once evident—that Poland could not have fallen, had her people entertained in respect to the Turks that appreciation of their value which the Turks entertained in reference to the Poles, whose Sultan, alone of the monarchs of Europe, endeavoured to avert their partition, and protested against it. No doubt the origin of this perverting infatuation may be traced to their early conflict with the Turks; and more especially to the pride that preserved the reminiscence of the chivalrous intervention of SOBIESKI before Vienna. But that which especially shut out from them the saving thought of

* In the autumn of 1853, it was announced from Bucharest in the London newspapers that orders had been issued to withdraw the Russian cavalry to the rear along the whole line on the Danube. On the same day it was announced that fourteen men (cavalry) had been shot for attempted desertion. It was not known that the cavalry were Malo-Russians, and that the affinity and affection of the Malo-Russians were with the Turks rather than the Russians.

community of interest with the Ottoman Empire, has principally to be referred to the war in the Caucasus. The Circassians being Mussulmans, and the Poles being employed against them, and being so employed in a lawless war, on the one hand the sense of justice in public dealings was lost, and on the other a hatred of the Mussulman engendered.

Such is barely the state of the case in respect to Poland as managed up to the present day by the Russian Cabinet. But it is impossible to dismiss the subject on these terms, and without some further indications of the, so to say, inner sentiments of the Polish people, which may be hereafter developed, into the most important of all means of political action. The slightest consideration given to the subject must satisfy even a superficial observer, that a consciousness of identity of interests with the Turks, were it established throughout the twenty millions of the warlike and enduring Polish people, must have the effect of maintaining Poland herself as a barrier on the north-east of Europe, and so restrain that physical pressure of Russia, which, not resisted by Poland, must add Poland to its own pressure when brought to bear upon Europe. In a word, the reparatory and defensive stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna made at that time to consist in a Constitution for Poland, guaranteed by Europe, can now only be replaced by an individual attachment of the Poles to the Ottoman Porte, so as to secure the impossibility of the military action of Russia against the latter, and at the same time to insure the present endurance of the Poles in the hopes of future restoration, whether from the successes of the Turks in arms, or from the assertion and preponderance of the influence of Constantinople.

Scarcely had the victory of SOBIESKI been achieved when a reaction took place; and the wiser of the Poles deplored the insurrectionary act against the traditional policy of their country. Under the Jagellon kings, the relations of Poland and of Turkey were those of alliance. The Polish noblesse in the *Pacta Conventa*, forbade all expeditions directed against the Ottomans, and this friendship was broken only by the incursions of the Cossacks into Turkey, and of the Tartars into Poland, at the instigation of Russia. Nevertheless, armies of the Tartars of the Crimea, sent through the authority of the Porte, appeared before Warsaw to resist the Swedes, and in Gallicia to resist the Transylvanians. The agent of CHARLES XII. at Constantinople, employed to establish an alliance between Sweden and Turkey, and to induce the latter to declare war against PETER the Great, was a Pole, PONIATOWSKI. The Confederation of Bar based their operations less on the hopes of support from Western Europe, than on the

assistance of the Turks. These dispositions of the Poles CATHERINE adroitly turned to account to destroy all interest for them in Europe, by designating them in her Manifestoes as "Enemies of the Christian name," whose object it was to introduce the Mussulmans into the heart of Europe. During the war of the French Republic, General DOBROUSKI presented to the Directory a plan of operations for France against Russia, by a combination with Turkey; and another DOBROUSKI, having successfully presented a similar plan at Constantinople through the instrumentality of HUSSEIN PASHA, the famous Pasha of Widdin, organised Polish legions in Bulgaria and Wallachia.

However these ancient traditions may have slumbered in the interval, and down to the insurrection of 1830, they were then by the shock suddenly revived, and from Warsaw two agents (WOLICKI and LINOUSKI), were sent to Constantinople to persuade the Porte to take up arms. The Poles should have thought of this two years before, as they were told by the Turks: but still, notwithstanding their own recent defeat, they would not have been disinclined, as the Reis Effendi expressed himself to General GUILLEMINOT, to support Poland, by sending 200,000 horsemen across the Ukraine. Whether or not such operation was then within their capacity, at all events war would have been declared against Russia, but for the interposition of the English Government in a form which overmatched the penetration of the Porte.

As the Poles in raising the standard of revolt had mistaken their time, so on their discomfiture and migration, they mistook their way. As they had waited until Turkey had been beaten before taking up arms, so afterwards they wandered away to the West of Europe, instead of returning to Turkey, where affections and lands awaited them, and where, finding a home, they might have established a link, to become hereafter a pivot of action. Here again the general infatuation did not remain without protest. Their best, if not their only historian, MOCHNACKI, writing in 1833, repeated to them what JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU had told them in 1791, and pointed out to them Turkey as their refuge and their hope; and that for not them only, but for Europe itself, saying that it was at Constantinople that the stand had to be made "for India, for Poland, and for Civilisation."

The Polish emigration in Europe sinking into frantic doctrines, and mixing itself with every wild scheme of Revolutionists, and every lawless enterprise of perfidious diplomacy, lost every memory of their land, and every sense of human right. Still, again, a protest has not been wanting; amongst the emi-

grants those of historic name and recognised station have adhered to the traditions of their race, and associated themselves with Turkey. Here an incident presents itself calculated to produce the gravest consequences for the future.

The Poles of the emigration offered their services to the Allies, in the war against Russia of 1854. A more deplorable act can scarcely be imagined, if taken to imply that the Poles believed that war to be sincere. On the other hand, assuming it to be understood by them that it was insincere, their association with it was an effort of genius, because it did present to the eyes of all Poland the flag of Poland beside that of Turkey on the battle-field against Russia. Thus the deception of which the Poles and the Turks were alike the victims, was converted into the basis of an alliance for future times, which must have the effect of discomfiting the plans and breaking the power of that Government, which has been enabled to use the great Powers of Europe, as the merest instruments of its will.

Throughout the Ukraine the germ of such thoughts have been secularly established. The popular prophet, WERNYHORA, has left behind him words which have passed from generation to generation, but of which the sense remained to these latter times to be developed.

"The DELIVERANCE of Poland shall come only when the Ottomans shall water their horses in the Vistula,"

Nor is it to be forgotten that still there are remote villages where the Mussulman Prayers are recited by a Polish population; that the Polish Ulans (from the Turkish Oghlan, boy) designated simply the cavalry regiments which the Tartars placed at the disposal of the Kings of Poland.

The Mussulmans introduced by WITOLD, brother of JAGELLON, all received in Poland the rank of Noble, and their fidelity was inviolable to their adopted country. Nor did they all retire into the Turkish possessions in the eighteenth century.

A prosperous people being regardless of the future, is also forgetful of the past. An unfortunate people applies itself to recover its traditions; and when it is successful in doing so, provides for the future. Now is the time for Poland to undergo this study, and to prepare for this result. It has to learn how great is its good fortune in not having a Europe on the East, as well as on the West; it has to replace passion by reason, and the mean by the noble affections of the mind. It has to exclude the thought of wreaking vengeance some day on the Nations of the West, by whom it is betrayed, by imposing upon itself the noble desire of saving those nations from Russia and themselves.

Returning now from this digression to the period under review,

we have to conclude that down to the Turkish war of 1828, the conversion of the Caucasus merely into a slaughter-house had sustained the Russian Empire within, and protecting it from disruption, had given to it its dimensions at home and its authority abroad.

From this period a new era opens for both the parties.

THE RECENT POLICY OF SUBJUGATING THE CAUCASUS.

The Circassians, up to this time, had not looked upon Russia animated with the purpose of their subjugation. No desperate efforts had been made for the establishment of lines of forts, except that of the north; no large armies had been moved against them. It was border warfare, not general pressure. It was a scattered guerilla, but no concentric operations. Consequently the idea of community among themselves had not arisen. There were so many tribes, just as there were so many families. On the other hand, the Turks were in their country. They were established on three points of the coast. The deputed Governors sought to make themselves men of importance, pretended to authority over the people, and carried on intrigues amongst the clans. The external feelings of the people consisted rather in the dominating jealousy of Turkey, than in the native hatred against the Russians. The whole was reversed by the war of 1829, and the Treaty of Adrianople which followed it. The withdrawal of the Turks, and the surrender by them of the posts which they held to the Russians, brought the latter down upon the scene, so as to shut them in on all sides at once. The jealousy for Turkey ceased; fear for Russia took its place; and by the interference with their trade the pressure fell upon the whole people. The pretended cession in the Treaty of Adrianople of Circassia to Russia might indeed be known to some of them; but it was Russian garrisons on the coast, and Russian cruisers pursuing, sinking, and capturing the small craft by which their habitual traffic was carried on with Constantinople, that announced to them the fatal change that had taken place. Here was the germ implanted, though it lay latent for a time, of the creation of a people of Circassia out of these isolated tribes.

On the other hand, the Russian Cabinet had to view in Circassia wholly different objects from those of 1770. The Caucasus appeared no longer as at that period, a mere geographical incident, which could be left out of account in carrying on the operations which were to put it in possession of the Ottoman Empire. For it had now discovered that that Empire was not to be conquered in itself; that in order to shake it by warlike means

from the West it was requisite to paralyse it by heavy blows, or by powerful menace in the East, so as to prevent the warlike populations of Anatolia, by the dread of an invader in the rear, from being brought up to face its armies on the Danube.

A policy based upon the purpose of acquiring does not exclude the necessity of self-defence. It must not, therefore, be considered that gain was the only consideration by which it was influenced. It is a very different picture that is shadowed forth by POZZO DI BORGO. Speaking of Turkey he designates the prospective relations of the two Empires in these words: "THE DANGERS OF THE FUTURE."

As this word "danger" is unintelligible to any save the acting persons belonging to the Russian Cabinet, it would be improper to quote it without some accompanying indications of the accuracy and value of the term.

First. Turkey regaining a military organisation, threats would cease to determine the policy of the Porte. Any difference, therefore, arising between the two Governments, a mere order to the Port Captain of Constantinople would paralyse the internal condition of the Russian Provinces of the South; the closing of the Bosphorus to the trade of Russia, if continued for a moderate space of time, would, without the firing of a shot, or the movement of a single company of soldiers, reduce Russia to the necessity of accepting any terms imposed by the Porte, on penalty of bankruptcy of the Government, and of one-half of the landed proprietors, which would of a certainty be accompanied by an insurrection of the whole of her southern provinces. In fact, the geographic position of the Bosphorus in reference to the material condition of Russia, and of the Porte in reference to the populations of Western and Southern Russia, constitute the Russian Empire a mere dependency of Constantinople from the moment that the Government there established acquires a self-subsisting character, and, emancipating itself on the one side from the dread of a Russian descent, and on the other from deference to the suggestions of the European Embassies, resolves to be guided according to its own institutions; that is, by the Law of Nations, in its dealing with Foreign Powers.

Secondly. Turkey, recovering through her military organisation her power of action, would be expected to reverse those restrictions upon her own exportation imposed in the time of her weakness through the threats of Russia, and subsequently continued by means of the English Commercial Treaty; in which case Russia would cease to be an exporting country. All the raw materials which she furnishes can be obtained at a lower cost, with greater facility for effecting returns, from the Ottoman

Empire, and in amount equal to any present demand in Europe. As for instance, corn, tallow, with oil as its equivalent, hides, timber, copper, iron, flax, with cotton and silk indirectly bearing upon the consumption of flax.

Thirdly. This same military reconstruction would render Poland unincorporable in the Russian Empire.

Fourthly. It would render hopeless the projected operations with a view to the subjugation of the Caucasus, and so close the door to future ambition in the east and south.

Fifthly and lastly. It would frustrate that deep and far-seeing design which had led to the erection of Sebastopol on the Crimea, to be as a mailed fist, on which the forces of the West were to be brought some day to break themselves, when the time had come for Russia to use the unconscious armies of England and France to prostrate Turkey in the shape of allies, and to acquire for herself the prestige of a triumph in a single-handed war with the great nations of the West.

These indications will suffice to explain why POZZO DI BORGO, in 1828, characterised the future relations of Turkey and Russia, as those of danger for the latter.*

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* Even so far back as the Treaty that gave Russia her present frontier (1812), and before the occurrence of that political convulsion which ended in the destruction of the Janissaries, it was the danger to which Russia was exposed that occupied those either composing her own Cabinet, or the servants of other States, working for her ends. Sir Robert Wilson was sent by Lord Castlereagh to Constantinople in 1812 to be attached to the Embassy of Mr. Liston, and was employed, as appears from his own letters, in engaging the Grand Vizier not to break the Peace which he had just signed with Russia, "for fear of a war with England." After this he proceeded to Moscow, to join the Russian army as British Commissioner. When at St Petersburg, he took the remarkable step of attempting to induce the Emperor to renounce the obnoxious clauses of the Peace of Bucharest, moved by "a sense of the duty which I owe your Majesty, and animated by an affectionate attachment to your Majesty's person." Thus begins the letter he addressed to Alexander, in which, after referring to the reforms about to be commenced, "which will give the Turkish power a very formidable character," he goes on to argue on the wisdom of conciliating the Turks. He then deals with the special provisions of the Peace of Bucharest:—

"If Russia, by the line of the Pruth and the Danube, had acquired *a military line of defence*, that would prove a barrier to the hostility of the Turks, and if *security had been obtained by the Peace of Bucharest*, then the maintenance of its stipulations (although they checked the advantages of a cordial Union with Turkey) might be a plausible measure. * *

"But when the security is not acquired, and only an imperfect military line is obtained, *a line that cannot in any case be offensively useful, and may defensively produce disasters*, then the terms of such a Peace are at the moment mischievous, and, as regards the future, most prejudicial." Sir R. Wilson makes the following remark on this letter: "The Emperor admitted the utility of the proposed modification of the Treaty of Bucharest, and was

It may now be desirable to introduce the passage in which those words occur; it is as follows:—

"*The Emperor has put the Turkish system to the proof, and His Majesty has found it to possess a commencement of physical and moral organisation which it hitherto had not.* If the SULTAN have been enabled to offer us a more determined and regular resistance, whilst he had scarcely assembled together the elements of his new plan of reform and ameliorations, how formidable should we have found him, had he had time to give it more solidity, and to render that barrier impenetrable which we find so much difficulty in surmounting, although art has hitherto done so little to assist nature.

"Things being in this state, we must congratulate ourselves upon having attacked them before they became more dangerous for us, for delay would only have rendered our relative situation worse, and prepared us greater obstacles than those which we meet.

"If required to add another proof of this truth, I would seek it in the whole tenor, and in the views contained in the confidential note of the Imperial Ministry. Far from lowering the demands and conditions of the peace, I have seen, with lively satisfaction, that it augments them, after the campaign has afforded it a more correct estimate of the real state of things, and has convinced it of the necessity of multiplying precautions, in order TO DIMINISH THE DANGERS OF THE FUTURE."*

These, however, were not the only considerations calculated to awaken the solicitude, and thereby develop the intellectual faculties of the Russian Cabinet, at this more recent period.

The depopulation of the steppes, an object in itself at the former period, when the subordination of the Calmucks, Tartars, and Cossacks had at all risks to be secured, now presented itself, as fully experienced in the wars from 1826 to 1829, as a serious obstacle. The *mere crossing* of this region (included in her own frontiers) has cost her relatively as to numbers, in some cases, a loss equal to that which the English army incurred during the whole campaigns of the Peninsula. The loss of stores and cattle was, of course, analogous; and the periods of the year during which any passage could be effected was reduced to three or four months. Henceforward all operations against the two Mussulman kingdoms could only be conducted at enormous sacrifices; and the number of troops that it was possible for her to employ was reduced to a third of those which she was enabled to bring on the theatre of war—then so much closer to her resources—in the middle of the last century.

Eastward, there was no longer any possibility of illusion or mistake as to the altered condition of the Caspian Sea; its unavailability for warlike operations on a large scale was now

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disposed to accede to it when I left St. Petersburg. But the moment of pressure was lost from scruples of delicacy; and as the exigency passed, the conciliatory feeling died away."—*Appendix to Sir R. Wilson's "Russian Journal."*

* Portfolio. First series. Vol. i. pp. 348-51.

established. There remained no chance of impression to be henceforward made by military effort, save by accumulating and concentrating power in the Transcaucasian region, and grouping it round Tiflis, which thirty years ago was aptly defined as "the eye with which Russia regarded the realm of CYRUS." There alone could she now make her spring. From that basis could she drive the wedge between the two Mussulman States. But for this purpose it was necessary that the Circassians should be reduced, and the Caucasus converted from a slaughter-house for her own obdurate subjects, into a nursery of troops for the conquest of her neighbours.

All this while the rest of the world remained in as complete ignorance of the affairs in which Russia was engaged, of the measures she was prosecuting, and the inducements and apprehensions which influenced her decisions, as if all these belonged to some other planet. That which did transpire in reference thereto, consisting entirely in misrepresentation, were helps that were afforded to her from the West. Thus it was that POZZO DI BORGO wrote at this time: "Public opinion has already sacrificed to us the fortresses and the Asiatic littoral of the Black Sea." We can therefore be at no difficulty to discover from whom the suggestion came to introduce into the Treaty of Adrianople this clause by which Turkey is made to appear to hand over Circassia to Russia.*

The misrepresentations spread through Europe bore chiefly upon two points. The first as to the character of the Circassians: they being made to appear as savages. Such was the terror so inspired, that, in 1834, the landing of the one Englishman who reached the country was effected by a boat dropping him on a bare point, and then hastily returning on board.

The other misrepresentation was in reference to the power of Russia. The new operation adopted to create in the Caucasian Isthmus a nucleus and nursery of aggressive force, was represented as a measure originating in folly and productive of danger. The word was passed, and by every one accepted, "Russia is weakening herself." This has been the ready answer of European Ministers in European Parliaments whenever they were called to account for subjection or connivance. But it was particularly laid down so far back as 1826 in reference to the Persian war, which was the first event in more recent times that awakened alarms as to the ulterior designs of Russia. An eminent literary man, KLAPROTH, after a simulated quarrel, pretended to

* When in former Treaties Russia pretended to cede Circassia to Turkey, it was, of course, with a view to this resumption.

escape from St. Petersburg, carrying with him important documents, which were successively communicated to the English and French Cabinets, purporting to be the plans for the invasion of India. Having thus added to his pre-eminent authority as a literary man the title to guide Europe from his recognised position of hostility to Russia, he prepared the public for the Persian war by a series of expositions, which first appeared in a French paper, the *Courrier Français*. The statements they contained were accepted as truths, and the conclusions they contained became henceforward maxims. The nature of both will be apprehended from the following extracts:—

"Since Russia has extended her possessions beyond the Caucasus, she finds it necessary to maintain a numerous army in the newly-conquered provinces. But the countries occupied do not afford sufficient provisions for the army, and supplies must therefore be forwarded by the Black Sea (?) and across the Caucasus, along a road seldom practicable for waggons. All articles necessary for the equipment and arming of troops, being conveyed in the same manner to Georgia, it will be readily perceived that the possession of that country must be burthensome to Russia. Forty thousand men scarcely suffice to keep down the population of Georgia, and the warlike tribes of the Caucasus, who are ever on the watch for opportunities to plunder the country, and to carry off the inhabitants into slavery.

"Constantly menaced on one side by the unsubdued mountaineers, the Russians cannot make a free disposition of the forces which they have to the south of the Caucasus. A war with Persia must greatly embarrass them; for though it is easy (?) to order a hundred thousand men to pass this chain of inhospitable mountains, it is quite impossible to feed them when they have arrived at their destination. No port of the Caucasian Isthmus produces corn in sufficient abundance to admit of any considerable exportation; and if a surplus did exist, the difficulty of the communication would prevent its conveyance to the less fertile provinces. The great obstacle which this deficiency of provisions presents *will always prevent* Russia from augmenting her army in Georgia, and from *making extensive conquests* in Persia."*

The ignorance and the misinformation of the public and the Cabinets of Europe was shared in to the fullest extent by the internal populations of the empire; and as amongst these the Poles had communications with Europe, and were considered authoritative in regard to Russia, their delusions and passions in respect to the Circassians, and the other populations of the Caucasian Isthmus, powerfully contributed to aid Russia in giving that false direction to European opinion, by which alone she could be suffered to prosecute her designs, and finally to achieve them.

RESISTANCE OF ENGLAND IN 1835.

While the Russian Cabinet, engaged in such great and difficult affairs, composed of men selected for their eminent capacities, not owing their entrance into office to extraneous accident, or liable

* Portfolio, 1st Series, vol. i. p. 325.

to expulsion on political considerations, were thus daily acquiring a progressive pre-eminence in the faculty of dealing with circumstances and with men, the other Cabinets presented no parity of conditions, out of which might arise, upon any given transaction, a successful competition with Russia; or even so much as the power of observing that which she was engaged in doing, or that which she intended to effect. The necessary consequence of this relative position was, that Russia was invariably enabled to make use of foreign cabinets for the advancement of her ends, even when these Cabinets thought they were opposing her. This condition was enunciated as an unquestionable maxim in the organ of the Conservative party when the Duke of WELLINGTON was in power in 1835, as follows:—"From the moment that a Power, which we still consider barbarous, was enabled to interfere in the affairs of Europe and of Asia, the Cabinets and Statesmen of Europe have become the tools with which she works." The composition of such a sentence—to say nothing of its appearing in the *Quarterly Review*, the organ of the party then in power, and its acknowledged authorship by the most eminent diplomatist in the service of the British Crown (author of the "Progress of Russia in the East," and soon after British Envoy in Persia)—could only be understood as the announcement that the era of ignorance, delusion, subserviency, and connivance, had passed by, and that England, now repossessed of sight, was about to recover her faculty of action, and exert it for the restoration of the States she had been hitherto aiding Russia in humbling, coercing, deceiving, and destroying.

The European public accepted this conclusion, which the attitude assumed by England during two years had all the appearance of justifying; at the end of which time, the sacrifice of an English vessel to Russia on the coast of Circassia, while engaged in peaceable traffic with the Circassians, signified her relapse into her anterior condition—with this difference, that she had hitherto only sacrificed others, while now she made sacrifice of herself. The temporary resumption of her position by England in the years 1835-6 did not, however, solely depend on the perception of Russia's designs, and a just estimate of her character by Sir JOHN MCNEILL. There was, then, another English diplomatist who had also arrived at the same conclusions, and exhibited an equal courage in the attempt to give them effect; whilst there was also a Sovereign in England, who, like LOUIS XV. in France, had formed the idea of a concert for the protection of Europe against Russia.

That other diplomatist was the then British Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord PONSONBY, brother-in-law to Lord GREY.

We have, therefore, at this period two members of the British Diplomatic Service—the one the representative of the King in Turkey, the other the representative of the King in Persia—who, at a given moment, break through all previous forms and traditions of office, who simultaneously address their Sovereign, the Cabinet, and the public, calling for a reversal of the policy hitherto pursued, denominating it subserviency, denouncing the fatal consequences that must follow upon its prosecution, and asserting the opposite course to be the safe one, and also easy; being nothing else than this, that England should detach herself from the Cabinet of Russia.

It is natural to look for some immediate cause for so unexpected an event. This cause we have not far to seek. It is to be found in the knowledge then acquired of Circassia, and therewith the secret of the weakness of Russia. The result of this discovery was the sending of a British vessel to trade with the Circassians. This was the course which, after mature deliberation by the best-informed and ablest men, who, at the same time, occupied high stations in the English Government, was adopted as the means of saving India, Persia, and Turkey. The individuals engaged in this operation were the King; his Private Secretary, Sir HERBERT TAYLOR;* the two Under-Secretaries of State for the Foreign Department, Mr. BACKHOUSE, and Mr. FOX STRANGWAYS, now Lord ILCHESTER, the Envoy in Persia, and the Ambassador at Constantinople; the whole acting with the apparent sanction of the Foreign Minister, and with the assenting cognisance of the Premier, Lord MELBOURNE.

This incident is here referred to, to show that when for a time the case was taken up on the other side, the Caucasian Isthmus came to be considered as of just as high an importance as, it is evident from the anterior statements, it was considered by the Russian Cabinet itself. As the possibility of future progress was held by the Russian Cabinet to be wholly involved in the operations in the Caucasus, so to the English Cabinet, when for a moment opposing her, was it equally certain that by frustrating her designs in the Caucasus her schemes against the South and the East would be frustrated also. Here, also, was shown the application of the maxims above enunciated—namely, that to counteract Russia, no warlike operations were requisite, but merely the cessation of subserviency; as the *Vixen* was not sent out to fire shot, but merely to exercise England's indefeasible right to trade with an independent people.

* This office, one of the highest importance, has since this period been abolished as troublesome to the Cabinet. The then holder of it was a man of eminent authority.

It is doubtless desirable to ascertain, if possible, in what term those two eminent British diplomatists defined the position Circassia, and what relative importance they gave to it, in affairs of the world. In regard to Lord PONSONBY, we are left in doubt, a letter of his on the subject having been produ on the 23rd of February, 1848, in the House of Commons which he refers to the despatches which he had sent home to Government in reference to the futility of any claim of Russ that people, and in which he speaks of Circassia as a positi second in importance only to Constantinople. He has elsewhe said, "*Constantinople breathes only under the shadow of the Ca casus.*"

As to Sir JOHN MCNEILL, it may be said that Circassia is t pivot of his work "The Progress of Russia," just as it is of t designs of Russia. When he was first informed by an eye-wi ness of what he had observed in Circassia, the words in which h expressed the effect made upon him were these: "This alters th balance of power throughout the world." The following passa will show how he speaks of the country in his published work:-

"It is difficult to imagine a stronger or better marked boundary than th which formed the frontier between Russia and Persia. The Black Sea on t one hand, and the Caspian on the other, connected by the stupendous chain the Caucasus, seem to have been designed by nature for the limit of po powerful nation, for a barrier against some great Power. The views which a duced the Russian Government to seek with unwearied perseverance a positi beyond it; in pursuance of which PETER I. incurred the cost and hazard of formidable expedition from Astrachan, and braved the obloquy of all the pol that marked his proceedings there and in Khiva; which induced CATHARINE purchase the sovereignty of Georgia and Imeritia, at the price of large dis tions to many chieftains, a considerable pension to HERACLIUS, and the ma tenance of troops to protect him; and which led her to attempt, by the mo questionable means, to secure a military footing on the southern shores of t Caspian—the views which have made it an integral part of the system Russia to maintain and improve, even at an enormous sacrifice of blood a treasure, the position she had obtained in the Caucasus and beyond it, ma have been directed to some ultimate object far more important than the p session of provinces which have hitherto been only costly appendages to t Empire. These acquisitions can be valued or valuable only in as much as th afford facilities for arriving at some great end which would, in her estimat remunerate her for all that might have been expended in attaining it. On other grounds would her policy be intelligible. She has not been compell by the unauthorised acts of deputed authorities, nor betrayed into a posit from which she could not recede. Every step in advance has been t deliberate act of her Government—the mature result of long preparati For a hundred years have her successive Sovereigns, *per fas et nefas*, stri pursued the same object, varying the means, but never relinquishing t purpose."*

* Sir John McNeill's Progress of Russia, Second Edition, 1836, p. 81.

VALUE AND RESOURCES OF CAUCASIA.

When Russia exchanged her policy in reference to Circas
when, on the one hand, ceasing to require it any longer as a pl
of butchery for her nominal subjects, and reduced to depend
its active resources for the means of future aggression, the c
had naturally to present itself in this form: What can be m
of it?

It becomes necessary, as the first step, to take in this coun
as one and as a whole. This is by no means easy to accompli
Nowhere on the earth is there such an immediate and strik
contrast between mountain and plain, between freedom and s
jection. Our maps not only give us the distinctive lines divid
three Empires from independent States, which are again cc
mingled, but each new map gives a new delimitation.* Tl
there is the distinction between Mussulman and Christian. T
separation of the quarters of the globe causes our maps to
intersected on this line by the boundary between Europe
Asia. If, again, looked at in a general map of the Russ
Empire, its dimensions dwindle into insignificance by the conti
to the eye with the enormous though vacant space inclu
within its frontiers.

To attain to this idea of unity we must find a general na
applicable to the whole; that name we might naturally derive fr
the sea adjoining it to the East, and which particularly belo
to it, and from the mountain which gives to it its charac
The names of both are derived from the same source; Casp
from Cassiapa, the Caucasus from Koi-cash, or Kav-cash,
Mountain of the Cash, originally belonging to the Indian C
casus, or Himalaya. The name of Caucasus is, indeed, unkno
in the country, but it is still preserved in Cashbeg, the p
second in height, whilst the principal peak is known as Elbrc
the Arabic form of Borgh, the term applied in the Zend to
Indian Caucasus. This was, therefore, in ancient times the coun
of the Cash.†

The scientific men of Russia early discovered the necessity

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* Besides the maps of Chambers, those of the "Useful Knowledge" Soci
and others, it is well to note that those published by the Government for
Civil Service Competitive Examination efface Circassia from the list of nati
and add its soil to the territory of Russia.

† The Cash are no other than the Cuthites; and China derives its anc
name of Cathai from its conquest by the same people. The Cuthites and
Cash are no other than the Turks, whose primitive seat of Empire was K
gar, "mountain of the Cash," whence their conquering invasions were mad
China, India, and the West.

a common name for the country inhabited by the Circassians and the Georgians. They gave to it the name of "Caucasian Isthmus." The Government of Russia, from a similar necessity, fell upon that of "Trans-Caucasian Provinces." The particle, Trans, and the adjunct, Provinces, both implying a Russian sense, being eliminated, leave us the term CAUCASIA, which, if adopted, will combine convenience without insinuation; whilst, merging into it, on the one side Circassia, on the other Georgia, the susceptibilities of either people are set at rest.*

The justice of any general designation must, however, depend on the existence, amongst the Georgians, of a general desire to recover their independence. Their faculty to do so need not be taken into account, the warlike masses which surround them, once put in motion, being perfectly equal to that end, if once we obtain the assurance that the Georgians, while seeking their independence of Russia, are brought to look to the independent tribes on the north and west, and the Mussulman tribes on the east, as engaged in a common cause. There is no problem of more importance in its solution to the future fate of mankind, and it resolves itself into a very simple question: namely, whether or not the pressure of Russia has or has not as yet effaced religious antipathies? It is proposed here to show that that question can be absolutely answered; and in the affirmative.

First of all it must be recollected, or, at all events, established, that the annexation of Georgia to Russia was not effected by military means. On the Georgian people there have not been left the crushing memories of a defeat. They only recollect that Russia, by fraud and composition, by treachery to their Prince, and false promises to their people, surreptitiously got hold of their country and crown.

In the second place, it is to be borne in mind, that they dwell, so to say, within the continual sound of war, and, consequently, know that small tribes can live despite the Russian Empire. Although the mass of troops required for the war in the mountains has proved hitherto sufficient to keep them in subjection, there is no illusion as to the vastness of the Russian power. They also know that the Circassians, during the Crimean war, desired to free Georgia; and, in Tiflis, the hearts of the people bounded with exultation on the arrival of the news of the first Russian defeat before Kars.

* The Daghestanees have for years in their jealousy of the Independent Tribes been moved to indignation at the very name of Circassia. In the recent address to the Queen of England of the Daghestanee chief, Mehemet Khan, the word "Circassians" is positively introduced, and the danger pointed out that would accrue to them from the subjugation of that people.

So far back, however, as their incorporation, representatives their princely House disdained to accept the proffers of Russia, a sought refuge amongst the Mussulmans, and to this day dwell the anti-Caucasian chain of the Ararat, watching from th heights which overlook their native country for the hour of th return. Some of them even, in conformity with a like change the formerly Christian populations of that district, have beco Mussulmans—a result which has almost universally attended this direction alike the presence and the approach of t Russians.* From the moment, therefore, of their incorporati the eyes of the Georgians were turned towards their Mussulm neighbours. Whilst as yet no amicable relationships existed l tween them and the free Circassians—whilst as yet subsidies c tinued to be paid and some respect for rights and usages observ the Georgians looked to incorporation with Turkey. During t war of 1812, such was the importance attributed to these dispc tions of this population lying at the extreme east of the two empir that thereon was based the resolution then adopted by the Porte, t to treat at Bucharest, but to prosecute the war with the view recovering the provinces lost in 1774, and not to rest conte short of the recovery on the east of the frontiers of the Khans the Crimea and Astrakhan. This determination was overrul by England, who forced the Treaty of Bucharest (including t dismemberment of Turkey in Bessarabia), by a threat of war.

The recent publication by Sir R. WILSON, British Milita Commissioner during the French invasion of Russia, enables to offer an official confirmation of this statement. In a let addressed to the Emperor of RUSSIA on the 12th of Septemb 1812, he uses these words:—

"Your Majesty is aware that the proclamation of the Turki peace was delayed for a considerable time after the ratificatic had been exchanged at Bucharest. The delay excited gr uneasiness in Count ITALINSKY and Mr. LISTON, and the host language of the Reis Effendi induced them to apprehend tl advantage might be taken of the war in which Russia v engaged, to advance pretensions beyond even the *status quo a bellum*. In a conference with the Reis Effendi and Mr. LISTC the former even intimated that *Georgia was rather a Turk*

* A writer in the Portfolio, in 1836, then estimated the converts to Isl within the present century and a half, at five millions.

"Muscovite Policy has carried on a successful war with the heathen Central Asia; *it alone has made converts among the stubborn Mussulmans.* has at the same time turned Protestant Germans in numbers from their fai and made them as thorough Russians as the population of Moscow."—*Tin January* 27, 1863,

than a Russian appendage, and he stated that Georgian de had already come to solicit Turkish protection and incorporati

"The tacit withdrawal of the Servian Article, and the *Article relative to the establishment on the Phasis*, was, in conference, held to be insufficient, and *an explicit declarati their dereliction* was insisted upon as a *sine quâ non* of peac was, however, evident, not only on that occasion, but on v others, and from multiplied sources of intelligence, that the Effendi, and a very powerful party in the Divan, being awa the French and Austrian Treaty that guaranteed the integ the Turkish dominions, and of the exigencies which would a diminution of the Russian Imperial forces on the Danube, sidered the peace *in toto* as most disadvantageous and d ditable to the interests and honour of the Ottomans. The G Vizier himself confessed to me afterwards similar sentiments told me '*that only the fear of a war with England had in him to terminate the negotiations with the expedition he had do*

From 1812 Georgia slumbered till 1826, when, durin Persian war, a general rising was all but accomplished sudden inroad into Daghestan of two Persian adventurers. occasion was too brief and the operations too restricted to of any notable manifestation; and it was not till the Polis of 1830-1 that any specific plan of emancipation seems to been formed in Georgia. The occasion was again lost be the delay and the uncertainty of information from the Wes the waiting upon movements from the East. No Polish saries came to them, and the Persian army, which they expe and which, under the Crown Prince, ABBAS MIRZA, was act on its march, was pursued by the Secretary of the British Leg and forced, under a threat of war from England, to halt a retire.

The Georgian leaders, thus foiled, were not, however, di certed. The conspiracy was not dissolved. They awaited a more favourable opportunity, which soon after they judg have arrived. The ensuing proceeding we give in the co porary words of a diplomatic agent:—

"The war with Poland followed those with Persia and with Turkey country being then drained of resources, the Georgians had the hardih form a scheme of a national revolt. They were, however, too tardy i movements, and after England had held back the other Powers, Fran cluded, then ready to fall on Russia, and had so laid Poland prostrate feet, the confederate Georgian provinces remained alone exposed t vengeance. But still they did not despair of success, and conscious facility with which their country might be rescued, and Russia's re-es into it rendered impracticable, they continued prosecuting their design up year 1833, when they imagined that the movements of MEHEMET ALI for

* Appendix to Sir Robert Wilson's Journal during the Moscow Campa

hem an ally in Egypt, and would enable them to accomplish their purpo
Their mistake originated in the representations made by the agents of MEHEM
ALI, that his movement, though apparently directed against the SULTAN, w
oncerted with him with a view of freeing him from Russian domination. Th
onsequently sent to urge the advance of a body of troops to the Caucas
These documents, as may be expected, immediately found their way to
Petersburg, and as soon as the Russian squadron was anchored in the Bosphor
nd that great combination happily concluded by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skeles
he Georgians paid the penalty of their hardihood on the one side, and th
onfidingness on the other, and the twenty-four chiefs who had signed t
locument transmitted to Egypt were sent to expiate their crime in the mir
f Siberia."

In so grave a matter no source of information can be neglecte
nd so scanty are the stray lights thrown upon it, that the task
ollection is no less facile than important. The work of Sir
McNEILL being within the reach of whoever desires informatic
it is sufficient to refer to it without reproducing here its conten
The substance of the pamphlet is the condition of the tribes of t
lowlands and of the mountains, and especially of the Georgia
When it appeared, the sense of those portions was not appr
hended. Now that they might be understood the work is f
gotten. No one will to-day peruse its pages without drawi
from them two inferences: the first, that the occupation of Geor
has hitherto been serviceable to Russia only as enabling her
assault the Caucasus in the rear; the second, that her rule a
operations must be preparing the whole populations of the lo
lands for amalgamation in order to throw off her yoke.

On the north, the line dividing Caucasia from the Russi
Empire is geographical—namely, the respective courses of t
Kuban and the Terek flowing east and west, north of which spre
the Steppes, and south of which rise the mountains.

To the south we must take the frontiers of Russia as laid do
in the Treaties of Adrianople and Turcmanchai.

By drawing a straight line from the mouth of the Terek to t
of the Kuban, another from St. Nicholas on the Black Sea
St. Nicholas on the Caspian, and again joining these extremi
by two lines, we will obtain a trapezoid, of which the conte
will be about equal to that of the country if the sinuosities of
coast and the frontiers are followed. The sides of this figure v
be respectively, north side, 550; south side, 450; west side, 3
and east side, 400 miles in length. The extreme length be
800 miles, exceeding the distance from Turin to Syracuse;
extreme width being 400 miles, nearly equal to the distance fr
Munich to Rome. In surface this country will exceed more th
twofold the dimensions of Italy, and nearly approach to those
France or of Austria.

The region, wholly independent, and actually at war, exte
on a continuous line, cut by a single pass, five hundred mi

upon an average width of one hundred. The proper Circassian territory is thus equal to Italy. If, like Italy, it is assailable on both sides, unlike Italy, it is inaccessible throughout its entire centre.

The rugged region furnishes subsistence for the whole of its present inhabitants, who draw nothing from the plains, and enables that portion of them which carries on the war to be supplied by the labour of those who remain at home. The remainder of Caucasia consists of plains, or of country which though mountainous and strong, is nevertheless of extreme fertility. The rich land, lying between the parallels of Messina and Rome, is again equal in extent to the whole of Italy. This is the country of the peach and the pheasant; to it the Western World owes the cherry and the vine: from the wild vine, the creepers on the forest-trees, the grapes are to this day carried to the wine-press. It is the land of the mulberry, and consequently of the silkworm. On its uplands the cotton-bush is said to be indigenous, and rice, which flourishes there without irrigation, derives its Western name from a harbour in an angle of the adjoining coast.

To arrive with any accuracy at the numbers of the people is utterly impossible. A statement, drawn up in 1850, by a Turkish trader, who had for twenty years been continually in the habit of visiting every part of the independent country, gives the following as the numbers of arm-bearing men who might be called out for local defence:—

Circassia, west of the Vladi Caucase, 160,000.
„ east of the Vladi Caucase, 200,000.
Daghestan (in case of insurrection), 80,000.

There then remain the people of Georgia, Immeritia, Mingrelia, and Gouriel, of whom the estimate may be more popularly made by houses. Calculating these by five, the numbers vary according to different calculations, from one million to two millions and a half.

We will probably not be far wrong in setting down the Caucasians at six millions of souls, and then dividing them into two equal parts, the one of which is absorbed in war, and the other available for agricultural industry.*

* Haxthausen, on Russian data, classes and estimates the population as follows:—

	Square Miles.	Population.
Transcaucasia	66,550	2,150,000
Ciscaucasia	56,080	620,000
Free Mountaineers . .	46,560	1,550,000
Total . . .	169,190	4,320,000

By this calculation the country exceeds Great Britain and Ireland by 50,000 square miles.

Such, then, is the picture which has been presented to the Russ Cabinet, than which nothing can be more calculated on the (side to alarm, on the other to excite. Here is a mass of 400,(warlike men, all armed, and a large proportion mounted, requir but the slightest concert of feeling and of motion to crush once her armies in the South. These armies are in the midst a subject population of a million and a half, who, on the occ rence of such disposition among the warlike tribes, would ready to rise upon them and cut them off in detail. This is only what she has to fear, but what she has to risk, in striving attain to that point from which alone the attractive features of case present themselves. What Russia has to look to, on favourable side of the account, is:—

First, an unlimited supply of ready-made soldiers close to field of future operations.

Secondly, an unlimited supply of provisions for a war in Per and in Turkey.

The plain of Georgia, though narrow and irregular, still has extreme length, as between sea and sea of four hundred and f miles; and as it might easily maintain a population equal to t of Italy, so from the large elbow-room afforded to its present in bitants, were the fictitious obstructions removed of war and n administration; and if the tribute were received in kind, made to consist in gommi—a kind of millet, which forms staple food of the Circassians—Indian corn, and other gra there is not a family of agriculturists that could not immediat supply provisions for two soldiers. The Russian Cabinet m be conscious that it holds in its hands, in Georgia alone, resources with which to pay and to feed two hundred thous men, together with the available materials for carrying on a p manent war against her southern neighbours, on these dimensi

Whilst the history of Russia, looked at from without, is one such undeviating success, that it has become logical to defin by the word "progress," as it has, indeed, become customary to do; looked at from within, that is to say from its own po of view, it would have to be described in a very different mann Its conceptions of action are so vast, the facilities of deception subornation so great, the reports of agents necessarily so sangui and equally of necessity the habits of systematic operation so p disposing to overlook incidental obstacles, that the years, months, and weeks, and days, must be severally concluded w disappointment, as they have been passed in anxiety. I most confident schemes, in respect to the largest incidents, h been doomed to provoking discomfiture, by reason of unexpec accidents, unprompted by any counteracting intelligence;

the fruits of long-matured conceptions have been filched from grasp, by the very means she has taken to achieve them. It thus that PETER'S expedition, when Persia was at his feet, when he expected to stretch his hand forth upon India, followed by the parturition of a Nadir Shah. It was thus that crossing of the Balkan gave to the Ottoman Empire an ar of four hundred thousand men, with a revenue to support If, as a servant of her own has said, all her sacrifices in Caucasus have left her, "not a whit advanced from where stood sixty years ago;" so may it be said, that in regard to whole of the East, all her sacrifices and all her triumphs h left her less advanced than she was at the close of the reig PETER, a century and a quarter ago.

GUSTAVUS III. has observed this phenomenon, and has tra it to its source. "As she advances, and becomes known, enemies spring up under her feet;" he adds; "but she ov comes this resistance through her influence over Cabinets distance."

Thus also it is that in the remarkable Memoir, prepared the instruction of the present Emperor, the abstract of which owe to the disturbed conscience of a Prussian Minister, it is down that future advance in the East will result from Rus "influence over the Cabinets of Europe." To this, however conjoined the necessity for vigorous military action against Caucasus.

This truth and rule receive a striking confirmation in events in China, where Russia, since her defeat of 1688, has mained wholly in check until the last few years, and where she has been effecting the most wonderful and rapid progr Here the European Powers have been brought into play, texts being available—first, of objects special of their own against China, and then the old one of jealousy of Russia, the necessity of counteracting her.

At Constantinople and at Teheran she maintains her pos solely by the presence of the English and French Embas Were these withdrawn, every vestige of influence over t countries would disappear. How is it, then, that she has sought to introduce European diplomatic agency into the C casus? It is that there the internal character and constitut being different to that of any other spot of the earth, so must operations conducted against it be exceptional. There is no pre which the European Powers could avail themselves of, because Circassians and the Russians ARE AT WAR. And as she has ceeded so long in preventing the knowledge of even the exist of that people, so must she prevent the knowledge of the

racter of the war that is carried on, and, above all things, stop commercial intercourse. The European Powers did all that she could require from them, when, in 1831, their representatives at Constantinople communicated in secret to their Consuls a Regulation which had never been made, but was only spoken of; so that every Consul privately warned the captain of every merchant vessel of his nation not to approach the coast of Circassia. So tender and delicate was this operation, that, with all her dexterity in composition, she was unable to write out a Regulation which should not be compromising, whilst the Government of England, which was followed by the other European Governments, in giving effect to this prohibition privately through the Consul at Constantinople, could not venture to communicate it to LLOYD'S, which is the channel, to the trade, of all communications effecting foreign commerce. So absolute and so secret was the understanding between the British Foreign Office and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, that when, in 1836, the King of ENGLAND undertook to send a vessel to that coast, through a direct communication to a merchant in London, and when he questioned the Foreign Minister as to any legal obstruction to that trade, the Minister suppressed the Regulation of 1831, and replied to His Majesty in the negative. When the merchant in question then formally addressed the Foreign Office, putting the same question, again the Minister, in his replies, suppressed all knowledge of this Regulation. But in the interval between the correspondence in London and the arrival of the vessel at Constantinople, the Russian Minister repeated there the warning of 1831.

To estimate the importance to Russia of preventing access to the Black Sea, let us follow for a moment the consequences that would have ensued had the *Vixen* discharged her cargo of SALT, and taken in in return wax and other articles which had been prepared for shipment. Immediately the trade would have been opened with the Danube, an outlet which Russia was equally engaged in closing; and the rock-salt of Wallachia would have supplied the mountaineers with a necessity of life, and that at a low rate. This supply would have affected at once the *health* of the soldiers engaged against Russia, and the preservation of meat for their subsistence.

The trade so opened, they would then have been enabled to obtain GUNPOWDER. Arms they have in abundance, and of a manufacture unrivalled in the rest of the world. The beautiful *savat* work in silver is exclusively their own, although now copied by the Russians in Tula. The ornamental part, whether the inlaying of gold on steel, the embroidery of gold and silver on stuffs, or the mosaic-work of leather, is of the most refined taste, and of a

style peculiarly their own. Anything like their shirts of mail has never even been seen in Europe, and these are sometimes of an estimated value of 500*l*. Their swords even are original in form. Human ingenuity has expended itself on this weapon, but nowhere else has the idea arisen of a sword without a guard! Here may be read the history of the people; in it the history of all true defence, which lies in reaching the life of your adversary, not in manœuvres to protect your own. This is the sword of chivalry, the sword which in their hands has never been drawn without cause, and never been sheathed without honour.* As to the steel of which it is composed, it suffices to say that the Damascus art, lost everywhere, has taken refuge with them, for there still remain three manufactories in Daghestan where it continues to be made. Then come the bow and arrow. One of the former, tested in London, is equal to 100 lbs. It is composed of five pieces, and is supposed to be three hundred years old. The arrows made with the most scrupulous imitation in Edinburgh have failed, as discharged from any bow made in Europe, by scores of yards, of the recorded flight of those of Circassia.

These are their weapons—the weapons of antiquity—with which, doubtless, they met and discomfited the sword of Rome, the backward arrows of the Parthians, the spear of the Tartars, the chariots of the Assyrians, and the slings of the Hyrcanians.

But in these days a new instrument of warfare has arisen, consisting of tubes and explosive powder. With this novel fashion they have scarcely habituated themselves; and yet, seeing the relatively expensive nature of the ancient artillery, and the constant employment against them of the modern artillery, whether in the shape of muskets or of cannon, they stand at a terrible disadvantage. As they live by war, and can only live by success in war, for them gunpowder, being a necessity of war, becomes a necessary of life. Therefore the free introduction of salt involved the free introduction of gunpowder.

At how many men shall we reckon Russia's yearly consumption on account of this introduction of salt and gunpowder? Would it be too much to place it at a regiment? Might it not also mean the failure of an expedition or the capture of a fort, and consequently of many expeditions, and many forts? Who can predicate the effect on the *morale* of the Russian armies of one hundred hand guns of long range amongst the Circassians, who at present, without artillery and without engineering, escalade and take forts according to the ancient fashion?

If freely supplied with gunpowder and muskets, would not

* In the photograph of Ismael Effendi, one of the Circassian Deputies, the sword is represented, held in his hand.

cannon follow, with men qualified to use them? Would Russia then be able to preserve a single post on the sea-board, or on the line of the Kouban, or the Terek? And would not these expeditions against Tiflis, Ganaj, Georgewisk, &c., be familiarly discussed in every Circassian hut, now only not discussed and not executed through the deficiency of artillery.

Nor is this all. The troops employed against them in the North are cavalry. Cavalry means horses, and horses require provender. Provender, as a material, is both bulky and inflammable. The Steppes do not supply it. The spring season affords luxuriant and abundant grasses, but thereafter the existence of the horse, on the Russian side of the lines, depends on the stock in hand, which stock has to be transported from distant regions. Judge, then, of the havoc which a few cylindrical musket-balls of JACOB or NORTON might make. The mere terror of explosive and igniting balls would rival, along the four hundred miles of frontier line, that produced in a fleet of line of battle ships, by a gun-boat throwing red-hot shot. With this difference, however, that a gun-boat might be sunk. For the Cossacks of the Kuban and the Terek there would remain no alternative but that of flying to a land of grass, or passing over to the Circassians. These, thus relieved on the North, would face to the South; and with their rear perfectly protected, would apply themselves to the recovery of Georgia.

Surely these are reasons enough for Russia to have strained every effort and run every risk to prevent the communication of all European nations with the Circassian coast.

But there are collateral effects of no less importance.

Gunpowder being to be procured amongst the Western Circassians, those of the east and those of the south, down as far as Salian, would have repaired thither to procure it. Communication would have been established between the tribes at that time knowing nothing of each other, or jealous of each other; the inevitable consequences would have followed of insurrection in the south-east. The Avars of Daghestan would have thrown in their lot with the general confederacy.

The salt would have been obtained from Wallachia; severally the opposite populations on the two sides of the Black Sea would have come to know of one another; and that isolation of her victims by which Russia works her way, would have ceased.

The most important of collateral results remains behind. It is the effect that would have been produced upon the Ottoman Empire.

Before the Treaty of Adrianople, a considerable traffic was

carried on between Circassia and Constantinople. The pretended regulation of 1831 was therefore a blow struck at Turkey; and the value at that moment to Russia of its acceptance by Mr. MANDEVILLE, the English Minister, and its communication by him to Mr. CARTWRIGHT, the Consul-General, to be privately communicated to English captains, who knew nothing of the traffic, and had not the remotest idea of engaging in it, was, that Turkey was obliged to submit to a Regulation which had received the sanction of the English Government. It was therefore England who, by an unavowed and, as regards herself, inoperative sentence, and not Russia, that stopped the communications between Constantinople and Circassia for now thirty-two years; that is to say, since the year 1831. During which time Turkey has had to endure the sinking or the seizure of innumerable *Vizzas*, without even so much as the ceremonial of an Admiralty Commission for their confiscation.

This humiliation of the Porte, as bearing upon events continually in progress, produced in effect a conspiracy between it and Russia. It had to cover its own remorse by misrepresentation, and to invent excuses for co-operation with its known enemy. In reply to remonstrances by a European, one of the highest officials of the Empire expressed himself in these terms:—

"The Circassians have themselves only to blame if they are at war with Russia; or if, being at war with her, they are not successful. For by their lawlessness they provoke her vengeance, and by their insubordination they throw away their advantages."

As the Turkish Government has to supply reasons for the abandonment of this people, so has the Russian Government or its officials to offer reasons for attacking them. The following words of a Russian diplomatist, in 1840, give the case as Russia presents it:—

"It would be easy to put an end to the war in the Caucasus, either by leaving it alone, or by striking it down by a series of heavy and concerted blows. But the Imperial Cabinet has other views. It desires to keep up the martial spirit of its army, while at the same time it secures a political safety-valve."

Russia has always to keep in view, in every sentence that she utters, that there must be combined invariably a double picture of her own position, and especially in reference to the Caucasus; having to act upon two people of wholly dissimilar character. From the Eastern world she has to veil the inspiring knowledge of her reverses. To the eyes of Europe she has to parade the consolatory assurances of her debility. In the sight of the one she has to appear an inevitable destiny. To the other she has to be represented

as so silly as to be constantly weakening herself by her own operations.

Now it is not only the disgrace and degradation that ensued for the Porte, who never ventured so much as to remonstrate, but it was the feelings of the members of the Divan that were outraged. Every Turkish official yearns towards Circassia. Every statesman that Turkey has produced has felt that the support of Circassia was necessary to the existence of the Empire. Far-seeing policy and impulsive desire coincided. It was not armies that had to be sent. It was salt and gunpowder. There are, besides, Circassians in high office at Constantinople—Circassians who are wealthy men. Just as in Europe money is subscribed for a country afflicted with famine, or a population that has suffered from inundation, so in like manner at Constantinople there were always ready those who would subscribe gunpowder and salt for the populations of the Caucasus famished by the English Consulate, and overwhelmed by the Russian forces.*

Now, if the trade had been opened by the *Vixen*, the Porte would have been relieved from the humiliation of the confiscation of its vessels, and so have recovered its independence. Charity and foresight would have had free course, whilst abundant supplies would have reached the Mountaineers without charge. The dispositions to aid them, instead of being cowed and crushed, as they have been, would have taken root, and developed themselves. The number of Circassians holding office under the Porte would have been increased, so that without shock, or apparent movement whatever, an amalgamation would have taken place of Circassia and the Ottoman Empire.

When General CHARNOFSKI returned from the East, he was asked by a friend what he had principally remarked there. His answer was, "I have seen a country over which is cast the shadow of the *Vixen*."

The visit of the Circassian deputies to England has suggested the idea of repeating the experiment of the *Vixen*, and, therefore, of reproducing a crisis similar to that of 1837, when, as it was then said, "the fortunes of Russia and the world lie under the hatches of a British schooner."

In the interval, however, an English steamer, the *Kangaroo*, was chartered at Constantinople for Circassia, and despatched thither, laden with arms and ammunition, in February, 1857. It proceeded to coal at Sinope; from thence to Toabs, on the Circassian coast, where it landed Polish, Hungarian, and other adventurers, together with cargo. The weather being stormy, the

* See the extracts already made from German newspapers in 1844, p. 10.

Kangaroo had been unable to tow a brig similarly laden through the gut of the Bosphorus, and some weeks elapsed before it was enabled to continue its voyage. After the transaction was completed, the Russian Embassy at the Porte put itself in motion, and required and obtained the exile from Constantinople of ISMAEL PASHA, a Circassian himself, who had contributed large funds towards the expedition, and of FERHAD PASHA (the Hungarian General STEIN), who had been active in despatching it. After a few months of country life, they were recalled to Constantinople on the fête-day of the Emperor, and as an act of Imperial magnanimity.

Here two questions will naturally be asked. First, why it is proposed now to send a vessel, since the way has been opened? Secondly, why, vessels having been sent, the results as above stated, have not been obtained?

The answer is simple and conclusive. The expedition was planned by the Russian Embassy itself. ISMAIL PASHA, on the one side, and the Poles embarked on the other, being alike dupes of a conspiracy in furtherance of that general scheme of amalgamation for the whole of Caucasia which has been expounded in the foregoing pages. The adventure, however, was an unfortunate one. The manager of the treachery, and the only one apparently cognisant of it on the spot, was detected by the interception of a letter from him to the Russian general. He was tried by a court-martial, condemned, and escaped with his life only through the influence of SEFER PASHA and some other persons, not Circassians, who were not inclined to see the particular crime of treachery too severely visited.

In the course, however, of these proceedings, a confession was drawn up by BANOYA, in which he attempts to justify himself to the *Poles*, the members of the Court-martial, on the grounds of obedience to his natural chiefs, by whom he had been sent to tender this service to Russia in the hope of obtaining from her compensation in her good offices in reference to Hungary. He says, "As Poles you must feel you would not stop at any means which might serve your country. By obeying the orders of my chiefs in the mission entrusted to me here, I still wished to be of use to my unhappy country."

The scheme itself will be found developed in the following extract from the confession:—

"At the same time I entered into communication with ISMAIL PASHA, Postmaster of the Ottoman Empire, a Circassian by birth, who appeared to me patriotic and able to make sacrifices for his country. I consulted with him on the manner in which it might be possible for us to send into Circassia arms, ammunition, tools for artificers, good officers and artisans. But the real plan

of the expedition was arranged between FERHAD PASHA,* Colonel TÜRR, and myself. *Captain* FRANCHINI, *military secretary to the Russian Minister, was present at several of our conferences.* The object was *to gain over Circassia to Russian interests in a peaceable, slow, but certain manner.* Russia may carry on the war for another period of thirty years, and lose several armies without a chance of conquering the mountaineers, and even if by immense sacrifices she succeeded in conquering the country, *every war with the Porte, by putting an end to her maritime power in the Black Sea, will render the occupation of Circassia impossible.*

"On the other hand, it would humiliate Russia in the eyes of Europe to leave the Circassians in peace and not to attack them; it is therefore necessary to put an end to an expensive war and to give satisfaction to Russian honour and interests. When *once* Circassia should have submitted to the direction of FERHAD PASHA and of myself, our plan would be:—

"1st. To choose some native prince who would bring the whole country under his rule.

"2ndly. To persuade the Circassians that they are not to expect any assistance either from the SULTAN or from any other Power.

"3rdly. To demoralise the mountaineers by dint of defeats on the field of battle—defeats studied and prepared beforehand.

"4thly. To bring them to recognise the CZAR as their nominal sovereign, without paying any tribute, but admitting garrisons into the country.

"The Russians, in the mean while, were to refrain from all attack on Circassia, and come to our assistance by operating on a large scale, only when the Circassians should have been already rendered tame and tractable. The Hungarians imported into Circassia would be placed about the prince; the more capable would be entrusted with the important posts. All the public functionaries would be chosen amoug our creatures.

Captain FRANCHINI assured us that Russia required nothing more than apparent submission, and concluded with much reason, that if before the war several thousand Circassians allowed themselves to be led by Russia to fight against their own countrymen; in future, when all motives of enmity between the two nations shall have disappeared, a multitude of young Circassians would eagerly join the Russian flag.

"By opening up the ways of commerce a competition between the Greco-Russian and Turkish traders would be inevitable, and then Russian merchants would overrun the country in the same way that the Turkish do now. Like the Circassian soldiers returning to their country from the Russian regiments, the Russian traders would also propagate Russian ideas in the country. Peace, commercial intercourse, the luxuries of life to which the richer inhabitants would get accustomed, the marks of imperial favour, money, and Russian orders would do the rest, and in twelve or fifteen years all these means of influence will make Circassia what Georgia now really is.

"We had the hope to obtain for our expedition the concurrence of several Circassians, or friends of Circassia, high in place, with the intention of compromising them and preventing their future intervention in the affairs of their country.

"*The 22nd September* ISMAIL PASHA *recommended me to engage for Circassia several hundred Poles who were barracked in Scutari, and who had formed part of the legion under* ZAMOYSKI, *since the employment of the Polish element might*

* At the time mentioned Ferhad Pasha was writing voluminous letters to persons in England, declaring the English and French Governments to be in collusion with Russia, and asking assistance for plans respecting Turkey.

become very dangerous to the Russians, and since the fidelity of the Poles might be relied upon in an enterprise against Russia. I promised to reflect, and went the same evening to FERHAD PASHA to communicate the news. The proposal did not agree with our plans, but it was difficult to reject it. The Circassians did not merely ask for officers, they wanted also soldiers, and we had no plausible motive to refuse the co-operation of the Poles, whose hatred to Russia is notorious. FERHAD PASHA had also heard that efforts were made among the Poles to make them act in Circassia."

At the time the most extraordinary efforts were made in all parts of Europe to discredit this confession and the circumstances connected with it, although no European journal would give insertion to it. It is brought within the knowledge of future history only by the act of the Poles, aided by some English gentlemen at Constantinople, who transmitted the documents to London, and there had them published. The Circassian Deputies when at Manchester were closely questioned in respect to the transaction. Their answers confirmed in every respect the statements which had been sent from Constantinople, and with which they themselves were wholly unacquainted.

Having seen Persia filched from her grasp by a slave who became a King; having seen Turkey filched from her grasp by a SULTAN who became a reformer, Russia must have acquired the habit of looking to possibilities in an unfavourable as well as a favourable light. She must have said to herself, "What are the unfortunate contingencies which may come to pass in Transcaucasia if I fail to subdue it by arms, or bend it to my will by contrivance?" It is not of likely, but of unlikely, things that we here speak. What we point to is not, therefore, an amalgamation with the Ottoman Empire, but the rise of a distinct and native power. Let us consider the case with a view to such a possibility, which requires that we should bring within the range of vision the regions, positions, and populations adjoining it on the south; a just estimate of which is, moreover, requisite for any one who would understand either what Russia meditates, or what it is possible for her to accomplish.

If the Caucasus is a rampart, the Ararat, with the group to which it belongs, is a fortress. Its northern slopes come down to the valleys of the Phasis and the Kur.

The strength of the country is further demonstrated by the endurance of the population. No more can a date be assigned to the Kurds than it can be to the Circassians. They, too, have seen the tides of historically recorded empire ebb and flow, rise and disappear around them. XENOPHON, twenty-two centuries ago, describes their condition much as it might be described to-day; and amongst the stores of the British Museum may be consulted the vivid impersonations of Sir ROBERT KERR PORTER,

of costumes which in richness and picturesque effect convey anything but the idea of a rude and savage people.

The mountain chain of Zagros, which they inhabit, rises to the height nearly of Mont Blanc, exceeding 14,000 feet. It is intersected by rich and beautiful valleys and plains, under the most healthy climate. They can muster 100,000 hardy, warlike, or rather desperate, men, trained and armed. These are almost all horsemen, and their breed of horses is admirable. They have strong feelings of clanship, and conjoin the professions of shepherd, agriculturist, and robber. Magnificent ruins, however, attest higher qualifications, and the name of SALADIN, a Curd, throws round their savage nature a halo of romance.

The larger portion of the group is inhabited by a very different population, the Armenians, formerly, like the Jews, most warlike, are now the reverse. They trace back their pedigree to Haïc, the son of Togarmah. From one of their kings Ararat is said to have derived its name, so that their permanency, like that of the Kurds, affords a corroboration of the strength of the country. Both concur in their political leanings, and these are towards the Porte; the Kurds finding in the Nizam a field of distinction, the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire one of speculation. Were Russia to be to-morrow in possession of Anatolia, she would find in the Masian mountains a second Caucasus.

Were a Caucasian kingdom to arise, it would be protected on the south against Persia and Turkey by a scarcely less formidable barrier than on the north by the Caucasus. It would lie between two ramparts which no engineers could blow up.* It would be defended by seas for ditches, and these wholly untraversable by an enemy. It would thus be an unassailable fortress, exceeding in extent Great Britain and Ireland, with the most beautiful climate, under the mildest zones, and bearing the richest produce. Traversed by the sea breezes along its length, cooled by those from the snowy tops on the north and on the south. It is capable of bearing a population of twenty millions of souls: it is a "virgin" soil for grain, and could inundate Europe with silk and cotton.

Such a possibility would have sufficed to prompt all the efforts that Russia has made in order to render it an impossibility. In the meantime she has to take her measures as imperiously to break the prosperity of the plains, until these come securely into her hands, as to crush the martial spirit of the mountains.

This contingency had to be guarded against by the self-same

* Sir R. Kerr Porter, in passing through the Vladi Caucase, found the Russians at work demolishing an ancient fortress, lest it should be occupied by the Circassians. He remarks, "But they cannot blow up the mountain."

process through which the whole operation had to be conducted, namely, the preventing of intercourse with the West. The combination of the clans of Circassia under one chief had never yet taken place, and every probability was against it. For a Caucasia to be created, it required a confidence to be placed in the same individual by the mountaineers as by the inhabitants of the plain, by the Mussulmans as by the Christians. This new creation could, therefore, only be effected by a stranger.

The like has happened before. The Lebanon, shortly after it became divided into two hostile sects, devised for itself a similar process for obtaining tranquillity at home together with defence. Maronites and Druzes concurred in selecting a foreign Prince, the conditions of whose rule were, that he should neither be a Druze nor a Maronite; and that he should bring no strangers with him into the Mountain. On the failure of this first line they elected a second and then a third. Thus they preserved themselves for a thousand years, free from religious war or persecution, and independent.

To a similar process the Russian Empire itself owes its origin. A foreigner and an Englishman, by obtaining authority over the discordant elements and hostile races then inhabiting the Sarmatian plains, instituted that dominion which soon after was called Muscovite, and is now known by the name of Russian.

If this danger had not presented itself to Russia as a forethought, it was forced upon her at the very moment that a stranger from the West landed on those shores. Within thirty-six hours ten thousand of the Mountaineers were assembled, representing various tribes. Amongst them spontaneously arose the project of a Union, and their proposals were conveyed through a Georgian. This Georgian had been in the household of the the SULTAN, and was sent from Constantinople with a view to such possible contingency by a former Turkish Ambassador in London. In the course of the years 1835-6, had there been in the English Cabinet freedom from private engagements towards Russia, this Caucasian State would have been erected; and the hope of success being broken alike in the Cabinet of Russia and amongst its people, Europe and Asia would have been spared the wars, insurrections, and commotions which from that time they have undergone, and rescued from those further contingencies of a similar nature to which they are exposed.

The reasons, however, which impose it upon Russia as a very necessity of existence to exclude all observation from the Black Sea, would be very inadequately understood without the knowledge of the condition of her navy.

THE RUSSIAN NAVY IN THE BLACK SEA.

During the Polish war one Pole had the idea of striking in this quarter the enemy of his country. His views were exposed in a memoir which was circulated as a curiosity, but which bore no signature. The writer had been for several years a common sailor in the Russian fleet. He described the composition and condition of the crews and their dispositions. According to his statement they consisted of drafts from the Baltic Provinces and of Poles. No apprehension being entertained in regard to men so circumstanced, the police regulations observed through other departments of the State were neglected. Thus the crew of each vessel was a body of ready-made conspirators, wanting only a leader and an occasion. These dispositions were fomented by the oppression under which they groaned, and the misery they endured. The service in regard to the mere nautical part, he sets down as destitute of all faculties of seamanship. The writer thereupon proposed that the Polish Government, in connection with the independent tribes of Circassia, should issue letters of marque for the Black Sea, purchasing the vessels in Europe, sending them disguised through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. He asserted that with one or two such vessels, the whole Russian navy could be secured, and thereby an insurrection in the South called forth to co-operate with the Polish movements.

When, six years later, the *Vixen* was captured in the bay of Soudjouk-Kaleh by the Russian brig *Ajax*, entering seaward, a prize crew was put on board of her, and the eight English sailors were transferred to the *Ajax*. During the passage from Soudjouk-Kaleh to Sebastopol, the crew of the *Ajax*, being in part from the Baltic, found means of communicating with the English sailors, and entreated them to aid them to take possession of the *Ajax*. These Englishmen replied to them, that there would be no use in capturing the *Ajax*, as she would be immediately retaken by the other Russian vessels. Their answer was: "The crews of the other vessels are the same as the crew of the *Ajax*. When we have taken the *Ajax* and secured the officers, we will sail into Sebastapol and secure the fleet."

The project was seriously debated; it was resolved in the negative, upon grounds wholly irrespective of success: these were, that the capture of a Russian vessel would be disapproved of by those who had devised the expedition. The circumstances here stated are drawn from the correspondence of the master of the *Vixen*, Childs. This portion was, however, suppressed in the

correspondence as published. Corroboratory references will, however, be found in contemporary publications.

If the foregoing statements in reference to Sebastopol have obtained in the reader's mind any degree of credit, he will be in a position to look at the term "Russian Fleet in the Black Sea," as similar in nature to "Sebastopol the centre of Russian Power." The latter delusion being the greater of the two, it will be easier to admit of the truth in the former. It would lead us too far to make the attempt either to trace the processes by which the truth has been misrepresented, or to present in themselves the nautical circumstances of the Black Sea. We must content ourselves with stating that there is but one conclusion in the minds of those conversant with the case. That is, that Russia is totally destitute of naval means of action. In the "Progress of Russia," that arm is not so much as once referred to by the British Envoy in Persia. The British Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE, at the close of 1853, spoke of the injustice and the danger of restraining the maritime action of Turkey against Russia, when the Turkish fleet was kept by the Allies in port, so that the Sinope squadron might be sacrificed. His predecessor, Lord PONSONBY, at the same time published a letter, in which he uses these words: "You have entered the Black Sea, not to protect the Turks, but the Russians." In the course of the following February, 1854, a diplomatic servant of one of the Western Powers, and conversant with the East from his boyhood, spoke these words: "If there could be a question as to the superiority of Turkey over Russia in reference to the land, I should not have deemed it possible that there should be any such question in reference to the sea." The first diplomatist of Austria, PRONESCH VON OSTEN, has borne testimony to the same effect. Finally, at the Conference of Vienna, the Plenipotentiaries of Russia could so far trust to the delusion she had established of her supremacy in the Black Sea, as to make use of the statement of the contrary truth as an argument for a particular end. (See Eastern Papers, No. 13, pp. 77, 78.)

Having now completed the exposition of the case, and shewn why Russia, in order to prevent intercourse, has aimed at suppressing knowledge of everything connected with the Black Sea, Sebastopol, and the Caucasus, we proceed to the immediate circumstances which have torn the veil from this mystery.

THE ARRIVAL OF CIRCASSIAN DEPUTIES IN ENGLAND.

The remarkable step taken by the Circassian people, of sending their own delegates to Europe, presents a wonderful contrast with all contemporary things, and carries us at once back to our

schoolboy associations of Greece and Rome. These delegates are not diplomatists. They were not deputed to Governments. They are sent to the Kings and to the people.* They expect to be received in an assembly, according, as they say, to the fashion of their own country. Having failed to obtain admission to the Queen of ENGLAND, they at once address themselves to the people. For the first time for many generations, a people in Europe is addressed by the representatives of another people.

Nor is this all. What they call upon the people to do is something which the people can do themselves, and in which every single individual, however humble, can bear his part. They do not ask for votes of sympathy; they do not ask for public resolutions, or for petitions to Parliament. They simply say, "Come and traffic with us. We do not fear Russia by land, we can easily stem the torrent of her invasion on that side, if you will not render the sea our enemy by submitting to have your own legitimate trade cut off. If you are merchants, you can send out ships. And if the merchants fear to do so, you can subscribe pounds or pence towards sending out a ship, and so you will open the way for merchants without fear to pursue their natural avocations."

In their private conversation they have gone further:—

"The English nation thinks itself secure, and is indifferent. They know nothing of what is going on in the world, and are backward to seize the opportunity which we afford them of delivering themselves from the greatest dangers. If very few of the English only were to undertake this work, they may procure the means of doing so from others who are not so indifferent. There are in Turkey many powerful men who, though they would not venture to charter an English ship from Constantinople themselves, would assist you in doing so if they were confident that you were sincere. There are even Circassians who are wealthy. There are kings in Europe besides those of England and France, who must desire that the power of Russia should be broken. Here is the way to break it. The Polish nation itself has means as well as numbers. Circassia offers them a second Poland which English ships can reach."

The result has been that a Circassian Committee has been instituted in London, the Chairman of which, a lawyer of eminence, has been known for many years by his persistent and strenuous efforts in the cause of Poland. This body, unlike the Polish Association, has proposed to itself a definite and practical object,

* When in 1857, the Circassians appealed to England, one of the reasons given in Parliament for rejecting their appeal was, that they had addressed the Queen, and not the British Government.

which is no other than that of chartering a ship to convey th
puties home to their own country. The deputies thereupon
taken their departure for Constantinople, to confer with
countrymen there assembled; proposing there to await the v
having solemnly sworn before their departure to embark in
vessel, with the full knowledge that they devote them
thereby to death in case of capture; but reckoning that
death in that fashion will be more beneficial to their country
than thousands of lives merely sacrificed on the field of batt

Thereupon this Committee has applied itself to prepar
legal grounds for its enterprise. It has addressed the Min
for Foreign Affairs, stating its purpose, and requiring to k
whether there are any legal impediments to its execution.
such impediments have been brought forward by the For
Minister in reply; the Committee thereupon declare that they
that no legal impediments exist. It follows that, should the v
be captured by the Russians, recourse would be had to a Cou
Law for the payment of damages by the Foreign Minister.

The Committee have likewise applied to the Privy Counc
ascertain whether any warlike obstructions of the characte
blockade had existence, and to the Committee of LLOYD'S
the existence of any regulations of a municipal character.
reply of the first body has been a reference to the Foreign-o
and of the second the denial of the notification of any
regulations.

This method of procedure is calculated to give confidence
in the judiciousness and in the legal and practical sense of
Circassian Committee; whilst the correspondence itself
aside all doubts as to any grounds of lawful objection that
be taken by the Russian Government to the expedition in q
tion. The vessel to be sent will, therefore, be a repetition o
affair of the *Vixen*, under circumstances very different to tho
1837, not only in regard to the source of the expedition, but
to the dispositions of the Ottoman Empire.

THE CONFISCATION OF THE "VIXEN" IN 1837 CONTRASTED W
THE CASE OF A VESSEL SENT OUT IN 1863.

The capture and confiscation of the *Vixen* was an event c
lated (as it has proved) to deter any merchant from again u
such an issue. Not so when the resolution to try it has once
formed independently of commercial objects. That confisc
then becomes a favourable instead of an unfavourable proce
for the following reasons:—

The English Government notified to the Russian its

the Act of Confiscation, not on the grounds of any Blockade instituted by Russia, nor on the grounds of any Regulations instituted by Russia that could affect territory not in her possession. Now these were the only obstructions ever spoken of to the Trade of Circassia. It was, though wholly without foundation, to one or other or both of those causes, that this Confiscation in 1837 was and has ever since been attributed. The Admiral in command of the Black Sea, announced its capture because of a "breach of bockade," and for carrying on trade "with the enemies of the Empire." The Vice-admiralty Commission of Sebastopol (for no legal tribunal was called into play) condemned the vessel on different and incompatible grounds; namely, the infraction of sanitary, police and customs regulations.

"The moment for firmness in language and decision in act has arrived; and let it not be forgotten that a neglect of such junctures —a constant sacrifice of opportunities in dealing with a powerful and encroaching adversary—must at length place us in a position where to struggle may be vain, and we may awake from our lethargy too late for safety."

These words are from the Preface to the second edition of Sir JOHN MCNEILL'S "Progress of Russia." It was published in 1838. The sentence must therefore have been written with reference to the *Vixen*, and while the betrayal of that vessel was still kept back from the public.

The English Government accepted the seizure and condemnation again on wholly different grounds; namely, the *de facto* occupation by Russia of the bay on which the *Vixen* was captured. These grounds were assumed on an assertion to that effect in a despatch of the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Lord DURHAM.

Sir STRATFORD CANNING moved for the copy of the decision of the Admiralty Commission under which the *Vixen* was condemned. He was told by the Foreign Minister that all the documents on the subject should be furnished.* This document is suppressed, if indeed it ever existed. All that is given is an article in the *St. Petersburg Gazette*. In this article the *Vixen* is declared confiscated as a smuggler. If, then, this document really exists, it must be in accordance with the statements of the officers on the station. These officers prove in their statements that Soudjouk-Kaleh was not in possession of the Russians, since they declare that the *Vixen* lay at anchor there thirty-six hours before it was overtaken by the *Ajax*. An Admiralty Commission could only

* The Conversation in which this promise was made, took place in the House of Commons, June 16, 1838. It occupies three columns of the Mirror of Parliament. It is entirely excluded from *Hansard's Debates*.

have dealt with a matter of blockade; a matter respecting the customs must have been referred to a finance commission. If it is not so, why was this document suppressed by the English Government? If it was really, as Lord DURHAM asserts, published in the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* of the 12th January, 1837, it must have been to exhibit, by its contradiction with the article, the omnipotence of Russia over the British Crown. The archives of the British Museum do not afford the means of ascertaining the truth, since the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* is excluded from its shelves. Perhaps some one who has access to a file of the Russian papers will make the inquiry.

Throughout the whole of this correspondence Russia no where asserts that Soudjouk Kaleh was in her possession, nor does even Lord DURHAM in his despatch say that he was told so by the Russians. He speaks as of his own knowledge. There must have been some reason for the avoidance by Russia of saying that Soudjouk Kaleh was in her possession, which she could easily have done, seeing what Lord DURHAM had written. She could also have made Lord DURHAM'S statement true, by occupying Soudjouk Kaleh; for not only the expedition but the destination of the vessel was known to her many months before the vessel left London. The season of the year was also favourable, and the anchorage was good. She might have transferred there, with the greatest facility, a body of troops, and erected a redoubt in the bay as she afterwards did. She might at all events have kept a squadron of vessels there constantly at anchor. But she did nothing of the sort. On the contrary, with her vessels almost within hail, at Anapa on the north, and Gheiengik on the south, she allowed the *Vixen* to sail by her observing ports, and her vessels both at anchor and under sail. It was only after thirty-six hours of uninterrupted communication had been allowed to her, that the *Ajax* was sent in to capture her. The public naturally disregarded the despatch of Lord DURHAM containing a falsehood too glaring to be deemed worth while dwelling upon, to accept the interpretation thus prepared for them, of Russian municipal regulations affecting territory not in her possession, to the extent of excluding all communication with it.

The game so played was the only one which, on that occasion, could have saved Russia. It was successful only because no one could have guessed it beforehand. Having been played, it is expended, and cannot be attempted a second time. The *Vixen* is, therefore, a drama which may be repeated from London, but which cannot be repeated from St. Petersburg.

The confiscation of the *Vixen* took place only eight years after the war between Russia and Turkey, in which the former had

been successful and the latter beaten; and also after (to use the words of POZZO DI BORGO) "the public opinion of Europe had abandoned to Russia the forts and coasts of the Asiatic shore of the Black Sea." The repetition of the experiment, if now made, will be under circumstances very different, and, indeed wholly the reverse of the former ones. Eight years have now again elapsed since a war between Russia and Turkey, in which the former was beaten and the latter triumphant; and after the public opinion of Europe, in consequence of this event, had, by the Treaty of Paris, resumed from Russia that eastern coast of the Black Sea which had been abandoned to her in 1829.

The sacrifice of the forces of England and France in the Crimea, the failure of their attempts upon Sebastopol, the fall of Kars, the failure of the Allies to impose upon Russia an indemnity for the expenses of the war, and the peace concluded, not by rejecting, but by accepting the Note of Prince MENSCHIKOFF, are disastrous events, which must be separated from the war of the Turks and the Russians, and set down solely to the account of the Allies. Those Allies, by the false arrangements which they made, and by the point which they chose, defeated themselves, and apparently involved the Porte in the consequences. The war, according to the British Secretary at War (Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT) "presented this peculiarity, that we were agreed with our enemy, but not with our Ally." From this position the other peculiarity flowed, that the Allies of Turkey were beaten by Russia, whilst Russia was beaten by Turkey. This will be seen from the simplest statement of those circumstances which have passed before our eyes, but which the daily comments of the press have rendered incomprehensible throughout Europe.*

Russia pretended to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire in reference to the Holy Sepulchre. The Porte refused to admit such interference. The Governments of England and France, but especially the former, attempted to induce the Porte to consent to this interference, and failed. The English Ambassador obtained, by using the utmost pressure, and after being closeted for several hours with the SULTAN, that the Northern Provinces of the Empire should be left unoccupied by Turkish troops; thus a territory equal to Great Britain remained without a single soldier to oppose the Russian advance. The Russians then, on the 8th of July, 1853, crossed the Pruth with eight thousand men without a declaration of war, pretending that they advanced to seize the Danubian Principalities, and to hold them as a "material guarantee" for the fulfilment by Turkey

* "This inscrutable mystery."—*Lord John Russell.*

of pretended engagements towards her in reference to her Christian subjects. The English Government, which had caused the withdrawal of the Turkish forces, now required of the SULTAN that he should not proclaim war, but endure the invasion, promising at the same time to have the affair settled by arbitration of the Great Powers. The award issued from Vienna in consequence was neither to reject Prince MENSCHIKOFF'S Note nor to denounce the invasion of the Turkish territory, on which was subsequently based their own declaration of war. It even went beyond the MENSCHIKOFF Note, by the addition of a most remarkable term. That Note required that Turkey should fulfil the "spirit" of her engagements towards Russia; the Vienna award added "AND LETTER."

It was now to be expected that nothing remained for Turkey but to submit. The whole forces of the Russian Empire were on the march for the South, Wallachia and Moldavia were occupied, a general insurrection of all the Christian subjects throughout the Empire was daily expected, and all Europe backed Russia in her pretensions. The majority of the persons composing the Turkish Government were smitten with terror. They shared with the generality of Europe in ignorance of their own strength and of Russia's weakness. But that happened which had happened before after the battle of Navarino, and on the demand for the extradition of the Hungarian Refugees. A sense of dignity and of honour made up for the deficiencies in knowledge and capacity, and the Porte declared war. No efforts were indeed made to accumulate troops; and the operations of the war, thus hurried by a shock as an abortion into being, were left to local chances. General BEM had three years before addressed a letter to the SULTAN, in which he used these words: "Your Majesty's troops will always give a good account of twice the number of Austrians or of Russians, if brought into the field against them, and Your MAJESTY can bring into the field twice the number of troops that these Governments can conjointly bring against Your MAJESTY."

The anticipations of this great General were fully borne out by the battles of Kalafat, Oltenizza, and Citate, where the numbers on both sides afforded three several opportunities of testing their truth. But they were destined to receive a far more wonderful confirmation before Silistria, when the whole available force of Russia was broken by the garrison of a single town. The event was announced by the *Times* in the following words:—

"Swift and terrible has been the retribution which has fallen on the Russian army engaged in this shameful and unprovoked aggression, and the chastisement is rendered the more humiliating

to the pride of the CZAR, and the more important to the political independence of the Porte, by the fact that a division of the Turkish army, unassisted by European troops, has sufficed to expel the invader with unexampled losses. These glorious results belong to the Turkish arms exclusively, and the soldiers of the SULTAN never fought with more devoted, and successful bravery, than on this occasion."*

The defeat of the Russian army, and its flight northward, withdrew from Russia that "material guarantee" upon which she had seized to enforce the MENSCHIKOFF Note. Russia was left in the alternative, of withdrawing the MENSCHIKOFF Note, or continuing the state of war. The state of war being continued, on the supposition, of course, that no Allies interfered, and that no Austrian troops entered Wallachia, Russia could do nothing, as the Turkish forces would now be posted on the Pruth, or rather in Bessarabia, which must have fallen. The present condition of the Steppes intervening between the Dniester and her resources, renders it impossible to bring up an army in a condition to meet an enemy in Bessarabia without Bessarabia itself for a place of recruitment.

On the declaration of war being issued by the Turkish Government, Odessa, in common with ISMAEL and the maritime towns, was seized with a panic, and the principal inhabitants fled. (See reports of Consul YEAMES.) So conscious were they of their unprotected condition, alike by land and by sea, and so prevalent was the alarm of a general insurrection, which would ensue upon the appearance of a Turkish naval expedition, looked for as a necessary consequence of a declaration of war. Russia was from that moment placed without the limits of any possible action; and whilst exposed to eminent hazard from internal insurrectionary movements, could do absolutely nothing to injure her enemy.

On the other hand, Turkey had every means of action open to her at her option. She could support Poland, and restore it; she could by a word recover Georgia.

But, without taking any active steps, without expending a piastre, or moving a soldier, she could by merely sitting quiet, extinguish the Russian Empire. For, being at war, the Bosphorus was closed.

Up to the period of this war, the designs of Russia against India, whenever discussed, or however concluded upon, were always set aside as of little or no moment, through the consciousness which every Englishman entertained, of the absolute control

* *Times*, June 22, 1854.

which his country possessed over Russia. It was felt that England being able to strike Russia in her commerce, was in possession of a counter check, which would prevent Russia from ever using any facilities of injury which she might possess. Now this check consisted solely in the geographical conformation of that Empire. It is this. The exports of Russia give her her wealth, and upon their free interchange with the world depends the revenue of the Government, and the loyalty of the nobles to their Sovereign. But Russia has got no sea-board commensurate with her dimensions, and indeed no sea-board at all. The Baltic and the Black Sea, which she has reached in recent times, are themselves but estuaries of confluent rivers, from which the ocean is only arrived at through a narrow gut. It is thus that by a few men-of-war, or indeed by a few privateers costing the State not a penny, England obtained this check over Russia, and thus secured at once her tenure of India, and her confidence as a great Maritime Power. The cruisers and the privateers having of course the faculty to search all vessels, and to seize all enemy's property.

Now, from the moment that the state of war exists between Russia and Turkey, the latter *ipso facto*, becomes possessed of all the power over Russia, which England had abandoned at Paris in 1856, or at least one half of it. She might indeed succeed to the whole by issuing half a dozen letters of marque for cruisers in the North. She has never done so, for dexterity and combination are qualities that belong only to Russian action.

In the case, as we have placed it, the alternative for Russia was therefore the withdrawal of the MENCHIKOFF Note, or the acceptance of a normal condition of war with the Porte, by which the exportation from all the countries watered by the Volga, the Don, the Dniester, the Dnieper, and the Bug, would be suppressed, the internal movements of commerce arrested, the commercial cities afflicted with panic, bankruptcy, and famine. The agricultural population, unable to sell their produce, which the city population would be unable to buy; and in fact the whole country exposed to convulsion, insurrection, and anarchy. It is easy to calculate how many months such a condition could have endured.

This war never could or would have been undertaken by Russia, had she not beforehand most effectually taken her measures to prevent the occurrence of such contingencies, or the revelation of such a position. She was prepared for the alternative of her own defeat by the presence of the Allies in the Black Sea, who restrained from action the Turkish fleet; who, by allowing her commerce to go free, prevented the Turks from interrupting it; who did not blockade Odessa, although that blockade had been three times announced in Parliament, but

who did blockade Constantinople by stopping the supplies from the Danube, as soon as the Provinces were freed from the Russians; and who, pursuing the same plan in the Baltic, made themselves tributary to Russia for enormous sums of gold, whilst they were nominally at war with her—twenty-seven millions of which were paid by England alone.

As, therefore, the consequences to be drawn from the opening of Circassia, must in reality depend on the dispositions of the Turkish Government, and as these dispositions must ultimately depend upon whether that Government quails before Russia, or is conscious of the power of resisting her, the difference will at once be apprehended between an experiment of this kind, made after a war in which Turkey had been beaten, and the same experiment made after a war in which Russia has been beaten.

We now come to the Treaty of Paris: Article 11, is as follows:—

"The Black Sea is *neutralised;* its waters and its ports, thrown open to the mercantile marine of every nation, are formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war, either of the Powers possessing its coasts, or of any other Power, with the exceptions mentioned in Articles 14 and 19 of the present Treaty."

The term "neutralised" has no sense, and "Black Sea," is a generality. If anything had been agreed to be done, that would have to be specified, and the parties to be named. These would be the parties to the Treaty, and not others. Supposing anything had been stipulated and agreed to by Russia and Turkey, that would not affect the "Black Sea" as such, but only their own coasts on the Black Sea. The term "Black Sea" is, therefore, only introduced to obtain some vague and general authority by which to regulate the intercourse with the Circassian coast, not with a view to throw it open to "the mercantile marine of every nation," but to exclude the mercantile marine of every nation. And so in the ensuing Article (No. 12), Russia and the Sublime Porte are mentioned as the two Powers possessing that sea.

There is, therefore, in the terms of this Treaty nothing which can affect favourably the project in question, but the reverse. The real sense of the Treaty of Paris is, however ,not the sense that has been put forward by the Western Governments who signed that Treaty; the last thing that they would desire is, that the real sense of that Treaty should be understood. Their self-managed discomfiture in the war is veiled, under the natural sense of the words:—"The Black Sea is open to the commerce of all nations." This is what they have offered to the nations as the accomplishment of their design "to arrest the aggressions of Russia;" and on the other hand, as the compensa-

tion, and the sole compensation for the sacrifice of one hundred thousand of their troops, and two hundred millions sterling of their treasure.

At all events, the generally accepted sense of the Treaty of Paris as having freed the Black Sea, will facilitate the expedition on the part of the English public, and render to the English Government far more difficult either obstruction made now, or sacrifice endured afterwards. For then various questions would be raised of a most painful nature to individual statesmen, most alarming to the Government generally, and most exciting to the people, namely:—

"Why did you go to war with Russia in 1854?"

"Were you beaten by Russia in that war?"

"Were the Turks triumphant till you interfered?"

"Why did you suspend and afterwards surrender the Right of Search?"

"Why did you spare Odessa?"

"Why did you attack Sebastopol?"

"Why did you not recover Bessarabia?"

"Why did you not help the Circassians?"

"Why did you betray Kars?" And, lastly,

"Why did you, the English Government, refuse the offers of Austria, France, and Prussia, to restore Poland?"

In fact, such proceedings on the part of the English Government against the undertaking of the Circassian Committee as would bring the case into a court of law, would be nothing else than putting the English Government on its trial for connivance with Russia in a war against herself.

But the Treaty of Paris contains something more than stipulations affecting the Belligerents. The Plenipotentiaries assume to themselves a prerogative hitherto unheard of amongst men: that of being a congress to alter the Law of Nations. In this character they abolish, or pretend to abolish, for those who are parties to that act, the right of capturing the persons and property of enemies on board the ships of neutrals. Now, it would appear that from the moment of the signature of that Treaty down to the present, Russia had never ceased one moment from the operation of her cruisers in the Black Sea, employed in watching the Circassian coast, and the operations of which consist in capturing Turkish vessels, and in confiscating whatever property she finds on board, whether Turkish or Circassian, and in seizing the persons of Circassians. This matter has been officially brought to the knowledge of the English Government in reference to the recent capture of seventy-two Circassians returning home after having made arrangements for emigration

into Turkey. The English Minister replied by declaring his intention not to interfere between the Russians and the Circassians. (See Letter of Lord RUSSELL, 12th December, 1862.) So that it is evident that in regard to the Declaration on Maritime Law, no less than in regard to the Treaty of Paris, the English Government in signing engagements, and in suffering engagements so signed to be violated, has been carrying through the same design as in the war of 1854. But this also is a matter that has to be concealed; and the expedition of the vessel to Circassia will have the effect of exposing the hollowness of the Declaration of Paris* no less than that of the Treaty of Paris.†

We now come to the practical issue: What will Russia do? Will she pursue the same course as with the *Kangaroo* and its consort in 1857, or with the *Vixen* in 1837? Will she allow the vessel to land and complete her voyage, as the safest course, trusting afterwards to the chapter of accidents; or will she seize the vessel to stop the chapter of accidents?

In the first case the matter is solved.

In the second comes the knot. This we have now to consider.

This time the vessel will be insured. This time the affair will not be in the hands of a merchant, who, having his fortune at the disposal of Russia in the Danubian Provinces, could be made bankrupt, and so be prevented from taking any steps. If the voyage be interrupted the case will now be brought into a court of law, as between the underwriters and the Foreign Minister. There will be no possibility of evading a legal issue by the unsubstantiated words of an Ambassador at St. Petersburg, asserting a *de facto* occupation where none existed; for two reasons.

First. In the recent correspondence between Lord RUSSELL and the Circassian Deputies, he speaks of the Circassians as an independent people; and, consequently, no statement of an English Ambassador to the Court of St. Petersburg, whether made by

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* Russia may reply: "The Declaration of Paris has reference only to belligerent rights and not to municipal regulations." This is all that is required, namely, a confession that her proceedings are piratical.

† A subsidiary Convention to the Treaty of Paris was signed between the Emperor of Russia and the Sultan, "limiting their naval force in the Black Sea."

Article I. The High Contracting Parties mutually engage not to have in the Black Sea any other vessels of war than those of which the number, the force, and the dimensions are hereinafter stipulated.

Article II. The High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves, each to maintain in that sea six steam-vessels of fifty mètres in length at the line of flotation, of a tonnage of eight hundred tons at the maximum; and four light steam or sailing vessels of a tonnage which shall not exceed two hundred tons each.

him or imputed to him, can be accepted as evidence in reference to any event occurring, not in Russia, the country to which he is accredited, but in Circassia.

Second. The underwriters being the plaintiffs, the ordinary forms of a court of law would require the preliminary introduction of proof, in reference to this matter, from the log of the vessel and the crew.

De facto occupation and municipal regulations are thus wholly excluded by the terms of submission, and cannot be pleaded.

Blockade cannot be pleaded, as no blockade has been proclaimed, nor has a Declaration of War issued.

As there is no plea that can be set up, so is there no question as to the verdict.

It is true that the acts of pirates are exempted from the contingencies of insurance. This gives everything that can be desired, since there can be no alternative between the term "piracy" being affixed by a court of law to the acts of the Russian Government, and the British Minister being cast in damages for connivance in piratical acts.

But this is not all. The Circassian Deputies will be on board the vessel. In case of capture, they will be seized, and sent to Siberia.

That the combination of two such results will have effects of great importance on Europe, cannot be doubted. But there is an effect which they will have in the East, of far greater importance, and which will not easily be apprehended. It will establish the conviction, or at least point towards the conviction in the mind of the Porte, of the connivance of the English with the Russian Government. There can be no event more fatal than this to Russia. Nothing stands between the Ottoman Empire and entire independence, but its reliance upon England as being opposed to Russia.

That the Queen of ENGLAND is endowed with extraordinary qualifications is now a secret to none. Scarcely less so is it that she is inspired with a fervent zeal for her country's honour and welfare. Her whole life has been a struggle against that system on the part of her Ministers which, during twenty-five years has placed the resources of England at the disposal of the Government of St. Petersburg. The commencement of her reign was signalised by the sacrifice of the *Vixen*, a subject on which she was not informed: it having been delayed until her accession, because it could not have been attempted under her uncle and predecessor, WILLIAM IV., who on that subject was informed. She has lived to see Deputies from that betrayed country arrive in her dominions to claim her protection. Her Minister, in

answering their first appeal, does so in the name of the Government, to the exclusion of the name of the QUEEN. It is, therefore, to be inferred that the QUEEN has remained for the past uncompromised in reference to Circassia; and that is all that is required to be able to estimate the course which the QUEEN will adopt in case of the seizure by Russia of this vessel.

Indeed, the decision of the QUEEN can scarcely be considered a matter of prospective speculation, seeing that Lord RUSSELL, after refusing to receive the Circassian Deputies, and after passing by the Crown in rejecting their appeal, did receive an exiled Prince from Daghestan, or that large portion of the south-eastern Caucasus which has submitted to Russia, and did offer to be the channel of his appeal to the QUEEN. This change in Lord RUSSELL is explicable only by information having reached the QUEEN in reference to Circassia, and by her having engaged the Foreign Minister to co-operate with her in its behalf.

To predict which alternative Russia will select is impossible; for her decision will be based upon arrangements with, or estimate of, individuals in London, Paris, and Constantinople. Clearly the case for her will be one of a choice of difficulties. It may, indeed, be equally difficult, on the other side, to say which of the two alternatives would be most desirable for the promoters of the expedition. This at least is certain: that from the moment the vessel sails the blow will have been struck—the first blow that ever, in the course of her history, will have been, in sense and sincerity, struck against her. A blow the counterpart to that directed against Sebastopol. It will be, not against her one invulnerable, but her one vulnerable point; one which she can neither endure nor parry, and which can be struck without cost or loss—above all things, without the intervention of an European Government. So that while, on the one hand, it is the means by which the aggressions of Russia can be stopped, so is it the only thing which the people of Europe can do for themselves and which, indeed, might be done for all by any individual combining in himself public-mindedness and moderate fortune.

INTERNAL DANGERS OF RUSSIA.

It has always been the practice of at least the diplom portion of the European public, to dispose of any anxieties c sioned by the external operations of Russia, by adducing internal weakness, the embarrassment of her finances, and insubordination of her people. While ignoring the exist of Poland in their dealings with Russia, they have taken stand on the existence of Poland, when they had to di Russia among themselves. Now, it has invariably prove

this "internal weakness," that this "financial penury," and this "running sore" of Poland, have never served in any way to avert any external blow, or to prostrate any foreign combination. Since the institution, by intervention in Greece, of the diplomatic process of acting upon nations by means of protocols and conferences, and during peace was commenced, it has been the task and business of those who have remained the depositaries of the ideas which found acceptance with the Government of England in the years 1835-1836, to expose the delusion of connecting in any way the internal condition of Russia with her diplomatic operations. To-day, however, the case is materially altered. The case before us is not one where Russia proposes to do something, while the rest of the world is called upon merely to accept or reject; the internal position of Russia has become so alarming and so critical, that the sense of danger must hamper her in every step she might otherwise be disposed to take, in counteracting a project devised directly against her, and having its source in a body over which neither she nor any Government can exercise control.

It becomes, therefore, of the last importance, to form for ourselves a correct estimate of the internal condition of Russia at this moment. The impenetrable veil with which she has surrounded herself, the absence of all the means of information common in Europe, render such an endeavour exceedingly difficult: so that we will have to proceed on induction conveyed along the slenderest threads.

The point with which we should begin is, however, not to be classed under these heads. It is an event distinguished by its notoriety and authenticity, no less than its importance: the occurrences in Poland of the last two years.

The next event, no less authentic, and where the interpretation alone remains in doubt, is the Emancipation of the serfs.

The third is the alteration in the condition of the army, progressively attained to, now culminating in the new process of Conscription.

The fourth is the increase in importance of the Starovirtze, and the extension, in a political sense, of their ideas, throughout the people.

The fifth is the disaffection of the nobles.

No. 1. A generation has passed away since the breaking down of Poland, and the fall of Warsaw. Twenty-nine years have elapsed since the Emperor NICHOLAS said to the Chiefs of the Poles, assembled under the guns of the new citadel of Warsaw, "I am glad the time has come when I address you no longer as King of Poland, but as Emperor of Russia." No other ex-

pectation could have been formed at that time than this—that the then living generation might give for a period trouble to the Russian Government, but that thereafter it would adjust itself to circumstances and submit to fate.

This impression received full confirmation from subsequent events. From without, no indication appeared of an intention on the part of any European Government to support it. On two occasions, one after the lapse of eighteen years, the other of twenty-four years, two events occur of very different characters, each presenting, and both combining, every possible inducement to the Polish people to arise and assert their independence, unless their spirit were wholly and absolutely broken. The one was the convulsive revolution that swept over Europe in 1848, encircling the Russian frontiers from Bucharest to Copenhagen, and to which no echo came from Poland, even in a whisper. The other was the war declared against Russia by Turkey, followed by the movements of the fleets and armies of England, France, and Sardinia, assailing her on the North and the South, and accumulating their line-of-battle ships at once in the Baltic and the Black Sea. Yet Poland remained as the burnt-out hearth on which the spark and the torch fall alike in vain. The inference is now ascertained to be erroneous. The events commencing in the year 1860, show that the Poles, as a people, have not resigned themselves to the conditions made for them. Although they have not been tempted to take up arms when the occasion offered, it is now evident that they had no idea of exchanging their character of Pole for that of Russian.

The revelation of this position we owe to no movements on their part, but to procedures taken against them by the Russian Government—procedures which are intelligible only by the purpose of driving them into open rebellion.

No. 2. The driving of the Poles into insurrection is connected with the organic change in reference to the Serfs. The Russian Government is constituted for external, and not for internal purposes. It is through its diplomacy that it secures its finances and its administration. The emancipation of the serfs is, therefore, to be looked upon as a measure connected with its diplomacy; not as being prompted either by any internal necessity or advantage or by any movement of political opinion acting independently of necessity or advantage. The motive may be explained by the evident results which are presented in two very distinct forms. The one, the obtaining for Russia a character of liberality so as to efface what remains of sympathy for the Poles, was facilitating the passage of revolutionary movements under

direct patronage of the Russian Cabinet. This is Russia's lever of action in Europe, which has to be strengthened by all possible means.

The other is the morselling of the State internally, and the reduction of that population hitherto possessing its rights, its station, and its connexion as Serfs, into a thoroughly disorganised mass, each losing all other sense in the precariousness of individual existence. The latter being a result desirable only by reason of the Government experiencing resistance, or apprehending opposition to its action abroad.

But out of this comes a most important change for Russia in reference to Foreign Powers; emancipating the Government from the sole dread which it entertained respecting them, namely, the control they might exercise over its trade.

The Declaration of Paris of 1856, forbidding the capture of belligerent property in neutral vessels, appeared indeed to have already effected this object. But still any day a minister might have arisen in England to reverse that Act. Then it required again but a few cruisers at the Sound, or the Dardanelles, to bring upon the present, or any subsequent Emperor of Russia the fate of PAUL. The Serfs being emancipated—the nobles become powerless. Neither the miseries nor the interests of the nation having a voice, the Government is relieved from such inconvenient control, and, unembarrassed within, could boldly venture its stakes abroad.

So serious an operation, and hitherto without parallel, while it evinces necessities without parallel, must be accompanied with an equivalent strain upon the military resources of the Empire. Even the Chartist movement in England alarmed the Duke of WELLINGTON, on the grounds of the exhaustion of the troops in mere observation.

This was precisely the condition of the Polish population. So that the army had to be simultaneously employed in observation of the Polish people and of the Russian; with the prospective danger of a mutual gravitation of the two bodies towards each other, not in the sense of amalgamation, for the furtherance of the designs of the Russian Cabinet abroad, but of concert to resist its oppression at home.

If these positions are correct, the explanation is at once afforded of two measures concurrently adopted, and severally inexplicable, namely, the emancipation of the serfs, and the attempt to drive the Poles into insurrection.

The latter design has been frustrated by a spirit of endurance quite as remarkable in its line as has been the active self-sacrifice

in respect to the Circassians. But for this calm pertinacity of each individual of a whole people, the Government would have attained its end, and the reappearance in any one province of a Polish flag would have instantly altered the whole face of affairs. From that moment it would have been the Russians against the Poles, and the Poles against the Russians; and that terrible passive resistance of the whole mass would have subsided, as heretofore, into a mutual antipathy of races.

The Government, foiled in its first attempt to produce a Polish Insurrection, has not thereupon desisted, but has pertinaciously pursued its purpose. Count ANDREW ZAMOYSKI, the man of greatest authority amongst the Poles, and to whose mild character and moderating influence it could not but attribute in a great degree the passive endurance of the people, was first called to St. Petersburg and then banished into Europe. Whilst to the Poles was conveyed a terrible message, in these words: "The policy adopted by the Imperial Government in respect to Poland, is that of extermination, and it sees no reason to change it."

The Poles of the emigration, who preserve channels of communication with every part of the country, who are looked to for direction, and who have hitherto exerted themselves in the line of moderation and submission, had now to be led to believe that the moment of action had come. Bakounin was let loose again, and sent round through Siberia to enlist them in a Russo-revolutionary scheme. These plans failing, after having all but succeeded, they were confidentially put in possession of the very original of a protest on the part of the Russian officers, against being employed in coercive measures against the Poles.

The picture we have here is that of an empire composed of two large masses of population ethnographically cognate, although religiously and historically divided, with an agglomeration around them of outlying and unwilling incorporations—the Government of which is exerting itself to produce a rebellion amongst the one of those two masses, consisting of twenty millions, and cannot succeed!

No. 3. It is the army which imposes upon Russia the necessity of calling forth a revolt amongst the Poles. That army is unequal to the duty of watching and overawing passive resistance, common at once to the Russians and the Poles. It might be expected to be so, in consequence of the change in the dispositions of both people. But there is another cause. *The change in the army itself.* It is impossible to collate the events from the middle of the last century without being struck with this change

Remarkable enough, if we compare the operations effected under TODLEBEN and SUWAROFF.* But still more so, if these be compared with the operations on the Danube under the anonymous general of 1853, and the disgraceful and disheartening reverses which have almost regularly marked the operations in the Caucasus. The failure of the expedition to Khiva, more than all the others, has destroyed throughout the populaces of Russia, the sense of the invincibility of their armies.†

The war in the Caucasus was to afford to Russia, all other considerations apart, a reserve, always ready, of formed and experienced officers, and of men, veterans in war. To this end, a single defeat is not unconducive, as the history of CHARLES XII. no less than that of the Bœotians shows. But it is not by a series of defeats, and the total inability to succeed, that a proud and martial spirit can be engendered in an army. From the moment that the Caucasian war ceased to have the object of merely killing the forces sent to supply it, and was converted into a

* "As to material force, that armed force, which in the actual state of things is the principle instrument of the power of Russia, has it become more formidable by the numbers and the spirit of the troops, as well as by the capacity of those who lead them? There is nothing to prove this. The war against the Turks (1828), especially the first campaign of that war proves rather the contrary. The war against the Poles did not last less than ten months; and when the disproportion between the two armies is considered, the nullity of the resources of the Poles, deprived of all succour from, even of all communication with, foreign countries, what a low idea must one not form of an army which they could hold in check for so long!

"Finally, that struggle, that horrible struggle of extermination with the mountaineers of the Caucasus, what success, what triumphs does it offer as compensation for the enormous and painful sacrifices which it entails upon the Russian Nation?

"Military force is, we repeat, the great instrument of power for Russia. The nation, as well as the Sovereign, wishes to have a powerful army. Nothing is more natural. But the more the army is numerous, the more is intelligence required to organise it, to preserve it, to direct it. Well, what do all your means of organisation, preservation, and direction, amount to? You organise the army by a recruiting system, made up of atrocities and absurdities. How do you preserve it? In its ranks death commits more terrible ravages than in the army of any other country; they even surpass all that imagination can conceive.

"During a war for which you had been preparing many years, which you waged in countries long familiar to you, during the last Turkish war, you suffered to perish—as we have elsewhere mentioned—in the hospitals alone, more than fifty thousand soldiers in the space of a single year. Finally, you cause this army to be led by officers, formed in the corps of cadets, where the military exercise only is taught, and nothing more."—*La Russie and les Russes.* Par M. Tourgeneff. Vol iii.

† There is not a village throughout Russia Proper, nor the hut of a Muzhik in which the events of that expedition are not perfectly well known, and their consequences reasoned upon in a hopeful sense as regards their own condition

purpose of acquisition, and therefore of war as such, it assumed its demoralising character for the whole Russian army.

Hitherto the Russian soldier had been peculiarly distinguished by loyalty. The only exception, if exception it can be called, is the most glaring of proofs. It occurred during the retreat of the French from Moscow, when the army was on the point of revolt, in consequence of seeing with what facility the French might have been totally exterminated; and thence, and from the private communications going on between their generals and the French, they suspected treason.*

* When Sir R. Wilson reached the Russian army he found the generals in open dissension with the Commander-in-chief, Barclay de Tolly, for having already suffered the enemy to overrun so many provinces, and not having defended the line of the Dnieper. The army resolved to send "for a new chief" to the Emperor, and also to make a Declaration, "that if any order came from St. Petersburg to suspend hostilities, and treat the invaders as friends (which was apprehended to be the true motive of the retrograde movements, in deference to the policy of Count Romanzow), such an order would be regarded as one which did not express His Imperial Majesty's real sentiments and wishes, but had been extracted from His Majesty under false representations or external control; and that the army would continue to maintain his pledge, and pursue the contest till the Invader was driven beyond the frontier."—p. 112.

Sir Robert Wilson undertook to be the bearer of this message "to mitigate the unavoidable distress of the Emperor." He found the Emperor aware of the state of the army; he said he had heard that Hetman Platow had even said to General Barclay, on the evacuation of Smolensk, "You see I wear but a cloak; I will never again put on a Russian uniform, since it has become a disgrace." Sir R. Wilson represents the Emperor as becoming calm, after a few struggles, on hearing his communication. He put off giving an answer until the next day, when he replied that he should carry back to the army pledges that the war should be carried on "whilst a Frenchman was in arms this side the frontier." But the Emperor would not give way on the point of choosing his own ministers. Count Romanzow, he said, must remain. Marshal Kutusow had been appointed to succeed Barclay de Tolly, before the arrival of Sir. R. Wilson. His appointment was not changed in consequence, although he was sent to carry out the very policy complained of. His first step, on taking the command, was to arrange a secret meeting with the French Marshal, Lauriston, at midnight, beyond the Russian advanced posts (p. 182). The proposed meeting was discovered, and a dozen generals met together and told Wilson that if Kutusow went to that meeting he would not be allowed to resume the command. Alexander publicly rebuked Kutusow, but he was nevertheless continued in the command, and continued to follow persistently the same course, namely, sparing the enemy. At Czernicznia he stopped Beningsen from pursuing Murat, and acted, says Wilson, "as if desirous of averting the catastrophe of his enemy" (212). At Maro Jaroslavets, not only was the French army spared, but the Russian army was endangered by a retrograde movement on a narrow causeway. Suwarrow said to Wilson, "We will hold to the last, and at least save our honour out of the wreck but we are lost." To Wilson's remonstrances Kutusow replied, "I am b

In this respect also the aspect of things is entirely changed. DESERTION is now the "danger" for Russia in a war with Turkey, whenever the forces of the two, in anything like comparative numbers, are brought upon the same field for any continuance of time. This was one of the arguments laid before the Divan in 1850, and discussed by it, on which was founded the proposal that the Porte should require from Russia the withdrawal of its army of fifty thousand men from the Danube to behind the Pruth. Turkish subaltern officers being examined upon the point, gave testimony in entire corroboration. The instantaneous compliance of Russia with this demand, and her retirement from the Provinces, notwithstanding the Treaty for seven years' occupation, show that the arguments which had determined the Porte were understood and accepted by Russia.

The highest European military authorities have conceded to the Russian forces the distinguishing qualification of courage. This aggregate courage has been explained by individual fear:—severity of discipline, and terror for their officers, overcoming the dread of the bullet, so as to keep the line unbroken and the march uninterrupted.*

This discipline has been in course of gradual relaxation. The army, as a body, is asserting rights, demanding and extorting privileges. The term of service has been successively reduced from the period of life to twenty-five years, and latterly so low as ten: opening an escape for the soldier, and re-incorporating disciplined men with the population. The power of unlimited

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no means sure, as I have told you before, that the total destruction of Napoleon and his army would be such a benefit to the world; his succession would not fall to Russia, or to any other Continental Power, but to that which already commands the sea, and whose domination would then be intolerable" (p. 235). Similar instances are accumulated on every page of Wilson's Journal. On Kutusow's refusal to support his advanced guard, engaged with the enemy at Biskowo, Wilson sent an aide-de-camp to St. Petersburg to tell the Emperor that the army "fell dishonoured, if not betrayed." When compelled to inaction before Krasnoi, the cry "Moscow, Moscow," rang through the ranks; and finally an attack was made without order from the Marshal. After the crossing of the Beresina, the Russian troops suffered nearly as much as the French, and lost on the march, says Wilson, above 90,000 men. When at Wilna, Alexander sent for Wilson to make a "confession" to him. Which was that, in giving the Order of St. George to Kutusow, he had "to submit to a controlling necessity," because *Kutusow was supported by the nobility of Moscow!*"

Napoleon being the goose that laid the golden egg for Russia, was neither to be taken, nor killed.

All this is of course entirely omitted by the regular historians, and especially in works of which presentation copies are sent to the Emperor of Russia.—See Alison.

* See "The White Slave" for some most interesting and instructive observations of the author, on that head.

punishment has been withdrawn from the officers, and regular sentences are now required, so that the sinew of that stolid courage, which had appalled their enemies when the Russian forces marched "on" Europe, is broken.*

Whilst the nerve of discipline was maintained, the endurance of privation affected neither the courage of the Russian soldier on the field of battle, nor his loyalty to his Sovereign; when relaxed, the economics of the Government, or the peculations of the officer, come to enter essentially into the calculation of result, under a strain upon its faculties, either by the growing mass of dissatisfaction at home, or by insurrectionary movements at a distance; such as those now threatened on the Persian border. Black bread with no butter, boiled barley twice a week, and five shillings a year pay with deductions, does not seem to be a safe rate of rations and pay for an army in the midst of an insurgent population, or in face of an enemy (the Turks) receiving without deductions the same pay for one month, and daily fed on pilaff, white bread, and meat, with the addition of salt, pepper, onions, charcoal, and butter.

The protest of Russian officers shown to the Poles at Paris, against being employed in crushing Poland, though no doubt a forgery, is at the same time no invention. The same may be said of the counter-declaration which has recently been addressed as a letter to the editor of the *Times*, and inserted in that paper. No doubt the officers, as well as the men of the Russian armies, loathe the service on which they are put in Poland, seeing that the species of resistance opposed to them evokes no national feeling. But those dispositions would immediately change were the Poles, upon the faith of them, to rise to reclaim against Russia their independence. It is, therefore, on the continuance of the Poles to resign themselves to their present fate, that will depend that progression in the deterioration in the Russian armies, which has prompted the Government to provoke this internal contest.

But the military system is at this moment undergoing a total revolution in the new form of recruitment, both in Poland and in Russia. This is the very point upon which passive resistance may assume an active character, whether for the Russian peasant or the Polish, creating the critical point in the history of Russia.

As to the Russian peasant there appears to be an amelioration as regards the selection of men, since the proprietor no longer designates the individual, and since it does not, consequently,

* When the Russian soldier speaks of operations against Europe, he use the phrase in the text. He changes the expression when Turkey is in questio and says "March *to* Turkey." The memorable threat of Nicholas, at the con mencement of the Polish insurrection, may be here recalled, "*Rouler Varsovi et marcher* SUR *l'Europe.*"

follow that the reprobate portion of the community is drafted into the army; but, on the other hand, the line of separation is comparatively effaced between the population and the army, so that the latter can no longer be employed with the same facility against the former.

As regards the Poles, Conscription has been changed to *Proscription*. It is as if the Mayor of every petty town in England received a packet of sentences of transportation, or of confinement to hard labour for ten years, and then walked about the streets distributing them as he went along; and in case of the receivers refusing to repair to gaol, sent for the military to a neighbouring barrack to seize them and drag them through the streets. The effect of the introduction, in this fashion, of recruits into an army, in which pity for the Poles has taken the place of hatred, cannot be problematical.* This, while coming under the head of the army, must also be transferred back to the head of Poland, as it is impossible to conceive a measure more effectually calculated to create insurrection. If it fails, it is difficult to see to what further means the Government can have resort.

No. 4. The Starovirtze: This vast branch of the history of Russia, unknown to the rest of the world, can only be here indicated in the faintest manner, because of its bearing at this moment most essentially and critically upon the events in progress. The Starovirtze, or "old believers," are those, as their name designates, who remained faithful to the profession of faith of the Eastern Church (Greek), when the new Russian State Religion was introduced, by which not only the Pontificate was absorbed into the Imperial person, but that person assimilated to the Godhead by "WORSHIP" being paid to him.† These old believers

* The Poles in each Russian regiment are known by the name of "the unfortunates." The system of companions employed in our own army to ensure the good conduct of the men, is employed in the Russian army in reference to the Poles, each of whom has two or three Russians allotted to him as observers.

† The present Russian Church is a near approach to Buddhism, the Czar being the normal Delai Lama. The name of Nebuchadnezzar, which is translatable in modern Russian, means, "There is no God but the Czar." If the Russian and the Assyrian people are not identical, the system at least of St. Petersburg to-day closely resembles that of Babylon at the time of the handwriting upon the wall. The following is from the Catechism:—

"Q. What duties does religion teach us, the humble subjects of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, to practice towards him?

"A. Worship, obedience, fidelity, the payment of taxes, service, love, and prayer, the whole being comprised in the words worship and fidelity."

This Catechism is published by special order of the Russian Government, and printed at Wilna in 1832, for the use of schools in the Polish Provinces

consider the CZAR to be Antichrist; and between them and the Government a struggle has been carried on ever since the time of PETER, consisting of persecution on the one hand, and martyrdom on the other. This malignancy, originating in religious belief, has extended to political affairs, and they have held the attempts of the Russian Cabinet on the independence of Foreign people, in no less horror than the pretensions of the CZAR to divine honours. The seat of this faith is Malo-Russia, including the Cossacks; but its ramifications extend throughout the whole Empire; finding at times even entrance to the highest offices, and within the precincts of the Court. Their numbers are estimated at twelve millions, and the cavalry and artillery are so far believed to incline towards them as to be distrusted by the Government, whenever troops are to be employed against them. Externally. the leanings of this body are towards the Porte, who in the year 1846, preserved for them the continuation of the apostolical succession of their priesthood.

It would now appear that the Starovirtze are assimilating to themselves the rest of the nation under a secular aspect, and that what may be termed their puritanical notions in reference to Government, are spreading independently of their religious dogmas. This new political conviction has found for itself a native and striking formula, which is this:—

"WE ABJURE THE WILL OF PETER THE GREAT."*

A quarter of a century ago Monsieur de CUSTINE defined as follows the, so to say, atomic connection between the internal condition of Russia and its external action. "The Russian balances the expectation of future dominion against the

* "Whoever judges of the Russian Opposition only by Bakounin and Herzen, will form a false idea of what is going on now amongst the Russian nation. I have met a great number of Russians, who reason in the following way: 'Slavery has not been an old Russian Institution. Its first foundation was laid by Boris Grodhoff; it has been sanctioned by the houses of Romanoff and Oldenburg. The latter, a foreign dynasty has tried to destroy all things national and Russian. They have made Russia the battle-field of all ambitious intriguers. Nearly all the Russian Diplomatists are Foreigners. The Russian Nation has nothing to do with the Testament of Peter the Great; it abhors conquest abroad, which is synonymous with slavery at home. To make Russia free, it is necessary to make it Russian again—to drive the Foreign and Russian Diplomatists from the soil of Russia.' Such reasoning is a highly remarkable symptom. I have had the opportunity of conversing with great numbers of Russians, and all these were the most bitter enemies of the Russian foreign policy. How wonderful, were the Russians themselves to rescue Europe from the dangers by which it is threatened by the Russian Government. All these people were the most bitter antagonists of Herzen and the Panslavists.—*Private Letter, Oct.* 1862

pressure of present slavery."* He has in a not less striking manner, presented the field of operation as seen by the then Russian eye. He says, "They say at St. Petersburg that Europe has entered on the path of Poland."

To the Russian eye the field includes now, not Europe only, but the East also. It is no longer, therefore, inducements and attractions which the foreign field presents: but difficulties, discomfitures, and dangers.

The Starovirtze operations are not, however, to be considered as confined to the interior. The Provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the Principality of Servia, together with Montenegro, a third of Bosnia, the Bulgarian inhabitants of the line of the Balkan, and the Greeks of Constantinople, and the cities of European Turkey, ARE ALL STAROVIRTZE. That is to say they belong to the ancient Eastern Church, against whom the persecutions of the Russian Church and Government have been so long directed; and who, in Russia Proper, are animated with the most profound hatred for the Russian Church and Government.

Now, let us imagine the power of Russia extending over European Turkey, and coming down to the Dardanelles and the White Sea; she would instantly lose that power of revolution against a neighbouring Empire, which she holds and employs at present solely through the ignorance in which those Christian populations are kept of her real character.

Let us suppose that the Turks were entirely removed from the field, and these countries left to their Christian inhabitants alone. We should then have five millions of Wallachians and Moldavians, six millions of Bulgarians, two millions of Servians and Bosnians, and, say, one million more of Morlacs and Montenegrins, independently of the Greeks, who are in numbers too insignificant to enumerate at all, but whom we may, perhaps, set down at one hundred thousand. The Catholics need not be enumerated, since their position of hostility to the supposed new Government of Russia is perfectly understood. The result of this extension of territory would, therefore, be simply this: That the numbers of the Starovirtze of the Russian Empire would be raised from twelve to twenty-six millions.

By the mere culture of a few literary men she can establish throughout an unimpassioned Europe the idea, that Christianity profits by her victories and incorporations. But to maintain the professors of the Greek faith, who are under the Ottoman sceptre, in the belief of a religious identity with herself, far other, and

* "Le Russe se paye de sa dégradation actuelle par l'espoir de sa domination future."

very elaborate means are required. These are the periodical transmission of plate for Church service, of embroidered priests' vestments, and of missals printed for this purpose at Moscow, and which could not be suffered to be seen in Russia. Whilst at the same time there are vast payments of minute salaries to individuals, and the continual revolutionary promptings of her agents. Yet with all this, she has utterly failed in her attempts to obtain a formal association with her Church, either in that country, Greece, which she has broken off from Turkey, or in those provinces where she has succeeded in shaking the connexion with Turkey—Wallachia and Moldavia.

That an ordinary member of the Russian Cabinet should be led into a false estimate of this position is certain. First: because it is a question on which an unbiassed judgment is not to be expected; and secondly, because of the very organisation which is employed to insurrectionise the Christian subjects of the Porte. From this mass of agents, reports must be incessantly pouring in. Each of these agents will be re-acted upon by that very delusion which their predecessors have succeeded in establishing. Even without reference to the desire of each to make himself important, he will be unconsciously deceiving his Government by detailing interviews with persons seeking to make themselves of importance with the Russian agent. The whole will be conducted to the total forgetfulness, and, it may be said, ignorance, of that mortal antagonism between the two Churches which ultimately must come into play.

It is, therefore, not more to the intellectual superiority of Count POZZO DI BORGO than to his position of Roman Catholic and remote stranger, that that just appreciation by the Russian Cabinet of its own position, shown in the Despatch of Count NESSELRODE in 1830, to the Archduke CONSTANTINE is owing.

That estimate amounts to this, that it is essential for Russia to have the Turks at Constantinople: because, as the successor of that Empire, she could not hold the European portion against its Christian inhabitants.

Not to be able to hold European Turkey, involves something more than not getting European Turkey. It involves the closing of the Dardanelles. The Russian system is like a man who walks through the streets with a halter round his neck; so that any dog may tread upon the cord. That cord has trailed these many years without misadventure, because the dogs in the street were her friends; and the master of the house an easy-going gentleman who never stirred from home.

MONTESQUIEU said: "It is happy for the Trading Powers that God has permitted Turks and Spaniards to be in the world

since, of all nations, they are the most proper to possess a great Empire with insignificance."

Were Constantinople in the hands of a Government having a mission—say to abolish slavery, say to extend civilisation or Christianity—one admitting that it entertained the lust of conquest, one professing to be so "virtuous"* as to desire to extend its influence, one seeking to benefit mankind by its philanthropy, or desiring to indulge the hunter passions of its subjects by sending them forth as "excursionists," then would it be seen how grave were the reasons which have, up to the present moment, influenced in secret the Russian Cabinet. Let France, or Austria, or England, or the United States occupy Constantinople, and then would be understood the dream of OMAR.† Let but one section of the Christian populations—the Greek, for instance—after a lucky insurrection against the Russian power, get hold of the Dardanelles, and then it will be seen that the Russian Empire is a mere dependency of Constantinople, from the moment it is in the hands of men with sense enough to use it for their own protection, or dishonesty enough to use it for the enslaving of others.

But the external and prospective question of the Starovirtze has an Asiatic as well as a European bearing. THE GEORGIAN PEOPLE ARE STAROVIRTZE.

It will be seen, then, that the SULTAN, who stands in the position of religious head to the Mussulman subjects of Russia, stands in an analagous position to a very large proportion of the nominally Christian subjects of the same Empire. There is no graver matter for consideration than the consequences that would ensue were the Porte to be driven by this continual and atrocious system of interference, to retort on Russia, the secret and insidious arms launched against herself.

Were the Porte once to apprehend the enormous power at present lying dormant in her hands, in the faculty of regulating or suspending intercourse through the Dardanelles, new dispositions would be evoked by the new thoughts: then would it apprehend also that *the simple condition of war with Russia*, without any of the military operations of war being conducted under it, would suffice, if continued for two or three years, to efface Russia from the list of nations.

It is, therefore, the first of the duties of the Russian Government, not to press upon the Porte in such a manner as to drive

* Louis Napoleon.

† This poetic allegory will be found in Von Hammer's "Ottoman Empire." It concludes by describing the city of Constantine as "a diamond between two emeralds and two sapphires, the centre stone in the ring of empire."

it either into an operation of thought, or an act of indignation. Consequently there is no demand which the Porte can make upon Russia, being at the same time resolved to enforce it, to which Russia will not yield compliance, and at once.*

No. 5. The nobles: The disaffection of this class, as it is a cause, so must it be an effect of the emancipation of the serfs. Their contingent disaffection on the occurrence of a war with England, the latter exercising the Right of Search, formed of itself a necessity for destroying them as a body; as it was still possible that in England a sovereign might assert his dignity, or a minister perform his duty. Russia in that case would lose the protection of the Declaration of Paris. But independently of the contingent danger, there was the present one of disaffection arising on internal grounds, and that disaffection common to the nobles of Russia and of Poland.

If, in regard to the four previous points, the world has been kept in ignorance or subjected to delusion, there is none here. In all the journals of Europe it has been printed that when the Emperor gave a ball at Warsaw, no lady could be found to attend: and when thereon he repaired to Moscow to recover from the blow, and commanded a theatrical representation, there, too, the ladies refused to attend. Such being the dispositions, then follows for the Poles, the new Conscription; for the Russians, the Emancipation of the Serfs.

That the Cabinet sees its way out of the chaos, and is working towards it, is indubitable. But the entrance is not in the East. The ensuing spring, summer, and winter must rise before it, with gloomiest aspect. The faintest hope of relief can only come with the following autumn, when the reaction from the disturbance of the Corn Trade in the New World will begin to bring in money. With the prospect of succeeding in a few years to this twenty millions of exportation from the United States, great efforts can be made, and much endured, because there is hope. But here, again, all is contingent on prolonging the slumbers of the Ottoman Porte. Let a firman issue declaring the free export of grain from the ports of Turkey, and all that

* When, in January, 1850, the Porte in a moment of sudden indignation on discovering the scheme of obtaining Astrabad for Russia (by the joint English and Russian Boundary Commission), by making Turkey cede Mohammarah to Persia, broke away from the English Ambassador, and required from Russia the withdrawal of her army from the Provinces of the Danube, the Russian Minister at once acceded. He asked for no delay to communicate to his Government this unexpected demand. No courier had arrived. He must therefore have acted under standing instructions, always to yield when the Porte was resolute.

Russia has gained by the civil war in America, and all the hopes she derives from it for composing her own internal dissensions will not only vanish, but the profits will pass to Turkey.

Such is the position presented now, to be contrasted with that which was presented in the year 1837. It is upon an Empire so imperilled by geography, a Cabinet so distracted with the troubles of the hour, and the dangers of the future, that the question of existence is to be brought to issue, not with any Foreign Government—for amongst that class there is not one living who would dare to look a Russian Ambassador in the face—but with a small body of private men, moved to make this stand against her solely by a will of their own. Nor can it be otherwise. Great enterprises can only be attempted or carried through by analogous sentiments. Such purposes can take their beginnings only from a few; who must also be unconnected with office, and moved solely by their own public-mindedness. If these men be really honest, and, withal, cognisant and judicious, they can strike at Russia a blow from which the subservient Cabinets of Europe cannot shield her.

Finally, it is necessary to discriminate between the Caucasus and Constantinople: two positions linked together by Lord POWSONBY, as if their value were analagous. He puts Constantinople as the first in the world, and the Caucasus as "only second;" adding, however, "But Constantinople breathes only under the shadow of the Caucasus." The distinction is, that the one is negative, and the other positive. The value of the Caucasus consists only in its being a protection against Russia; whereas, the importance of Constantinople lies in its being a means of coercion for Russia. The Emperor ALEXANDER said, "Constantinople is the key of my house."

Whilst these pages are passing through the press, the telegraphic announcements in the morning papers for the first time make mention of Circassia as one of the Powers of Europe and of Asia.* We learn at once that Russia is sending arms into Servia, and calling the Porte to account for sending arms into

* On the 21st of January, the London papers contained the following announcement:—

"TURKEY, RUSSIA, AND CIRCASSIA.

"*Paris, Friday* 20.

"*La France* says one of the principal points in the programme of the new Turkish Ministry is the development, in considerable proportions, of the Turkish army and fleet. It is asserted that, in view of the decided attitude of the Sultan, Russia is about to increase the army of the Caucasus, where important military events are expected to take place."

Circassia. Upon this it is announced that the new policy pursued by the Porte is of so alarming a nature that a "diplomatic intervention" is requisite to arrest it. Nor is this all. The Porte, following the lead of Europe (Russia excepted) had sent MEHEMET PASHA to get mailed vessels. Millions were to be expended thereon. MEHEMET PASHA has been recalled to become member of the new "Ministry" as CAPITAN PASHA. This functionary is said to be the warm advocate of Circassia, consequently he knows where the mail of Turkey is to be found. Scarcely has he had time to reach Constantinople when the following notice appear in the *Levant Herald*:—

"The mailed gun-boats recently ordered by the Porte, in England, have been countermanded."

It is well enough for England to case in metal her now useless ships of the line. Having surrendered her maritime power, a plaything, however costly, is cheap to cover her wounded self-love. She has millions to squander: better expend them on oxide of iron than on Canton bombardments and Mexican co-operations. She is secularly a Russian dupe, and has to go on; and so the other effigies of power stuck up in gaudy colours all over Europe, and called "Governments." But Turkey, being, as an Administration, composed individually of men more or less respectable, and bearing the brunt of the disorganising process on the part of all, which each, on its displacement, must succumb to without a struggle, has serious duties to attend to.

This cannot have occurred by the mere logical process. The Turks have not studied Aldrich. It is the alternative process which alone they could have employed. They cannot have said, "Iron ships are nonsense." That was beyond them. They have only said, but this sufficed, "The Danube need not be defended against Russian guns, since by the Dardanelles we command Russia's fate." They must have said, "If Russia threatens us on the Danube, we will protect ourselves on the Kuban."

But to escape from the contagion of folly is, in a foolish age, to attain to the profits of wisdom. They speak much of cotton wanting in Lancashire. Cotton is far more wanted at Constantinople. Here thousands of millions of pounds are needed to give our operatives bread. There some grains of that precious material for the ears of the Grand Vizier when approached by a European Dragoman are all that is requisite to give life to an Empire by which alone Europe lives.

The journals of Europe are, at the instigation of Turkish ambassadors, industriously spreading the idea of the insanity of the SULTAN, thus connecting the change at Constantinople with

the mission of the Delegates to England, and the projected chartering of a British vessel for Circassia.

The Queen of ENGLAND appears to stand in a parallel position to the SULTAN, as may be gathered from the contents of the diplomatic documents, as well as from the rumours secretly spread or openly embodied in newspaper leaders.

Concurrently with these operations we have the sudden and indecent project of surrendering the Ionian Islands to the Greek State in this its moment of senseless convulsion; which means not less than the public profession of insurrectionising and dismembering Turkey.

Now, supposing that these various measures fail in preventing the sailing of the vessel, and in frightening the SULTAN into submission, then far more important results may be achieved than those originally contemplated. Instead of completing and maintaing the defensive line of the Caucasus, there will have been called into play the active qualities and the coercive power of the Bosphorus.

The development of this power consists absolutely in the perception by the Porte, or even by a single person of station and faculties, of certain ideas, which come naturally to be evolved in such a discussion.

FIRST. THAT THE CONDITION OF WAR GIVES TO THE PORTE THE COMMAND OF RUSSIA.

SECONDLY. THAT THE FREE EXPORT OF GRAIN FROM THE TURKISH PORTS MAKES RUSSIA BANKRUPT.

If it be needful for Europe to undertake measures to prevent the realization of the schemes of Russia, it is no less necessary to take the same course to protect itself from the scarcely less terrible consequences of the failure of those schemes. Russia will not succeed for herself. But if she is allowed much longer to go on, she will unlock the gates of a Chinese cataclysm, giving to it a military direction. On the other hand, she will have aroused the old Ottoman Lion, and reconverted those warlike races, now become also disciplined, into a new source of terror for Europe.

If the "progress" of Russia has commenced to run only from the moment that some one of her Princes had said to himself, "I will conquer the world;" so is it impossible that that career should be arrested until someone of that world should have said to himself, "I will destroy Russia." As well might you expect to save one deck in a ship, with a disregarded leak in its bottom; as well secure one story in a house, with a conflagration unattended to; as well strive to save one limb of a body afflicted with an untreated deadly disease, as propose to rescue Poland, save Turkey, protect

Circassia, or India, or Germany, or England, or France, except by going to the source of the danger, alike for each, and for all. We have to strike at that Power which is the source of evil, and the mover of commotion, where it is vulnerable; that is not in its soil, and in its armies, but in its system, and its trade. Strike then, and strike to destroy. Destroy the Russian system, and emancipate the Russian people. As the blow is levelled only against two or three foreigners seated in a single Council Chamber, so it may be delivered also by a few individuals without parade or authority of state, and by means of a few words spoken in season.

This may be difficult to conceive; but the difficulty lies only there. Once conceived, the execution is facile. It is no less easy than necessary to destroy Russia.

Letters of Lord Ponsonby.

LORD PONSONBY TO THE FIRST EXPLORER OF CIRCASSIA.

Extracts.

No. 1.

July 1, 1834.

Certainly there can be no objection to your going to Trebizond. On the contrary, it must be, I think, *in the way of business.*

No. 2.

September 3, 1834.

I shall send off a messenger *very* soon. I think it of great importance that Government should be put in complete possession of the political state of the Caucasian nations, without *any delay*, and I have good reason for pressing the thing.

Will you draw up a Memoir on the subject? I will send it in a despatch. It is right you should receive the credit due to the expositor of facts, that have been hitherto only generally and superficially known.

The WILL, the power, derived from situation, &c., of the Caucasians to resist Russia. The difficulty and facility also attending such efforts as may be made by England to support the Caucasians, are the objects which I wish you to touch mainly. You may trust to me that I know of a *new* necessity for the speedy execution of what I propose to you to do; and also for the necessity which demands that *publicity* should be given to it. I mean that it should be done in a despatch, not in a private letter.

If we do not take care, Russia will obtain the Caucasus, and all

the power that possession will give her over Turkey and Persia, &c. I beg you to let me know if you will do this *instanter* or not?

No. 3.

September 7, 1834.

Pray tell me if, when you were at Sebastopol, the ships of war there were without their topmasts?

No. 4.

September 8, 1834.

Let us send our fleets here with the consent of the SULTAN, and then treat both with Russia and with MEHEMET ALI. We shall then be strong enough to say to both, You shall neither of you do that which has a tendency to disturb the European balance of power, and injuriously to affect the great interests of England and France. I can see no other solution of the question. I do not hope that it will be resorted to. I am well convinced that these are days of talk, not deeds. I therefore expect that the forelock presented to us by fortune will not be seized; that in disdain of our impotency she will turn her bald back (of her head be it understood) to us, and fly where more vigour will be found to force her favours.

No. 5.

September, 1834.

The Russians have begun to prepare the creation of a large naval force in the Black Sea, but it will require three or four years to complete their work. This fact alone speaks volumes, both as to their ultimate objects, and the fear that now restrains their movements; and I think the work they have undertaken may be the delay, as well as the final cause, of the ruin of the Caucasians.

Your visit has been the occasion of great emotions. I will not keep your secret any longer.

No. 6.

November 15, 1834.

Now for some news. The Russian fleet is in ordinary at Sebastopol, but still may be got ready in a couple of days. The troops are gone, or going, into cantonments *out* of the Crimea, in consequence of the distress and poverty created by failure of the crops in the former year, which distress is increasing by the very scanty crops of the present year.

The fortifications at Sebastopol are not completed, and the works on them are suspended on account of the difficulties above-

mentioned. The necessary buildings are making at Nicolaiff for fulfilling the contracts for ships of the line, &c.

You see we have now time to do much. The Russian troops cannot fly back to their late position; and some weeks, at all events, must elapse before they could be ready, and the fleet also, to act *here*. What an opportunity the present hour affords for striking a fatal blow against Russian power, if there could anywhere be found the vigour and energy of an angry mouse.

No. 7.

November 20, 1834.

What can I say, but that curs will bark, and rogues lie, and fools believe, and time show the cowardice of the one, the falsehood of the other, and vary the folly of the last.

[This was called forth by letters from the Foreign Minister, requiring the removal from Constantinople of the gentleman who had visited Circassia, because he was endangering the peace of Europe.]

I have given to-day Baron STURMER my mind in full respecting the designs of Russia, and the disgrace that will fall on Prince METTERNICH, if he should permit them to be effected after having been warned as he has been of their existence. I told the Baron, METTERNICH would be not only disgraced but hanged, if thereafter Russia should carry her points, for the World would know that he had been well informed on the situation of things; that he knew as well as ROUSSIN and myself the state of things, and that what we knew would be known by all the world.

Let people talk at home, we must succeed, for truth is with us; and honesty and resolution, and your activity.

No. 8.

December 8, 1834.

The Circassian question is that which will demand your greatest exertions, and it will be the most difficult. I have forced the Porte into a corner about the free passage of British ships through the Bosphorus—if free passage be granted to Russian ships. I think you will reckon my note a good one, when you see it in London. It is dated December 4, you may be sure I had Circassia in view.

Courage and perseverance, you are engaged in a noble work. The enterprise itself is glory. To fail in it is something more than to succeed in less undertakings.

After the Russo-Turkish War of 1853.

No. 1.

November 17, 1853.

Will France and England combine to *force* the SULTAN to forego the *use* of the advantages he may have obtained by the valour of his troops, and skill of his generals, and devotion of his subjects? Will France and England force him whom they call Ally to reinstate his enemy in the possession of those territorial possessions which have been so lately notoriously used to favour attack upon him? Will France and England, under the disguise of love for peace, replace in the hands of Russia territories which will facilitate a renewal of attempts at conquest, and, therefore, be a constant excitement to that very thing, war, which France and England profess to hinder? Supposing that Ottoman armies should be able to drive the Russians from Bessarabia, would France and England forbid the SULTAN from repossessing himself of that frontier which formerly fortified his Empire, and which later events have proved to be almost necessary for its safety? Will France and England force the SULTAN to break the Treaties he has now made with the Circassians and other people in and about the Caucasus? Will France and England force the Ottomans not to use the fleet which by their skill and forethought they have created to supply the loss which England inflicted upon them at Navarino; and forbid the employment of that arm where, if used, it may be found superior to the fleet of Russia (their mortal enemy)? Will France and England insist upon the re-establishment of the prohibition of the passage of the Bosphorus to ships of war, by which the Black Sea was made a sort of peculium for Russia? And, to conclude, I will ask, will France and England again believe in the faithful performance of treaties by the Russians? The world will not credit such a thing. The world will think that the Governments of France and England have in view other ends than the one that is asserted to be theirs—*Peace.*

No. 2.

December 24, 1853.

The plan, as it is developed in the proceeding of the Mediatorial Conferences, and published under date 5th December, is in substance the preservation to Russia of all those territories which Russia held in virtue of treaties, which treaties are now abrogated by the existence of war between Russia and Turkey. It is a plan to

accept a state of vassalage, to break faith with his allies in Asia, to disgust all his most faithful subjects, and to deprive himself of a chance of future resistance to the will of Russia.

I am certain that had we not been resisted by the common sense of the Turks, we should have made the ruin of their Empire inevitable. I am sorry that the Turks have yielded, as I am told they nowhave done, to any proposition made by us for negotiation. I think that if they, the Turks, are drawn in to trust England, they will ultimately be ruined.

Let the Allies, as they call themselves, withdraw their fleet. Let them leave to Turkey and to Russia to fight the battle out: the Turks will gain. They will not be defeated by Russia. They will not be forced to restore the treaties through which Russia has obtained the advantages against Turkey, which have been so mischievous; but it would be better for Turkey to undergo any defeat than to submit to English diplomacy.

The dispute between Russia and the Porte is, whether, or not the Russians should be masters of the best part of the world. I look at the condition of things in this light, and I am convinced that the policy adopted by the Allies is the straight way to the establishment of Russia in that position.

I think that England is the country that will be the greatest loser in power, and that what we all know of the Russian means and ends in Asia fully shows the fact.

I am certain that English Ministers, and the French also, as it appears, are ready to assume the right to dictate the terms of peace, and what those terms will be is to me indubitable—that is, the real effectual dependence of Turkey upon the will of Russia.

I have no faith in, or respect for the conduct of the Allies. I have seen them support the robber in the work of attacking the weaker person, of whom those Allies were the self-elected guards. Like a false trustee, they have permitted the robbery of the man whose possession of the estate they were bound to defend.

The Circassian War as Viewed from St. Petersburg.

On three of the least credible statements in this exposition, confirmation is offered in the news published on one morning in one London journal. Extracts are subjoined.

St. Petersburg, December 27, 1862.

Grand-Duke MICHAEL has been sent to the Caucasus to supersede Prince BARJATINSKI, and reconquer the vast provinces recently lost. For seven months nothing but continued misfortune has attended the Russian eagles. In the former haunts of Schamyl, the natives seem to have made but little progress against the overwhelming numbers and superior artillery of the Emperor; but in the west, the entire space between the great tramroad and the Black Sea has been reoccupied by the original possessors, rendering it a matter of considerable difficulty for the Russians to push their reinforcements to the southern side of the hills, and resulting in the destruction of many of the fortresses which had been destined to coerce and overawe the mountaineers. While the fact of this humiliating defeat is generally admitted in Russia, it is yet impossible to ascertain the cause of the catastrophe. Making all allowance for the *mutinous disposition of the Polish soldiers*, who are chiefly employed in fighting the Circassians, it is yet improbable in the highest degree that the success of the aboriginals can have arisen from anything short of actual treason and wilful surrender. Another way to account for the overthrow of the Russian arms would be to assume an enormous exaggeration of former victories in the reports of Generals BARJATINSKI and PHILIPSON. The news officially communicated at the time of SCHAMYL'S capture did not seem to admit of another successful rising of the mountaineers. It is a fact, at any rate, that the Russian authorities in the Caucasus are composed of rogues, robbers, and housebreakers, from the presiding judges down to the meanest usher in the Imperial courts. Imagine all the villany of the Russian system let loose upon a conquered dependency, and you will perhaps realise a distant idea of the order and quiet which prevail at Tiflis.

CHINA.

The news from China announce that Russia intends helping Prince KONG to triumph over the Taepings. This resolution can

surprise nobody, Russia being particularly interested in what is passing in the Celestial Empire. But people would rather have expected a mysterious line of policy directed against England and France *than one in the sense adopted by those two Powers.* (!) Not having been able to seize the whole of the cake for herself, Russia has, in all probability, decided upon asking for her share. (!)

POLAND.

Warsaw, December 29.

It is no longer the Government, but the central revolutionary committee, that strains every nerve to check insurrection. It is no more the Central Committee, but the Government, which uses every means in its power to instigate an armed rising. Incredible as it appears, you may rely on the authenticity of this piece of intelligence. The fact is undoubted, that a hint has been given, both by the Polish revolutionary and Russian military committees, to defer the outbreak to a more favourable time, and prevent useless bloodshed for the present. The period fixed upon by the secret powers, we can easily infer from this stratagem, is no other than the time of the peasantry movement which is expected to occur in Russia in the course of the ensuing summer. Government, at that dreaded moment, will be compelled to scatter the troops in every direction, and be in a worse position than now to bring great power and attention to bear upon one individual point of its vast dominions. The same reason accounting for the pacific disposition of the people equally explains the increasing severity and reckless oppression on the part of the rulers. Wavering though the Poles may have been on the very brink of rebellion, they are not likely to oblige the Russians by an actual outbreak, even were their dearest wishes to be gratified by the contemplated act. The only apprehension entertained by the Polish patriots of a premature rising refers to the atrocious cruelties of the conscription business. To suffer this provocation quietly will be a severe trial for the self-command and political discretion of this turbulent race. Among the documents recently abstracted from the recruiting-office, are also instructions of the Central Government to the provincial authorities, in which the politically excited elements are pointed out to the special attention of the kidnapping patrols. The publicity of such an order, and the abstraction of the original lists, in consequence of which the levy will be left to the discretion of sergeants and privates, naturally contributes to heat the public mind beyond its usual degree of irritation; yet as a very large portion—people say a third or a

half—of the persons originally marked for the service have already absconded from the country, the hope for the preservation of order and quiet during the winter is, perhaps, as well founded as the committees would have it.

Arrests continue unabated in all parts of the country, from a desire to cause an insurrection and quell it in the bud of an entire district, say the patriots; to whom the Government papers reply, by way of refutation, that arms, money, and compromising documents, have been discovered on landed estates, and are known to be stowed away in a variety of places not yet searched by the police. In my opinion both are right. The prisoners are all placed before secret courts, and packed off to Siberia.—*Daily Telegraph, Saturday, Jan.* 3, 1863.

LIABILITY OF THE MINISTER IN CASE OF THE ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF A BRITISH VESSEL.—(*See p.* 76.)

In 1829, Russia tried to obtain from the English Government the surreptitious acknowledgment of an obstruction to neutral trade by Lord Aberdeen, who refused on the ground of his own legal liability. The only record of the transaction is in a Russian despatch. The words, as quoted below, establish the liability of the Minister in the event of the seizure of the vessel about to be sent to Circassia, and will also show the stride made by Russia between June, 1829, and October, 1831, when the "Regulation" for the Coast of Circassia was accepted by Mr. Mandeville.

"We insisted, nevertheless, upon the demand that we were charged to sustain, observing to Lord Aberdeen that a publication in the *London Gazette*, appeared to be useless, and that he would be considered as asking from us the extension which Russia did give to the blockade of the Dardanelles, and that then we would officially reply to him, that Russia confined the blockade to the Gulf of Saros and Enos, and that that declaration would contribute to give confidence to commerce in respect to the blockade of Smyrna or other ports of the Levant, and that instead of publishing this declaration in the *London Gazette*, it *would suffice to cause this reply to be circulated amongst the merchants of the capital, because then they could not use the pretext of ignorance.*

"Lord Aberdeen replied to us, *that the English tribunals would not admit of this middle term; that the law was positive, and that without the official publication in the London Gazette, the Government would be condemned to the payment of costs and interest to the injured parties* (and his statement is correct)."—Despatch from Prince Lieven and Count Matuszevich, to Count Nesselrode. London, 1st (13th) June, 1829.

SUPPLY OF COTTON AND SILK FROM CIRCASSIA.

At a recent meeting of the Circassian Committee, held at the Ship Hotel, Charing Cross, Mr. E. Beales in the chair, the resources of the countries composing the Caucasus, or bordering on it, were investigated, and a mass of the most interesting information elicited from persons who had visited these countries, as also from a Prince of Daghestan, lately arrived in this country on a similar mission to that of the Circassian Deputies. It there appears that the plains and uplands of Georgia produce a cotton which may be estimated as of the most valuable staple of that class which the East affords, and that it may be supplied in almost unlimited quantities—seeing that this region, running north-west and south-east, traverses an extreme length equal to the distance from Marseilles to Rouen, on an average width of a hundred miles; so that the surface available for the production of cotton is equal to that of North and South Carolina. The eastern portion of this territory is at present devoted to the more lucrative product—silk, which is the staple of Daghestan. It was stated that three French merchants, having penetrated into that country with a view to the exportation of silk, had disappeared under the suspicion of foul play; and that when the French Government complained to the Russian authorities, six of the peasants were arrested and hung, and the French Government informed that the murderers had been discovered and justice done. It is to be presumed that the success of the project of the Committee, undertaken on political grounds, of sending a vessel out to open the commerce and navigation of the Black Sea under the Treaty of Paris, might collaterally obtain great alleviation of the sufferings of our people, whilst opening a new and important traffic with the central portions of Asia. There was a large attendance of the Committee, comprising moving men from the City.—*Liverpool Albion, December*, 1853.


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